+++ /dev/null
-Security fix for CVE-2016-1531
-==============================
-
-All installations having Exim set-uid root and using 'perl_startup' are
-vulnerable to a local privilege escalation. Any user who can start an
-instance of Exim (and this is normally *any* user) can gain root
-privileges.
-
-The official fix is in Exim release 4.86.2. (tagged as exim-4_86_2)
-
-For your convenience we released 4.85.2 (tagged as exim-4_85_2)
- 4.84.2 (tagged as exim-4_84_2)
-
-To support package maintainers on older systems we maintain (on a best
-effort basis) GIT branches with backported patches for older releases:
-
- exim-4_80_1+CVE-2016-1531
- exim-4_82_1+CVE-2016-1531
-
-(We didn't assign GIT tags, to indicate that's nothing real official.)
-
-
-New options
------------
-
-We had to introduce two new configuration options:
-
- keep_environment =
- add_environment =
-
-Both options are empty per default. That is, Exim cleans the complete
-environment on startup. This affects Exim itself and any subprocesses,
-as transports, that may call other programs via some alias mechanisms,
-as routers (queryprogram), lookups, and so on.
-
-** THIS MAY BREAK your existing installation **
-
-If both options are not used in the configuration, Exim issues a warning
-on startup. This warning disappears if at least one of these options is
-used (even if set to an empty value).
-
-keep_environment should contain a list of trusted environment variables.
-(Do you trust PATH?). This may be a list of names and REs.
-
- keep_environment = ^LDAP_ : FOO_PATH
-
-To add (or override) variables, you can use add_environment:
-
- add_environment = <; PATH=/sbin:/usr/sbin
-
-
-New behaviour
--------------
-
-Now Exim changes its working directory to / right after startup,
-even before reading its configuration. (Later Exim changes its working
-directory to $spool_directory, as usual.)
-
-Exim only accepts an absolute configuration file path now, when using
-the -C option.
-
-
-Thank you for your understanding.
-
-[Heiko Schlittermann <hs@schlittermann.de>]
--- /dev/null
+security/CVE-2016-1531.txt
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-CVE ID: CVE-2016-9963
-Date: 2016-12-15
-Credits: Bjoern Jacke <bjoern@j3e.de>
-Version(s): 4.69 -> 4.87
-Issue: If several conditions are met, Exim leaks private information
- to a remote attacker.
-
-Conditions
-==========
-
-If *all* of the following conditions are met
-
- Build options
- -------------
-
- * Exim is built with DKIM enabled (default for newer versions)
- exim -bV | grep 'Support.*DKIM'
-
- Runtime options
- ---------------
-
- * Exim uses DKIM signing (transport options dkim_private_key,
- dkim_domain, and other)
-
- * The dkim_private_key option names a file containing the key.
-
- exim -bP transports | grep 'dkim_private_key = .'
-
- * Exim uses PRDR (transport option hosts_try_prdr) (default
- since 4.86)
-
- exim -bP transports | grep 'hosts_try_prdr = .'
-
- *OR*
-
- Exim uses the LMTP protocol variant for SMTP transport.
-
- exim -bP transports | grep 'protocol = lmtp'
-
- Operation
- ---------
-
- * Exim transports a multi-recipient message
-
- * The destination host supports PRDR
- OR
- the message transport uses LMTP
-
- * One or more recipients are rejected after the DATA phase
-
-Impact
-======
-
-Exim leaks the private DKIM signing key to the log files. Additionally,
-if the build option EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO=yes is used, the key material
-is included in the bounce message.
-
-Fix
-===
-
-Install a fixed Exim version:
-
- 4.88
- 4.87.1
-
-If you can't install one of the above versions, ask your package
-maintainer for a version containing the backported fix. On request and
-depending on our resources we will support you in backporting the fix.
-(Please note, that Exim project officially doesn't support versions
-prior the current stable version.)
-
-If you think that you MIGHT be affected, we HIGHLY recommend to create
-a new set of DKIM keys and fade out the previous DKIM key soon to make
-sure that a possibly leaked DKIM key can not be misused in the future.
-
-
-Workaround
-==========
-
-Disable PRDR in your outgoing transport(s): set hosts_try_prdr to an
-empty string.
-
-AND do not use the LMTP protocol variant of the SMTP driver.
-
-Indication
-==========
-
-You can check if you where affected already. The mainlog entries look like this:
-
-2016-12-17 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 ** baduser@test.ex R=client T=send_to_server H=ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4 [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: PRDR error after -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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\nfKQax6vhiMq+0qIiEwLA1wavyLVKZ7Mfag+/4NTcDUVC\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n: 550 PRDR R=<baduser@test.ex> refusal
-
-Even if there is no evidence in the existing log files, that a DKIM key
-leakage happened this might have happened in the past, log files might
-have been deleted already but a key leak could have ended up via mail
-bounce in a user mail box
-
-[Heiko Schlittermann <hs@schlittermann.de>]
--- /dev/null
+security/CVE-2016-9963.txt
\ No newline at end of file
--- /dev/null
+Security fix for CVE-2016-1531
+==============================
+
+All installations having Exim set-uid root and using 'perl_startup' are
+vulnerable to a local privilege escalation. Any user who can start an
+instance of Exim (and this is normally *any* user) can gain root
+privileges.
+
+The official fix is in Exim release 4.86.2. (tagged as exim-4_86_2)
+
+For your convenience we released 4.85.2 (tagged as exim-4_85_2)
+ 4.84.2 (tagged as exim-4_84_2)
+
+To support package maintainers on older systems we maintain (on a best
+effort basis) GIT branches with backported patches for older releases:
+
+ exim-4_80_1+CVE-2016-1531
+ exim-4_82_1+CVE-2016-1531
+
+(We didn't assign GIT tags, to indicate that's nothing real official.)
+
+
+New options
+-----------
+
+We had to introduce two new configuration options:
+
+ keep_environment =
+ add_environment =
+
+Both options are empty per default. That is, Exim cleans the complete
+environment on startup. This affects Exim itself and any subprocesses,
+as transports, that may call other programs via some alias mechanisms,
+as routers (queryprogram), lookups, and so on.
+
+** THIS MAY BREAK your existing installation **
+
+If both options are not used in the configuration, Exim issues a warning
+on startup. This warning disappears if at least one of these options is
+used (even if set to an empty value).
+
+keep_environment should contain a list of trusted environment variables.
+(Do you trust PATH?). This may be a list of names and REs.
+
+ keep_environment = ^LDAP_ : FOO_PATH
+
+To add (or override) variables, you can use add_environment:
+
+ add_environment = <; PATH=/sbin:/usr/sbin
+
+
+New behaviour
+-------------
+
+Now Exim changes its working directory to / right after startup,
+even before reading its configuration. (Later Exim changes its working
+directory to $spool_directory, as usual.)
+
+Exim only accepts an absolute configuration file path now, when using
+the -C option.
+
+
+Thank you for your understanding.
+
+[Heiko Schlittermann <hs@schlittermann.de>]
--- /dev/null
+CVE ID: CVE-2016-9963
+Date: 2016-12-15
+Credits: Bjoern Jacke <bjoern@j3e.de>
+Version(s): 4.69 -> 4.87
+Issue: If several conditions are met, Exim leaks private information
+ to a remote attacker.
+
+Conditions
+==========
+
+If *all* of the following conditions are met
+
+ Build options
+ -------------
+
+ * Exim is built with DKIM enabled (default for newer versions)
+ exim -bV | grep 'Support.*DKIM'
+
+ Runtime options
+ ---------------
+
+ * Exim uses DKIM signing (transport options dkim_private_key,
+ dkim_domain, and other)
+
+ * The dkim_private_key option names a file containing the key.
+
+ exim -bP transports | grep 'dkim_private_key = .'
+
+ * Exim uses PRDR (transport option hosts_try_prdr) (default
+ since 4.86)
+
+ exim -bP transports | grep 'hosts_try_prdr = .'
+
+ *OR*
+
+ Exim uses the LMTP protocol variant for SMTP transport.
+
+ exim -bP transports | grep 'protocol = lmtp'
+
+ Operation
+ ---------
+
+ * Exim transports a multi-recipient message
+
+ * The destination host supports PRDR
+ OR
+ the message transport uses LMTP
+
+ * One or more recipients are rejected after the DATA phase
+
+Impact
+======
+
+Exim leaks the private DKIM signing key to the log files. Additionally,
+if the build option EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO=yes is used, the key material
+is included in the bounce message.
+
+Fix
+===
+
+Install a fixed Exim version:
+
+ 4.88
+ 4.87.1
+
+If you can't install one of the above versions, ask your package
+maintainer for a version containing the backported fix. On request and
+depending on our resources we will support you in backporting the fix.
+(Please note, that Exim project officially doesn't support versions
+prior the current stable version.)
+
+If you think that you MIGHT be affected, we HIGHLY recommend to create
+a new set of DKIM keys and fade out the previous DKIM key soon to make
+sure that a possibly leaked DKIM key can not be misused in the future.
+
+
+Workaround
+==========
+
+Disable PRDR in your outgoing transport(s): set hosts_try_prdr to an
+empty string.
+
+AND do not use the LMTP protocol variant of the SMTP driver.
+
+Indication
+==========
+
+You can check if you where affected already. The mainlog entries look like this:
+
+2016-12-17 09:44:33 10HmaX-0005vi-00 ** baduser@test.ex R=client T=send_to_server H=ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4 [ip4.ip4.ip4.ip4]: PRDR error after -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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\nfKQax6vhiMq+0qIiEwLA1wavyLVKZ7Mfag+/4NTcDUVC\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n: 550 PRDR R=<baduser@test.ex> refusal
+
+Even if there is no evidence in the existing log files, that a DKIM key
+leakage happened this might have happened in the past, log files might
+have been deleted already but a key leak could have ended up via mail
+bounce in a user mail box
+
+[Heiko Schlittermann <hs@schlittermann.de>]
<li> <a href="{$docroot}/maillist.html">Mailing Lists</a> </li>
<li> <a href="http://wiki.exim.org/">Wiki</a> </li>
<li> <a href="https://bugs.exim.org/">Bugs</a> </li>
+ <li> <a href="{$docroot}/static/doc/security">Security</a> </li>
<li> <a href="{$docroot}/credits.html">Credits</a> </li>
<li class="img">