1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.62 2006/06/28 16:00:23 ph10 Exp $ */
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2006 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
15 /* Default callout timeout */
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
26 static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
30 /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
32 static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK };
34 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
35 follows, and the cond_expand_at_top and uschar cond_modifiers tables lower
41 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
46 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
50 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
53 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
54 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
56 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
57 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
69 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
73 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
78 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
84 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
87 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
92 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
93 "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
94 but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
96 static uschar *conditions[] = {
100 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
105 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
109 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
112 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
113 US"dk_domain_source",
115 US"dk_sender_domains",
116 US"dk_sender_local_parts",
120 US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted",
121 US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite",
122 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
126 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
131 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
134 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
135 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
138 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
144 /* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
148 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
149 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
152 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
156 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
157 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
158 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
159 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
163 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
164 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
165 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
172 /* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
173 turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
174 control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
175 and should be tidied up. */
177 static uschar *controls[] = {
178 US"allow_auth_unadvertised",
179 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
182 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
186 US"caseful_local_part",
187 US"caselower_local_part",
193 US"suppress_local_fixups",
194 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
200 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
201 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
202 checking functions. */
204 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
206 TRUE, /* add_header */
207 FALSE, /* authenticated */
208 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
209 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
211 TRUE, /* condition */
213 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
217 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
220 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
221 TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
222 TRUE, /* dk_policy */
223 TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
224 TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
225 TRUE, /* dk_senders */
226 TRUE, /* dk_status */
230 FALSE, /* encrypted */
233 FALSE, /* local_parts */
234 TRUE, /* log_message */
236 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
240 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
241 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
243 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
244 FALSE, /* recipients */
245 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
248 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
251 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
254 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
260 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
262 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
264 TRUE, /* add_header */
265 FALSE, /* authenticated */
266 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
267 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
269 FALSE, /* condition */
271 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
275 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
278 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
279 FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
280 FALSE, /* dk_policy */
281 FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
282 FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
283 FALSE, /* dk_senders */
284 FALSE, /* dk_status */
286 FALSE, /* dnslists */
288 FALSE, /* encrypted */
291 FALSE, /* local_parts */
292 TRUE, /* log_message */
294 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
298 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
299 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
301 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
302 FALSE, /* recipients */
303 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
306 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
309 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
312 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
318 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
319 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
320 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
322 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
326 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* add_header */
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
328 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
329 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* authenticated */
332 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
333 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
335 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
336 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
337 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
338 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
340 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
341 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
342 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
343 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
348 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
349 always and check in the control processing itself. */
353 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
355 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
360 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
362 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
365 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
366 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
367 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
368 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
369 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
370 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
371 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
372 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
374 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
375 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
376 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
377 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
378 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
379 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
380 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
382 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
383 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
384 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
386 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
387 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
388 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
390 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
391 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
392 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
393 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
394 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
395 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
396 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
398 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
399 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
400 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
401 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
402 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
404 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
406 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
407 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
408 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
409 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
410 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
411 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
412 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
415 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dnslists */
416 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
419 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
421 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* encrypted */
422 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|
423 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
428 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* hosts */
429 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
432 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
438 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
440 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
445 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
447 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
453 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
455 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
457 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
458 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
461 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
463 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
464 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
465 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
467 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
469 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
470 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
471 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
475 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
477 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
480 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
481 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
483 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
485 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
486 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
490 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
491 always and check in the verify function itself */
497 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
498 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
499 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
501 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
503 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)), /* allow_auth_unadvertised */
505 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
509 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
510 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dk_verify */
511 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
517 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
520 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
522 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* enforce_sync */
523 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
525 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_enforce_sync */
526 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
529 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
530 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
531 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
534 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
535 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
536 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
539 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
540 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
543 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
544 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
545 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
547 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
549 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
550 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
551 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
555 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
556 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
557 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
560 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
561 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
562 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
564 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_multiline */
565 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
568 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
570 typedef struct control_def {
572 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
573 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
576 static control_def controls_list[] = {
577 { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED, FALSE },
578 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
579 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
581 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
582 { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE },
584 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
585 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
586 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
587 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
588 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
589 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
590 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
591 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
592 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
594 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
595 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
596 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
597 { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
600 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
601 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
602 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
603 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
605 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
607 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
608 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
610 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
611 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
612 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
613 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
614 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
615 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
616 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
618 static int csa_return_code[] = {
620 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
623 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
624 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
625 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
628 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
631 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
632 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
633 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
634 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
635 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
636 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
639 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
641 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
645 /*************************************************
646 * Pick out name from list *
647 *************************************************/
649 /* Use a binary chop method
656 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
660 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
666 int mid = (start + end)/2;
667 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
668 if (c == 0) return mid;
669 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
676 /*************************************************
677 * Read and parse one ACL *
678 *************************************************/
680 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
681 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
682 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
683 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
684 blank lines (where relevant).
687 func function to get next line of ACL
688 error where to put an error message
690 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
691 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
695 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
697 acl_block *yield = NULL;
698 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
699 acl_block *this = NULL;
700 acl_condition_block *cond;
701 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
706 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
709 BOOL negated = FALSE;
710 uschar *saveline = s;
713 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
716 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
723 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
724 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
726 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
727 if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
729 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
730 continues the previous verb. */
732 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
737 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
749 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
752 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
754 lastp = &(this->next);
757 this->condition = NULL;
758 condp = &(this->condition);
759 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
765 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
768 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
770 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
773 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
778 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
780 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
782 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
783 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
787 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
789 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
790 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
791 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
793 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
794 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
798 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
801 cond->u.negated = negated;
804 condp = &(cond->next);
806 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
807 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
808 gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
815 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0) goto BAD_ACL_VAR;
821 else if (s[4] == 'm')
826 else goto BAD_ACL_VAR;
828 n = Ustrtoul(s + 5, &endptr, 10);
829 if ((*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr)) || n >= max)
832 *error = string_sprintf("syntax error or unrecognized name after "
833 "\"set\" in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", s);
837 cond->u.varnumber = n + offset;
839 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
842 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
843 "endpass" has no data */
845 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
849 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
850 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
853 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
854 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
863 /*************************************************
864 * Set up added header line(s) *
865 *************************************************/
867 /* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
868 to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
869 "warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
870 added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
872 Argument: string of header lines
877 setup_header(uschar *hstring)
880 int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
882 /* An empty string does nothing; otherwise add a final newline if necessary. */
884 if (hlen <= 0) return;
885 if (hstring[hlen-1] != '\n') hstring = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
887 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
889 for (p = q = hstring; *p != 0; )
892 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
893 header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
895 /* Find next header line within the string */
899 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
900 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
903 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
904 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
908 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
910 newtype = htype_add_rec;
913 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
915 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
918 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
920 newtype = htype_add_top;
923 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
925 newtype = htype_add_bot;
928 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
931 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
932 to the front of it. */
934 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
936 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
939 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
942 /* See if this line has already been added */
944 while (*hptr != NULL)
946 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
947 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
950 /* Add if not previously present */
954 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
963 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
972 /*************************************************
974 *************************************************/
976 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
977 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
978 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
980 ** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
981 its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
984 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
985 user_message message for adding to headers
986 log_message message for logging, if different
992 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
994 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
999 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
1000 string_printing(log_message));
1002 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1003 failed", add the failure message. */
1005 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
1006 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
1007 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
1008 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
1010 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1011 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
1013 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
1014 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
1018 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
1019 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
1020 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
1021 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
1022 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
1023 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
1024 acl_warn_logged = logged;
1028 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1030 if (user_message == NULL) return;
1032 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1035 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1037 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1038 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1039 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
1043 /* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1044 function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
1046 setup_header(user_message);
1051 /*************************************************
1052 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
1053 *************************************************/
1055 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1056 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1057 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1058 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1061 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1062 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1064 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1065 FAIL verification failed
1066 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1070 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
1074 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
1076 /* Previous success */
1078 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1080 /* Previous failure */
1082 if (host_lookup_failed)
1084 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1088 /* Need to do a lookup */
1091 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1093 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1095 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
1096 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1098 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1100 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1103 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1109 /*************************************************
1110 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1111 *************************************************/
1113 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1114 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1115 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1116 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1117 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1118 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1119 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1120 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1123 dnsa the DNS answer block
1124 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1125 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1126 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1128 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1129 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1130 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1134 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1140 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1142 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1144 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1146 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1150 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1157 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1159 target_found = TRUE;
1161 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1162 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1164 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1166 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1168 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1170 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1174 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1175 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1178 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1179 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1184 /*************************************************
1185 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1186 *************************************************/
1188 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1189 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1190 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1191 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1192 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1193 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1194 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1197 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1199 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1200 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1201 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1202 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1206 acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1210 int priority, weight, port;
1217 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1218 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1219 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1221 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1222 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1223 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1224 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1226 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1227 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1228 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1230 if (domain[0] == '[')
1232 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1233 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1234 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1237 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1238 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1239 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1240 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1241 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1243 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1245 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1246 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1250 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1251 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1252 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1253 we return from this function. */
1255 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1256 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1258 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1259 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1260 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1262 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1265 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1267 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1270 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1272 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1276 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1278 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1284 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1286 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1288 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1290 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1292 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1295 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1296 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1300 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1302 /* Check the CSA version number */
1304 if (priority != 1) continue;
1306 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1307 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1308 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1309 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1310 SRV records of their own. */
1312 if (found != domain)
1315 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1317 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1320 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1321 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1322 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1323 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1324 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1326 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1328 if (weight > 2) continue;
1330 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1331 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1332 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1334 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1335 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1337 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1342 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1344 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1346 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1347 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1348 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1349 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1350 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1352 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1354 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1355 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1356 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1357 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1359 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1360 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1362 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1365 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1368 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1372 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1376 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1378 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1381 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1383 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1386 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1387 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1388 /* else fall through */
1390 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1391 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1392 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1397 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1398 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1401 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1407 /*************************************************
1408 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1409 *************************************************/
1411 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1412 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1413 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1414 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1417 where where called from
1418 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1419 arg the argument of "verify"
1420 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1421 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1422 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1424 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1425 FAIL verification failed
1426 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1431 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1432 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1436 int callout_overall = -1;
1437 int callout_connect = -1;
1438 int verify_options = 0;
1440 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1441 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1442 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1443 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1444 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1445 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1446 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1447 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1448 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1450 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1451 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1452 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1455 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1457 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1459 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1461 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1463 if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1465 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1466 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1467 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1470 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1471 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1472 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1474 if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1476 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1477 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1478 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1482 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1483 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1485 if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1487 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1488 if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1489 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1492 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1493 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1495 if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1497 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1498 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1499 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1500 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1501 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1502 return csa_return_code[rc];
1505 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1506 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1507 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1510 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
1512 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1513 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1514 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1515 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1516 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1520 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1521 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1523 if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
1525 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1526 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1527 rc = verify_check_notblind();
1530 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1531 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1532 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1537 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1538 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1539 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1542 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1543 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1544 sender and recipient. */
1546 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1548 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1549 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1552 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1553 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1554 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1556 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1559 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1561 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1562 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1563 acl_wherenames[where]);
1567 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1570 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1571 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1572 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1573 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1578 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1581 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1582 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1587 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1588 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1590 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1593 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1594 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1595 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1597 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1599 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1601 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1602 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1605 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1608 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1611 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1613 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1615 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1619 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1625 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1627 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1628 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1629 kind of table-driven thing. */
1631 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1634 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1635 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1636 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1637 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1638 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1639 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1640 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1641 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1642 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1643 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
1644 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1647 verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
1650 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1652 if (!verify_header_sender)
1654 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1655 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1656 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1660 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1663 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1664 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1667 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1668 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1671 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1674 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1677 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1678 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1681 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1682 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1685 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1688 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1691 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1692 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1695 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1696 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1697 if (callout_overall < 0)
1699 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1700 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1704 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1707 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1710 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1711 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1714 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1715 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1716 if (callout_connect < 0)
1718 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1719 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1723 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1725 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1728 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1729 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1737 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1738 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1744 /* Option not recognized */
1748 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1749 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1754 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1755 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1757 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1758 "for a recipient callout";
1762 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1763 message if giving out verification details. */
1765 if (verify_header_sender)
1768 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1769 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1773 *basic_errno = verrno;
1774 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1776 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1777 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1778 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1783 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1784 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1785 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1786 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1787 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1788 during message reception.
1790 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1791 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1792 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1793 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1794 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1795 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1796 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1798 else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1800 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1803 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1804 "sender verify callout";
1808 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1809 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1810 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1812 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1813 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1814 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1815 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1817 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1819 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1820 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1822 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1825 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1826 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1827 specified (see comments above).
1829 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1830 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1831 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1832 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1833 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1838 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1840 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1841 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1842 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1844 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1845 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1846 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1848 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1849 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1851 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1853 if (success_on_redirect)
1854 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1856 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1859 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1860 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1862 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1866 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1868 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1869 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1873 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1874 verify_sender_address);
1877 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1879 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1881 /* Cache the result code */
1883 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1884 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1885 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1886 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1887 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
1889 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1890 the sender verification. */
1892 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
1895 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1897 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
1900 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1901 the DEFER overrides. */
1907 if (success_on_redirect)
1908 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1910 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1914 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
1915 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
1916 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1918 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
1919 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
1920 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
1921 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1923 /* Make $address_data visible */
1924 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1927 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1929 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1930 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1932 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1933 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1937 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1938 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1940 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1944 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1946 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1948 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1952 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1953 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
1957 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
1960 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1961 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1965 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
1966 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
1970 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1973 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
1974 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1975 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
1976 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1979 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1982 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1983 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1986 /* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
1989 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1990 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1997 /*************************************************
1998 * Check argument for control= modifier *
1999 *************************************************/
2001 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
2004 arg the argument string for control=
2005 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2006 where which ACL we are in
2007 log_msgptr for error messages
2009 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2013 decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2018 for (d = controls_list;
2019 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
2022 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
2023 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
2026 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
2027 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
2029 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2030 return CONTROL_ERROR;
2039 /*************************************************
2040 * Handle rate limiting *
2041 *************************************************/
2043 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2044 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2046 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2047 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2048 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2049 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2052 arg the option string for ratelimit=
2053 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2054 log_msgptr for error messages
2056 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2057 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2058 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2059 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2063 acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2065 double limit, period;
2068 BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
2069 BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
2071 tree_node **anchor, *t;
2072 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
2073 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
2076 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2077 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2078 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2080 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
2081 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2082 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2084 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2085 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
2089 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2090 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2091 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2092 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2094 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
2096 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2097 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
2102 /* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
2103 lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
2104 if the period or options are different. */
2108 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
2109 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2110 run-time division errors. */
2112 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2113 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
2114 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2117 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2118 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
2119 sender_rate_period);
2123 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
2124 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
2126 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2129 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2130 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2131 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
2132 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
2133 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
2134 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
2135 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
2136 else have_key = TRUE;
2138 if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
2140 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
2144 /* Default option values */
2145 if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
2146 if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
2148 /* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
2149 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2151 if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
2152 key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
2154 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2155 limit, period, key);
2157 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2158 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2159 so that they survive across resets. */
2162 old_pool = store_pool;
2166 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2167 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2169 else if (per_mail || per_byte)
2170 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2172 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2174 if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2177 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2178 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2180 store_pool = old_pool;
2181 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2183 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2187 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2188 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2189 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2191 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2194 store_pool = old_pool;
2196 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2197 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2200 dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2202 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2206 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2207 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2208 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2209 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2214 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2215 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2216 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2217 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2219 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2220 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2221 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2222 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2223 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2225 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2226 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2227 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2229 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2230 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2231 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2232 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2234 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2236 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2237 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2238 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2239 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2240 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2241 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2243 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2245 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2246 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2247 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2248 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2250 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2251 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2252 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2253 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2254 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2256 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2257 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2258 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2259 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2261 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2262 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2263 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2265 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2266 : this_time - prev_time;
2268 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2269 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2271 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2272 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2274 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2275 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2276 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2277 decay as if nothing happened. */
2280 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2281 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2282 else if (per_cmd && where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2283 dbd->rate = (double)recipients_count
2284 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2286 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2289 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2290 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2291 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2292 be completely blocked). */
2294 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2297 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2298 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2299 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2300 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2302 if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
2303 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2306 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2310 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2312 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2313 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2316 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2317 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2319 store_pool = old_pool;
2320 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2323 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2330 /*************************************************
2331 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2332 *************************************************/
2334 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2338 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2339 where where called from
2340 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2341 level the nesting level
2342 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2343 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2344 user_msgptr user message pointer
2345 log_msgptr log message pointer
2346 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2348 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2349 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2350 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2351 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2352 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2353 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2354 but can be temporary callout problem)
2355 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2360 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2361 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2362 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2364 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2365 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2368 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2372 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2377 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2378 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2380 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2382 user_message = cb->arg;
2386 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2388 log_message = cb->arg;
2392 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2393 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2395 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2401 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2402 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2403 checking functions in some cases. */
2405 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2407 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2410 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2411 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2412 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2413 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2418 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2423 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2424 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2425 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2427 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2429 int n = cb->u.varnumber;
2430 int t = (n < ACL_CVARS)? 'c' : 'm';
2431 if (n >= ACL_CVARS) n -= ACL_CVARS;
2432 debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
2436 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2439 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2443 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2445 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2447 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2448 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2449 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2453 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2454 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2458 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
2462 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2466 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2467 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2469 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2470 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2476 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2477 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2478 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2482 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2483 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2485 int old_pool = store_pool;
2486 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2487 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2488 store_pool = old_pool;
2493 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2494 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2495 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2497 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2498 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2499 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2500 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2502 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2506 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2508 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2510 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2512 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2513 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2517 switch(control_type)
2519 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
2520 allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
2523 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2524 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2529 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2530 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
2538 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2539 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2542 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2543 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2546 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2547 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2550 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2551 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2554 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2555 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2556 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2560 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2561 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2564 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
2565 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
2566 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
2570 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2571 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
2576 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2577 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2581 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2582 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2583 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2584 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
2585 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
2592 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2597 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2598 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2601 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
2602 originator_name = US"";
2603 submission_mode = TRUE;
2606 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2609 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
2610 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2612 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2615 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2616 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2619 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
2621 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2624 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2625 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2626 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
2633 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2638 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
2639 suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
2644 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2646 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2652 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2655 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2656 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2661 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2666 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2669 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2670 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2671 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2672 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2673 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2674 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2675 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2676 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2677 it is not always available.
2679 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2680 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2681 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2682 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2686 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
2692 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2698 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2699 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
2700 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2701 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2702 switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
2703 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
2704 rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
2705 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2707 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
2708 rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
2709 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2711 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
2712 rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
2713 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2718 case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
2719 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2720 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2722 if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
2723 rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
2724 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2725 if (dk_verify_block->testing)
2726 rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
2727 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2730 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2731 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2732 if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
2733 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2734 NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2738 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
2739 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2740 if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
2741 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
2742 NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
2746 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
2747 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2748 if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
2749 rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
2753 case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
2754 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2755 if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
2756 switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
2757 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
2758 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
2759 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2761 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
2762 rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
2763 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2765 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
2766 rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
2767 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2769 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
2770 rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
2771 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2773 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
2774 rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
2775 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2777 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
2778 rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
2779 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2781 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
2782 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
2783 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2791 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2795 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2796 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2799 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2800 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2801 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2802 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2803 writing is poorly documented. */
2805 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2806 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2808 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2809 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2810 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2812 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2813 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2815 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2816 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2820 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2821 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2822 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2823 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2824 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2825 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2828 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2829 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2830 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2833 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2834 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2835 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2836 &deliver_localpart_data);
2848 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2849 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2850 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2851 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2852 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2853 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2856 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2857 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2858 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2864 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2865 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2866 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2870 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2873 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2874 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2875 /* Run the malware backend. */
2877 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2878 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2880 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2882 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2889 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2890 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2894 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2895 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
2898 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2899 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2903 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2909 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2912 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2913 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2914 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2915 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2920 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
2921 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
2924 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2928 int old_pool = store_pool;
2929 if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_CVARS) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2930 acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
2931 store_pool = old_pool;
2935 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2938 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2939 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2940 /* Run the spam backend. */
2942 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2943 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2945 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2947 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2955 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2957 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
2961 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2962 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
2963 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2964 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2965 (until something changes it). */
2968 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
2969 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
2970 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
2974 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2975 "condition %d", cb->type);
2979 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2981 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
2983 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
2984 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
2987 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
2991 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
2992 handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
2993 which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
2994 message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
2995 appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
2996 and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
2998 These modifiers act in different ways:
3000 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
3001 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
3003 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
3004 message that is already set.
3006 If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
3008 if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] ||
3009 (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) ||
3010 (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT))
3014 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
3015 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
3016 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
3017 during expansions. */
3019 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3020 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
3022 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3024 if (user_message != NULL)
3026 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
3027 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
3028 if (expmessage == NULL)
3030 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3031 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3032 user_message, expand_string_message);
3034 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
3037 if (log_message != NULL)
3039 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
3040 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
3041 if (expmessage == NULL)
3043 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3044 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3045 log_message, expand_string_message);
3047 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
3049 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
3050 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
3054 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
3056 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3059 acl_verify_message = NULL;
3067 /*************************************************
3068 * Get line from a literal ACL *
3069 *************************************************/
3071 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
3072 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
3073 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
3075 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
3076 Exim configuration file. That is:
3078 . Leading spaces are ignored.
3080 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
3081 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
3082 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
3084 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
3085 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
3087 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
3090 Returns: a pointer to the next line
3094 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
3095 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3103 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3107 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3108 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
3109 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
3111 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3113 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3114 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3116 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
3118 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3119 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3121 if (*yield != '#') break;
3124 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3125 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3126 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3127 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3132 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3134 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3143 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3144 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3149 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
3150 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
3151 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
3154 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3155 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3156 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3158 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
3159 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
3161 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3162 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
3165 /* Control does not reach here */
3172 /*************************************************
3173 * Check access using an ACL *
3174 *************************************************/
3176 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3177 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3178 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3179 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3180 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3181 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3182 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3183 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3184 appears immediately above.
3187 where where called from
3188 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3189 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3190 level the nesting level
3191 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3192 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3194 Returns: OK access is granted
3195 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3196 FAIL access is denied
3197 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3198 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3203 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3204 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3207 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3208 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3211 /* Catch configuration loops */
3215 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3221 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3225 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3226 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3230 ss = expand_string(s);
3233 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3234 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3235 expand_string_message);
3241 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3243 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3244 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3248 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3249 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3250 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3251 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3252 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3254 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3256 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3259 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3262 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3265 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3266 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3269 else if (*ss == '/')
3271 struct stat statbuf;
3272 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3275 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3280 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3282 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3287 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3288 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3290 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3292 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3293 ss, strerror(errno));
3296 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3299 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3300 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3304 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3305 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3306 persists between multiple messages. */
3310 int old_pool = store_pool;
3311 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3312 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3313 store_pool = old_pool;
3314 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3317 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3318 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3320 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3324 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3329 int basic_errno = 0;
3330 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3332 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3333 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3335 if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
3336 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3337 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3339 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3344 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3346 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3349 search_error_message = NULL;
3350 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3351 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3353 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3354 ERROR always causes a return. */
3359 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3360 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3362 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3363 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3364 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3368 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3370 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3373 default: /* Paranoia */
3375 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3379 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3384 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3387 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3388 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3391 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3396 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3401 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3402 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3403 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3408 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
3411 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3419 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3425 if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
3429 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
3432 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3438 if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
3442 if (cond != OK) return cond;
3447 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
3448 else if (cond == DEFER && (log_extra_selector & LX_acl_warn_skipped) != 0)
3449 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3450 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
3451 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
3452 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
3453 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3457 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3462 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3467 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3469 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
3474 /*************************************************
3475 * Check access using an ACL *
3476 *************************************************/
3478 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3479 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3480 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3483 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3484 recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
3485 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3486 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3487 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3489 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3490 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3491 FAIL access is denied
3492 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3493 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3498 acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
3499 uschar **log_msgptr)
3503 address_item *addr = NULL;
3505 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
3506 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
3507 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
3509 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
3511 adb = address_defaults;
3513 addr->address = recipient;
3514 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
3516 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3519 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
3520 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
3523 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3525 deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
3526 sender_address_data = NULL;
3528 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3529 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3533 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
3535 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3536 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3542 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3544 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
3546 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3547 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3551 /* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
3552 message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3554 if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75)
3556 uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr);
3562 while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++;
3563 if (*ss == 0) break;
3570 while (--t > s + 35)
3574 if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; }
3575 if (tt == NULL) tt = t;
3579 if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
3584 if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n')
3590 if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */