1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.87 2009/11/16 19:50:36 nm4 Exp $ */
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2009 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
15 /* Default callout timeout */
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
26 static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
30 /* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
31 are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
32 "accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
35 static int msgcond[] = {
36 (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* accept */
39 (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* discard */
41 (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* require */
45 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
46 follows, and the cond_expand_at_top and uschar cond_modifiers tables lower
52 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
58 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
61 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
65 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
79 ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
81 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
85 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
90 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
96 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
99 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
105 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
106 "message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", and "set" are
107 modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
108 their side effects. */
110 static uschar *conditions[] = {
114 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
120 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
123 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
127 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
141 US"log_reject_target",
143 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
147 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
152 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
155 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
156 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
159 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
166 /* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
170 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
171 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
178 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
179 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
180 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
181 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
185 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
186 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
187 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
191 CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
192 CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
193 CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
194 CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH
197 /* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
198 turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
199 control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
200 and should be tidied up. */
202 static uschar *controls[] = {
203 US"allow_auth_unadvertised",
204 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
208 US"dkim_disable_verify",
211 US"caseful_local_part",
212 US"caselower_local_part",
218 US"suppress_local_fixups",
219 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
224 US"no_multiline_responses",
230 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions/modifiers a string expansion is done
231 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
232 checking functions. */
234 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
236 TRUE, /* add_header */
237 FALSE, /* authenticated */
238 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
239 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
241 TRUE, /* condition */
244 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
247 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
251 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
255 TRUE, /* dkim_signers */
256 TRUE, /* dkim_status */
260 FALSE, /* encrypted */
263 FALSE, /* local_parts */
264 TRUE, /* log_message */
265 TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
267 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
271 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
272 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
274 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
275 FALSE, /* recipients */
276 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
279 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
282 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
285 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
287 TRUE, /* spf_guess */
292 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
294 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
296 TRUE, /* add_header */
297 FALSE, /* authenticated */
298 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
299 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
301 FALSE, /* condition */
304 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
307 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
311 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
315 FALSE, /* dkim_signers */
316 FALSE, /* dkim_status */
318 FALSE, /* dnslists */
320 FALSE, /* encrypted */
323 FALSE, /* local_parts */
324 TRUE, /* log_message */
325 TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
327 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
331 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
332 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
334 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
335 FALSE, /* recipients */
336 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
339 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
342 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
345 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
347 FALSE, /* spf_guess */
352 /* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
353 times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
354 For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
357 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
361 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* add_header */
362 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
363 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
365 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
367 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* authenticated */
368 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
369 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
371 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
372 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
373 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
374 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
375 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
376 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
377 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
378 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
379 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
386 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
387 always and check in the control processing itself. */
391 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
393 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* dcc */
396 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
398 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
401 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT), /* delay */
403 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
405 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
410 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_DKIM), /* dkim_signers */
413 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_DKIM), /* dkim_status */
416 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dnslists */
417 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
420 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
422 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* encrypted */
423 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|
424 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
429 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* hosts */
430 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
433 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
437 0, /* log_reject_target */
441 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
443 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
448 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
450 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
456 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
458 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
460 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
461 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
464 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
466 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
467 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
468 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
470 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
472 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
473 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
474 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
478 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
480 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
483 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
486 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
488 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
489 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
490 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
492 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf_guess */
494 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
495 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
496 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
497 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
498 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
501 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
502 always and check in the verify function itself */
508 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
509 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
510 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
512 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
514 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)), /* allow_auth_unadvertised */
516 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
521 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dkim_disable_verify */
522 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
528 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
531 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
533 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* enforce_sync */
534 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
536 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_enforce_sync */
537 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
540 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
541 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
542 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
545 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
546 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
547 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
550 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
551 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
554 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
555 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
556 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
558 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
560 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
561 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
562 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
566 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
567 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
568 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
571 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
572 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
573 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
575 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_multiline */
576 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
578 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_pipelining */
579 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
581 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_delay_flush */
582 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
584 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_callout_flush */
585 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
588 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
590 typedef struct control_def {
592 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
593 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
596 static control_def controls_list[] = {
597 { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED, FALSE },
598 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
599 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
602 { US"dkim_disable_verify", CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY, FALSE },
604 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
605 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
606 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
607 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
608 { US"no_callout_flush", CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH, FALSE },
609 { US"no_delay_flush", CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH, FALSE },
610 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
611 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
612 { US"no_pipelining", CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING, FALSE },
613 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
614 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
615 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
617 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
618 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
619 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
620 { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
623 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
624 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
625 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
626 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
628 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
630 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
631 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
633 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
634 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
635 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
636 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
637 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
638 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
639 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
641 static int csa_return_code[] = {
643 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
646 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
647 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
648 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
651 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
654 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
655 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
656 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
657 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
658 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
659 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
662 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
664 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
668 /*************************************************
669 * Pick out name from list *
670 *************************************************/
672 /* Use a binary chop method
679 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
683 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
689 int mid = (start + end)/2;
690 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
691 if (c == 0) return mid;
692 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
699 /*************************************************
700 * Read and parse one ACL *
701 *************************************************/
703 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
704 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
705 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
706 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
707 blank lines (where relevant).
710 func function to get next line of ACL
711 error where to put an error message
713 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
714 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
718 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
720 acl_block *yield = NULL;
721 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
722 acl_block *this = NULL;
723 acl_condition_block *cond;
724 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
729 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
732 BOOL negated = FALSE;
733 uschar *saveline = s;
736 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
739 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
746 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
747 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
749 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
750 if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
752 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
753 continues the previous verb. */
755 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
760 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
772 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
775 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
777 lastp = &(this->next);
780 this->condition = NULL;
781 condp = &(this->condition);
782 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
788 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
791 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
793 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
796 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
801 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
803 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
805 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
806 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
810 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
812 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
813 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
814 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
816 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
817 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
821 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
824 cond->u.negated = negated;
827 condp = &(cond->next);
829 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
830 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
831 gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
832 variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
833 extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
834 arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
835 After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
836 after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
843 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 &&
844 Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
846 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
847 "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
852 if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
854 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
855 "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
860 while (*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
862 if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
864 *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
865 "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
871 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
873 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
876 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
877 "endpass" has no data */
879 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
883 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
884 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
887 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
888 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
897 /*************************************************
898 * Set up added header line(s) *
899 *************************************************/
901 /* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
902 to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
903 "warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
904 added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
906 Argument: string of header lines
911 setup_header(uschar *hstring)
914 int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
916 /* An empty string does nothing; otherwise add a final newline if necessary. */
918 if (hlen <= 0) return;
919 if (hstring[hlen-1] != '\n') hstring = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
921 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
923 for (p = q = hstring; *p != 0; )
926 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
927 header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
929 /* Find next header line within the string */
933 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
934 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
937 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
938 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
942 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
944 newtype = htype_add_rec;
947 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
949 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
952 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
954 newtype = htype_add_top;
957 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
959 newtype = htype_add_bot;
962 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
965 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
966 to the front of it. */
968 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
970 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
973 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
976 /* See if this line has already been added */
978 while (*hptr != NULL)
980 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
981 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
984 /* Add if not previously present */
988 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
997 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
1006 /*************************************************
1008 *************************************************/
1010 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
1011 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
1012 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
1014 ** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
1015 its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
1018 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
1019 user_message message for adding to headers
1020 log_message message for logging, if different
1026 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
1028 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
1031 string_item *logged;
1033 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
1034 string_printing(log_message));
1036 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1037 failed", add the failure message. */
1039 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
1040 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
1041 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
1042 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
1044 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1045 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
1047 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
1048 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
1052 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
1053 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
1054 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
1055 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
1056 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
1057 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
1058 acl_warn_logged = logged;
1062 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1064 if (user_message == NULL) return;
1066 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1069 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1071 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1072 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1073 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
1077 /* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1078 function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
1080 setup_header(user_message);
1085 /*************************************************
1086 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
1087 *************************************************/
1089 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1090 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1091 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1092 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1095 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1096 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1098 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1099 FAIL verification failed
1100 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1104 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
1108 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
1110 /* Previous success */
1112 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1114 /* Previous failure */
1116 if (host_lookup_failed)
1118 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1122 /* Need to do a lookup */
1125 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1127 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1129 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
1130 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1132 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1134 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1137 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1143 /*************************************************
1144 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1145 *************************************************/
1147 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1148 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1149 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1150 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1151 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1152 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1153 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1154 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1157 dnsa the DNS answer block
1158 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1159 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1160 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1162 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1163 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1164 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1168 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1174 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1176 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1178 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1180 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1184 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1191 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1193 target_found = TRUE;
1195 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1196 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1198 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1200 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1202 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1204 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1208 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1209 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1212 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1213 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1218 /*************************************************
1219 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1220 *************************************************/
1222 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1223 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1224 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1225 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1226 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1227 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1228 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1231 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1233 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1234 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1235 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1236 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1240 acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1244 int priority, weight, port;
1251 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1252 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1253 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1255 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1256 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1257 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1258 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1260 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1261 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1262 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1264 if (domain[0] == '[')
1266 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1267 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1268 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1271 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1272 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1273 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1274 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1275 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1277 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1279 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1280 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1284 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1285 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1286 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1287 we return from this function. */
1289 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1290 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1292 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1293 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1294 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1296 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1299 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1301 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1304 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1306 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1310 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1312 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1318 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1320 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1322 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1324 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1326 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1329 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1330 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1334 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1336 /* Check the CSA version number */
1338 if (priority != 1) continue;
1340 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1341 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1342 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1343 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1344 SRV records of their own. */
1346 if (found != domain)
1349 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1351 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1354 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1355 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1356 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1357 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1358 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1360 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1362 if (weight > 2) continue;
1364 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1365 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1366 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1368 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1369 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1371 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1376 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1378 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1380 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1381 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1382 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1383 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1384 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1386 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1388 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1389 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1390 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1391 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1393 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1394 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1396 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1399 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1402 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1406 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1410 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1412 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1415 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1417 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1420 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1421 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1422 /* else fall through */
1424 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1425 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1426 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1431 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1432 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1435 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1441 /*************************************************
1442 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1443 *************************************************/
1445 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1446 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1447 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1448 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1451 where where called from
1452 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1453 arg the argument of "verify"
1454 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1455 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1456 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1458 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1459 FAIL verification failed
1460 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1465 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1466 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1470 int callout_overall = -1;
1471 int callout_connect = -1;
1472 int verify_options = 0;
1474 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1475 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1476 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1477 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1478 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1479 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1480 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1481 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1482 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1484 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1485 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1486 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1489 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1491 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1493 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1495 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1497 if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1499 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1500 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1501 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1504 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1505 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1506 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1508 if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1510 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1511 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1512 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1516 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1517 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1519 if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1521 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1522 if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1523 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1526 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1527 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1529 if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1531 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1532 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1533 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1534 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1535 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1536 return csa_return_code[rc];
1539 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1540 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1541 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1544 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
1546 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1547 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1548 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1549 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1550 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1554 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1555 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1557 if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
1559 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1560 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1561 rc = verify_check_notblind();
1564 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1565 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1566 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1571 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1572 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1573 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1576 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1577 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1578 sender and recipient. */
1580 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1582 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1583 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1586 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1587 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1588 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1590 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1593 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1595 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1596 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1597 acl_wherenames[where]);
1601 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1604 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1605 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1606 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1607 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1612 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1615 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1616 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1621 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1622 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1624 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1627 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1628 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1629 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1631 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1633 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1635 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1636 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1639 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1642 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1645 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1647 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1649 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1653 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1659 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1661 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1662 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1663 kind of table-driven thing. */
1665 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1668 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1669 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1670 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1671 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1672 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1673 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1674 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1675 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1676 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1677 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
1678 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1681 verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
1684 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1686 if (!verify_header_sender)
1688 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1689 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1690 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1694 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1697 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1698 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1701 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1702 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1705 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1708 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1711 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1712 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1715 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1716 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1719 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1722 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1725 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1726 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1729 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1730 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1731 if (callout_overall < 0)
1733 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1734 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1738 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1741 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1744 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1745 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1748 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1749 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1750 if (callout_connect < 0)
1752 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1753 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1757 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1759 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1762 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1763 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1771 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1772 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1778 /* Option not recognized */
1782 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1783 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1788 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1789 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1791 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1792 "for a recipient callout";
1796 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1797 message if giving out verification details. */
1799 if (verify_header_sender)
1802 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1803 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1807 *basic_errno = verrno;
1808 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1810 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1811 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1812 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1817 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1818 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1819 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1820 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1821 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1822 during message reception.
1824 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1825 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1826 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1827 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1828 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1829 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1830 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1832 else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1834 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1837 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1838 "sender verify callout";
1842 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1843 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1844 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1846 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1847 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1848 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1849 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1851 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1853 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1854 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1856 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1859 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1860 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1861 specified (see comments above).
1863 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1864 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1865 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1866 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1867 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1872 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1874 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1875 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1876 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1878 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1879 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1880 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1882 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1883 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1885 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1887 if (success_on_redirect)
1888 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1890 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1893 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1894 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1896 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1900 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1902 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1903 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1907 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1908 verify_sender_address);
1911 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1913 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1915 /* Cache the result code */
1917 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1918 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1919 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1920 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1921 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
1923 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1924 the sender verification. */
1926 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
1929 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1931 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
1934 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1935 the DEFER overrides. */
1941 if (success_on_redirect)
1942 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1944 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1948 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
1949 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
1950 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1952 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1953 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
1954 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
1955 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
1957 /* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
1958 if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1960 /* Make $address_data visible */
1961 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1964 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1966 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1967 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1969 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1970 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1974 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1975 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1977 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1981 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1983 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1985 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1989 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1990 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
1994 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
1997 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1998 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
2002 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
2003 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
2007 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
2010 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
2011 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
2012 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
2013 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
2016 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
2019 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
2020 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
2023 /* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
2026 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
2027 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
2034 /*************************************************
2035 * Check argument for control= modifier *
2036 *************************************************/
2038 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
2041 arg the argument string for control=
2042 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2043 where which ACL we are in
2044 log_msgptr for error messages
2046 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2050 decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2055 for (d = controls_list;
2056 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
2059 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
2060 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
2063 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
2064 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
2066 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2067 return CONTROL_ERROR;
2076 /*************************************************
2077 * Handle rate limiting *
2078 *************************************************/
2080 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2081 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2083 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2084 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2085 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2086 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2089 arg the option string for ratelimit=
2090 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2091 log_msgptr for error messages
2093 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2094 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2095 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2096 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2100 acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2102 double limit, period;
2106 BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, noupdate = FALSE;
2107 BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
2109 tree_node **anchor, *t;
2110 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
2111 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
2114 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2115 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2116 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2118 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
2119 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2120 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2122 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2123 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
2127 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2128 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2129 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2130 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2132 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
2134 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2135 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
2140 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
2141 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2142 run-time division errors. */
2144 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2145 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
2146 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2149 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2150 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
2151 sender_rate_period);
2155 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
2156 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
2158 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2161 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2162 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2163 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
2164 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
2165 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
2166 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
2167 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
2168 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
2169 else key = string_sprintf("%s", ss);
2172 if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
2174 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
2178 /* Default option values */
2180 if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
2181 if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
2183 /* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
2184 If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
2185 omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
2186 are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */
2189 key = (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address;
2191 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s/%s",
2193 per_byte? US"per_byte" :
2194 per_cmd? US"per_cmd" :
2195 per_mail? US"per_mail" : US"per_conn",
2196 strict? US"strict" : US"leaky",
2199 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2200 limit, period, key);
2202 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
2203 For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
2204 pool so that they survive across resets. */
2207 old_pool = store_pool;
2211 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2212 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2214 else if (per_mail || per_byte)
2215 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2217 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2219 if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2222 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2223 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
2224 store_pool = old_pool;
2225 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2227 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2231 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2232 rate from the database, update it, and write it back when required. If there's
2233 no previous rate for this key, create one. */
2235 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2238 store_pool = old_pool;
2240 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2241 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2244 dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2246 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2250 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2251 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2252 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2253 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2258 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2259 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2260 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2261 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2263 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2264 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2265 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2266 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2267 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2269 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2270 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2271 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2273 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2274 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2275 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2276 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2278 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2280 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2281 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2282 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2283 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2284 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2285 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2287 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2289 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2290 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2291 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2292 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2294 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2295 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2296 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2297 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2298 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2300 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2301 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2302 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2303 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2305 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2306 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2307 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2309 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2310 : this_time - prev_time;
2312 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2313 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2315 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2316 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2318 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2319 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2320 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2321 decay as if nothing happened. */
2324 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2325 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2326 else if (per_cmd && where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2327 dbd->rate = (double)recipients_count
2328 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2330 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2333 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2334 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2335 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2336 be completely blocked). */
2338 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
2340 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2341 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2342 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2343 rate preventing them from getting any email through. If noupdate is set,
2344 do not do any updates. */
2346 if ((rc == FAIL || !leaky) && !noupdate)
2348 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2349 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db updated\n");
2353 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
2354 noupdate? "noupdate set" : "over the limit, but leaky");
2359 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2361 if (anchor != NULL && !noupdate)
2363 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2365 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2366 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2369 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2370 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2372 store_pool = old_pool;
2373 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2376 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2383 /*************************************************
2384 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2385 *************************************************/
2387 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2391 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2392 where where called from
2393 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2394 level the nesting level
2395 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2396 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2397 user_msgptr user message pointer
2398 log_msgptr log message pointer
2399 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2401 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2402 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2403 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2404 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2405 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2406 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2407 but can be temporary callout problem)
2408 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2413 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2414 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2415 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2417 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2418 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2421 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2425 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2430 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2431 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2433 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2435 user_message = cb->arg;
2439 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2441 log_message = cb->arg;
2445 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2446 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2448 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2454 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2455 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2456 checking functions in some cases. */
2458 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2460 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2463 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2464 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2465 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2466 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2471 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2476 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2477 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2478 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2480 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2482 debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
2483 lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
2486 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2489 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2493 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2495 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2497 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2498 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2499 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2503 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2504 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2508 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
2512 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2516 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2517 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2519 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2520 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2526 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2527 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2528 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2532 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2533 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2535 int old_pool = store_pool;
2536 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2537 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2538 store_pool = old_pool;
2543 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2544 /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
2545 expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
2546 different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
2547 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2548 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2550 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2551 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2552 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2553 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2555 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2558 case ACLC_CONTINUE: /* Always succeeds */
2562 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2564 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2566 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2568 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2569 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2573 switch(control_type)
2575 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
2576 allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
2579 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2580 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2585 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2586 case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
2587 dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
2594 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2595 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2598 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2599 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2602 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2603 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2606 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2607 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2610 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2611 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2612 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2616 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2617 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2620 case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
2621 pipelining_enable = FALSE;
2624 case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
2625 disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
2628 case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
2629 disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
2632 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
2633 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
2634 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
2638 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2639 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
2644 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2645 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2649 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2650 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2651 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2652 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
2653 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
2660 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2665 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2666 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2669 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
2670 originator_name = US"";
2671 submission_mode = TRUE;
2674 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2677 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
2678 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2680 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2683 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2684 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2687 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
2689 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2692 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2693 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2694 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
2701 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2706 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
2707 suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
2712 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
2715 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2716 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2717 /* Run the dcc backend. */
2718 rc = dcc_process(&ss);
2719 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2720 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2722 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2724 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2732 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2734 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2740 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2743 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2744 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2749 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2754 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2757 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2758 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2759 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2760 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2761 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2762 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2763 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2764 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2765 it is not always available.
2767 NOTE 1: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2768 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2769 Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
2770 smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
2772 NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
2773 apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
2778 if (smtp_out != NULL && !disable_delay_flush) mac_smtp_fflush();
2779 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
2785 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2791 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2792 case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
2793 if (dkim_cur_signer != NULL)
2794 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
2795 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
2800 case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
2801 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_exim_expand_query(DKIM_VERIFY_STATUS),
2802 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
2807 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2811 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2812 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2815 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2816 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2817 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2818 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2819 writing is poorly documented. */
2821 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2822 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2824 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2825 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2826 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2828 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2829 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2831 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2832 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2836 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2837 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2838 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2839 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2840 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2841 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2844 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2845 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2846 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2849 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2850 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2851 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2852 &deliver_localpart_data);
2855 case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
2861 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2864 if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
2865 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
2866 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT;
2869 logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
2870 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name \"%s\" in "
2871 "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]);
2874 log_reject_target = logbits;
2887 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2888 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2889 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2890 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2891 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2892 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2895 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2896 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2897 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2903 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2906 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2907 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2911 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2914 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2915 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2916 /* Run the malware backend. */
2918 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2919 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2921 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2923 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2930 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2931 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2935 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2936 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
2939 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2940 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2944 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2950 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2953 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2954 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2955 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2956 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2961 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
2962 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
2965 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2969 int old_pool = store_pool;
2970 if (cb->u.varname[0] == 'c') store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2971 acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
2972 store_pool = old_pool;
2976 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2979 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2980 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2981 /* Run the spam backend. */
2983 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2984 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2986 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2988 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2996 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2998 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL);
3000 case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
3001 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
3005 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
3006 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
3007 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
3008 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
3009 (until something changes it). */
3012 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
3013 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
3014 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
3018 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
3019 "condition %d", cb->type);
3023 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
3025 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
3027 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
3028 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
3031 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
3035 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
3036 handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make
3037 it the same as the user message.
3039 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
3040 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
3042 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
3043 message that is already set.
3045 Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but
3046 for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and
3047 when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no
3048 "endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is
3051 if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;
3053 if (((1<<rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
3056 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3057 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
3059 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
3060 nested ACLs) are always discarded. This also happens for acceptance verbs
3061 when they actually do accept. Only messages specified at this level are used.
3062 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
3063 during expansions. */
3065 if (verb == ACL_WARN ||
3066 (rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
3067 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3069 if (user_message != NULL)
3071 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
3072 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
3073 if (expmessage == NULL)
3075 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3076 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3077 user_message, expand_string_message);
3079 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
3082 if (log_message != NULL)
3084 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
3085 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
3086 if (expmessage == NULL)
3088 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3089 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3090 log_message, expand_string_message);
3092 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
3094 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
3095 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
3099 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
3101 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3104 acl_verify_message = NULL;
3112 /*************************************************
3113 * Get line from a literal ACL *
3114 *************************************************/
3116 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
3117 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
3118 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
3120 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
3121 Exim configuration file. That is:
3123 . Leading spaces are ignored.
3125 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
3126 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
3127 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
3129 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
3130 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
3132 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
3135 Returns: a pointer to the next line
3139 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
3140 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3148 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3152 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3153 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
3154 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
3156 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3158 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3159 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3161 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
3163 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3164 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3166 if (*yield != '#') break;
3169 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3170 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3171 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3172 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3177 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3179 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3188 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3189 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3194 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
3195 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
3196 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
3199 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3200 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3201 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3203 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
3204 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
3206 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3207 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
3210 /* Control does not reach here */
3217 /*************************************************
3218 * Check access using an ACL *
3219 *************************************************/
3221 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3222 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3223 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3224 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3225 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3226 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3227 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3228 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3229 appears immediately above.
3232 where where called from
3233 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3234 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3235 level the nesting level
3236 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3237 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3239 Returns: OK access is granted
3240 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3241 FAIL access is denied
3242 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3243 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3248 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3249 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3252 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3253 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3256 /* Catch configuration loops */
3260 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3266 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3270 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3271 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3275 ss = expand_string(s);
3278 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3279 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3280 expand_string_message);
3286 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3288 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3289 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3293 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3294 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3295 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3296 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3297 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3299 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3301 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3304 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3307 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3310 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3311 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3314 else if (*ss == '/')
3316 struct stat statbuf;
3317 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3320 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3325 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3327 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3332 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3333 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3335 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3337 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3338 ss, strerror(errno));
3341 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3344 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3345 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3349 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3350 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3351 persists between multiple messages. */
3355 int old_pool = store_pool;
3356 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3357 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3358 store_pool = old_pool;
3359 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3362 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3363 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3365 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3369 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3374 int basic_errno = 0;
3375 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3377 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3378 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3380 if ((where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT) &&
3381 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3382 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3384 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT or not-QUIT ACL",
3389 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3391 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3394 search_error_message = NULL;
3395 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3396 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3398 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3399 ERROR always causes a return. */
3404 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3405 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3407 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3408 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3409 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3413 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3415 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3418 default: /* Paranoia */
3420 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3424 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3429 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3432 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3433 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3436 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3441 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3446 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3447 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3448 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3453 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
3456 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3464 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3470 if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
3474 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
3477 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3483 if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
3487 if (cond != OK) return cond;
3492 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
3493 else if (cond == DEFER && (log_extra_selector & LX_acl_warn_skipped) != 0)
3494 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3495 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
3496 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
3497 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
3498 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3502 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3507 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3512 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3514 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
3519 /*************************************************
3520 * Check access using an ACL *
3521 *************************************************/
3523 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3524 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3525 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3528 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3529 recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
3530 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3531 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3532 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3534 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3535 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3536 FAIL access is denied
3537 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3538 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3543 acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
3544 uschar **log_msgptr)
3548 address_item *addr = NULL;
3550 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
3551 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
3552 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
3553 log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
3555 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
3557 adb = address_defaults;
3559 addr->address = recipient;
3560 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
3562 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3565 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
3566 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
3569 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3571 deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
3572 sender_address_data = NULL;
3574 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3575 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3579 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
3581 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3582 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3588 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3590 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
3592 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3593 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3597 /* Before giving a response, take a look at the length of any user message, and
3598 split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3600 *user_msgptr = string_split_message(*user_msgptr);
3601 if (fake_response != OK)
3602 fake_response_text = string_split_message(fake_response_text);
3609 /*************************************************
3610 * Create ACL variable *
3611 *************************************************/
3613 /* Create an ACL variable or reuse an existing one. ACL variables are in a
3614 binary tree (see tree.c) with acl_var_c and acl_var_m as root nodes.
3617 name pointer to the variable's name, starting with c or m
3619 Returns the pointer to variable's tree node
3623 acl_var_create(uschar *name)
3625 tree_node *node, **root;
3626 root = (name[0] == 'c')? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
3627 node = tree_search(*root, name);
3630 node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name));
3631 Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
3632 (void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
3634 node->data.ptr = NULL;
3640 /*************************************************
3641 * Write an ACL variable in spool format *
3642 *************************************************/
3644 /* This function is used as a callback for tree_walk when writing variables to
3645 the spool file. To retain spool file compatibility, what is written is -aclc or
3646 -aclm followed by the rest of the name and the data length, space separated,
3647 then the value itself, starting on a new line, and terminated by an additional
3648 newline. When we had only numbered ACL variables, the first line might look
3649 like this: "-aclc 5 20". Now it might be "-aclc foo 20" for the variable called
3653 name of the variable
3654 value of the variable
3655 ctx FILE pointer (as a void pointer)
3661 acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx)
3663 FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx;
3664 fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);