This variable refers to the certificate presented to the peer of an
inbound connection when the message was received.
It is only useful as the argument of a
-&%certextract%& expansion item or the name for a &%def%& expansion condition.
+&%certextract%& expansion item, &%md5%& or &%sha1%& operator,
+or a &%def%& condition.
.wen
.new
This variable refers to the certificate presented by the peer of an
inbound connection when the message was received.
It is only useful as the argument of a
-&%certextract%& expansion item or the name for a &%def%& expansion condition.
+&%certextract%& expansion item, &%md5%& or &%sha1%& operator,
+or a &%def%& condition.
.wen
.new
.vindex "&$tls_out_ourcert$&"
This variable refers to the certificate presented to the peer of an
outbound connection. It is only useful as the argument of a
-&%certextract%& expansion item or the name for a &%def%& expansion condition.
+&%certextract%& expansion item, &%md5%& or &%sha1%& operator,
+or a &%def%& condition.
.wen
.new
.vindex "&$tls_out_peercert$&"
This variable refers to the certificate presented by the peer of an
outbound connection. It is only useful as the argument of a
-&%certextract%& expansion item or the name for a &%def%& expansion condition.
+&%certextract%& expansion item, &%md5%& or &%sha1%& operator,
+or a &%def%& condition.
.wen
.vitem &$tls_in_certificate_verified$&
JH/21 Observability of OCSP via variables tls_(in,out)_ocsp. Stapling
is requested by default, modifiable by smtp transport option
- hosts_request_ocsp;
+ hosts_request_ocsp.
+
+JH/22 Expansion operators ${md5:string} and ${sha1::string} can now
+ operate on certificate variables to give certificate fingerprints
Exim version 4.82
9. Support for DNSSEC on outbound connections.
10. New variables "tls_(in,out)_(our,peer)cert" and expansion item
- "certextract" to extract fields from them.
+ "certextract" to extract fields from them. Hash operators md5 and sha1
+ work over them for generating fingerprints.
Version 4.82
{
int c;
uschar *arg = NULL;
- uschar *sub = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, skipping, TRUE, &resetok);
- if (sub == NULL) goto EXPAND_FAILED;
- s++;
+ uschar *sub;
+ var_entry *vp;
/* Owing to an historical mis-design, an underscore may be part of the
operator name, or it may introduce arguments. We therefore first scan the
table of names that contain underscores. If there is no match, we cut off
the arguments and then scan the main table. */
- c = chop_match(name, op_table_underscore,
- sizeof(op_table_underscore)/sizeof(uschar *));
-
- if (c < 0)
+ if ((c = chop_match(name, op_table_underscore,
+ sizeof(op_table_underscore)/sizeof(uschar *))) < 0)
{
arg = Ustrchr(name, '_');
if (arg != NULL) *arg = 0;
if (arg != NULL) *arg++ = '_'; /* Put back for error messages */
}
+ /* Deal specially with operators that might take a certificate variable
+ as we do not want to do the usual expansion. For most, expand the string.*/
+ switch(c)
+ {
+ case EOP_SHA1:
+ case EOP_MD5:
+ if (s[1] == '$')
+ {
+ uschar * s1 = s;
+ sub = expand_string_internal(s+2, TRUE, &s1, skipping,
+ FALSE, &resetok);
+ if (!sub) goto EXPAND_FAILED; /*{*/
+ if (*s1 != '}') goto EXPAND_FAILED_CURLY;
+ if ((vp = find_var_ent(sub)) && vp->type == vtype_cert)
+ {
+ s = s1+1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ vp = NULL;
+ /*FALLTHROUGH*/
+ default:
+ sub = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, skipping, TRUE, &resetok);
+ if (!sub) goto EXPAND_FAILED;
+ s++;
+ break;
+ }
+
/* If we are skipping, we don't need to perform the operation at all.
This matters for operations like "mask", because the data may not be
in the correct format when skipping. For example, the expression may test
}
case EOP_MD5:
- {
- md5 base;
- uschar digest[16];
- int j;
- char st[33];
- md5_start(&base);
- md5_end(&base, sub, Ustrlen(sub), digest);
- for(j = 0; j < 16; j++) sprintf(st+2*j, "%02x", digest[j]);
- yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, US st, (int)strlen(st));
+ if (vp && *(void **)vp->value)
+ {
+ uschar * cp = tls_cert_fprt_md5(*(void **)vp->value);
+ yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, cp, (int)strlen(cp));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ md5 base;
+ uschar digest[16];
+ int j;
+ char st[33];
+ md5_start(&base);
+ md5_end(&base, sub, Ustrlen(sub), digest);
+ for(j = 0; j < 16; j++) sprintf(st+2*j, "%02x", digest[j]);
+ yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, US st, (int)strlen(st));
+ }
continue;
- }
case EOP_SHA1:
- {
- sha1 base;
- uschar digest[20];
- int j;
- char st[41];
- sha1_start(&base);
- sha1_end(&base, sub, Ustrlen(sub), digest);
- for(j = 0; j < 20; j++) sprintf(st+2*j, "%02X", digest[j]);
- yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, US st, (int)strlen(st));
+ if (vp && *(void **)vp->value)
+ {
+ uschar * cp = tls_cert_fprt_sha1(*(void **)vp->value);
+ yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, cp, (int)strlen(cp));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sha1 base;
+ uschar digest[20];
+ int j;
+ char st[41];
+ sha1_start(&base);
+ sha1_end(&base, sub, Ustrlen(sub), digest);
+ for(j = 0; j < 20; j++) sprintf(st+2*j, "%02X", digest[j]);
+ yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, US st, (int)strlen(st));
+ }
continue;
- }
/* Convert hex encoding to base64 encoding */
extern uschar * tls_cert_subject_altname(void *, uschar * mod);
extern uschar * tls_cert_version(void *, uschar * mod);
+extern uschar * tls_cert_fprt_md5(void *);
+extern uschar * tls_cert_fprt_sha1(void *);
+
extern int tls_client_start(int, host_item *, address_item *,
void *);
extern void tls_close(BOOL, BOOL);
}
+/*****************************************************
+* Certificate operator routines
+*****************************************************/
+static uschar *
+fingerprint(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, gnutls_digest_algorithm_t algo)
+{
+int ret;
+size_t siz = 0;
+uschar * cp;
+uschar * cp2;
+uschar * cp3;
+
+if ((ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(cert, algo, NULL, &siz))
+ != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
+ {
+ expand_string_message =
+ string_sprintf("%s: gf0 fail: %d %s\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ ret, gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+cp = store_get(siz*3+1);
+if ((ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(cert, algo, cp, &siz)) < 0)
+ {
+ expand_string_message =
+ string_sprintf("%s: gf1 fail: %d %s\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ ret, gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+for (cp3 = cp2 = cp+siz; cp < cp2; cp++, cp3+=2)
+ sprintf(cp3, "%02X",*cp);
+return cp2;
+}
+
+
+uschar *
+tls_cert_fprt_md5(void * cert)
+{
+return fingerprint((gnutls_x509_crt_t)cert, GNUTLS_DIG_MD5);
+}
+
+uschar *
+tls_cert_fprt_sha1(void * cert)
+{
+return fingerprint((gnutls_x509_crt_t)cert, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1);
+}
+
+
/* vi: aw ai sw=2
*/
/* End of tlscert-gnu.c */
return list;
}
+
+
+/*****************************************************
+* Certificate operator routines
+*****************************************************/
+static uschar *
+fingerprint(X509 * cert, const EVP_MD * fdig)
+{
+int j;
+unsigned int n;
+uschar md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+uschar * cp;
+
+if (!X509_digest(cert,fdig,md,&n))
+ {
+ expand_string_message = US"tls_cert_fprt: out of mem\n";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+cp = store_get(n*2+1);
+for (j = 0; j < (int)n; j++) sprintf(cp+2*j, "%02X", md[j]);
+return(cp);
+}
+
+uschar *
+tls_cert_fprt_md5(void * cert)
+{
+return fingerprint((X509 *)cert, EVP_md5());
+}
+
+uschar *
+tls_cert_fprt_sha1(void * cert)
+{
+return fingerprint((X509 *)cert, EVP_sha1());
+}
+
+
/* vi: aw ai sw=2
*/
/* End of tlscert-openssl.c */
logwrite = ${certextract {subj_altname} {$tls_in_peercert} {SAN <$value>}{(no SAN)}}
# logwrite = ${certextract {ocsp_uri} {$tls_in_peercert} {OCU <$value>}{(no OCU)}}
logwrite = ${certextract {crl_uri} {$tls_in_peercert} {CRU <$value>}{(no CRU)}}
+ logwrite = md5 fingerprint ${md5:$tls_in_peercert}
+ logwrite = sha1 fingerprint ${sha1:$tls_in_peercert}
# ----- Routers -----
logwrite = ${certextract {subj_altname} {$tls_in_peercert} {SAN <$value>}{(no SAN)}}
logwrite = ${certextract {ocsp_uri} {$tls_in_peercert} {OCU <$value>}{(no OCU)}}
logwrite = ${certextract {crl_uri} {$tls_in_peercert} {CRU <$value>}{(no CRU)}}
+ logwrite = md5 fingerprint ${md5:$tls_in_peercert}
+ logwrite = sha1 fingerprint ${sha1:$tls_in_peercert}
# ----- Routers -----
1999-03-02 09:44:33 SG <6c 37 41 26 4d 5d f4 b5 31 10 67 ca fb 64 b6 22 98 62 f7 1e 95 7b 6c e6 74 47 21 f4 5e 89 36 3e b9 9c 8a c5 52 bb c4 af 12 93 26 3b d7 3d e0 56 71 1e 1d 21 20 02 ed f0 4e d5 5e 45 42 fd 3c 38 41 54 83 86 0b 3b bf c5 47 39 ff 15 ea 93 dc fd c7 3d 18 58 59 ca dd 2a d8 b9 f9 2f b9 76 93 f4 ae e3 91 56 80 2f 8c 04 2f ad 57 ef d2 51 19 f4 b4 ef 32 9c ac 3a 7c 0d b8 39 db b1 e3 30 73 1a>
1999-03-02 09:44:33 SAN <DNS=server2.example.com>
1999-03-02 09:44:33 CRU <http://crl.example.com/latest.crl>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 md5 fingerprint C5FA6C8B1BE926DBC4E436AF08F92B55
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 sha1 fingerprint 40B2135E6B67AE36A397696DA328423685E74CE3
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@test.ex H=[ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=smtps X=TLS1.x:xxxxRSA_AES_256_CBC_SHAnnn:256 DN="CN=server2.example.com" S=sss
1999-03-02 09:44:33 Start queue run: pid=pppp -qf
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 => CALLER <CALLER@test.ex> R=abc T=local_delivery
1999-03-02 09:44:33 SAN <DNS=server2.example.com>
1999-03-02 09:44:33 OCU <http://oscp/example.com/>
1999-03-02 09:44:33 CRU <http://crl.example.com/latest.crl>
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 md5 fingerprint C5FA6C8B1BE926DBC4E436AF08F92B55
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 sha1 fingerprint 40B2135E6B67AE36A397696DA328423685E74CE3
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@test.ex H=[ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=smtps X=TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256 DN="/CN=server2.example.com" S=sss
1999-03-02 09:44:33 Start queue run: pid=pppp -qf
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 => CALLER <CALLER@test.ex> R=abc T=local_delivery
git://git.exim.org / users / heiko / exim.git / commitdiff