1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
6 /* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 */
7 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
9 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
14 /* Default callout timeout */
16 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
18 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
20 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
25 static uschar *verbs[] = {
26 [ACL_ACCEPT] = US"accept",
27 [ACL_DEFER] = US"defer",
28 [ACL_DENY] = US"deny",
29 [ACL_DISCARD] = US"discard",
30 [ACL_DROP] = US"drop",
31 [ACL_REQUIRE] = US"require",
35 /* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
36 are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
37 "accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
40 static int msgcond[] = {
41 [ACL_ACCEPT] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
42 [ACL_DEFER] = BIT(OK),
44 [ACL_DISCARD] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
46 [ACL_REQUIRE] = BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
50 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
57 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
63 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
66 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
84 ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
86 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
90 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
96 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
103 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
113 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
114 "message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", "queue" and "set" are
115 modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
116 their side effects. Do not invent new modifier names that result in one name
117 being the prefix of another; the binary-search in the list will go wrong. */
119 typedef struct condition_def {
122 /* Flag to indicate the condition/modifier has a string expansion done
123 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
124 checking functions. */
125 BOOL expand_at_top:1;
129 /* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
130 times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
131 For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
137 static condition_def conditions[] = {
138 [ACLC_ACL] = { US"acl", FALSE, FALSE, 0 },
140 [ACLC_ADD_HEADER] = { US"add_header", TRUE, TRUE,
142 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
143 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
147 ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
149 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
152 [ACLC_AUTHENTICATED] = { US"authenticated", FALSE, FALSE,
153 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
154 ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO,
156 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
157 [ACLC_BMI_OPTIN] = { US"bmi_optin", TRUE, TRUE,
159 ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO |
160 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_MIME |
161 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
164 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
166 ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_STARTTLS |
167 ACL_BIT_VRFY | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
168 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
171 [ACLC_CONDITION] = { US"condition", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
172 [ACLC_CONTINUE] = { US"continue", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
174 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
175 always and check in the control processing itself. */
176 [ACLC_CONTROL] = { US"control", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
178 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
179 [ACLC_DCC] = { US"dcc", TRUE, FALSE,
182 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
188 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
189 [ACLC_DECODE] = { US"decode", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
192 [ACLC_DELAY] = { US"delay", TRUE, TRUE, ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT },
194 [ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER] = { US"dkim_signers", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
195 [ACLC_DKIM_STATUS] = { US"dkim_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
198 [ACLC_DMARC_STATUS] = { US"dmarc_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DATA },
201 /* Explicit key lookups can be made in non-smtp ACLs so pass
202 always and check in the verify processing itself. */
203 [ACLC_DNSLISTS] = { US"dnslists", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
205 [ACLC_DOMAINS] = { US"domains", FALSE, FALSE,
207 ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
213 [ACLC_ENCRYPTED] = { US"encrypted", FALSE, FALSE,
214 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
218 [ACLC_ENDPASS] = { US"endpass", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
220 [ACLC_HOSTS] = { US"hosts", FALSE, FALSE,
221 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
223 [ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS] = { US"local_parts", FALSE, FALSE,
225 ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
232 [ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE] = { US"log_message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
233 [ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET] = { US"log_reject_target", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
234 [ACLC_LOGWRITE] = { US"logwrite", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
236 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
237 [ACLC_MALWARE] = { US"malware", TRUE, FALSE,
240 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
247 [ACLC_MESSAGE] = { US"message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
248 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
249 [ACLC_MIME_REGEX] = { US"mime_regex", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
252 [ACLC_QUEUE] = { US"queue", TRUE, TRUE,
260 [ACLC_RATELIMIT] = { US"ratelimit", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
261 [ACLC_RECIPIENTS] = { US"recipients", FALSE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
263 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
264 [ACLC_REGEX] = { US"regex", TRUE, FALSE,
267 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
275 [ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER] = { US"remove_header", TRUE, TRUE,
277 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL|ACL_BIT_RCPT |
278 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
282 ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
283 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
285 [ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS] = { US"sender_domains", FALSE, FALSE,
286 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
288 ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
289 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
290 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
292 [ACLC_SENDERS] = { US"senders", FALSE, FALSE,
293 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
295 ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
296 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
297 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
300 [ACLC_SET] = { US"set", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
302 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
303 [ACLC_SPAM] = { US"spam", TRUE, FALSE,
304 (unsigned int) ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
305 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
312 [ACLC_SPF] = { US"spf", TRUE, FALSE,
313 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
314 ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
315 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
316 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
317 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
319 [ACLC_SPF_GUESS] = { US"spf_guess", TRUE, FALSE,
320 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
321 ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
322 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
323 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
324 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
327 [ACLC_UDPSEND] = { US"udpsend", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
329 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
330 always and check in the verify function itself */
331 [ACLC_VERIFY] = { US"verify", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
336 /* Return values from decode_control(); used as index so keep in step
337 with the controls_list table that follows! */
340 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
341 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
344 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
345 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
346 CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY,
352 CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY,
353 CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC,
356 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
357 CONTROL_ERROR, /* pseudo-value for decode errors */
362 CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH,
363 CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
364 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
365 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
366 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
368 CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
369 CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
373 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
375 CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT,
381 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics.
382 For each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
383 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
385 typedef struct control_def {
387 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
388 unsigned forbids; /* bitmap of dis-allowed times */
391 static control_def controls_list[] = {
392 /* name has_option forbids */
393 [CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED] =
394 { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", FALSE,
396 ~(ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO)
398 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
400 { US"bmi_run", FALSE, 0 },
402 [CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART] =
403 { US"caseful_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
404 [CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART] =
405 { US"caselower_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
406 [CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY] =
407 { US"cutthrough_delivery", TRUE, 0 },
409 { US"debug", TRUE, 0 },
412 [CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY] =
413 { US"dkim_disable_verify", FALSE,
414 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
415 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
418 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
423 [CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY] =
424 { US"dmarc_disable_verify", FALSE,
425 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
427 [CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC] =
428 { US"dmarc_enable_forensic", FALSE,
429 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
435 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START | ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT
437 [CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
438 { US"enforce_sync", FALSE,
439 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
442 /* Pseudo-value for decode errors */
444 { US"error", FALSE, 0 },
446 [CONTROL_FAKEDEFER] =
447 { US"fakedefer", TRUE,
449 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
450 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
456 [CONTROL_FAKEREJECT] =
457 { US"fakereject", TRUE,
459 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
460 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
469 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
470 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
471 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
472 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
475 [CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH] =
476 { US"no_callout_flush", FALSE,
477 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
479 [CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH] =
480 { US"no_delay_flush", FALSE,
481 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
484 [CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
485 { US"no_enforce_sync", FALSE,
486 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
488 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
489 [CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL] =
490 { US"no_mbox_unspool", FALSE,
492 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
493 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
494 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
498 [CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE] =
499 { US"no_multiline_responses", FALSE,
500 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
502 [CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING] =
503 { US"no_pipelining", FALSE,
504 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
510 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
511 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
512 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
513 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
516 [CONTROL_SUBMISSION] =
517 { US"submission", TRUE,
519 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA)
521 [CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS] =
522 { US"suppress_local_fixups", FALSE,
524 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
525 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START)
528 [CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT] =
529 { US"utf8_downconvert", TRUE, (unsigned) ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY)
534 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
535 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
536 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
537 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
539 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
541 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
542 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
544 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
545 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
546 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
547 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
548 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
549 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
550 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
552 static int csa_return_code[] = {
555 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = OK,
556 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = OK,
557 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = FAIL,
558 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = FAIL,
559 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = FAIL,
560 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = FAIL
563 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
564 [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
566 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"defer",
567 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"defer",
568 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"fail",
569 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"fail",
570 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"fail",
571 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"fail"
574 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
575 [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
577 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
578 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
579 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
580 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"failed (host name not authorized)",
581 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
582 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"failed (client address mismatch)"
585 /* Options for the ratelimit condition. Note that there are two variants of
586 the per_rcpt option, depending on the ACL that is used to measure the rate.
587 However any ACL must be able to look up per_rcpt rates in /noupdate mode,
588 so the two variants must have the same internal representation as well as
589 the same configuration string. */
592 RATE_PER_WHAT, RATE_PER_CLASH, RATE_PER_ADDR, RATE_PER_BYTE, RATE_PER_CMD,
593 RATE_PER_CONN, RATE_PER_MAIL, RATE_PER_RCPT, RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS
596 #define RATE_SET(var,new) \
597 (((var) == RATE_PER_WHAT) ? ((var) = RATE_##new) : ((var) = RATE_PER_CLASH))
599 static uschar *ratelimit_option_string[] = {
600 [RATE_PER_WHAT] = US"?",
601 [RATE_PER_CLASH] = US"!",
602 [RATE_PER_ADDR] = US"per_addr",
603 [RATE_PER_BYTE] = US"per_byte",
604 [RATE_PER_CMD] = US"per_cmd",
605 [RATE_PER_CONN] = US"per_conn",
606 [RATE_PER_MAIL] = US"per_mail",
607 [RATE_PER_RCPT] = US"per_rcpt",
608 [RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS] = US"per_rcpt"
611 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
613 static int acl_check_wargs(int, address_item *, const uschar *, uschar **,
617 /*************************************************
618 * Find control in list *
619 *************************************************/
621 /* The lists are always in order, so binary chop can be used.
624 name the control name to search for
625 ol the first entry in the control list
626 last one more than the offset of the last entry in the control list
628 Returns: index of a control entry, or -1 if not found
632 find_control(const uschar * name, control_def * ol, int last)
634 for (int first = 0; last > first; )
636 int middle = (first + last)/2;
637 uschar * s = ol[middle].name;
638 int c = Ustrncmp(name, s, Ustrlen(s));
639 if (c == 0) return middle;
640 else if (c > 0) first = middle + 1;
648 /*************************************************
649 * Pick out condition from list *
650 *************************************************/
652 /* Use a binary chop method
656 list list of conditions
659 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
663 acl_checkcondition(uschar * name, condition_def * list, int end)
665 for (int start = 0; start < end; )
667 int mid = (start + end)/2;
668 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid].name);
669 if (c == 0) return mid;
670 if (c < 0) end = mid;
671 else start = mid + 1;
677 /*************************************************
678 * Pick out name from list *
679 *************************************************/
681 /* Use a binary chop method
688 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
692 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
694 for (int start = 0; start < end; )
696 int mid = (start + end)/2;
697 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
698 if (c == 0) return mid;
699 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
706 /*************************************************
707 * Read and parse one ACL *
708 *************************************************/
710 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
711 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
712 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
713 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
714 blank lines (where relevant).
717 func function to get next line of ACL
718 error where to put an error message
720 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
721 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
725 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
727 acl_block *yield = NULL;
728 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
729 acl_block *this = NULL;
730 acl_condition_block *cond;
731 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
736 while ((s = (*func)()))
739 BOOL negated = FALSE;
740 uschar *saveline = s;
743 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
746 if (Uskip_whitespace(&s) == '!')
752 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
753 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
755 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
756 if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
758 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
759 continues the previous verb. */
761 if ((v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, nelem(verbs))) < 0)
765 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
777 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
780 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block), FALSE);
782 lastp = &(this->next);
784 this->condition = NULL;
786 this->srcline = config_lineno; /* for debug output */
787 this->srcfile = config_filename; /**/
788 condp = &(this->condition);
789 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
795 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
798 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
800 if ((c = acl_checkcondition(name, conditions, nelem(conditions))) < 0)
802 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
807 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
809 if (negated && conditions[c].is_modifier)
811 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
812 "\"%s\"", conditions[c].name);
816 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
818 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
819 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
820 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
822 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
823 conditions[c].name, verbs[this->verb]);
827 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), FALSE);
830 cond->u.negated = negated;
833 condp = &(cond->next);
835 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
836 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
837 gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
838 variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
839 extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
840 arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
841 After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
842 after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
847 if ( Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_status", 18) == 0
848 || Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_reason", 18) == 0)
850 uschar * endptr = s+18;
852 if (isalnum(*endptr))
854 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
855 "modifier \"set %s\" "
856 "(only \"dkim_verify_status\" or \"dkim_verify_reason\" permitted)",
860 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s, 18);
862 Uskip_whitespace(&s);
869 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 && Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
871 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
872 "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
877 if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
879 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
880 "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
885 while (*endptr && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
887 if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
889 *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
890 "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
896 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
898 Uskip_whitespace(&s);
901 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
902 "endpass" has no data */
904 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
908 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
909 conditions[c].is_modifier ? US"modifier" : US"condition");
912 Uskip_whitespace(&s);
913 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
922 /*************************************************
923 * Set up added header line(s) *
924 *************************************************/
926 /* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
927 to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
928 "warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
929 added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
931 Argument: string of header lines
936 setup_header(const uschar *hstring)
939 int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
941 /* Ignore any leading newlines */
942 while (*hstring == '\n') hstring++, hlen--;
944 /* An empty string does nothing; ensure exactly one final newline. */
945 if (hlen <= 0) return;
946 if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n') /* no newline */
947 q = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
948 else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n') /* double newline */
950 uschar * s = string_copy(hstring);
951 while(s[--hlen] == '\n')
958 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
960 for (p = q; *p; p = q)
964 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
965 header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
967 /* Find next header line within the string */
971 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); /* we know there was a newline */
972 if (*++q != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
975 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
976 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
980 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
982 newtype = htype_add_rec;
985 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
987 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
990 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
992 newtype = htype_add_top;
995 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
997 newtype = htype_add_bot;
1000 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
1003 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
1004 to the front of it. */
1006 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
1007 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
1009 hdr = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", *s == ':' ? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", (int) (q - p), p);
1010 hlen = Ustrlen(hdr);
1012 /* See if this line has already been added */
1016 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, hdr, hlen) == 0) break;
1017 hptr = &(*hptr)->next;
1020 /* Add if not previously present */
1024 /* The header_line struct itself is not tainted, though it points to
1025 possibly tainted data. */
1026 header_line * h = store_get(sizeof(header_line), FALSE);
1039 /*************************************************
1040 * List the added header lines *
1041 *************************************************/
1047 for (header_line * h = acl_added_headers; h; h = h->next)
1050 if (h->text[i-1] == '\n') i--;
1051 g = string_append_listele_n(g, '\n', h->text, i);
1054 return g ? g->s : NULL;
1058 /*************************************************
1059 * Set up removed header line(s) *
1060 *************************************************/
1062 /* This function is called by the remove_header modifier. The argument is
1063 treated as a sequence of header names which are added to a colon separated
1064 list, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
1066 Argument: string of header names
1071 setup_remove_header(const uschar *hnames)
1074 acl_removed_headers = acl_removed_headers
1075 ? string_sprintf("%s : %s", acl_removed_headers, hnames)
1076 : string_copy(hnames);
1081 /*************************************************
1083 *************************************************/
1085 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
1086 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
1087 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
1089 ** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
1090 its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
1093 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
1094 user_message message for adding to headers
1095 log_message message for logging, if different
1101 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
1103 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
1106 string_item *logged;
1108 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
1109 string_printing(log_message));
1111 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1112 failed", add the failure message. */
1114 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
1115 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
1116 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
1117 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
1119 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1120 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
1122 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged; logged = logged->next)
1123 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
1127 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
1128 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
1129 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
1130 logged->text = US logged + sizeof(string_item);
1131 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
1132 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
1133 acl_warn_logged = logged;
1137 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1139 if (!user_message) return;
1141 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1144 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1146 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1147 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1148 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
1152 /* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1153 function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
1155 setup_header(user_message);
1160 /*************************************************
1161 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
1162 *************************************************/
1164 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1165 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1166 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1167 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1170 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1171 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1173 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1174 FAIL verification failed
1175 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1179 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
1183 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
1185 /* Previous success */
1187 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1189 /* Previous failure */
1191 if (host_lookup_failed)
1193 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1197 /* Need to do a lookup */
1200 debug_printf_indent("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1202 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1204 *log_msgptr = rc == DEFER
1205 ? US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1206 : string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1208 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1211 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1217 /*************************************************
1218 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1219 *************************************************/
1221 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1222 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1223 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1224 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1225 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1226 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1227 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1228 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1231 dnsa the DNS answer block
1232 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1233 reset option specifying what portion to scan, as described above
1234 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1236 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1237 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1238 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1242 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1245 int rc = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1247 for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1249 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1251 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1255 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1259 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1261 rc = CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1263 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1264 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1266 for (dns_address * da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da; da = da->next)
1268 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1270 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1272 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1276 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1277 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1285 /*************************************************
1286 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1287 *************************************************/
1289 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1290 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1291 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1292 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1293 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1294 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1295 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1298 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1300 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1301 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1302 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1303 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1307 acl_verify_csa(const uschar *domain)
1310 const uschar *found;
1311 int priority, weight, port;
1312 dns_answer * dnsa = store_get_dns_answer();
1318 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1319 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1320 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1322 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1323 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1324 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1325 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1327 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1328 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1329 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1331 if (domain[0] == '[')
1333 const uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1334 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1335 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1338 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1339 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1340 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1341 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1342 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1344 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1346 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1347 domain = dns_build_reverse(domain);
1350 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1351 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1352 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1353 we return from this function. */
1355 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1356 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1358 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain), is_tainted(domain));
1359 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1360 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1362 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1365 switch (dns_special_lookup(dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1367 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1370 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1372 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1376 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1378 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1384 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1386 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1388 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)) if (rr->type == T_SRV)
1390 const uschar * p = rr->data;
1392 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1394 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1395 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1399 debug_printf_indent("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1401 /* Check the CSA version number */
1403 if (priority != 1) continue;
1405 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1406 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1407 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1408 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1409 SRV records of their own. */
1411 if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
1412 return t->data.val = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN;
1414 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1415 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1416 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1417 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1418 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1420 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1422 if (weight > 2) continue;
1424 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1425 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1426 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1428 (void)dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, p,
1429 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1431 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1436 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1438 if (!rr) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1440 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1441 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1442 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1443 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1444 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1446 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1448 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1449 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1450 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1451 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1453 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1454 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1456 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1459 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1462 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1466 lookup_dnssec_authenticated = NULL;
1467 switch (dns_lookup(dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1469 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1472 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1474 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1477 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1478 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1479 /* else fall through */
1481 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1482 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1483 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1487 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1493 /*************************************************
1494 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1495 *************************************************/
1497 enum { VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, VERIFY_CERT, VERIFY_HELO, VERIFY_CSA, VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX,
1498 VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT,
1499 VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, VERIFY_ARC
1504 unsigned where_allowed; /* bitmap */
1505 BOOL no_options; /* Never has /option(s) following */
1506 unsigned alt_opt_sep; /* >0 Non-/ option separator (custom parser) */
1508 static verify_type_t verify_type_list[] = {
1509 /* name value where no-opt opt-sep */
1510 { US"reverse_host_lookup", VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, (unsigned)~0, FALSE, 0 },
1511 { US"certificate", VERIFY_CERT, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
1512 { US"helo", VERIFY_HELO, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
1513 { US"csa", VERIFY_CSA, (unsigned)~0, FALSE, 0 },
1514 { US"header_syntax", VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
1515 { US"not_blind", VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, FALSE, 0 },
1516 { US"header_sender", VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, FALSE, 0 },
1517 { US"sender", VERIFY_SNDR, ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT
1518 |ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP,
1520 { US"recipient", VERIFY_RCPT, ACL_BIT_RCPT, FALSE, 0 },
1521 { US"header_names_ascii", VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
1522 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
1523 { US"arc", VERIFY_ARC, ACL_BIT_DATA, FALSE , 0 },
1528 enum { CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, CALLOUT_NOCACHE, CALLOUT_RANDOM, CALLOUT_USE_SENDER,
1529 CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,
1530 CALLOUT_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, CALLOUT_CONNECT,
1531 CALLOUT_HOLD, CALLOUT_TIME /* TIME must be last */
1537 BOOL has_option; /* Has =option(s) following */
1538 BOOL timeval; /* Has a time value */
1540 static callout_opt_t callout_opt_list[] = {
1541 /* name value flag has-opt has-time */
1542 { US"defer_ok", CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1543 { US"no_cache", CALLOUT_NOCACHE, vopt_callout_no_cache, FALSE, FALSE },
1544 { US"random", CALLOUT_RANDOM, vopt_callout_random, FALSE, FALSE },
1545 { US"use_sender", CALLOUT_USE_SENDER, vopt_callout_recipsender, FALSE, FALSE },
1546 { US"use_postmaster", CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER,vopt_callout_recippmaster, FALSE, FALSE },
1547 { US"postmaster_mailfrom",CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM,0, TRUE, FALSE },
1548 { US"postmaster", CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1549 { US"fullpostmaster", CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,vopt_callout_fullpm, FALSE, FALSE },
1550 { US"mailfrom", CALLOUT_MAILFROM, 0, TRUE, FALSE },
1551 { US"maxwait", CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
1552 { US"connect", CALLOUT_CONNECT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
1553 { US"hold", CALLOUT_HOLD, vopt_callout_hold, FALSE, FALSE },
1554 { NULL, CALLOUT_TIME, 0, FALSE, TRUE }
1559 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1560 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1561 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1562 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1565 where where called from
1566 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1567 arg the argument of "verify"
1568 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1569 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1570 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1572 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1573 FAIL verification failed
1574 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1579 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *arg,
1580 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1584 int callout_overall = -1;
1585 int callout_connect = -1;
1586 int verify_options = 0;
1588 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1589 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1590 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1591 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1592 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1593 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1594 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1595 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1596 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1598 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1599 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them.
1602 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1603 const uschar *list = arg;
1604 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
1607 if (!ss) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1609 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1611 for (vp = verify_type_list;
1612 CS vp < CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list);
1615 if (vp->alt_opt_sep ? strncmpic(ss, vp->name, vp->alt_opt_sep) == 0
1616 : strcmpic (ss, vp->name) == 0)
1618 if (CS vp >= CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list))
1621 if (vp->no_options && slash)
1623 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1624 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1627 if (!(vp->where_allowed & BIT(where)))
1629 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify %s in ACL for %s",
1630 vp->name, acl_wherenames[where]);
1635 case VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP:
1636 if (!sender_host_address) return OK;
1637 if ((rc = acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr)) == DEFER)
1638 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
1639 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0)
1644 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1645 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1646 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1648 if (tls_in.certificate_verified) return OK;
1649 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1653 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1654 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1656 if (!f.helo_verified && !f.helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1657 return f.helo_verified ? OK : FAIL;
1660 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1661 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1663 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1664 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1665 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1666 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1667 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1668 return csa_return_code[rc];
1670 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
1672 { /* Do Authenticated Received Chain checks in a separate function. */
1673 const uschar * condlist = CUS string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
1677 if (!(arc_state = acl_verify_arc())) return DEFER;
1678 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ARC verify result %s %s%s%s\n", arc_state,
1679 arc_state_reason ? "(":"", arc_state_reason, arc_state_reason ? ")":"");
1681 if (!condlist) condlist = US"none:pass";
1682 while ((cond = string_nextinlist(&condlist, &csep, NULL, 0)))
1683 if (Ustrcmp(arc_state, cond) == 0) return OK;
1688 case VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX:
1689 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct 5322-syntax. If there is
1690 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1691 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1694 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1695 if (rc != OK && *log_msgptr)
1696 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1697 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1699 acl_verify_message = *log_msgptr;
1702 case VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII:
1703 /* Check that all header names are true 7 bit strings
1704 See RFC 5322, 2.2. and RFC 6532, 3. */
1706 rc = verify_check_header_names_ascii(log_msgptr);
1707 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr)
1708 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1711 case VERIFY_NOT_BLIND:
1712 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1713 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1715 BOOL case_sensitive = TRUE;
1717 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
1718 if (strcmpic(ss, US"case_insensitive") == 0)
1719 case_sensitive = FALSE;
1722 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1723 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1727 if ((rc = verify_check_notblind(case_sensitive)) != OK)
1729 *log_msgptr = US"bcc recipient detected";
1730 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1731 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1736 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1737 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1738 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1740 case VERIFY_HDR_SNDR:
1741 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1745 /* In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1746 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1750 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1753 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1754 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1755 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1756 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1767 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1768 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1770 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
1772 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1773 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1774 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1776 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1778 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1780 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1781 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1784 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1787 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1790 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1792 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1794 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1798 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1801 const uschar * sublist = ss;
1806 while (isspace(*sublist)) sublist++;
1807 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, NULL, 0)))
1810 double period = 1.0F;
1812 for (op= callout_opt_list; op->name; op++)
1813 if (strncmpic(opt, op->name, Ustrlen(op->name)) == 0)
1816 verify_options |= op->flag;
1819 opt += Ustrlen(op->name);
1820 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1823 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1824 "\"%s\" in ACL verify condition \"%s\"", op->name, arg);
1827 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1829 if (op->timeval && (period = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
1831 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1832 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1838 case CALLOUT_DEFER_OK: callout_defer_ok = TRUE; break;
1839 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1840 case CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1841 case CALLOUT_MAILFROM:
1842 if (!verify_header_sender)
1844 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1845 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1846 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1849 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1851 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM: pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); break;
1852 case CALLOUT_MAXWAIT: callout_overall = period; break;
1853 case CALLOUT_CONNECT: callout_connect = period; break;
1854 case CALLOUT_TIME: callout = period; break;
1860 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1861 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1867 /* Option not recognized */
1871 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1872 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1877 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1878 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1880 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1881 "for a recipient callout";
1885 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1886 message if giving out verification details. */
1888 if (verify_header_sender)
1892 if ((rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1893 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1896 *basic_errno = verrno;
1897 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1899 if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
1900 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1901 if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1906 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1907 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1908 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1909 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1910 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1911 during message reception.
1913 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1914 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1915 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1916 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1917 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1918 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1919 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1921 else if (verify_sender_address)
1923 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)))
1925 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1926 "sender verify callout";
1930 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1931 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1932 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1934 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1935 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1936 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1937 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1939 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed))
1943 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1944 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1946 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("using cached sender verify result\n");
1949 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1950 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1951 specified (see comments above).
1953 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1954 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1955 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1956 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1957 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1962 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1964 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1966 if ((sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
1968 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
1969 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
1972 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1973 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1975 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1976 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1977 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1979 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1980 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1982 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1984 if (success_on_redirect)
1985 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1987 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1990 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1991 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1993 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1996 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
2000 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
2001 debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
2002 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
2004 debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok\n",
2005 verify_sender_address);
2009 rc = OK; /* Null sender */
2011 /* Cache the result code */
2013 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
2014 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
2015 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
2016 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
2017 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
2019 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
2020 the sender verification. */
2022 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
2025 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
2027 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->prop.address_data;
2030 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
2031 the DEFER overrides. */
2037 if (success_on_redirect)
2038 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
2040 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
2044 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
2045 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
2046 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
2048 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
2049 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
2050 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
2051 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
2053 /* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
2054 if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
2056 /* Make $address_data visible */
2057 deliver_address_data = addr2.prop.address_data;
2060 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
2062 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
2063 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
2065 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
2066 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
2070 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
2071 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
2073 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
2076 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
2077 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
2078 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
2081 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
2082 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
2086 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
2089 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
2090 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
2094 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
2095 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
2099 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
2102 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
2103 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\", \"header_names_ascii\" "
2104 "or \"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
2105 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
2112 /*************************************************
2113 * Check argument for control= modifier *
2114 *************************************************/
2116 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below.
2117 To handle the case "queue_only" we accept an _ in the
2118 initial / option-switch position.
2121 arg the argument string for control=
2122 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2123 where which ACL we are in
2124 log_msgptr for error messages
2126 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2130 decode_control(const uschar *arg, const uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2136 if ( (idx = find_control(arg, controls_list, nelem(controls_list))) < 0
2137 || ( (c = arg[len = Ustrlen((d = controls_list+idx)->name)]) != 0
2138 && (!d->has_option || c != '/' && c != '_')
2141 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2142 return CONTROL_ERROR;
2152 /*************************************************
2153 * Return a ratelimit error *
2154 *************************************************/
2156 /* Called from acl_ratelimit() below
2159 log_msgptr for error messages
2160 format format string
2161 ... supplementary arguments
2167 ratelimit_error(uschar **log_msgptr, const char *format, ...)
2171 string_cat(NULL, US"error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: ");
2173 va_start(ap, format);
2174 g = string_vformat(g, SVFMT_EXTEND|SVFMT_REBUFFER, format, ap);
2177 gstring_release_unused(g);
2178 *log_msgptr = string_from_gstring(g);
2185 /*************************************************
2186 * Handle rate limiting *
2187 *************************************************/
2189 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2190 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2192 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2193 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2194 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2195 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2198 arg the option string for ratelimit=
2199 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2200 log_msgptr for error messages
2202 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2203 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2204 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2205 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2209 acl_ratelimit(const uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2211 double limit, period, count;
2214 uschar *unique = NULL;
2216 BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, readonly = FALSE;
2217 BOOL noupdate = FALSE, badacl = FALSE;
2218 int mode = RATE_PER_WHAT;
2220 tree_node **anchor, *t;
2221 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
2223 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
2224 dbdata_ratelimit_unique *dbdb;
2227 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2228 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2229 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2231 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period / maximum burst
2232 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2233 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2235 if (!(sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
2236 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "sender rate limit not set");
2238 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2239 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2240 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2241 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2243 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
2244 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2245 "\"%s\" is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);
2247 /* Second is the rate measurement period / exponential smoothing time
2248 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2249 run-time division errors. */
2251 period = !(sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0))
2252 ? -1.0 : readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2254 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2255 "\"%s\" is not a time value", sender_rate_period);
2257 /* By default we are counting one of something, but the per_rcpt,
2258 per_byte, and count options can change this. */
2262 /* Parse the other options. */
2264 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
2266 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2267 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2268 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
2269 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"readonly") == 0) readonly = TRUE;
2270 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) RATE_SET(mode, PER_CMD);
2271 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0)
2273 RATE_SET(mode, PER_CONN);
2274 if (where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
2277 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0)
2279 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2280 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
2282 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0)
2284 /* If we are running in the RCPT ACL, then we'll count the recipients
2285 one by one, but if we are running when we have accumulated the whole
2286 list then we'll add them all in one batch. */
2287 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
2288 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
2289 else if (where >= ACL_WHERE_PREDATA && where <= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2290 RATE_SET(mode, PER_ALLRCPTS), count = (double)recipients_count;
2291 else if (where == ACL_WHERE_MAIL || where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2292 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT), badacl = TRUE;
2294 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0)
2296 /* If we have not yet received the message data and there was no SIZE
2297 declaration on the MAIL command, then it's safe to just use a value of
2298 zero and let the recorded rate decay as if nothing happened. */
2299 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2300 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
2301 else count = message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size;
2303 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_addr") == 0)
2305 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
2306 if (where != ACL_WHERE_RCPT) badacl = TRUE, unique = US"*";
2307 else unique = string_sprintf("%s@%s", deliver_localpart, deliver_domain);
2309 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"count=", 6) == 0)
2312 count = Ustrtod(ss+6, &e);
2313 if (count < 0.0 || *e != '\0')
2314 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "\"%s\" is not a positive number", ss);
2316 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"unique=", 7) == 0)
2317 unique = string_copy(ss + 7);
2319 key = string_copy(ss);
2321 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s", key, ss);
2324 /* Sanity check. When the badacl flag is set the update mode must either
2325 be readonly (which is the default if it is omitted) or, for backwards
2326 compatibility, a combination of noupdate and strict or leaky. */
2328 if (mode == RATE_PER_CLASH)
2329 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting per_* options");
2330 if (leaky + strict + readonly > 1)
2331 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting update modes");
2332 if (badacl && (leaky || strict) && !noupdate)
2333 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2334 "\"%s\" must not have /leaky or /strict option, or cannot be used in %s ACL",
2335 ratelimit_option_string[mode], acl_wherenames[where]);
2337 /* Set the default values of any unset options. In readonly mode we
2338 perform the rate computation without any increment so that its value
2339 decays to eventually allow over-limit senders through. */
2341 if (noupdate) readonly = TRUE, leaky = strict = FALSE;
2342 if (badacl) readonly = TRUE;
2343 if (readonly) count = 0.0;
2344 if (!strict && !readonly) leaky = TRUE;
2345 if (mode == RATE_PER_WHAT) mode = RATE_PER_MAIL;
2347 /* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
2348 If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
2349 omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
2350 are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */
2353 key = !sender_host_address ? US"" : sender_host_address;
2355 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s%s",
2357 ratelimit_option_string[mode],
2358 unique == NULL ? "" : "unique/",
2362 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit condition count=%.0f %.1f/%s\n", count, limit, key);
2364 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
2365 For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
2366 pool so that they survive across resets. In readonly mode we only remember the
2367 result for the rest of this command in case a later command changes it. After
2368 this bit of logic the code is independent of the per_* mode. */
2370 old_pool = store_pool;
2373 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2377 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2378 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2382 case RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS:
2383 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2388 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2391 anchor = NULL; /* silence an "unused" complaint */
2392 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
2393 "internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
2397 if ((t = tree_search(*anchor, key)))
2400 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2401 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
2402 store_pool = old_pool;
2403 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2405 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2409 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
2410 from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */
2412 if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
2414 store_pool = old_pool;
2416 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit database not available\n");
2417 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2420 dbdb = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, &dbdb_size);
2423 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2427 /* Locate the basic ratelimit block inside the DB data. */
2428 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found key in database\n");
2431 /* Forget the old Bloom filter if it is too old, so that we count each
2432 repeating event once per period. We don't simply clear and re-use the old
2433 filter because we want its size to change if the limit changes. Note that
2434 we keep the dbd pointer for copying the rate into the new data block. */
2436 if(unique && tv.tv_sec > dbdb->bloom_epoch + period)
2438 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding old Bloom filter\n");
2444 if(unique && dbdb_size < sizeof(*dbdb))
2446 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding undersize Bloom filter\n");
2451 /* Allocate a new data block if the database lookup failed
2452 or the Bloom filter passed its age limit. */
2458 /* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
2459 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
2460 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
2461 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
2466 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new Bloom filter\n");
2468 /* See the long comment below for an explanation of the magic number 2.
2469 The filter has a minimum size in case the rate limit is very small;
2470 this is determined by the definition of dbdata_ratelimit_unique. */
2472 extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
2473 if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
2474 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
2475 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
2476 dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
2477 dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
2478 memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);
2480 /* Preserve any basic ratelimit data (which is our longer-term memory)
2481 by copying it from the discarded block. */
2491 /* If we are counting unique events, find out if this event is new or not.
2492 If the client repeats the event during the current period then it should be
2493 counted. We skip this code in readonly mode for efficiency, because any
2494 changes to the filter will be discarded and because count is already set to
2497 if (unique && !readonly)
2499 /* We identify unique events using a Bloom filter. (You can find my
2500 notes on Bloom filters at http://fanf.livejournal.com/81696.html)
2501 With the per_addr option, an "event" is a recipient address, though the
2502 user can use the unique option to define their own events. We only count
2503 an event if we have not seen it before.
2505 We size the filter according to the rate limit, which (in leaky mode)
2506 is the limit on the population of the filter. We allow 16 bits of space
2507 per entry (see the construction code above) and we set (up to) 8 of them
2508 when inserting an element (see the loop below). The probability of a false
2509 positive (an event we have not seen before but which we fail to count) is
2513 allzero = exp(-numhash * pop / size)
2514 = exp(-0.5 * pop / limit)
2515 fpr = pow(1 - allzero, numhash)
2517 For senders at the limit the fpr is 0.06% or 1 in 1700
2518 and for senders at half the limit it is 0.0006% or 1 in 170000
2520 In strict mode the Bloom filter can fill up beyond the normal limit, in
2521 which case the false positive rate will rise. This means that the
2522 measured rate for very fast senders can bogusly drop off after a while.
2524 At twice the limit, the fpr is 2.5% or 1 in 40
2525 At four times the limit, it is 31% or 1 in 3.2
2527 It takes ln(pop/limit) periods for an over-limit burst of pop events to
2528 decay below the limit, and if this is more than one then the Bloom filter
2529 will be discarded before the decay gets that far. The false positive rate
2530 at this threshold is 9.3% or 1 in 10.7. */
2533 unsigned n, hash, hinc;
2537 /* Instead of using eight independent hash values, we combine two values
2538 using the formula h1 + n * h2. This does not harm the Bloom filter's
2539 performance, and means the amount of hash we need is independent of the
2540 number of bits we set in the filter. */
2542 md5_start(&md5info);
2543 md5_end(&md5info, unique, Ustrlen(unique), md5sum);
2544 hash = md5sum[0] | md5sum[1] << 8 | md5sum[2] << 16 | md5sum[3] << 24;
2545 hinc = md5sum[4] | md5sum[5] << 8 | md5sum[6] << 16 | md5sum[7] << 24;
2547 /* Scan the bits corresponding to this event. A zero bit means we have
2548 not seen it before. Ensure all bits are set to record this event. */
2550 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit checking uniqueness of %s\n", unique);
2553 for (n = 0; n < 8; n++, hash += hinc)
2555 int bit = 1 << (hash % 8);
2556 int byte = (hash / 8) % dbdb->bloom_size;
2557 if ((dbdb->bloom[byte] & bit) == 0)
2559 dbdb->bloom[byte] |= bit;
2564 /* If this event has occurred before, do not count it. */
2568 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event found in Bloom filter\n");
2572 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event added to Bloom filter\n");
2575 /* If there was no previous ratelimit data block for this key, initialize
2576 the new one, otherwise update the block from the database. The initial rate
2577 is what would be computed by the code below for an infinite interval. */
2581 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit initializing new key's rate data\n");
2583 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2584 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2589 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2590 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2591 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2592 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2594 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2595 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2596 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2597 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2598 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2600 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2601 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2602 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2604 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2605 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2606 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2607 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2609 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2611 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2612 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2613 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2614 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2615 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2616 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2618 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2620 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2621 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2622 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2623 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2625 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2626 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2627 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2628 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2629 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2631 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2632 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2633 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2634 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2636 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2637 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2638 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2640 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2641 : this_time - prev_time;
2643 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2644 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2646 /* Combine the instantaneous rate (period / interval) with the previous rate
2647 using the smoothing factor a. In order to measure sized events, multiply the
2648 instantaneous rate by the count of bytes or recipients etc. */
2650 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2651 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2652 dbd->rate = (1 - a) * count / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2654 /* When events are very widely spaced the computed rate tends towards zero.
2655 Although this is accurate it turns out not to be useful for our purposes,
2656 especially when the first event after a long silence is the start of a spam
2657 run. A more useful model is that the rate for an isolated event should be the
2658 size of the event per the period size, ignoring the lack of events outside
2659 the current period and regardless of where the event falls in the period. So,
2660 if the interval was so long that the calculated rate is unhelpfully small, we
2661 re-initialize the rate. In the absence of higher-rate bursts, the condition
2662 below is true if the interval is greater than the period. */
2664 if (dbd->rate < count) dbd->rate = count;
2667 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit.
2668 This matters for edge cases such as a limit of zero, when the client
2669 should be completely blocked. */
2671 rc = dbd->rate < limit ? FAIL : OK;
2673 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2674 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2675 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2676 rate preventing them from getting any email through. If readonly is set,
2677 neither leaky nor strict are set, so we do not do any updates. */
2679 if ((rc == FAIL && leaky) || strict)
2681 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbdb, dbdb_size);
2682 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db updated\n");
2686 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
2687 readonly? "readonly mode" : "over the limit, but leaky");
2692 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference. Take the taint status
2693 from the key for consistency even though it's unlikely we'll ever expand this. */
2695 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key), is_tainted(key));
2697 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2698 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2700 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2701 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2703 store_pool = old_pool;
2704 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2707 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2714 /*************************************************
2715 * The udpsend ACL modifier *
2716 *************************************************/
2718 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below.
2721 arg the option string for udpsend=
2722 log_msgptr for error messages
2724 Returns: OK - Completed.
2725 DEFER - Problem with DNS lookup.
2726 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2730 acl_udpsend(const uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
2742 hostname = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2743 portstr = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2747 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination host in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2752 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2757 *log_msgptr = US"missing datagram payload in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2760 portnum = Ustrtol(portstr, &portend, 10);
2761 if (*portend != '\0')
2763 *log_msgptr = US"bad destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2767 /* Make a single-item host list. */
2768 h = store_get(sizeof(host_item), FALSE);
2769 memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item));
2774 if (string_is_ip_address(hostname, NULL))
2775 h->address = hostname, r = HOST_FOUND;
2777 r = host_find_byname(h, NULL, 0, NULL, FALSE);
2778 if (r == HOST_FIND_FAILED || r == HOST_FIND_AGAIN)
2780 *log_msgptr = US"DNS lookup failed in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2785 debug_printf_indent("udpsend [%s]:%d %s\n", h->address, portnum, arg);
2787 /*XXX this could better use sendto */
2788 r = s = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_DGRAM, h->address, portnum, portnum,
2789 1, NULL, &errstr, NULL);
2790 if (r < 0) goto defer;
2792 r = send(s, arg, len, 0);
2795 errstr = US strerror(errno);
2803 string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" truncated from %d to %d octets", len, r);
2808 debug_printf_indent("udpsend %d bytes\n", r);
2813 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" failed: %s", errstr);
2819 /*************************************************
2820 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2821 *************************************************/
2823 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2827 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2828 where where called from
2829 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2830 level the nesting level
2831 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2832 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2833 user_msgptr user message pointer
2834 log_msgptr log message pointer
2835 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2837 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2838 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2839 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2840 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2841 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2842 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2843 but can be temporary callout problem)
2844 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2849 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2850 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2851 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2853 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2854 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2856 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2860 for (; cb; cb = cb->next)
2865 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2866 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2868 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2870 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent(" message: %s\n", cb->arg);
2871 user_message = cb->arg;
2875 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2877 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("l_message: %s\n", cb->arg);
2878 log_message = cb->arg;
2882 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2883 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2885 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2891 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2892 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2893 checking functions in some cases. */
2895 if (!conditions[cb->type].expand_at_top)
2897 else if (!(arg = expand_string(cb->arg)))
2899 if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2900 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2901 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2902 return f.search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
2905 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2910 debug_printf_indent("check %s%s %n",
2911 (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2912 conditions[cb->type].name, &lhswidth);
2914 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2916 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2917 if ( Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0
2918 || Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
2920 debug_printf("%s ", cb->u.varname);
2926 debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
2927 lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
2931 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2934 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2938 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2940 if ((conditions[cb->type].forbids & (1 << where)) != 0)
2942 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2943 conditions[cb->type].is_modifier ? "use" : "test",
2944 conditions[cb->type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
2948 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2949 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2953 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
2957 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2961 rc = acl_check_wargs(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2962 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2964 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2965 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2971 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2972 rc = sender_host_authenticated ? match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated,
2973 &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL) : FAIL;
2976 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2977 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2979 int old_pool = store_pool;
2980 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2981 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2982 store_pool = old_pool;
2987 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2988 /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
2989 expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
2990 different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
2992 ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */
2993 : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2994 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2996 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2997 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2998 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2999 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
3001 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
3004 case ACLC_CONTINUE: /* Always succeeds */
3009 const uschar *p = NULL;
3010 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
3012 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
3014 if (controls_list[control_type].forbids & (1 << where))
3016 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
3017 controls_list[control_type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
3021 switch(control_type)
3023 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
3024 f.allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
3027 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
3028 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
3033 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3034 case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
3035 f.dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
3036 # ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
3037 /* Since DKIM was blocked, skip DMARC too */
3038 f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3039 f.dmarc_enable_forensic = FALSE;
3044 #ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
3045 case CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY:
3046 f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3049 case CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC:
3050 f.dmarc_enable_forensic = TRUE;
3057 int fd, af, level, optname, value;
3058 /* If we are acting on stdin, the setsockopt may fail if stdin is not
3059 a socket; we can accept that, we'll just debug-log failures anyway. */
3060 fd = fileno(smtp_in);
3061 if ((af = ip_get_address_family(fd)) < 0)
3064 debug_printf_indent("smtp input is probably not a socket [%s], not setting DSCP\n",
3068 if (dscp_lookup(p+1, af, &level, &optname, &value))
3069 if (setsockopt(fd, level, optname, &value, sizeof(value)) < 0)
3071 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("failed to set input DSCP[%s]: %s\n",
3072 p+1, strerror(errno));
3076 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("set input DSCP to \"%s\"\n", p+1);
3080 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised DSCP value in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3086 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3094 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
3095 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
3098 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
3099 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
3102 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
3103 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
3106 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
3107 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
3110 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3111 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
3112 f.no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
3116 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
3117 f.no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
3120 case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
3121 f.pipelining_enable = FALSE;
3124 case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
3125 f.disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
3128 case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
3129 f.disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
3132 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
3133 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"fakereject");
3134 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
3135 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
3138 const uschar *pp = p + 1;
3140 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
3143 else /* Explicitly reset to default string */
3144 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
3147 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
3148 f.deliver_freeze = TRUE;
3149 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
3150 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
3151 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
3158 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3161 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"item frozen");
3165 f.queue_only_policy = TRUE;
3166 if (Ustrcmp(p, "_only") == 0)
3168 else while (*p == '/')
3169 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/only", 5) == 0)
3170 { p += 5; f.queue_smtp = FALSE; }
3171 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/first_pass_route", 17) == 0)
3172 { p += 17; f.queue_smtp = TRUE; }
3175 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"queueing forced");
3178 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
3179 originator_name = US"";
3180 f.submission_mode = TRUE;
3183 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
3186 f.active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
3187 f.active_local_from_check = FALSE;
3189 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
3191 const uschar *pp = p + 8;
3192 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3193 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
3196 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
3198 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
3200 const uschar *pp = p + 6;
3202 submission_name = parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6);
3209 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3216 uschar * debug_tag = NULL;
3217 uschar * debug_opts = NULL;
3222 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3223 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "tag=", 4) == 0)
3225 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3226 debug_tag = string_copyn(p+5, pp-p-5);
3228 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "opts=", 5) == 0)
3230 for (pp += 5; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3231 debug_opts = string_copyn(p+6, pp-p-6);
3233 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "kill", 4) == 0)
3235 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3239 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3244 debug_logging_stop();
3246 debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
3250 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
3251 f.suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
3254 case CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY:
3256 uschar * ignored = NULL;
3257 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
3262 /* Too hard to think about for now. We might in future cutthrough
3263 the case where both sides handle prdr and this-node prdr acl
3265 ignored = US"PRDR active";
3266 else if (f.deliver_freeze)
3267 ignored = US"frozen";
3268 else if (f.queue_only_policy)
3269 ignored = US"queue-only";
3270 else if (fake_response == FAIL)
3271 ignored = US"fakereject";
3272 else if (rcpt_count != 1)
3273 ignored = US"nonfirst rcpt";
3274 else if (cutthrough.delivery)
3275 ignored = US"repeated";
3276 else if (cutthrough.callout_hold_only)
3279 debug_printf_indent(" cutthrough request upgrades callout hold\n");
3280 cutthrough.callout_hold_only = FALSE;
3281 cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
3285 cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
3288 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3289 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
3292 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
3293 /* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool") == 0) ; default */
3296 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3301 DEBUG(D_acl) if (ignored)
3302 debug_printf(" cutthrough request ignored on %s item\n", ignored);
3307 case CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT:
3312 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3313 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
3314 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3320 message_utf8_downconvert = 0;
3321 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3322 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3326 if (p[1] == '-' && p[2] == '1')
3328 message_utf8_downconvert = -1;
3329 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3330 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = TRUE;
3334 *log_msgptr = US"bad option value for control=utf8_downconvert";
3338 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3339 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
3340 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3350 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
3353 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3354 const uschar * list = arg;
3355 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
3356 /* Run the dcc backend. */
3357 rc = dcc_process(&ss);
3358 /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
3359 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
3360 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3361 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3366 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3368 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
3374 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
3377 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
3378 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
3383 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
3388 debug_printf_indent("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
3391 /* NOTE 1: Remember that we may be
3392 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
3393 Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
3394 smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
3396 NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
3397 apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
3402 if (smtp_out && !f.disable_delay_flush)
3405 #if !defined(NO_POLL_H) && defined (POLLRDHUP)
3411 p.fd = fileno(smtp_out);
3412 p.events = POLLRDHUP;
3415 if (poll(&p, n, delay*1000) > 0)
3416 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay cancelled by peer close\n");
3419 /* Lacking POLLRDHUP it appears to be impossible to detect that a
3420 TCP/IP connection has gone away without reading from it. This means
3421 that we cannot shorten the delay below if the client goes away,
3422 because we cannot discover that the client has closed its end of the
3423 connection. (The connection is actually in a half-closed state,
3424 waiting for the server to close its end.) It would be nice to be able
3425 to detect this state, so that the Exim process is not held up
3426 unnecessarily. However, it seems that we can't. The poll() function
3427 does not do the right thing, and in any case it is not always
3430 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
3437 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3438 case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
3439 if (dkim_cur_signer)
3440 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
3441 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3446 case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
3447 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_verify_status,
3448 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3452 #ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
3453 case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS:
3454 if (!f.dmarc_has_been_checked)
3456 f.dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
3457 /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
3458 * view into the process in the future. */
3459 rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS),
3460 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3465 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, &arg, log_msgptr);
3469 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
3470 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
3473 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
3474 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
3475 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
3476 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
3477 writing is poorly documented. */
3479 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
3480 if (tls_in.cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
3482 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
3483 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':');
3484 if (!cipher) cipher = tls_in.cipher; else
3486 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
3487 if (endcipher) *endcipher = 0;
3489 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
3490 if (endcipher) *endcipher = ':';
3494 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
3495 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
3496 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
3497 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
3498 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
3499 message in the same SMTP connection. */
3502 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
3503 sender_host_address ? sender_host_address : US"", CUSS &host_data);
3504 if (rc == DEFER) *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3505 if (host_data) host_data = string_copy_perm(host_data, TRUE);
3508 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
3509 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
3510 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
3511 CUSS &deliver_localpart_data);
3514 case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
3518 const uschar *s = arg;
3520 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, NULL, 0)))
3522 if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
3523 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
3524 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT;
3527 logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
3528 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name \"%s\" in "
3529 "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]);
3532 log_reject_target = logbits;
3539 const uschar *s = arg;
3545 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
3546 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
3547 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
3548 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
3549 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
3550 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
3553 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
3554 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
3555 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
3561 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
3563 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
3564 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
3568 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3569 case ACLC_MALWARE: /* Run the malware backend. */
3571 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3572 const uschar * list = arg;
3573 uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
3575 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
3578 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
3579 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0)
3581 else if ( strncmpic(opt, US"tmo=", 4) == 0
3582 && (timeout = readconf_readtime(opt+4, '\0', FALSE)) < 0
3585 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad timeout value in '%s'", opt);
3589 rc = malware(ss, timeout);
3590 if (rc == DEFER && defer_ok)
3591 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3595 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
3596 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
3601 if (is_tainted(arg))
3603 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted",
3607 if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
3609 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
3610 "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
3613 queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE);
3616 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
3617 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
3620 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
3621 rc = match_address_list(CUS addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
3622 CUSS &recipient_data);
3625 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3631 case ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER:
3632 setup_remove_header(arg);
3635 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
3638 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
3639 sdomain = sdomain ? sdomain + 1 : US"";
3640 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
3641 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
3646 rc = match_address_list(CUS sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
3647 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, CUSS &sender_data);
3650 /* Connection variables must persist forever; message variables not */
3654 int old_pool = store_pool;
3655 if ( cb->u.varname[0] != 'm'
3656 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
3657 || event_name /* An event is being delivered */
3660 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3661 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM /* Overwriteable dkim result variables */
3662 if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0)
3663 dkim_verify_status = string_copy(arg);
3664 else if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
3665 dkim_verify_reason = string_copy(arg);
3668 acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
3669 store_pool = old_pool;
3673 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3676 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3677 const uschar * list = arg;
3678 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
3680 rc = spam(CUSS &ss);
3681 /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
3682 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
3683 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3684 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3691 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL);
3693 case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
3694 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
3699 rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr);
3702 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
3703 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
3704 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
3705 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
3706 (until something changes it). */
3709 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
3711 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
3712 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
3716 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
3717 "condition %d", cb->type);
3721 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
3723 if (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)
3724 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
3725 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
3727 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
3731 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
3732 handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make
3733 it the same as the user message.
3735 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
3736 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
3738 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
3739 message that is already set.
3741 Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but
3742 for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and
3743 when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no
3744 "endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is
3747 if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;
3749 if ((BIT(rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
3752 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3753 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
3755 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
3756 nested ACLs) are always discarded. This also happens for acceptance verbs
3757 when they actually do accept. Only messages specified at this level are used.
3758 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
3759 during expansions. */
3761 if (verb == ACL_WARN ||
3762 (rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
3763 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3767 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
3768 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
3771 if (!f.expand_string_forcedfail)
3772 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3773 user_message, expand_string_message);
3775 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
3780 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
3781 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
3784 if (!f.expand_string_forcedfail)
3785 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3786 log_message, expand_string_message);
3788 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
3790 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
3791 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
3795 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
3797 if (!*log_msgptr) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3800 acl_verify_message = NULL;
3808 /*************************************************
3809 * Get line from a literal ACL *
3810 *************************************************/
3812 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
3813 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
3814 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
3816 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
3817 Exim configuration file. That is:
3819 . Leading spaces are ignored.
3821 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
3822 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
3823 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
3825 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
3826 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
3828 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
3831 Returns: a pointer to the next line
3835 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
3836 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3844 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3848 Uskip_whitespace(&acl_text); /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3849 if (!*acl_text) return NULL; /* No more data */
3850 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
3852 while (*acl_text && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3854 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3855 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3857 if (!*acl_text) return *yield == '#' ? NULL : yield;
3859 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3860 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3862 if (*yield != '#') break;
3865 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3866 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3867 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3868 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3873 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3875 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3884 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3885 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3890 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
3891 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
3892 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
3895 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3896 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3897 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3899 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
3900 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
3902 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3903 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
3906 /* Control does not reach here */
3913 /*************************************************
3914 * Check access using an ACL *
3915 *************************************************/
3917 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3918 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3919 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3920 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3921 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3922 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3923 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3924 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3925 appears immediately above.
3928 where where called from
3929 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3930 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3931 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3932 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3934 Returns: OK access is granted
3935 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3936 FAIL access is denied
3937 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3938 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3943 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s,
3944 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3947 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3948 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3951 /* Catch configuration loops */
3955 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3961 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3965 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3966 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3970 if (!(ss = expand_string(s)))
3972 if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3973 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3974 expand_string_message);
3980 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
3982 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3983 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3987 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3988 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3989 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3990 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3991 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3993 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3995 tree_node * t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3998 if (!(acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr)))
4000 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
4003 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
4004 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
4007 else if (*ss == '/')
4009 struct stat statbuf;
4012 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
4013 "attempt to open tainted ACL file name \"%s\"", ss);
4014 /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
4015 *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
4018 if ((fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
4020 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
4024 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
4026 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
4031 /* If the string being used as a filename is tainted, so is the file content */
4032 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1, is_tainted(ss));
4033 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
4035 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
4037 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
4038 ss, strerror(errno));
4041 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
4044 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
4045 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
4049 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
4050 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
4051 persists between multiple messages. */
4055 int old_pool = store_pool;
4056 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
4057 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
4058 store_pool = old_pool;
4059 if (!acl && *log_msgptr) return ERROR;
4062 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss), is_tainted(ss));
4063 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
4065 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
4069 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
4074 int basic_errno = 0;
4075 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
4076 BOOL acl_quit_check = acl_level == 0
4077 && (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT);
4079 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
4080 f.acl_temp_details = FALSE;
4082 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("processing \"%s\" (%s %d)\n",
4083 verbs[acl->verb], acl->srcfile, acl->srcline);
4085 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
4088 search_error_message = NULL;
4089 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, acl_level,
4090 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
4092 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
4093 ERROR always causes a return. */
4098 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test deferred in %s\n",
4099 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4100 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
4102 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
4103 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
4104 if (smtp_return_error_details) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4107 f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4108 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
4111 default: /* Paranoia */
4113 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test error in %s\n",
4114 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4118 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test succeeded in %s\n",
4119 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4123 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test failed in %s\n",
4124 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4127 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
4128 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
4131 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\" in %s\n",
4132 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4136 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\" in %s\n",
4137 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4141 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
4142 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
4143 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
4148 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
4150 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: ACCEPT\n", acl_name);
4155 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
4163 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DEFER\n", acl_name);
4164 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4165 f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4173 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DENY\n", acl_name);
4174 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4180 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
4182 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DISCARD\n", acl_name);
4183 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4189 debug_printf_indent("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
4197 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DROP\n", acl_name);
4198 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4206 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: not OK\n", acl_name);
4207 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4214 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
4215 else if (cond == DEFER && LOGGING(acl_warn_skipped))
4216 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
4217 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
4218 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
4219 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
4220 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
4224 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
4229 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
4234 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
4236 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
4240 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("QUIT or not-QUIT toplevel ACL may not fail "
4241 "('%s' verb used incorrectly)", verbs[acl->verb]);
4248 /* Same args as acl_check_internal() above, but the string s is
4249 the name of an ACL followed optionally by up to 9 space-separated arguments.
4250 The name and args are separately expanded. Args go into $acl_arg globals. */
4252 acl_check_wargs(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *s,
4253 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
4256 uschar * tmp_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
4257 uschar * sav_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
4263 if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(name = expand_string(tmp)))
4266 for (i = 0; i < 9; i++)
4268 while (*s && isspace(*s)) s++;
4270 if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(tmp_arg[i] = expand_string(tmp)))
4277 sav_narg = acl_narg;
4279 for (i = 0; i < acl_narg; i++)
4281 sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
4282 acl_arg[i] = tmp_arg[i];
4286 sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
4287 acl_arg[i++] = NULL;
4291 ret = acl_check_internal(where, addr, name, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4294 acl_narg = sav_narg;
4295 for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) acl_arg[i] = sav_arg[i];
4299 if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return ERROR;
4300 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
4301 tmp, expand_string_message);
4302 return f.search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
4307 /*************************************************
4308 * Check access using an ACL *
4309 *************************************************/
4311 /* Alternate interface for ACL, used by expansions */
4313 acl_eval(int where, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
4316 address_item *addr = NULL;
4319 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
4320 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
4321 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
4322 log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
4324 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
4326 adb = address_defaults;
4328 addr->address = expand_string(US"$local_part@$domain");
4329 addr->domain = deliver_domain;
4330 addr->local_part = deliver_localpart;
4331 addr->cc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
4332 addr->lc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
4336 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4343 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
4344 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
4345 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
4348 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
4349 recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
4350 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
4351 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
4352 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
4354 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
4355 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
4356 FAIL access is denied
4357 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
4358 DEFER can't tell at the moment
4361 int acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
4364 acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
4365 uschar **log_msgptr)
4369 address_item *addr = NULL;
4371 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
4372 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
4373 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
4374 log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
4376 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
4377 if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY || where==ACL_WHERE_PRDR)
4379 if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY)
4382 adb = address_defaults;
4384 addr->address = recipient;
4385 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
4387 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
4391 if ((addr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
4393 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
4394 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
4397 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
4398 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
4403 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4405 acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
4407 /* Cutthrough - if requested,
4408 and WHERE_RCPT and not yet opened conn as result of recipient-verify,
4409 and rcpt acl returned accept,
4410 and first recipient (cancel on any subsequents)
4411 open one now and run it up to RCPT acceptance.
4412 A failed verify should cancel cutthrough request,
4413 and will pass the fail to the originator.
4414 Initial implementation: dual-write to spool.
4415 Assume the rxd datastream is now being copied byte-for-byte to an open cutthrough connection.
4417 Cease cutthrough copy on rxd final dot; do not send one.
4419 On a data acl, if not accept and a cutthrough conn is open, hard-close it (no SMTP niceness).
4421 On data acl accept, terminate the dataphase on an open cutthrough conn. If accepted or
4422 perm-rejected, reflect that to the original sender - and dump the spooled copy.
4423 If temp-reject, close the conn (and keep the spooled copy).
4424 If conn-failure, no action (and keep the spooled copy).
4428 case ACL_WHERE_RCPT:
4429 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
4430 case ACL_WHERE_PRDR:
4433 if (f.host_checking_callout) /* -bhc mode */
4434 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"host-checking mode");
4437 && cutthrough.delivery
4438 && rcpt_count > cutthrough.nrcpt
4441 if ((rc = open_cutthrough_connection(addr)) == DEFER)
4442 if (cutthrough.defer_pass)
4444 uschar * s = addr->message;
4445 /* Horrid kludge to recover target's SMTP message */
4447 do --s; while (!isdigit(*s));
4448 if (*--s && isdigit(*s) && *--s && isdigit(*s)) *user_msgptr = s;
4449 f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4453 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("cutthrough defer; will spool\n");
4457 else HDEBUG(D_acl) if (cutthrough.delivery)
4458 if (rcpt_count <= cutthrough.nrcpt)
4459 debug_printf_indent("ignore cutthrough request; nonfirst message\n");
4461 debug_printf_indent("ignore cutthrough request; ACL did not accept\n");
4464 case ACL_WHERE_PREDATA:
4466 cutthrough_predata();
4468 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"predata acl not ok");
4471 case ACL_WHERE_QUIT:
4472 case ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT:
4473 /* Drop cutthrough conns, and drop heldopen verify conns if
4474 the previous was not DATA */
4476 uschar prev = smtp_connection_had[smtp_ch_index-2];
4477 BOOL dropverify = !(prev == SCH_DATA || prev == SCH_BDAT);
4479 cancel_cutthrough_connection(dropverify, US"quit or conndrop");
4487 deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
4488 deliver_domain_data = sender_address_data = NULL;
4490 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
4491 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
4495 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
4497 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
4498 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
4504 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
4506 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
4508 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
4509 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
4513 /* Before giving a response, take a look at the length of any user message, and
4514 split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
4516 *user_msgptr = string_split_message(*user_msgptr);
4517 if (fake_response != OK)
4518 fake_response_text = string_split_message(fake_response_text);
4524 /*************************************************
4525 * Create ACL variable *
4526 *************************************************/
4528 /* Create an ACL variable or reuse an existing one. ACL variables are in a
4529 binary tree (see tree.c) with acl_var_c and acl_var_m as root nodes.
4532 name pointer to the variable's name, starting with c or m
4534 Returns the pointer to variable's tree node
4538 acl_var_create(uschar * name)
4540 tree_node * node, ** root = name[0] == 'c' ? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
4541 if (!(node = tree_search(*root, name)))
4543 node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name), is_tainted(name));
4544 Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
4545 (void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
4547 node->data.ptr = NULL;
4553 /*************************************************
4554 * Write an ACL variable in spool format *
4555 *************************************************/
4557 /* This function is used as a callback for tree_walk when writing variables to
4558 the spool file. To retain spool file compatibility, what is written is -aclc or
4559 -aclm followed by the rest of the name and the data length, space separated,
4560 then the value itself, starting on a new line, and terminated by an additional
4561 newline. When we had only numbered ACL variables, the first line might look
4562 like this: "-aclc 5 20". Now it might be "-aclc foo 20" for the variable called
4566 name of the variable
4567 value of the variable
4568 ctx FILE pointer (as a void pointer)
4574 acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx)
4576 FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx;
4577 if (is_tainted(value)) putc('-', f);
4578 fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);