commands are acceptable.
When used, the pipelining saves on roundtrip times.
+See also the &%hosts_pipe_connect%& smtp transport option.
+
Currently the option name &"X_PIPE_CONNECT"& is used.
.wen
.new
The file(s) should be in DER format,
-except for GnuTLS 3.6.3 or later when an optional filetype prefix
-can be used. The prefix must be one of "DER" or "PEM", followed by
+except for GnuTLS 3.6.3 or later
+or for OpenSSL,
+when an optional filetype prefix can be used.
+The prefix must be one of "DER" or "PEM", followed by
a single space. If one is used it sets the format for subsequent
files in the list; the initial format is DER.
-When a PEM format file is used it may contain multiple proofs,
-for multiple certificate chain element proofs under TLS1.3.
+If multiple proofs are wanted, for multiple chain elements
+(this only works under TLS1.3)
+they must be coded as a combined OCSP response.
+
+Although GnuTLS will accept PEM files with multiple separate
+PEM blobs (ie. separate OCSP responses), it sends them in the
+TLS Certificate record interleaved with the certificates of the chain;
+although a GnuTLS client is happy with that, an OpenSSL client is not.
.wen
.option tls_on_connect_ports main "string list" unset
It also turns SMTP into a client-first protocol
so combines well with TCP Fast Open.
+See also the &%pipelining_connect_advertise_hosts%& main option.
+
Note:
When the facility is used, the transport &%helo_data%& option
will be expanded before the &$sending_ip_address$& variable
11. Main options for DKIM verify to filter hash and key types.
-12. Under GnuTLS, with TLS1.3, support for full-chain OCSP stapling.
+12. With TLS1.3, support for full-chain OCSP stapling.
13. Dual-certificate stacks on servers now support OCSP stapling, under OpenSSL.
uschar * p;
int sep = 0;
const uschar * envlist = add_environment;
- int old_pool = store_pool;
while ((p = string_nextinlist(&envlist, &sep, NULL, 0)))
{
#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC
debug_printf("%s\n", gnutls_session_get_desc(state->session));
#endif
-#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG
+#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG
# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS1_3
if (gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session) < GNUTLS_TLS1_3)
-#else
+# else
if (TRUE)
-#endif
+# endif
{
gnutls_datum_t c, s;
gstring * gc, * gs;
- /* we only want the client random and the master secret */
+ /* For TLS1.2 we only want the client random and the master secret */
gnutls_session_get_random(state->session, &c, &s);
gnutls_session_get_master_secret(state->session, &s);
gc = ddump(&c);
" add SSLKEYLOGFILE to keep_environment in the exim config\n"
" run exim as root\n"
" if using sudo, add SSLKEYLOGFILE to env_keep in /etc/sudoers\n"
- " (works for TLS1.2 also, and saves cut-paste into file)\n");
+ " (works for TLS1.2 also, and saves cut-paste into file)"
+ " Trying to use add_environment for this will not work\n");
#endif
}
sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
cbinfo various parts of session state
filename the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
+ is_pem file is PEM format; otherwise is DER
*/
static void
ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo,
- const uschar * filename)
+ const uschar * filename, BOOL is_pem)
{
BIO * bio;
OCSP_RESPONSE * resp;
unsigned long verify_flags;
int status, reason, i;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file '%s'\n", filename);
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file (%s) '%s'\n", is_pem ? "PEM" : "DER", filename);
if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS filename, "rb")))
{
return;
}
-resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
+if (is_pem)
+ {
+ uschar * data, * freep;
+ char * dummy;
+ long len;
+ if (!PEM_read_bio(bio, &dummy, &dummy, &data, &len))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to read PEM file \"%s\"\n",
+ filename);
+ return;
+ }
+debug_printf("read pem file\n");
+ freep = data;
+ resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, CUSS &data, len);
+ OPENSSL_free(freep);
+ }
+else
+ resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
+
if (!resp)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
const uschar * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file;
int osep = 0;
uschar * ofile;
+ BOOL fmt_pem = FALSE;
if (olist)
if (!expand_check(olist, US"tls_ocsp_file", USS &olist, errstr))
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (olist)
if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0)))
- ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, ofile);
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"PEM ", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ fmt_pem = TRUE;
+ ofile += 4;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"DER ", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ fmt_pem = FALSE;
+ ofile += 4;
+ }
+ ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, ofile, fmt_pem);
+ }
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of ocsp file list\n");
#endif
OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
int i;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):\n");
len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
if(!p)
{
*/
{
BIO * bp = NULL;
- int status, reason;
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+#ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
+#endif
DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
/* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, cbinfo->verify_stack,
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
- "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
- ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
- BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bp);
- OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
- goto failed;
- }
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)) <= 0)
+ if (ERR_peek_error())
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
+ ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
+ BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
+ goto failed;
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no explicit trust for OCSP signing"
+ " in the root CA certificate; ignoring\n");
- BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
/*XXX So we have a good stapled OCSP status. How do we know
it is for the cert of interest? OpenSSL 1.1.0 has a routine
For now, carry on blindly accepting the resp. */
- {
- OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
-
+ for (int idx =
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
- if (OCSP_resp_count(bs) != 1)
+ OCSP_resp_count(bs) - 1;
#else
- STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
- if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
+ sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) - 1;
#endif
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
- "with multiple responses not handled");
- goto failed;
- }
- single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
+ idx >= 0; idx--)
+ {
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP * single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, idx);
+ int status, reason;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * rev, * thisupd, * nextupd;
+
+ /*XXX so I can see putting a loop in here to handle a rsp with >1 singleresp
+ - but what happens with a GnuTLS-style input?
+
+ we could do with a debug label for each singleresp
+ - it has a certID with a serialNumber, but I see no API to get that
+ */
status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
&thisupd, &nextupd);
- }
- DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
- DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
- if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
- EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
- }
- else
- {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
+ EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
switch(status)
{
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
- i = 1;
- goto good;
+ continue; /* the idx loop */
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
break;
default:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
"Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
break;
}
+
+ goto failed;
}
+
+ i = 1;
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
+ goto good;
+
failed:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
good:
BIO_free(bp);
tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
{
long result, item;
-uschar *end;
+uschar * exp, * end;
uschar keep_c;
BOOL adding, item_parsed;
result = SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
/* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
- * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
+from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
#endif
return TRUE;
}
-for (uschar * s = option_spec; *s; /**/)
+if (!expand_check(option_spec, US"openssl_options", &exp, &end))
+ return FALSE;
+
+for (uschar * s = exp; *s; /**/)
{
while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
if (*s == '\0')
else if (Ustrncmp(path, spool_directory, Ustrlen(spool_directory)) != 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
- debug_printf("removing env SSLKEYLOGFILE: not under spooldir\n");
+ debug_printf("removing env SSLKEYLOGFILE=%s: not under spooldir\n", path);
unsetenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE");
}
}
--- /dev/null
+OCSP Response Information:
+ Response Status: Successful
+ Response Type: Basic OCSP Response
+ Version: 1
+ Responder ID: CN=clica CA rsa,O=example.com
+ Produced At: Thu Oct 10 20:08:22 UTC 2019
+ Responses:
+ Certificate ID:
+ Hash Algorithm: SHA256
+ Issuer Name Hash: 5af082e51d62fe01fd706baebeb878db64e68f76e74a36f36d914297ddee24b8
+ Issuer Key Hash: 333db14364b98e78a33dd8a4fae8d8378ea9b0f5fbca97b25685aa0d32116091
+ Serial Number: 65
+ Certificate Status: good
+ This Update: Thu Oct 10 20:08:22 UTC 2019
+ Next Update: Tue Oct 09 20:08:22 UTC 2029
+ Certificate ID:
+ Hash Algorithm: SHA256
+ Issuer Name Hash: bfa7275a566efd4be2df82dbd9d1290d470186f6ff2acd8c16659f342ab56109
+ Issuer Key Hash: 208f9d28c7c0bc914144dfa8c0be3d5b3bfcebb622c8a8dc27e865fc06ca0e12
+ Serial Number: 42
+ Certificate Status: good
+ This Update: Thu Oct 10 20:08:22 UTC 2019
+ Next Update: Tue Oct 09 20:08:22 UTC 2029
+ Certificate ID:
+ Hash Algorithm: SHA256
+ Issuer Name Hash: bfa7275a566efd4be2df82dbd9d1290d470186f6ff2acd8c16659f342ab56109
+ Issuer Key Hash: 208f9d28c7c0bc914144dfa8c0be3d5b3bfcebb622c8a8dc27e865fc06ca0e12
+ Serial Number: 41
+ Certificate Status: good
+ This Update: Thu Oct 10 20:08:22 UTC 2019
+ Next Update: Tue Oct 09 20:08:22 UTC 2029
+ Extensions:
+ Signature Algorithm: RSA-SHA256
+
+-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----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-----END OCSP RESPONSE-----
####
- # so, for full-chain OCSP we sill want an OCSP resp for the Signer cert and also (?) one for the
- # CA cert itself. The existing bits below only create for the leaf certs, next layer down.
- #
- # First test will be just adding OCSP for the Signer cert. Presumably we could use the CA cert
- # to sign that.
-
# create OCSP reqs & resps
CADIR=$idir/CA
done
# convert one good leaf-resp to PEM
- $server=server1
+ server=server1
RESP=$idir/$server.$iname/$server.$iname.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp
ocsptool -S $RESP -j > $RESP.pem
- # Then, ocsp request and responses for the signer cert
+ # Then, ocsp request and (valid, revoked) responses for the signer cert
REQ=$CADIR/Signer.ocsp.req
RESP=$CADIR/Signer.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp
openssl ocsp -issuer $CADIR/CA.pem -sha256 -cert $CADIR/Signer.pem -no_nonce -reqout $REQ
-ndays 3652 -reqin $REQ -respout $RESP
ocsptool -S $RESP -j > $RESP.pem
- # Then, ocsp request and response for the CA cert
- REQ=$CADIR/CA.ocsp.req
- RESP=$CADIR/CA.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp
- openssl ocsp -issuer $CADIR/CA.pem -sha256 -cert $CADIR/CA.pem -no_nonce -reqout $REQ
- openssl ocsp $IVALID -rsigner $CADIR/CA.pem -rkey $CADIR/CA.key -CA $CADIR/CA.pem -resp_no_certs -noverify \
+ # Finally, a full-chain all-good request and response
+ REQ=$idir/$server.$iname/fullchain.ocsp.req
+ leafcert=$idir/$server.$iname/$server.$iname.pem
+ signercert=$CADIR/Signer.pem
+ cacert=$CADIR/CA.pem
+ openssl ocsp -sha256 -no_nonce -reqout $REQ \
+ -issuer $signercert -cert $leafcert \
+ -issuer $cacert -cert $CADIR/Signer.pem -cert $CADIR/CA.pem
+
+ RESP=$idir/$server.$iname/fullchain.ocsp.resp
+ authorities=$idir/$server.$iname/ca_chain.pem
+ openssl ocsp $IVALID -rsigner $CADIR/CA.pem -rkey $CADIR/CA.key -CA $authorities -resp_no_certs -noverify \
-ndays 3652 -reqin $REQ -respout $RESP
ocsptool -S $RESP -j > $RESP.pem
--- /dev/null
+5655
\ No newline at end of file
# Exim test configuration 5655
-# OCSP stapling, server, multiple chain-element OCSP
+# OCSP stapling, server, multiple chain-element OCSP. Both GnuTLS and OpenSSL.
.include DIR/aux-var/tls_conf_prefix
# ----- Main settings -----
-acl_smtp_connect = accept logwrite = ${env {SSLKEYLOGFILE}}
acl_smtp_mail = check_mail
acl_smtp_rcpt = check_recipient
DRSA = CADIR/example.com
DECDSA = CADIR/example_ec.com
-tls_certificate = DRSA/server1.example.com/fullchain.pem \
- : DECDSA/server1.example_ec.com/server1.example_ec.com.pem
-tls_privatekey = DRSA/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.unlocked.key \
- : DECDSA/server1.example_ec.com/server1.example_ec.com.unlocked.key
+tls_certificate = DRSA/server1.example.com/fullchain.pem
+tls_privatekey = DRSA/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.unlocked.key
.ifndef CONTROL
-tls_ocsp_file = PEM DIR/tmp/ocsp/triple.ocsp.pem \
- : DER DECDSA/server1.example_ec.com/server1.example_ec.com.ocsp.good.resp
+tls_ocsp_file = PEM DRSA/server1.example.com/fullchain.ocsp.resp.pem
.else
-tls_ocsp_file = PEM DIR/tmp/ocsp/double_r.ocsp.pem \
- : DER DECDSA/server1.example_ec.com/server1.example_ec.com.ocsp.good.resp
+tls_ocsp_file = PEM DIR/tmp/ocsp/double_r.ocsp.pem
.endif
.ifdef _HAVE_GNUTLS
tls_require_ciphers = ${if eq {LIMIT}{TLS1.2} {NORMAL:!VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2} {}}
.endif
+.ifdef _HAVE_OPENSSL
+.ifdef LIMIT
+openssl_options = ${if eq {LIMIT}{TLS1.2} {+no_tlsv1_3} {}}
+.endif
+.endif
# ------ ACL ------
driver = smtp
port = PORT_D
hosts_require_tls = *
-.ifdef _HAVE_GNUTLS
+.ifdef _HAVE_GNUTLS
tls_require_ciphers = ${if eq {LIMIT}{TLS1.2} \
{NONE:\
- ${if eq {OPT}{rsa} \
- {+SIGN-RSA-SHA256:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+RSA} \
- {+SIGN-ECDSA-SHA512:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+KX-ALL}}\
+ +SIGN-RSA-SHA256:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+RSA\
:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+COMP-NULL:+CURVE-ALL:+CTYPE-X509} \
{}}
- tls_verify_certificates = CADIR/\
- ${if eq {OPT}{rsa} \
- {example.com/server1.example.com} \
- {example_ec.com/server1.example_ec.com}}\
- /ca_chain.pem
.endif
+.ifdef _HAVE_OPENSSL
+ tls_require_ciphers = RSA
+.endif
+ tls_verify_certificates = CADIR/example.com/server1.example.com/ca_chain.pem
hosts_require_ocsp = *
tls_verify_cert_hostnames = :
--- /dev/null
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 1: TLS1.2 Server sends good leaf-staple on request, to client requiring RSA auth
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@server1.example.com U=CALLER P=local S=sss
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 => rsa.auth@test.ex R=client T=remote_delivery H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1] X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=yes DN="/CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmaY-0005vi-00"
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 Completed
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 2: TLS1.3 Server sends good 3-element staple on request, to client requiring RSA auth
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@server1.example.com U=CALLER P=local S=sss
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 => rsa.auth@test.ex R=client T=remote_delivery H=127.0.0.1 [127.0.0.1] X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=yes DN="/CN=server1.example.com" C="250 OK id=10HmbA-0005vi-00"
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 Completed
+
+******** SERVER ********
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=pppp, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 acl_mail: ocsp in status: 4 (verified)
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 <= <> H=localhost (server1.example.com) [127.0.0.1] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no S=sss id=E10HmaX-0005vi-00@server1.example.com
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=pppp, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 acl_mail: ocsp in status: 4 (verified)
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbA-0005vi-00 <= <> H=localhost (server1.example.com) [127.0.0.1] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no S=sss id=E10HmaZ-0005vi-00@server1.example.com
******** SERVER ********
1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=pppp, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 TESTSUITE/spool/sslkeys
1999-03-02 09:44:33 acl_mail: ocsp in status: 4 (verified)
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 <= <> H=localhost (server1.example.com) [127.0.0.1] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no S=sss id=E10HmaX-0005vi-00@server1.example.com
1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=pppp, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 TESTSUITE/spool/sslkeys
1999-03-02 09:44:33 acl_mail: ocsp in status: 1 (notresp)
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmbA-0005vi-00 <= <> H=localhost (server1.example.com) [127.0.0.1] P=esmtps X=TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx CV=no S=sss id=E10HmaZ-0005vi-00@server1.example.com
1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=pppp, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port PORT_D
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 TESTSUITE/spool/sslkeys
1999-03-02 09:44:33 TLS error on connection from localhost [127.0.0.1] (recv): The TLS connection was non-properly terminated.
--- /dev/null
+# OCSP stapling, server, multiple chain-element OCSP
+#
+#
+#
+#
+exim -z '1: TLS1.2 Server sends good leaf-staple on request, to client requiring RSA auth'
+****
+#
+exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DLIMIT=TLS1.2
+****
+#
+exim -odf -DOPT=rsa -DLIMIT=TLS1.2 rsa.auth@test.ex
+Subject: test
+
+.
+****
+killdaemon
+#
+#
+exim -z '2: TLS1.3 Server sends good 3-element staple on request, to client requiring RSA auth'
+****
+#
+# Works when the (single) proof file has an ocsp-response with 3 statusses.
+# Contrast with with GnuTLS which can do either that or have 3 proof files
+# each with one status.
+#
+exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DLIMIT=TLS1.3
+****
+exim -odf -DOPT=rsa rsa.auth@test.ex
+Subject: test
+
+.
+****
+killdaemon
+#
+##
+##
+#exim -z '3: TLS1.3 Server sends bad nonleaf staple, client detects it'
+#****
+##
+#EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK=y exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DLIMIT=TLS1.3 -DCONTROL=bad
+#****
+#exim -odf -DOPT=rsa rsa.auth@test.ex
+#Subject: test
+#
+#.
+#****
+#killdaemon
+##
+##
+#
+#
+sudo rm -fr tmp/
+no_msglog_check
--- /dev/null
+support OpenSSL
+support OCSP
+running IPv4
+feature _HAVE_TLS1_3
sudo chmod -R a+rwx DIR/tmp/ocsp
perl
chdir 'aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com';
-system 'cat server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp.pem CA/Signer.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp.pem CA/CA.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp.pem > DIR/tmp/ocsp/triple.ocsp.pem';
system 'cat server1.example.com/server1.example.com.ocsp.signernocert.good.resp.pem CA/Signer.ocsp.signernocert.revoked.resp.pem > DIR/tmp/ocsp/double_r.ocsp.pem';
****
#
exim -z '1: TLS1.2 Server sends good leaf-staple on request, to client requiring RSA auth'
****
#
-exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DLIMIT=TLS1.2
+sudo exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DLIMIT=TLS1.2
****
#
exim -odf -DOPT=rsa -DLIMIT=TLS1.2 rsa.auth@test.ex
exim -z '2: TLS1.3 Server sends good 3-element staple on request, to client requiring RSA auth'
****
#
+# Prefix with sudo to get SSLKEYLOGFILE to work. Only works on the server.
exim -bd -oX PORT_D -DSERVER=server -DLIMIT=TLS1.3
****
exim -odf -DOPT=rsa rsa.auth@test.ex
#define udn 2 /* Unix domain socket number */
#define skn 2 /* Potential number of sockets */
-int main(int argc, char **argv)
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i;
int port = 0;
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / commitdiff