Exim did stdio operations after fclose. This was exposed by a recent
change which nulled out the file handle after the fclose.
+JH/32 Bug 1909: Fix OCSP proof verification for cases where the proof is
+ signed directly by the cert-signing cert, rather than an intermediate
+ OCSP-signing cert. This is the model used by LetsEncrypt.
+
Exim version 4.87
-----------------
} server;
struct {
X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
+ STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack;
BOOL verify_required;
} client;
} u_ocsp;
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
cert))
ERR_clear_error();
+ sk_X509_push(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_stack, cert);
}
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
* Load OCSP information into state *
*************************************************/
+static STACK_OF(X509) *
+cert_stack_from_store(X509_STORE * store)
+{
+STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
+STACK_OF(X509) * sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+int i;
+
+for(i = sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
+ X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
+ if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
+ {
+ X509 * x = tmp_obj->data.x509;
+ sk_X509_push(sk, x);
+ }
+ }
+return sk;
+}
+
+static void
+cert_stack_free(STACK_OF(X509) * sk)
+{
+while (sk_X509_num(sk) > 0) (void) sk_X509_pop(sk);
+sk_X509_free(sk);
+}
+
+
+
/* Called to load the server OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
caller has determined this is needed. Checks validity. Debugs a message
if invalid.
static void
ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
{
-BIO *bio;
-OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
-OCSP_BASICRESP *basic_response;
-OCSP_SINGLERESP *single_response;
-ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
-X509_STORE *store;
+BIO * bio;
+OCSP_RESPONSE * resp;
+OCSP_BASICRESP * basic_response;
+OCSP_SINGLERESP * single_response;
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * rev, * thisupd, * nextupd;
+X509_STORE * store;
+STACK_OF(X509) * sk;
unsigned long verify_flags;
int status, reason, i;
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
}
-bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb");
-if (!bio)
+if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb")))
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
return;
}
-status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
-if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
+if ((status = OCSP_response_status(resp)) != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
goto bad;
}
-basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
-if (!basic_response)
+if (!(basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)))
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
}
store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
+sk = cert_stack_from_store(store);
verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
/* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
-i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, NULL, store, verify_flags);
-if (i <= 0)
+/* This does a full verify on the OCSP proof before we load it for serviing
+up; possibly overkill - just date-checks might be nice enough.
+
+OCSP_basic_verify takes a "store" arg, but does not
+use it for the chain verification, which is all we do
+when OCSP_NOVERIFY is set. The content from the wire
+"basic_response" and a cert-stack "sk" are all that is used.
+
+Seperately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not
+be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
+But what with? We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback.
+And there we NEED it; we miust verify that status... unless the
+library does it for us anyway? */
+
+if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, sk, NULL, verify_flags)) < 0)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
}
+ cert_stack_free(sk);
goto bad;
}
+cert_stack_free(sk);
/* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
one certificate we use, and nothing for anything else in a chain. If this
right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
-single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0);
-if (!single_response)
+
+if (!(single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0)))
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
/* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
/* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
- if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL,
+ if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_stack,
cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
}
else
+ {
cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_stack = NULL;
+ }
#endif
cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
return FAIL;
}
+ if (!(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_stack = sk_X509_new_null()))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create stack for stapling verify\n");
+ return FAIL;
+ }
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(*ctxp, tls_client_stapling_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
}
# '1: Server sends good staple on request'
#
exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server \
- -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.good.resp
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp
****
client-ssl \
-ocsp aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/ca_chain.pem \
# '2: Server does not staple an outdated response'
#
exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server \
- -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.dated.resp
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.dated.resp
****
# XXX test sequence might not be quite right; this is for a server refusal
# and we're expecting a client refusal.
# '3: Server does not staple a response for a revoked cert'
#
exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server \
- -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.revoked.resp
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.revoked.resp
****
client-ssl \
-ocsp aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/ca_chain.pem \
# '4: Connection functions when server is prepared to staple but client does not request it'
#
exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server \
- -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.good.resp
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp
****
#
client-ssl \
#
# Client works when we don't request OCSP stapling
exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server \
- -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.good.resp
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp
****
exim nostaple@test.ex
test message.
#
# Client fails on revoked stapled info
EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK=y exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server \
- -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.revoked.resp
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.revoked.resp
****
exim CALLER@test.ex
test message.
#
# Client fails on expired stapled info
EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK=y exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server \
- -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.dated.resp
+ -DRETURN=DIR/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.dated.resp
****
exim CALLER@test.ex
test message.
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+static STACK_OF(X509) *
+cert_stack_from_store(X509_STORE * store)
+{
+STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
+STACK_OF(X509) * sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+int i;
+
+for(i = sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ {
+ X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
+ if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
+ {
+ X509 * x = tmp_obj->data.x509;
+ sk_X509_push(sk, x);
+ }
+ }
+return sk;
+}
+
+static void
+cert_stack_free(STACK_OF(X509) * sk)
+{
+while (sk_X509_num(sk) > 0) (void) sk_X509_pop(sk);
+sk_X509_free(sk);
+}
+
+
static int
tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
{
OCSP_BASICRESP *bs;
char *CAfile = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+STACK_OF(X509) * sk;
int ret = 1;
len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
return 0;
}
+
CAfile = ocsp_stapling;
if(!(store = setup_verify(arg, CAfile, NULL)))
{
return 0;
}
-/* No file of alternate certs, no options */
-if(OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL, store, 0) <= 0)
+sk = cert_stack_from_store(store);
+
+/* OCSP_basic_verify takes a "store" arg, but does not
+use it for the chain verification, which is all we do
+when OCSP_NOVERIFY is set. The content from the wire
+(in "bs") and a cert-stack "sk" are all that is used. */
+
+if(OCSP_basic_verify(bs, sk, NULL, OCSP_NOVERIFY) <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(arg, "Response Verify Failure\n");
ERR_print_errors(arg);
else
BIO_printf(arg, "Response verify OK\n");
+cert_stack_free(sk);
X509_STORE_free(store);
return ret;
}
******** SERVER ********
-Exim version x.yz ....
-configuration file is TESTSUITE/test-config
-admin user
-daemon_smtp_port overridden by -oX:
- <: 1225
-listening on all interfaces (IPv6) port 1225
-listening on all interfaces (IPv4) port 1225
-pid written to TESTSUITE/spool/exim-daemon.pid
-LOG: MAIN
- exim x.yz daemon started: pid=pppp, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port 1225
-daemon running with uid=EXIM_UID gid=EXIM_GID euid=EXIM_UID egid=EXIM_GID
-Listening...
-Connection request from ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4 port 51808
-1 SMTP accept process running
-Listening...
-11402 Process 11402 is handling incoming connection from [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]
-LOG: MAIN
- acl_conn: ocsp in status: 0 (notreq)
-Process 11402 is ready for new message
-setting SSL CTX options: 0x1100000
-Diffie-Hellman initialized from default with 2048-bit prime
-ECDH: curve 'prime256v1'
-ECDH: enabled 'prime256v1' curve
-tls_certificate file TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem
-tls_privatekey file TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.unlocked.key
-tls_ocsp_file TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.good.resp
-Initialized TLS
-Added 1 certificate authorities.
-Calling SSL_accept
-SSL info: before/accept initialization
-SSL info: before/accept initialization
-Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); have response
-SSL info: SSLv3 read client hello A
-SSL info: SSLv3 write server hello A
-SSL info: SSLv3 write certificate A
-SSL info: unknown state
-SSL info: SSLv3 write key exchange A
-SSL info: SSLv3 write certificate request A
-SSL info: SSLv3 flush data
-SSL authenticated verify ok: depth=0 SN=/C=UK/O=The Exim Maintainers/OU=Test Suite/CN=Phil Pennock
-SSL info: SSLv3 read client certificate A
-SSL info: SSLv3 read client key exchange A
-SSL info: SSLv3 read certificate verify A
-SSL info: SSLv3 read finished A
-SSL info: SSLv3 write session ticket A
-SSL info: SSLv3 write change cipher spec A
-SSL info: SSLv3 write finished A
-SSL info: SSLv3 flush data
-SSL info: SSL negotiation finished successfully
-SSL info: SSL negotiation finished successfully
-SSL_accept was successful
-Cipher: TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256
-Shared ciphers: AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
-TLS active
-Calling SSL_read(0x970690, 0x981230, 4096)
-LOG: MAIN
- acl_mail: ocsp in status: 4 (verified)
-tls_do_write(0x83cc40, 8)
-SSL_write(SSL, 0x83cc40, 8)
-outbytes=8 error=0
-Calling SSL_read(0x970690, 0x981230, 4096)
-tls_do_write(0x83cc40, 14)
-SSL_write(SSL, 0x83cc40, 14)
-outbytes=14 error=0
-Calling SSL_read(0x970690, 0x981230, 4096)
-tls_do_write(0x83cc40, 44)
-SSL_write(SSL, 0x83cc40, 44)
-outbytes=44 error=0
-tls_close(): shutting down SSL
-SSL info: SSL negotiation finished successfully
-LOG: smtp_connection MAIN
- SMTP connection from [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] closed by QUIT
-11398 child 11402 ended: status=0x0
-11398 normal exit, 0
-11398 0 SMTP accept processes now running
-11398 Listening...
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / commitdiff