Track tainted data and refuse to expand it

[users/jgh/exim.git] / src / exim_monitor / em_menu.c

diff --git a/src/exim_monitor/em_menu.c b/src/exim_monitor/em_menu.c
index 8e638f07e7e162ee5f070bbe3cce948e4ab722ff..92e0b351ba2cc9061fb7988c9f74eedeee47813a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/exim_monitor/em_menu.c
+++ b/src/exim_monitor/em_menu.c
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static void headersAction(Widget w, XtPointer client_data, XtPointer call_data)
 uschar buffer[256];
 header_line *h, *next;
 Widget text = text_create(US client_data, text_depth);
-void *reset_point;
+rmark reset_point;
 
 w = w;      /* Keep picky compilers happy */
 call_data = call_data;
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ call_data = call_data;
 /* Remember the point in the dynamic store so we can recover to it afterwards.
 Then use Exim's function to read the header. */
 
-reset_point = store_get(0);
+reset_point = store_mark();
 
 sprintf(CS buffer, "%s-H", US client_data);
 if (spool_read_header(buffer, TRUE, FALSE) != spool_read_OK)
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ if (spool_read_header(buffer, TRUE, FALSE) != spool_read_OK)
 
 if (sender_address != NULL)
   {
-  text_showf(text, "%s sender: <%s>\n", sender_local? "Local" : "Remote",
+  text_showf(text, "%s sender: <%s>\n", f.sender_local ? "Local" : "Remote",
     sender_address);
   }