CVE-2023-42114
+JH/04 Bug 2903: avoid exit on an attempt to rewrite a malformed address.
+ Make the rewrite never match and keep the logging. Trust the
+ admin to be using verify=header-syntax (to actually reject the message).
+
+
+Exim version 4.next
+-------------------
+
+HS/01 Fix string_is_ip_address() CVE-2023-42117 (Bug 3031)
+
+
+Exim version 4.97
+-----------------
+
+JH/01 The hosts_connection_nolog main option now also controls "no MAIL in
+ SMTP connection" log lines.
+
+JH/02 Option default value updates:
+ - queue_fast_ramp (main) true (was false)
+ - remote_max_parallel (main) 4 (was 2)
+
+JH/03 Cache static regex pattern compilations, for use by ACLs.
+
+JH/04 Bug 2903: avoid exit on an attempt to rewrite a malformed address.
+ Make the rewrite never match and keep the logging. Trust the
+ admin to be using verify=header-syntax (to actually reject the message).
+
+JH/05 Follow symlinks for placing a watch on TLS creds files. This means
+ (under Linux) we watch the dir containing the final file; previously
+ it would be the dir with the first symlink. We still do not monitor
+ the entire path.
+
+JH/06 Check for bad chars in rDNS for sender_host_name. The OpenBSD (at least)
+ dn_expand() is happy to pass them through.
+
+JH/07 OpenSSL Fix auto-reload of changed server OCSP proof. Previously, if
+ the file with the proof had an unchanged name, the new proof(s) were
+ loaded on top of the old ones (and nover used; the old ones were stapled).
+
+JH/08 Bug 2915: Fix use-after-free for $regex<n> variables. Previously when
+ more than one message arrived in a single connection a reference from
+ the earlier message could be re-used. Often a sigsegv resulted.
+ These variables were introduced in Exim 4.87.
+ Debug help from Graeme Fowler.
+
+JH/09 Fix ${filter } for conditions that modify $value. Previously the
+ modified version would be used in construction the result, and a memory
+ error would occur.
+
+JH/10 GnuTLS: fix for (IOT?) clients offering no TLS extensions at all.
+ Find and fix by Jasen Betts.
+
+JH/11 OpenSSL: fix for ancient clients needing TLS support for versions earlier
+ than TLSv1,2, Previously, more-recent versions of OpenSSL were permitting
+ the systemwide configuration to override the Exim config.
+
+HS/01 Bug 2728: Introduce EDITME option "DMARC_API" to work around incompatible
+ API changes in libopendmarc.
+
+JH/12 Bug 2930: Fix daemon startup. When started from any process apart from
+ pid 1, in the normal "background daemon" mode, having to drop process-
+ group leadership also lost track of needing to create listener sockets.
+
+JH/13 Bug 2929: Fix using $recipients after ${run...}. A change made for 4.96
+ resulted in the variable appearing empty. Find and fix by Ruben Jenster.
+
+JH/14 Bug 2933: Fix regex substring match variables for null matches. Since 4.96
+ a capture group which obtained no text (eg. "(abc)*" matching zero
+ occurrences) could cause a segfault if the corresponding $<n> was
+ expanded.
+
+JH/15 Fix argument parsing for ${run } expansion. Previously, when an argument
+ included a close-brace character (eg. it itself used an expansion) an
+ error occurred.
+
+JH/16 Move running the smtp connect ACL to before, for TLS-on-connect ports,
+ starting TLS. Previously it was after, meaning that attackers on such
+ ports had to be screened using the host_reject_connection main config
+ option. The new sequence aligns better with the STARTTLS behaviour, and
+ permits defences against crypto-processing load attacks, even though it
+ is strictly an incompatible change.
+ Also, avoid sending any SMTP fail response for either the connect ACL
+ or host_reject_connection, for TLS-on-connect ports.
+
+JH/17 Permit the ACL "encrypted" condition to be used in a HELO/EHLO ACL,
+ Previously this was not permitted, but it makes reasonable sense.
+ While there, restore a restriction on using it from a connect ACL; given
+ the change JH/16 it could only return false (and before 4.91 was not
+ permitted).
+
+JH/18 Fix a fencepost error in logging. Previously (since 4.92) when a log line
+ was exactly sized compared to the log buffer, a crash occurred with the
+ misleading message "bad memory reference; pool not found".
+ Found and traced by Jasen Betts.
+
+JH/19 Bug 2911: Fix a recursion in DNS lookups. Previously, if the main option
+ dns_again_means_nonexist included an element causing a DNS lookup which
+ iteslf returned DNS_AGAIN, unbounded recursion occurred. Possible results
+ included (though probably not limited to) a process crash from stack
+ memory limit, or from excessive open files. Replace this with a paniclog
+ whine (as this is likely a configuration error), and returning
+ DNS_NOMATCH.
+
+JH/20 Bug 2954: (OpenSSL) Fix setting of explicit EC curve/group. Previously
+ this always failed, probably leading to the usual downgrade to in-clear
+ connections.
+
+JH/21 Fix TLSA lookups. Previously dns_again_means_nonexist would affect
+ SERVFAIL results, which breaks the downgrade resistance of DANE. Change
+ to not checking that list for these lookups.
+
+JH/22 Bug 2434: Add connection-elapsed "D=" element to more connection
+ closure log lines.
+
+JH/23 Fix crash in string expansions. Previously, if an empty variable was
+ immediately followed by an expansion operator, a null-indirection read
+ was done, killing the process.
+
+JH/24 Bug 2997: When built with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO, bounce messages can
+ include an SMTP response string which is longer than that supported
+ by the delivering transport. Alleviate by wrapping such lines before
+ column 80.
+
+JH/25 Bug 2827: Restrict size of References: header in bounce messages to 998
+ chars (RFC limit). Previously a limit of 12 items was made, which with
+ a not-impossible References: in the message being bounced could still
+ be over-large and get stopped in the transport.
+
+JH/26 For a ${readsocket } in TLS mode, send a TLS Close Alert before the TCP
+ close. Previously a bare socket close was done.
+
+JH/27 Fix ${srs_encode ..}. Previously it would give a bad result for one day
+ every 1024 days.
+
+JH/28 Bug 2996: Fix a crash in the smtp transport. When finding that the
+ message being considered for delivery was already being handled by
+ another process, and having an SMTP connection already open, the function
+ to close it tried to use an uninitialized variable. This would afftect
+ high-volume sites more, especially when running mailing-list-style loads.
+ Pollution of logs was the major effect, as the other process delivered
+ the message. Found and partly investigated by Graeme Fowler.
+
+JH/29 Change format of the internal ID used for message identification. The old
+ version only supported 31 bits for a PID element; the new 64 (on systems
+ which can use Base-62 encoding, which is all currently supported ones
+ but not Darwin (MacOS) or Cygwin, which have case-insensitive filesystems
+ and must use Base-36). The new ID is 23 characters rather than 16, and is
+ visible in various places - notably logs, message headers, and spool file
+ names. Various of the ancillary utilities also have to know the format.
+ As well as the expanded PID portion, the sub-second part of the time
+ recorded in the ID is expanded to support finer precision. Theoretically
+ this permits a receive rate from a single comms channel of better than the
+ previous 2000/sec.
+ The major timestamp part of the ID is not changed; at 6 characters it is
+ usable until about year 3700.
+ Updating from previously releases is fully supported: old-format spool
+ files are still usable, and the utilities support both formats. New
+ message will use the new format. The one hints-DB file type which uses
+ message-IDs (the transport wait- DB) will be discarded if an old-format ID
+ is seen; new ones will be built with only new-format IDs.
+ Optionally, a utility can be used to convert spool files from old to new,
+ but this is only an efficiency measure not a requirement for operation
+ Downgrading from new to old requires running a provided utility, having
+ first stopped all operations. This will convert any spool files from new
+ back to old (losing time-precision and PID information) and remove any
+ wait- hints databases.
+
+JH/30 Bug 3006: Fix handling of JSON strings having embedded commas. Previously
+ we treated them as item separators when parsing for a list item, but they
+ need to be protected by the doublequotes. While there, add handling for
+ backslashes.
+
+JH/31 Bug 2998: Fix ${utf8clean:...} to disallow UTF-16 surrogate codepoints.
+ Found and fixed by Jasen Betts. No testcase for this as my usual text
+ editor insists on emitting only valid UTF-8.
+
+JH/32 Fix "tls_dhparam = none" under GnuTLS. At least with 3.7.9 this gave
+ a null-indirection SIGSEGV for the receive process.
+
+JH/33 Fix free for live variable $value created by a ${run ...} expansion during
+ -bh use. Internal checking would spot this and take a panic.
+
+JH/34 Bug 3013: Fix use of $recipients within arguments for ${run...}.
+ In 4.96 this would expand to empty.
+
+JH/35 Bug 3014: GnuTLS: fix expiry date for an auto-generated server
+ certificate. Find and fix by Andreas Metzler.
+
+JH/36 Add ARC info to DMARC hostory records.
+
+JH/37 Bug 3016: Avoid sending DSN when message was accepted under fakereject
+ or fakedefer. Previously the sender could discover that the message
+ had in fact been accepted.
+
+JH/38 Taint-track intermediate values from the peer in multi-stage authentation
+ sequences. Previously the input was not noted as being tainted; notably
+ this resulted in behaviour of LOGIN vs. PLAIN being inconsistent under
+ bad coding of authenticators.
+
+JH/39 Bug 3023: Fix crash induced by some combinations of zero-length strings
+ and ${tr...}. Found and diagnosed by Heiko Schlichting.
+
+JH/40 Support list of dkim results in the dkim_status ACL condition, making
+ it more usable in the data ACL.
+
+
Exim version 4.96
-----------------
maskptr NULL if no mask is permitted to follow
otherwise, points to an int where the offset of '/' is placed
if there is no / followed by trailing digits, *maskptr is set 0
+ errp NULL if no diagnostic information is required, and if the netmask
+ length should not be checked. Otherwise it is set pointing to a short
+ descriptive text.
Returns: 0 if the string is not a textual representation of an IP address
4 if it is an IPv4 address
6 if it is an IPv6 address
-*/
+The legacy string_is_ip_address() function follows below.
+*/
int
-string_is_ip_address(const uschar *s, int *maskptr)
-{
-int yield = 4;
+string_is_ip_addressX(const uschar *ip_addr, int *maskptr, const uschar **errp) {
+ struct addrinfo hints;
+ struct addrinfo *res;
-/* If an optional mask is permitted, check for it. If found, pass back the
-offset. */
+ uschar *slash, *percent;
-if (maskptr)
+ uschar *endp = 0;
+ long int mask = 0;
+ const uschar *addr = 0;
+
+ /* If there is a slash, but we didn't request a (optional) netmask,
+ we return failure, as we do if the mask isn't a pure numerical value,
+ or if it is negative. The actual length is checked later, once we know
+ the address family. */
+ if (slash = Ustrchr(ip_addr, '/'))
{
- const uschar *ss = s + Ustrlen(s);
- *maskptr = 0;
- if (s != ss && isdigit(*(--ss)))
+ if (!maskptr)
{
- while (ss > s && isdigit(ss[-1])) ss--;
- if (ss > s && *(--ss) == '/') *maskptr = ss - s;
+ if (errp) *errp = "netmask found, but not requested";
+ return 0;
}
- }
-
-/* A colon anywhere in the string => IPv6 address */
-
-if (Ustrchr(s, ':') != NULL)
- {
- BOOL had_double_colon = FALSE;
- BOOL v4end = FALSE;
-
- yield = 6;
-
- /* An IPv6 address must start with hex digit or double colon. A single
- colon is invalid. */
-
- if (*s == ':' && *(++s) != ':') return 0;
-
- /* Now read up to 8 components consisting of up to 4 hex digits each. There
- may be one and only one appearance of double colon, which implies any number
- of binary zero bits. The number of preceding components is held in count. */
- for (int count = 0; count < 8; count++)
+ uschar *rest;
+ mask = Ustrtol(slash+1, &rest, 10);
+ if (*rest || mask < 0)
{
- /* If the end of the string is reached before reading 8 components, the
- address is valid provided a double colon has been read. This also applies
- if we hit the / that introduces a mask or the % that introduces the
- interface specifier (scope id) of a link-local address. */
-
- if (*s == 0 || *s == '%' || *s == '/') return had_double_colon ? yield : 0;
-
- /* If a component starts with an additional colon, we have hit a double
- colon. This is permitted to appear once only, and counts as at least
- one component. The final component may be of this form. */
-
- if (*s == ':')
- {
- if (had_double_colon) return 0;
- had_double_colon = TRUE;
- s++;
- continue;
- }
-
- /* If the remainder of the string contains a dot but no colons, we
- can expect a trailing IPv4 address. This is valid if either there has
- been no double-colon and this is the 7th component (with the IPv4 address
- being the 7th & 8th components), OR if there has been a double-colon
- and fewer than 6 components. */
-
- if (Ustrchr(s, ':') == NULL && Ustrchr(s, '.') != NULL)
- {
- if ((!had_double_colon && count != 6) ||
- (had_double_colon && count > 6)) return 0;
- v4end = TRUE;
- yield = 6;
- break;
- }
-
- /* Check for at least one and not more than 4 hex digits for this
- component. */
-
- if (!isxdigit(*s++)) return 0;
- if (isxdigit(*s) && isxdigit(*(++s)) && isxdigit(*(++s))) s++;
-
- /* If the component is terminated by colon and there is more to
- follow, skip over the colon. If there is no more to follow the address is
- invalid. */
-
- if (*s == ':' && *(++s) == 0) return 0;
+ if (errp) *errp = "netmask not numeric or <0";
+ return 0;
}
- /* If about to handle a trailing IPv4 address, drop through. Otherwise
- all is well if we are at the end of the string or at the mask or at a percent
- sign, which introduces the interface specifier (scope id) of a link local
- address. */
+ *maskptr = slash - ip_addr; /* offset of the slash */
+ endp = slash;
+ } else if (maskptr) *maskptr = 0; /* no slash found */
- if (!v4end)
- return (*s == 0 || *s == '%' ||
- (*s == '/' && maskptr != NULL && *maskptr != 0))? yield : 0;
+ /* The interface-ID suffix (%<id>) is optional (for IPv6). If it
+ exists, we check it syntactically. Later, if we know the address
+ family is IPv4, we might reject it.
+ The interface-ID is mutually exclusive with the netmask, to the
+ best of my knowledge. */
+ if (percent = Ustrchr(ip_addr, '%'))
+ {
+ if (slash)
+ {
+ if (errp) *errp = "interface-ID and netmask are mutually exclusive";
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (uschar *p = percent+1; *p; p++)
+ if (!isalnum(*p) && !ispunct(*p))
+ {
+ if (errp) *errp = "interface-ID must match [[:alnum:][:punct:]]";
+ return 0;
+ }
+ endp = percent;
}
-/* Test for IPv4 address, which may be the tail-end of an IPv6 address. */
-
-for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ /* inet_pton() can't parse netmasks and interface IDs, so work on a shortened copy
+ allocated on the current stack */
+ if (endp) {
+ ptrdiff_t l = endp - ip_addr;
+ if (l > 255)
+ {
+ if (errp) *errp = "rudiculous long ip address string";
+ return 0;
+ }
+ addr = alloca(l+1); /* *BSD does not have strndupa() */
+ Ustrncpy((uschar *)addr, ip_addr, l);
+ ((uschar*)addr)[l] = '\0';
+ } else addr = ip_addr;
+
+ int af;
+ union { /* we do not need this, but inet_pton() needs a place for storage */
+ struct in_addr sa4;
+ struct in6_addr sa6;
+ } sa;
+
+ af = Ustrchr(addr, ':') ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
+ if (!inet_pton(af, addr, &sa))
{
- long n;
- uschar * end;
-
- if (i != 0 && *s++ != '.') return 0;
- n = strtol(CCS s, CSS &end, 10);
- if (n > 255 || n < 0 || end <= s || end > s+3) return 0;
- s = end;
+ if (errp) *errp = af == AF_INET6 ? "IP address string not parsable as IPv6"
+ : "IP address string not parsable IPv4";
+ return 0;
}
+ /* we do not check the values of the mask here, as
+ this is done on the callers side (but I don't understand why), so
+ actually I'd like to do it here, but it breaks at least 0002 */
+ switch (af)
+ {
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (errp && mask > 128)
+ {
+ *errp = "IPv6 netmask value must not be >128";
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 6;
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (percent)
+ {
+ if (errp) *errp = "IPv4 address string must not have an interface-ID";
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (errp && mask > 32) {
+ *errp = "IPv4 netmask value must not be >32";
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 4;
+ default:
+ if (errp) *errp = "unknown address family (should not happen)";
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
-return !*s || (*s == '/' && maskptr && *maskptr != 0) ? yield : 0;
+int
+string_is_ip_address(const uschar *ip_addr, int *maskptr) {
+ return string_is_ip_addressX(ip_addr, maskptr, 0);
}
+
#endif /* COMPILE_UTILITY */
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / commitdiff