affect Exim's operation, with an unchanged configuration file. For new
options, and new features, see the NewStuff file next to this ChangeLog.
-Exim version 4.96.1
--------------------
+Exim version 4.97
+-----------------
+
+JH/01 The hosts_connection_nolog main option now also controls "no MAIL in
+ SMTP connection" log lines.
+
+JH/02 Option default value updates:
+ - queue_fast_ramp (main) true (was false)
+ - remote_max_parallel (main) 4 (was 2)
+
+JH/03 Cache static regex pattern compilations, for use by ACLs.
+
+JH/04 Bug 2903: avoid exit on an attempt to rewrite a malformed address.
+ Make the rewrite never match and keep the logging. Trust the
+ admin to be using verify=header-syntax (to actually reject the message).
+
+JH/05 Follow symlinks for placing a watch on TLS creds files. This means
+ (under Linux) we watch the dir containing the final file; previously
+ it would be the dir with the first symlink. We still do not monitor
+ the entire path.
+
+JH/06 Check for bad chars in rDNS for sender_host_name. The OpenBSD (at least)
+ dn_expand() is happy to pass them through.
+
+JH/07 OpenSSL Fix auto-reload of changed server OCSP proof. Previously, if
+ the file with the proof had an unchanged name, the new proof(s) were
+ loaded on top of the old ones (and nover used; the old ones were stapled).
+
+JH/08 Bug 2915: Fix use-after-free for $regex<n> variables. Previously when
+ more than one message arrived in a single connection a reference from
+ the earlier message could be re-used. Often a sigsegv resulted.
+ These variables were introduced in Exim 4.87.
+ Debug help from Graeme Fowler.
+
+JH/09 Fix ${filter } for conditions that modify $value. Previously the
+ modified version would be used in construction the result, and a memory
+ error would occur.
+
+JH/10 GnuTLS: fix for (IOT?) clients offering no TLS extensions at all.
+ Find and fix by Jasen Betts.
+
+JH/11 OpenSSL: fix for ancient clients needing TLS support for versions earlier
+ than TLSv1,2, Previously, more-recent versions of OpenSSL were permitting
+ the systemwide configuration to override the Exim config.
+
+HS/01 Bug 2728: Introduce EDITME option "DMARC_API" to work around incompatible
+ API changes in libopendmarc.
+
+JH/12 Bug 2930: Fix daemon startup. When started from any process apart from
+ pid 1, in the normal "background daemon" mode, having to drop process-
+ group leadership also lost track of needing to create listener sockets.
+
+JH/13 Bug 2929: Fix using $recipients after ${run...}. A change made for 4.96
+ resulted in the variable appearing empty. Find and fix by Ruben Jenster.
+
+JH/14 Bug 2933: Fix regex substring match variables for null matches. Since 4.96
+ a capture group which obtained no text (eg. "(abc)*" matching zero
+ occurrences) could cause a segfault if the corresponding $<n> was
+ expanded.
+
+JH/15 Fix argument parsing for ${run } expansion. Previously, when an argument
+ included a close-brace character (eg. it itself used an expansion) an
+ error occurred.
+
+JH/16 Move running the smtp connect ACL to before, for TLS-on-connect ports,
+ starting TLS. Previously it was after, meaning that attackers on such
+ ports had to be screened using the host_reject_connection main config
+ option. The new sequence aligns better with the STARTTLS behaviour, and
+ permits defences against crypto-processing load attacks, even though it
+ is strictly an incompatible change.
+ Also, avoid sending any SMTP fail response for either the connect ACL
+ or host_reject_connection, for TLS-on-connect ports.
+
+JH/17 Permit the ACL "encrypted" condition to be used in a HELO/EHLO ACL,
+ Previously this was not permitted, but it makes reasonable sense.
+ While there, restore a restriction on using it from a connect ACL; given
+ the change JH/16 it could only return false (and before 4.91 was not
+ permitted).
+
+JH/18 Fix a fencepost error in logging. Previously (since 4.92) when a log line
+ was exactly sized compared to the log buffer, a crash occurred with the
+ misleading message "bad memory reference; pool not found".
+ Found and traced by Jasen Betts.
+
+JH/19 Bug 2911: Fix a recursion in DNS lookups. Previously, if the main option
+ dns_again_means_nonexist included an element causing a DNS lookup which
+ itself returned DNS_AGAIN, unbounded recursion occurred. Possible results
+ included (though probably not limited to) a process crash from stack
+ memory limit, or from excessive open files. Replace this with a paniclog
+ whine (as this is likely a configuration error), and returning
+ DNS_NOMATCH.
+
+JH/20 Bug 2954: (OpenSSL) Fix setting of explicit EC curve/group. Previously
+ this always failed, probably leading to the usual downgrade to in-clear
+ connections.
+
+JH/21 Fix TLSA lookups. Previously dns_again_means_nonexist would affect
+ SERVFAIL results, which breaks the downgrade resistance of DANE. Change
+ to not checking that list for these lookups.
+
+JH/22 Bug 2434: Add connection-elapsed "D=" element to more connection
+ closure log lines.
+
+JH/23 Fix crash in string expansions. Previously, if an empty variable was
+ immediately followed by an expansion operator, a null-indirection read
+ was done, killing the process.
+
+JH/24 Bug 2997: When built with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO, bounce messages can
+ include an SMTP response string which is longer than that supported
+ by the delivering transport. Alleviate by wrapping such lines before
+ column 80.
+
+JH/25 Bug 2827: Restrict size of References: header in bounce messages to 998
+ chars (RFC limit). Previously a limit of 12 items was made, which with
+ a not-impossible References: in the message being bounced could still
+ be over-large and get stopped in the transport.
+
+JH/26 For a ${readsocket } in TLS mode, send a TLS Close Alert before the TCP
+ close. Previously a bare socket close was done.
+
+JH/27 Fix ${srs_encode ..}. Previously it would give a bad result for one day
+ every 1024 days.
+
+JH/28 Bug 2996: Fix a crash in the smtp transport. When finding that the
+ message being considered for delivery was already being handled by
+ another process, and having an SMTP connection already open, the function
+ to close it tried to use an uninitialized variable. This would afftect
+ high-volume sites more, especially when running mailing-list-style loads.
+ Pollution of logs was the major effect, as the other process delivered
+ the message. Found and partly investigated by Graeme Fowler.
+
+JH/29 Change format of the internal ID used for message identification. The old
+ version only supported 31 bits for a PID element; the new 64 (on systems
+ which can use Base-62 encoding, which is all currently supported ones
+ but not Darwin (MacOS) or Cygwin, which have case-insensitive filesystems
+ and must use Base-36). The new ID is 23 characters rather than 16, and is
+ visible in various places - notably logs, message headers, and spool file
+ names. Various of the ancillary utilities also have to know the format.
+ As well as the expanded PID portion, the sub-second part of the time
+ recorded in the ID is expanded to support finer precision. Theoretically
+ this permits a receive rate from a single comms channel of better than the
+ previous 2000/sec.
+ The major timestamp part of the ID is not changed; at 6 characters it is
+ usable until about year 3700.
+ Updating from previously releases is fully supported: old-format spool
+ files are still usable, and the utilities support both formats. New
+ message will use the new format. The one hints-DB file type which uses
+ message-IDs (the transport wait- DB) will be discarded if an old-format ID
+ is seen; new ones will be built with only new-format IDs.
+ Optionally, a utility can be used to convert spool files from old to new,
+ but this is only an efficiency measure not a requirement for operation
+ Downgrading from new to old requires running a provided utility, having
+ first stopped all operations. This will convert any spool files from new
+ back to old (losing time-precision and PID information) and remove any
+ wait- hints databases.
+
+JH/30 Bug 3006: Fix handling of JSON strings having embedded commas. Previously
+ we treated them as item separators when parsing for a list item, but they
+ need to be protected by the doublequotes. While there, add handling for
+ backslashes.
+
+JH/31 Bug 2998: Fix ${utf8clean:...} to disallow UTF-16 surrogate codepoints.
+ Found and fixed by Jasen Betts. No testcase for this as my usual text
+ editor insists on emitting only valid UTF-8.
+
+JH/32 Fix "tls_dhparam = none" under GnuTLS. At least with 3.7.9 this gave
+ a null-indirection SIGSEGV for the receive process.
+
+JH/33 Fix free for live variable $value created by a ${run ...} expansion during
+ -bh use. Internal checking would spot this and take a panic.
+
+JH/34 Bug 3013: Fix use of $recipients within arguments for ${run...}.
+ In 4.96 this would expand to empty.
+
+JH/35 Bug 3014: GnuTLS: fix expiry date for an auto-generated server
+ certificate. Find and fix by Andreas Metzler.
+
+JH/36 Add ARC info to DMARC hostory records.
+
+JH/37 Bug 3016: Avoid sending DSN when message was accepted under fakereject
+ or fakedefer. Previously the sender could discover that the message
+ had in fact been accepted.
+
+JH/38 Taint-track intermediate values from the peer in multi-stage authentation
+ sequences. Previously the input was not noted as being tainted; notably
+ this resulted in behaviour of LOGIN vs. PLAIN being inconsistent under
+ bad coding of authenticators.
-This is a security release.
+JH/39 Bug 3023: Fix crash induced by some combinations of zero-length strings
+ and ${tr...}. Found and diagnosed by Heiko Schlichting.
-JH/01 Bug 2999: Fix a possible OOB write in the external authenticator, which
++JH/40 Bug 2999: Fix a possible OOB write in the external authenticator, which
+ could be triggered by externally-supplied input. Found by Trend Micro.
+ CVE-2023-42115
+
-JH/02 Bug 3000: Fix a possible OOB write in the SPA authenticator, which could
++JH/41 Bug 3000: Fix a possible OOB write in the SPA authenticator, which could
+ be triggered by externally-controlled input. Found by Trend Micro.
+ CVE-2023-42116
+
-JH/03 Bug 3001: Fix a possible OOB read in the SPA authenticator, which could
++JH/42 Bug 3001: Fix a possible OOB read in the SPA authenticator, which could
+ be triggered by externally-controlled input. Found by Trend Micro.
+ CVE-2023-42114
+
Exim version 4.96
-----------------
-JH/01 Move the wait-for-next-tick (needed for unique messmage IDs) from
+JH/01 Move the wait-for-next-tick (needed for unique message IDs) from
after reception to before a subsequent reception. This should
mean slightly faster delivery, and also confirmation of reception
to senders.
* Samba project (by Andrew Tridgell, Jeremy Allison, and others).
*
* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2021
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
* Tom Kistner provided additional code, adding spa_build_auth_challenge() to
* support server authentication mode.
up with a different answer to the one above)
*/
+ #ifndef MACRO_PREDEF
+
+
#define DEBUG_X(a,b) ;
extern int DEBUGLEVEL;
#define spa_bytes_add(ptr, header, buf, count) \
{ \
- if (buf && (count) != 0) /* we hate -Wint-in-bool-contex */ \
+ if ( buf && (count) != 0 /* we hate -Wint-in-bool-contex */ \
+ && ptr->bufIndex + count < sizeof(ptr->buffer) \
+ ) \
{ \
SSVAL(&ptr->header.len,0,count); \
SSVAL(&ptr->header.maxlen,0,count); \
#define spa_string_add(ptr, header, string) \
{ \
- char *p = string; \
+ uschar * p = string; \
int len = 0; \
- if (p) len = strlen(p); \
- spa_bytes_add(ptr, header, (US p), len); \
+ if (p) len = Ustrlen(p); \
+ spa_bytes_add(ptr, header, p, len); \
}
#define spa_unicode_add_string(ptr, header, string) \
{ \
- char *p = string; \
- uschar *b = NULL; \
+ uschar * p = string; \
+ uschar * b = NULL; \
int len = 0; \
if (p) \
{ \
- len = strlen(p); \
- b = strToUnicode(p); \
+ len = Ustrlen(p); \
+ b = US strToUnicode(CS p); \
} \
spa_bytes_add(ptr, header, b, len*2); \
}
- #define GetUnicodeString(structPtr, header) \
- unicodeToString(((char*)structPtr) + IVAL(&structPtr->header.offset,0) , SVAL(&structPtr->header.len,0)/2)
- #define GetString(structPtr, header) \
- toString(((CS structPtr) + IVAL(&structPtr->header.offset,0)), SVAL(&structPtr->header.len,0))
-
#ifdef notdef
#define DumpBuffer(fp, structPtr, header) \
- dumpRaw(fp,(US structPtr)+IVAL(&structPtr->header.offset,0),SVAL(&structPtr->header.len,0))
+ dumpRaw(fp,(US structPtr)+IVAL(&structPtr->header.offset,0),SVAL(&structPtr->header.len,0))
static void
return buf;
}
+ static inline uschar *
+ get_challenge_unistr(SPAAuthChallenge * challenge, SPAStrHeader * hdr)
+ {
+ int off = IVAL(&hdr->offset, 0);
+ int len = SVAL(&hdr->len, 0);
+ return off + len < sizeof(SPAAuthChallenge)
+ ? US unicodeToString(CS challenge + off, len/2) : US"";
+ }
+
+ static inline uschar *
+ get_challenge_str(SPAAuthChallenge * challenge, SPAStrHeader * hdr)
+ {
+ int off = IVAL(&hdr->offset, 0);
+ int len = SVAL(&hdr->len, 0);
+ return off + len < sizeof(SPAAuthChallenge)
+ ? US toString(CS challenge + off, len) : US"";
+ }
+
#ifdef notdef
+ #define GetUnicodeString(structPtr, header) \
+ unicodeToString(((char*)structPtr) + IVAL(&structPtr->header.offset,0) , SVAL(&structPtr->header.len,0)/2)
+
+ #define GetString(structPtr, header) \
+ toString(((CS structPtr) + IVAL(&structPtr->header.offset,0)), SVAL(&structPtr->header.len,0))
+
+
void
dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest (FILE * fp, SPAAuthRequest * request)
{
#endif
void
- spa_build_auth_request (SPAAuthRequest * request, char *user, char *domain)
+ spa_build_auth_request (SPAAuthRequest * request, uschar * user, uschar * domain)
{
- char *u = strdup (user);
- char *p = strchr (u, '@');
+ uschar * u = string_copy(user);
+ uschar * p = Ustrchr(u, '@');
if (p)
{
if (!domain)
- domain = p + 1;
+ domain = p + 1;
*p = '\0';
}
SIVAL (&request->flags, 0, 0x0000b207); /* have to figure out what these mean */
spa_string_add (request, user, u);
spa_string_add (request, domain, domain);
- free (u);
}
void
spa_build_auth_response (SPAAuthChallenge * challenge,
- SPAAuthResponse * response, char *user,
- char *password)
+ SPAAuthResponse * response, uschar * user,
+ uschar * password)
{
uint8x lmRespData[24];
uint8x ntRespData[24];
uint32x cf = IVAL(&challenge->flags, 0);
- char *u = strdup (user);
- char *p = strchr (u, '@');
- char *d = NULL;
- char *domain;
+ uschar * u = string_copy(user);
+ uschar * p = Ustrchr(u, '@');
+ uschar * d = NULL;
+ uschar * domain;
if (p)
{
*p = '\0';
}
- else domain = d = strdup((cf & 0x1)?
- CCS GetUnicodeString(challenge, uDomain) :
- CCS GetString(challenge, uDomain));
+ else domain = d = string_copy(cf & 0x1
+ ? CUS get_challenge_unistr(challenge, &challenge->uDomain)
+ : CUS get_challenge_str(challenge, &challenge->uDomain));
- spa_smb_encrypt (US password, challenge->challengeData, lmRespData);
- spa_smb_nt_encrypt (US password, challenge->challengeData, ntRespData);
+ spa_smb_encrypt(password, challenge->challengeData, lmRespData);
+ spa_smb_nt_encrypt(password, challenge->challengeData, ntRespData);
response->bufIndex = 0;
memcpy (response->ident, "NTLMSSP\0\0\0", 8);
SIVAL (&response->msgType, 0, 3);
- spa_bytes_add (response, lmResponse, lmRespData, (cf & 0x200) ? 24 : 0);
- spa_bytes_add (response, ntResponse, ntRespData, (cf & 0x8000) ? 24 : 0);
+ spa_bytes_add(response, lmResponse, lmRespData, cf & 0x200 ? 24 : 0);
+ spa_bytes_add(response, ntResponse, ntRespData, cf & 0x8000 ? 24 : 0);
if (cf & 0x1) { /* Unicode Text */
- spa_unicode_add_string (response, uDomain, domain);
- spa_unicode_add_string (response, uUser, u);
- spa_unicode_add_string (response, uWks, u);
+ spa_unicode_add_string(response, uDomain, domain);
+ spa_unicode_add_string(response, uUser, u);
+ spa_unicode_add_string(response, uWks, u);
} else { /* OEM Text */
- spa_string_add (response, uDomain, domain);
- spa_string_add (response, uUser, u);
- spa_string_add (response, uWks, u);
+ spa_string_add(response, uDomain, domain);
+ spa_string_add(response, uUser, u);
+ spa_string_add(response, uWks, u);
}
- spa_string_add (response, sessionKey, NULL);
+ spa_string_add(response, sessionKey, NULL);
response->flags = challenge->flags;
-
- if (d != NULL) free (d);
- free (u);
}
+
+
+ #endif /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/
* All the code used here was torn by Marc Prud'hommeaux out of the
* Samba project (by Andrew Tridgell, Jeremy Allison, and others).
*/
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
/* December 2004: The spa_base64_to_bits() function has no length checking in
it. I have added a check. PH */
void spa_bits_to_base64 (unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, int);
int spa_base64_to_bits(char *, int, const char *);
- void spa_build_auth_response (SPAAuthChallenge *challenge,
- SPAAuthResponse *response, char *user, char *password);
- void spa_build_auth_request (SPAAuthRequest *request, char *user,
- char *domain);
+ void spa_build_auth_response (SPAAuthChallenge * challenge,
+ SPAAuthResponse * response, uschar * user, uschar * password);
+ void spa_build_auth_request (SPAAuthRequest * request, uschar * user,
+ uschar * domain);
extern void spa_smb_encrypt (unsigned char * passwd, unsigned char * c8,
unsigned char * p24);
extern void spa_smb_nt_encrypt (unsigned char * passwd, unsigned char * c8,
/* Copyright (c) Jeremy Harris 2019-2020 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
/* This file provides an Exim authenticator driver for
a server to verify a client SSL certificate, using the EXTERNAL
if (ob->server_param2)
{
uschar * s = expand_string(ob->server_param2);
- auth_vars[expand_nmax] = s;
+ auth_vars[expand_nmax = 1] = s;
expand_nstring[++expand_nmax] = s;
expand_nlength[expand_nmax] = Ustrlen(s);
if (ob->server_param3)
/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
/* This file, which provides support for Microsoft's Secure Password
Authentication, was contributed by Marc Prud'hommeaux. Tom Kistner added SPA
SPAAuthChallenge challenge;
SPAAuthResponse response;
char msgbuf[2048];
- char *domain = NULL;
- char *username, *password;
+ uschar * domain = NULL, * username, * password;
/* Code added by PH to expand the options */
*buffer = 0; /* Default no message when cancelled */
- if (!(username = CS expand_string(ob->spa_username)))
+ if (!(username = expand_string(ob->spa_username)))
{
if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return CANCELLED;
string_format(buffer, buffsize, "expansion of \"%s\" failed in %s "
return ERROR;
}
- if (!(password = CS expand_string(ob->spa_password)))
+ if (!(password = expand_string(ob->spa_password)))
{
if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return CANCELLED;
string_format(buffer, buffsize, "expansion of \"%s\" failed in %s "
}
if (ob->spa_domain)
- if (!(domain = CS expand_string(ob->spa_domain)))
+ if (!(domain = expand_string(ob->spa_domain)))
{
if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return CANCELLED;
string_format(buffer, buffsize, "expansion of \"%s\" failed in %s "
DSPA("\n\n%s authenticator: using domain %s\n\n", ablock->name, domain);
- spa_build_auth_request(&request, CS username, domain);
+ spa_build_auth_request(&request, username, domain);
spa_bits_to_base64(US msgbuf, US &request, spa_request_length(&request));
DSPA("\n\n%s authenticator: sending request (%s)\n\n", ablock->name, msgbuf);
DSPA("\n\n%s authenticator: challenge (%s)\n\n", ablock->name, buffer + 4);
spa_base64_to_bits(CS (&challenge), sizeof(challenge), CCS (buffer + 4));
- spa_build_auth_response(&challenge, &response, CS username, CS password);
+ spa_build_auth_response(&challenge, &response, username, password);
spa_bits_to_base64(US msgbuf, US &response, spa_request_length(&response));
DSPA("\n\n%s authenticator: challenge response (%s)\n\n", ablock->name, msgbuf);
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / commitdiff