int fd_out;
BOOL peer_cert_verified;
BOOL trigger_sni_changes;
+ BOOL have_set_peerdn;
const struct host_item *host;
uschar *peerdn;
uschar *received_sni;
} exim_gnutls_state_st;
static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = {
- NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE,
NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
static void
extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
{
-gnutls_protocol_t protocol;
gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
-gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx;
-gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac;
-uschar *p;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
int old_pool;
int rc;
/* returns size in "bytes" */
tls_bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8;
-if (!*state->cipherbuf)
- {
- protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session);
- mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session);
- kx = gnutls_kx_get(state->session);
-
- string_format(state->cipherbuf, sizeof(state->cipherbuf),
- "%s:%s:%u",
- gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol),
- gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac),
- tls_bits);
-
- /* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS
- code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS
- releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */
- for (p = state->cipherbuf; *p != '\0'; ++p)
- if (isspace(*p))
- *p = '-';
- }
tls_cipher = state->cipherbuf;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", tls_cipher);
*************************************************/
/* Called from both server and client code.
-Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and we use that to detect double-calls.
+Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and state->have_set_peerdn
+and we use that to detect double-calls.
Arguments:
state exim_gnutls_state_st *
const gnutls_datum *cert_list;
int rc;
unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
+gnutls_protocol_t protocol;
+gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
+gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx;
+gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac;
gnutls_certificate_type_t ct;
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
-uschar *dn_buf;
+uschar *p, *dn_buf;
size_t sz;
-if (state->peerdn)
+if (state->have_set_peerdn)
return OK;
+state->have_set_peerdn = TRUE;
-state->peerdn = US"unknown";
+state->peerdn = NULL;
+/* tls_cipher */
+cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session);
+protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session);
+mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session);
+kx = gnutls_kx_get(state->session);
+
+string_format(state->cipherbuf, sizeof(state->cipherbuf),
+ "%s:%s:%d",
+ gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol),
+ gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac),
+ (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8);
+
+/* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS
+code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS
+releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */
+for (p = state->cipherbuf; *p != '\0'; ++p)
+ if (isspace(*p))
+ *p = '-';
+
+/* tls_peerdn */
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list == NULL || cert_list_size == 0)
{
- state->peerdn = US"unknown (no certificate)";
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no certificate from peer (%p & %d)\n",
cert_list, cert_list_size);
if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED)
if (ct != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
{
const char *ctn = gnutls_certificate_type_get_name(ct);
- state->peerdn = string_sprintf("unknown (type %s)", ctn);
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("TLS: peer cert not X.509 but instead \"%s\"\n", ctn);
if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED)
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=%s\n",
- *error, state->peerdn);
+ *error, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED)
{
else
{
state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=%s\n", state->peerdn);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=%s\n",
+ state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
}
tls_peerdn = state->peerdn;
} while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED));
alarm(0);
+if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake",
+ sigalrm_seen ? "timed out" : gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host);
+
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n");
/* Verify late */
rc = peer_status(state);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
-/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */
+/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */
extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state);
#else
/* Static variables that are used for buffering data by both sets of
-functions and the common functions below. */
+functions and the common functions below.
+We're moving away from this; GnuTLS is already using a state, which
+can switch, so we can do TLS callouts during ACLs. */
-static uschar *ssl_xfer_buffer = NULL;
static const int ssl_xfer_buffer_size = 4096;
+#ifndef USE_GNUTLS
+static uschar *ssl_xfer_buffer = NULL;
static int ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
static int ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
static int ssl_xfer_eof = 0;
static int ssl_xfer_error = 0;
+#endif
uschar *tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
#ifdef USE_GNUTLS
#include "tls-gnu.c"
+
+#define ssl_xfer_buffer (current_global_tls_state->xfer_buffer)
+#define ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm (current_global_tls_state->xfer_buffer_lwm)
+#define ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm (current_global_tls_state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
+#define ssl_xfer_eof (current_global_tls_state->xfer_eof)
+#define ssl_xfer_error (current_global_tls_state->xfer_error)
+
#else
#include "tls-openssl.c"
#endif
------BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-MIIBOgIBAAJBANaJrAW82pGvpnCZtUm1gGYBkQU7IT4FHuBu/f6TaakRt2Tl6jPm
-STeFY7HCxeKO+NaxrRqGj+77bdW1McEaPg8CAwEAAQJAUC8Dft9/d40FcbdZVRPD
-yhxSxfg8K/CBAlQplXEmQBxiJ7zDsdqJC2C8qO/HYzgLNNKKMFsq+SkiwRuP0ZoH
-DQIhAN/aWQpj1Z7MhNervDKNx3mVbsJb59Cw51Z7TE8CpU/NAiEA9VjdkywEyJox
-MTh5kWx/0USTvf+Tm5Lr1BCivrocUUsCIFL8uZxPWf5gml6Fd5QF2uW34nTS0qeF
-2AE4s6OGtf0NAiEA31nePV0S8lHQUuxqiNMjBylbVjPFzLDIJ3HKQWQZ8wcCIBRy
-w144Nd8BGkUPlChqoW1y1XU43Wz5VI8g5ZFiuzPk
------END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+
+Generator: 11:3e:bd:2e:a2:c2:4d:bb:a7:b4:bf:01
+ b3:73:00:b9:ae:7f:69:7f:91:69:de:8d
+ 02:6e:15:8e:3f:47:19:75:bb:1a:a4:61
+ 5c:77:59:0b:ca:76:93:72:c9:32:66:71
+ 6a:96:16:ba:1e:92:ca:d9:92:6a:99:7f
+ 82:df:b1:5f:90:cf:3f:a0:24:c9:c4:d4
+ 30:91:30:21:07:da:93:69:52:44:3b:68
+ e2:2a:53:64:7f:82:07:37:b2:a8:b8:0c
+ 27:b6:e0:b8:62:25:5b:53:10:43:44:cb
+ e7:72:1b:4a:36:b1:6e:f9:c2:08:ff:93
+ 87:ba:d3:3c:d4:4d:26:6a:eb:2e:2f:87
+ 13:56:db:55:8f:9a:04:e5:d0:89:a5:4e
+ 24:90:a2:6b:30:2d:13:49:7f:ca:61:74
+ ad:aa:0d:e6:ef:07:87:aa:56:28:64:f3
+ dd:8a:1f:8b:b6:a7:a4:82:e3:5c:7f:76
+ c8:42:31:e2:4b:41:bf:00:16:19:a2:ed
+ be:85:9a:8e:82:c4:09:9d:09:fb:53:3e
+ bf:67:d8:c9:01:1c:e3:b2:d3:f3:40:e2
+ 93:61:6a:93:fd:b6:72:56:63:f7:56:9c
+ 08:28:44:3f:f2:bf:9e:97:d8:53:b0:c4
+ 74:11:0e:c0:c8:9f:eb:6a:aa:37:25:a7
+ 15:91:d8:82:5d:36:5e:81:29:15:2c:a7
+ d4:f0:74:43:b0:fb:9a:a4:88:c8:79:b0
+ f6:39:58:6c:ed:95:f2:00:ef:03:cd:8f
+ 41:28:6a:e7:8a:b1:48:75:6a:72:e0:78
+ 30:a0:8f:a1
+
+Prime: 4c:de:d0:89:11:fc:b9:15:66:77:7a:b2
+ af:f9:eb:f2:b3:33:50:44:d7:3d:e6:8b
+ e6:3b:a2:b0:b3:0d:62:64:e1:5e:22:ca
+ 91:43:a2:ff:b7:bf:49:13:12:5d:8c:b9
+ ad:65:b7:5f:3a:98:69:a3:a3:06:4c:a6
+ 54:87:a6:35:d5:a7:a0:3d:cb:95:50:87
+ 42:47:47:c5:42:62:4a:b8:f3:fe:da:14
+ 6e:33:d0:26:c7:44:8a:49:a9:a5:89:cc
+ e9:37:6c:05:3f:ec:f6:a1:c2:06:40:7d
+ 03:1b:d0:1c:31:c8:0c:14:84:bc:dc:db
+ f0:b1:22:b0:62:4d:43:f9:4d:c5:b3:13
+ 5f:52:0a:82:eb:fa:ed:d2:f2:d4:4b:fc
+ 17:17:3b:6e:aa:02:d6:da:73:1b:de:08
+ a7:29:f7:f6:2f:a8:cd:8e:fb:8a:84:4c
+ 8d:42:46:3c:ba:dc:5f:e6:b3:00:bc:7e
+ 74:08:c4:5a:51:3b:56:e9:09:25:8a:d1
+ 8a:15:b8:42:6e:88:3d:f8:a2:b4:12:5e
+ 33:91:f2:b5:bf:33:48:b9:77:72:41:22
+ 50:1e:94:53:4f:78:d4:1d:4e:7e:b0:61
+ 50:7e:e9:4c:e3:89:81:b4:ba:3e:69:4b
+ cb:53:67:eb:cd:ab:00:ab:0d:80:d5:6c
+ f2:d2:96:0d:fb:6f:48:30:df:b4:4d:20
+ 17:a4:6f:71:9e:d7:08:36:24:ed:93:14
+ 26:73:ac:29:59:61:d8:29:7e:e8:54:2e
+ aa:f8:0b:35:2c:1b:57:d3:6a:e4:b4:01
+ 0d:7e:6d:0f
+
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
-MGUCYKCtXam0x/2mj+EibbOu+m/WAR33VA+YHPYQZuqr6PrwYnUcex5Hm4/QNsGy
-b0o6BgckIFopfTgrUUANGuOlqAbGAwfzV2FxnEorKXTCP36hBFSWtFDbEcFVxQqr
-jfVLwwIBBg==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=
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
-
1999-03-02 09:44:33 exim x.yz daemon started: pid=pppp, no queue runs, listening for SMTP on port 1225
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@test.ex H=[127.0.0.1] P=smtps X=TLS1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256 S=sss
1999-03-02 09:44:33 TLS error on connection from (rhu.barb) [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] (gnutls_handshake): The peer did not send any certificate.
-1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@test.ex H=[ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=smtps X=TLS1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256 DN="C=UK,L=Cambridge,O=University of Cambridge,OU=Computing Service,CN=Philip Hazel" S=sss
+1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaY-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@test.ex H=[ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4] P=smtps X=TLS1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256 DN="C=UK,O=The Exim Maintainers,OU=Test Suite,CN=Phil Pennock" S=sss
1999-03-02 09:44:33 Start queue run: pid=pppp -qf
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 => CALLER <CALLER@test.ex> R=abc T=local_delivery
1999-03-02 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 Completed
id 10HmaY-0005vi-00
for CALLER@test.ex; Tue, 2 Mar 1999 09:44:33 +0000
tls-certificate-verified: 1
-TLS: cipher=TLS1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256 peerdn=C=UK,L=Cambridge,O=University of Cambridge,OU=Computing Service,CN=Philip Hazel
+TLS: cipher=TLS1.0:RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256 peerdn=C=UK,O=The Exim Maintainers,OU=Test Suite,CN=Phil Pennock
This is a test encrypted message from a verified host.
* Main Program *
*************************************************/
-/* Usage: client
- <IP address>
- <port>
- [<outgoing interface>]
- [<cert file>]
- [<key file>]
-*/
+const char * const HELP_MESSAGE = "\n\
+Usage: client\n\
+ <IP address>\n\
+ <port>\n\
+ [<outgoing interface>]\n\
+ [<cert file>]\n\
+ [<key file>]\n\
+\n";
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
while (argc >= argi + 1 && argv[argi][0] == '-')
{
+ if (strcmp(argv[argi], "-help") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(argv[argi], "--help") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(argv[argi], "-h") == 0)
+ {
+ printf(HELP_MESSAGE);
+ exit(0);
+ }
if (strcmp(argv[argi], "-tls-on-connect") == 0)
{
tls_on_connect = 1;
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / commitdiff