+
+
+.subsection "Revoked certificates"
+.cindex "TLS" "revoked certificates"
+.cindex "revocation list"
+.cindex "certificate" "revocation list"
+.cindex "OCSP" "stapling"
+There are three ways for a certificate to be made unusable
+before its expiry.
+
+.ilist
+Certificate issuing authorities issue Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) when
+certificates are revoked. If you have such a list, you can pass it to an Exim
+server using the global option called &%tls_crl%& and to an Exim client using
+an identically named option for the &(smtp)& transport. In each case, the value
+of the option is expanded and must then be the name of a file that contains a
+CRL in PEM format.
+The downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially huge
+file from every certificate authority they know of.
+
+.next
+The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
+Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
+against an OCSP server run by the CA.
+OCSP is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
+It requires the CA running software with access to the
+private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries.
+Because every client TLS transaction with a server results in an OCSP
+access to the CA, it results in a heavy load on the CA.
+It also lets the CA track all usage of the certs, which is a privacy problem.
+
+The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
+comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
+connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
+re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
+
+.next
+The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
+issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
+the OCSP server (probably using the original OCSP above),
+then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
+negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
+CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
+resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
+starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
+proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
+
+Unless Exim is built with the support disabled,
+or with GnuTLS earlier than version 3.3.16 / 3.4.8
+support for OCSP stapling is included.
+
+There is a global option called &%tls_ocsp_file%&.
+The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
+an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
+option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the &%tls_certificate%& option
+contains &`tls_in_sni`&, as per other TLS options.
+
+Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
+proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
+Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
+contents are always valid. Exim will expand the &%tls_ocsp_file%& option
+on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
+next connection.
+
+When built with OpenSSL Exim will check for a valid next update timestamp
+in the OCSP proof; if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be
+ignored.
+
+For the client to be able to verify the stapled OCSP the server must
+also supply, in its stapled information, any intermediate
+certificates for the chain leading to the OCSP proof from the signer
+of the server certificate. There may be zero or one such. These
+intermediate certificates should be added to the server OCSP stapling
+file named by &%tls_ocsp_file%&.
+
+Note that the proof only covers the terminal server certificate,
+not any of the chain from CA to it.
+
+There is no current way to staple a proof for a client certificate.
+
+.code
+ A helper script "ocsp_fetch.pl" for fetching a proof from a CA
+ OCSP server is supplied. The server URL may be included in the
+ server certificate, if the CA is helpful.
+
+ One failure mode seen was the OCSP Signer cert expiring before the end
+ of validity of the OCSP proof. The checking done by Exim/OpenSSL
+ noted this as invalid overall, but the re-fetch script did not.
+.endd
+.endlist
+
+