* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2015 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */
The code herein is a revamp of GnuTLS integration using the current APIs; the
original tls-gnu.c was based on a patch which was contributed by Nikos
-Mavroyanopoulos. The revamp is partially a rewrite, partially cut&paste as
+Mavrogiannopoulos. The revamp is partially a rewrite, partially cut&paste as
appropriate.
APIs current as of GnuTLS 2.12.18; note that the GnuTLS manual is for GnuTLS 3,
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030014
# define SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE
#endif
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030109
+# define SUPPORT_CORK
+#endif
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030506 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
+# define SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000
+# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA 2
+# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE 3
+# else
+# error GnuTLS version too early for DANE
+# endif
+# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x999999
+# define GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
+# endif
+#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
# include <gnutls/ocsp.h>
#endif
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+# include <gnutls/dane.h>
+#endif
/* GnuTLS 2 vs 3
/* Values for verify_requirement */
enum peer_verify_requirement
- { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED };
+ { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED, VERIFY_DANE };
/* This holds most state for server or client; with this, we can set up an
outbound TLS-enabled connection in an ACL callout, while not stomping all
int fd_in;
int fd_out;
BOOL peer_cert_verified;
+ BOOL peer_dane_verified;
BOOL trigger_sni_changes;
BOOL have_set_peerdn;
const struct host_item *host;
uschar *exp_tls_verify_certificates;
uschar *exp_tls_crl;
uschar *exp_tls_require_ciphers;
- uschar *exp_tls_ocsp_file;
const uschar *exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames;
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
uschar *event_action;
#endif
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+ char * const * dane_data;
+ const int * dane_data_len;
+#endif
tls_support *tlsp; /* set in tls_init() */
uschar *xfer_buffer;
int xfer_buffer_lwm;
int xfer_buffer_hwm;
- int xfer_eof;
- int xfer_error;
+ BOOL xfer_eof; /*XXX never gets set! */
+ BOOL xfer_error;
} exim_gnutls_state_st;
static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = {
- NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL,
+ .session = NULL,
+ .x509_cred = NULL,
+ .priority_cache = NULL,
+ .verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE,
+ .fd_in = -1,
+ .fd_out = -1,
+ .peer_cert_verified = FALSE,
+ .peer_dane_verified = FALSE,
+ .trigger_sni_changes =FALSE,
+ .have_set_peerdn = FALSE,
+ .host = NULL,
+ .peercert = NULL,
+ .peerdn = NULL,
+ .ciphersuite = NULL,
+ .received_sni = NULL,
+
+ .tls_certificate = NULL,
+ .tls_privatekey = NULL,
+ .tls_sni = NULL,
+ .tls_verify_certificates = NULL,
+ .tls_crl = NULL,
+ .tls_require_ciphers =NULL,
+
+ .exp_tls_certificate = NULL,
+ .exp_tls_privatekey = NULL,
+ .exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL,
+ .exp_tls_crl = NULL,
+ .exp_tls_require_ciphers = NULL,
+ .exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = NULL,
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
- NULL,
+ .event_action = NULL,
#endif
- NULL,
- NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ .tlsp = NULL,
+
+ .xfer_buffer = NULL,
+ .xfer_buffer_lwm = 0,
+ .xfer_buffer_hwm = 0,
+ .xfer_eof = FALSE,
+ .xfer_error = FALSE,
};
/* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming
/* Set this to control gnutls_global_set_log_level(); values 0 to 9 will setup
the library logging; a value less than 0 disables the calls to set up logging
-callbacks. */
+callbacks. Possibly GNuTLS also looks for an environment variable
+"GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL". */
#ifndef EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL
# define EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL -1
#endif
# define EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 1024
#endif
-#define exim_gnutls_err_check(Label) do { \
- if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), host); } } while (0)
+#define exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, Label) do { \
+ if ((rc) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \
+ return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), host, errstr); \
+ } while (0)
-#define expand_check_tlsvar(Varname) expand_check(state->Varname, US #Varname, &state->exp_##Varname)
+#define expand_check_tlsvar(Varname, errstr) \
+ expand_check(state->Varname, US #Varname, &state->exp_##Varname, errstr)
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00
# define HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
usually obtained from gnutls_strerror()
host NULL if setting up a server;
the connected host if setting up a client
+ errstr pointer to returned error string
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-tls_error(const uschar *prefix, const char *msg, const host_item *host)
+tls_error(const uschar *prefix, const char *msg, const host_item *host,
+ uschar ** errstr)
{
-if (host)
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection (%s)%s%s",
- host->name, host->address, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : "");
- return FAIL;
- }
-else
- {
- uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
- if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
- conn_info += 5;
- /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s)%s%s",
- conn_info, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : "");
- return DEFER;
- }
+if (errstr)
+ *errstr = string_sprintf("(%s)%s%s", prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : "");
+return host ? FAIL : DEFER;
}
static void
record_io_error(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, int rc, uschar *when, uschar *text)
{
-const char *msg;
+const char * msg;
+uschar * errstr;
if (rc == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED)
msg = CS string_sprintf("%s: %s", US gnutls_strerror(rc),
else
msg = gnutls_strerror(rc);
-tls_error(when, msg, state->host);
+(void) tls_error(when, msg, state->host, &errstr);
+
+if (state->host)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection %s",
+ state->host->name, state->host->address, errstr);
+else
+ {
+ uschar * conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
+ if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0) conn_info += 5;
+ /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s %s", conn_info, errstr);
+ }
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", state->ciphersuite);
tlsp->certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+tlsp->dane_verified = state->peer_dane_verified;
+#endif
/* note that tls_channelbinding_b64 is not saved to the spool file, since it's
only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */
*/
static int
-init_server_dh(void)
+init_server_dh(uschar ** errstr)
{
int fd, rc;
unsigned int dh_bits;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n");
rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params);
-exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_init");
+exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_init");
m.data = NULL;
m.size = 0;
-if (!expand_check(tls_dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &exp_tls_dhparam))
+if (!expand_check(tls_dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &exp_tls_dhparam, errstr))
return DEFER;
if (!exp_tls_dhparam)
else if (exp_tls_dhparam[0] != '/')
{
if (!(m.data = US std_dh_prime_named(exp_tls_dhparam)))
- return tls_error(US"No standard prime named", CS exp_tls_dhparam, NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"No standard prime named", CS exp_tls_dhparam, NULL, errstr);
m.size = Ustrlen(m.data);
}
else
if (m.data)
{
rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3");
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loaded fixed standard D-H parameters\n");
return OK;
}
different filename and ensure we have sufficient bits. */
dh_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_DH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_NORMAL);
if (!dh_bits)
- return tls_error(US"gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() failed", NULL, NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() failed", NULL, NULL, errstr);
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("GnuTLS tells us that for D-H PK, NORMAL is %d bits.\n",
dh_bits);
{
if (!string_format(filename_buf, sizeof(filename_buf),
"%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits))
- return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL, errstr);
filename = filename_buf;
}
{
saved_errno = errno;
(void)close(fd);
- return tls_error(US"TLS cache stat failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache stat failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL, errstr);
}
if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
{
(void)close(fd);
- return tls_error(US"TLS cache not a file", NULL, NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache not a file", NULL, NULL, errstr);
}
if (!(fp = fdopen(fd, "rb")))
{
saved_errno = errno;
(void)close(fd);
return tls_error(US"fdopen(TLS cache stat fd) failed",
- strerror(saved_errno), NULL);
+ strerror(saved_errno), NULL, errstr);
}
m.size = statbuf.st_size;
if (!(m.data = malloc(m.size)))
{
fclose(fp);
- return tls_error(US"malloc failed", strerror(errno), NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"malloc failed", strerror(errno), NULL, errstr);
}
if (!(sz = fread(m.data, m.size, 1, fp)))
{
saved_errno = errno;
fclose(fp);
free(m.data);
- return tls_error(US"fread failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"fread failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL, errstr);
}
fclose(fp);
rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
free(m.data);
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3");
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("read D-H parameters from file \"%s\"\n", filename);
}
}
else
return tls_error(string_open_failed(errno, "\"%s\" for reading", filename),
- NULL, NULL);
+ NULL, NULL, errstr);
/* If ret < 0, either the cache file does not exist, or the data it contains
is not useful. One particular case of this is when upgrading from an older
if ((PATH_MAX - Ustrlen(filename)) < 10)
return tls_error(US"Filename too long to generate replacement",
- CS filename, NULL);
+ CS filename, NULL, errstr);
temp_fn = string_copy(US "%s.XXXXXXX");
if ((fd = mkstemp(CS temp_fn)) < 0) /* modifies temp_fn */
- return tls_error(US"Unable to open temp file", strerror(errno), NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"Unable to open temp file", strerror(errno), NULL, errstr);
(void)fchown(fd, exim_uid, exim_gid); /* Probably not necessary */
/* GnuTLS overshoots!
debug_printf("requesting generation of %d bit Diffie-Hellman prime ...\n",
dh_bits_gen);
rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits_gen);
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2");
/* gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() will tell us the exact size, every time,
and I confirmed that a NULL call to get the size first is how the GnuTLS
rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
m.data, &sz);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing");
m.size = sz;
if (!(m.data = malloc(m.size)))
- return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", strerror(errno), NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", strerror(errno), NULL, errstr);
/* this will return a size 1 less than the allocation size above */
rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
free(m.data);
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real");
}
m.size = sz; /* shrink by 1, probably */
{
free(m.data);
return tls_error(US"TLS cache write D-H params failed",
- strerror(errno), NULL);
+ strerror(errno), NULL, errstr);
}
free(m.data);
if ((sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, US"\n", 1)) != 1)
return tls_error(US"TLS cache write D-H params final newline failed",
- strerror(errno), NULL);
+ strerror(errno), NULL, errstr);
if ((rc = close(fd)))
- return tls_error(US"TLS cache write close() failed", strerror(errno), NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache write close() failed", strerror(errno), NULL, errstr);
if (Urename(temp_fn, filename) < 0)
return tls_error(string_sprintf("failed to rename \"%s\" as \"%s\"",
- temp_fn, filename), strerror(errno), NULL);
+ temp_fn, filename), strerror(errno), NULL, errstr);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote D-H parameters to file \"%s\"\n", filename);
}
/* Create and install a selfsigned certificate, for use in server mode */
static int
-tls_install_selfsign(exim_gnutls_state_st * state)
+tls_install_selfsign(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL;
time_t now;
return rc;
err:
- rc = tls_error(where, gnutls_strerror(rc), NULL);
+ rc = tls_error(where, gnutls_strerror(rc), NULL, errstr);
goto out;
}
+/* Add certificate and key, from files.
+
+Return:
+ Zero or negative: good. Negate value for certificate index if < 0.
+ Greater than zero: FAIL or DEFER code.
+*/
+
+static int
+tls_add_certfile(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const host_item * host,
+ uschar * certfile, uschar * keyfile, uschar ** errstr)
+{
+int rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred,
+ CS certfile, CS keyfile, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+if (rc < 0)
+ return tls_error(
+ string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s", certfile, keyfile),
+ gnutls_strerror(rc), host, errstr);
+return -rc;
+}
+
+
/*************************************************
* Variables re-expanded post-SNI *
*************************************************/
Arguments:
state exim_gnutls_state_st *
+ errstr error string pointer
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
+tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr)
{
struct stat statbuf;
int rc;
if (!host) /* server */
if (!state->received_sni)
{
- if (state->tls_certificate &&
- (Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
- Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
- Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
- ))
+ if ( state->tls_certificate
+ && ( Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni")
+ || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni")
+ || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
+ ) )
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI.\n");
state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE;
}
rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&state->x509_cred);
-exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials");
+exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials");
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK
+gnutls_certificate_set_flags(state->x509_cred, GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_API_V2);
+#endif
/* remember: expand_check_tlsvar() is expand_check() but fiddling with
state members, assuming consistent naming; and expand_check() returns
/* check if we at least have a certificate, before doing expensive
D-H generation. */
-if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate))
+if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate, errstr))
return DEFER;
/* certificate is mandatory in server, optional in client */
|| !*state->exp_tls_certificate
)
if (!host)
- return tls_install_selfsign(state);
+ return tls_install_selfsign(state, errstr);
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no client certificate specified; okay\n");
-if (state->tls_privatekey && !expand_check_tlsvar(tls_privatekey))
+if (state->tls_privatekey && !expand_check_tlsvar(tls_privatekey, errstr))
return DEFER;
/* tls_privatekey is optional, defaulting to same file as certificate */
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: have a changed cert/key pair.\n");
}
- rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred,
- CS state->exp_tls_certificate, CS state->exp_tls_privatekey,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- exim_gnutls_err_check(
- string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s",
- state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey));
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n");
- } /* tls_certificate */
+ if (!host) /* server */
+ {
+ const uschar * clist = state->exp_tls_certificate;
+ const uschar * klist = state->exp_tls_privatekey;
+ const uschar * olist;
+ int csep = 0, ksep = 0, osep = 0, cnt = 0;
+ uschar * cfile, * kfile, * ofile;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &ofile, errstr))
+ return DEFER;
+ olist = ofile;
+#endif
-/* Set the OCSP stapling server info */
+ while (cfile = string_nextinlist(&clist, &csep, NULL, 0))
+
+ if (!(kfile = string_nextinlist(&klist, &ksep, NULL, 0)))
+ return tls_error(US"cert/key setup: out of keys", NULL, host, errstr);
+ else if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host, cfile, kfile, errstr)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ {
+ int gnutls_cert_index = -rc;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key %s registered\n", cfile);
+
+ /* Set the OCSP stapling server info */
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-if ( !host /* server */
- && tls_ocsp_file
- )
- {
- if (gnutls_buggy_ocsp)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS library is buggy for OCSP; avoiding\n");
+ if (tls_ocsp_file)
+ if (gnutls_buggy_ocsp)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("GnuTLS library is buggy for OCSP; avoiding\n");
+ }
+ else if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0)))
+ {
+ /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get
+ observability. More efficient would be to read the file once only,
+ if it never changed (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update,
+ or watch datestamp. */
+
+# ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK
+ rc = gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2(
+ state->x509_cred, gnutls_cert_index,
+ server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile);
+
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc,
+ US"gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2");
+# else
+ if (cnt++ > 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("oops; multiple OCSP files not supported\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function(
+ state->x509_cred, server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile);
+# endif
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response file = %s\n", ofile);
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of OCSP response files in list\n");
+#endif
+ }
}
else
{
- if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file",
- &state->exp_tls_ocsp_file))
- return DEFER;
-
- /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get observability.
- More efficient would be to read the file once only, if it never changed
- (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update, or watch datestamp. */
-
- gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function(state->x509_cred,
- server_ocsp_stapling_cb, state->exp_tls_ocsp_file);
-
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response file = %s\n", state->exp_tls_ocsp_file);
+ if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host,
+ state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey, errstr)))
+ return rc;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n");
}
- }
-#endif
+
+ } /* tls_certificate */
/* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is
if (state->tls_verify_certificates && *state->tls_verify_certificates)
{
- if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_verify_certificates))
+ if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_verify_certificates, errstr))
return DEFER;
#ifndef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE
if (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, "system") == 0)
state->exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL;
#endif
if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl)
- if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_crl))
+ if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_crl, errstr))
return DEFER;
if (!(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates &&
if (cert_count < 0)
{
rc = cert_count;
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"setting certificate trust");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"setting certificate trust");
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n", cert_count);
if (cert_count < 0)
{
rc = cert_count;
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file");
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Processed %d CRLs.\n", cert_count);
}
Arguments:
state exim_gnutls_state_st *
+ errstr error string pointer
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
+tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr)
{
int rc;
const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */
{
if (!dh_server_params)
{
- rc = init_server_dh();
+ rc = init_server_dh(errstr);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
}
gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->x509_cred, dh_server_params);
/* Link the credentials to the session. */
rc = gnutls_credentials_set(state->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, state->x509_cred);
-exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_credentials_set");
+exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_credentials_set");
return OK;
}
crl CRL file
require_ciphers tls_require_ciphers setting
caller_state returned state-info structure
+ errstr error string pointer
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
const uschar *cas,
const uschar *crl,
const uschar *require_ciphers,
- exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state)
+ exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state,
+ uschar ** errstr)
{
exim_gnutls_state_st *state;
int rc;
if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11)
{
rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL);
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_pkcs11_init");
}
#endif
rc = gnutls_global_init();
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_global_init");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_global_init");
#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0
DEBUG(D_tls)
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n");
rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER);
}
-exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_init");
+exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_init");
state->host = host;
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("Expanding various TLS configuration options for session credentials.\n");
-rc = tls_expand_session_files(state);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
/* These are all other parts of the x509_cred handling, since SNI in GnuTLS
requires a new structure afterwards. */
-rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+if ((rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
/* set SNI in client, only */
if (host)
{
- if (!expand_check(sni, US"tls_out_sni", &state->tlsp->sni))
+ if (!expand_check(sni, US"tls_out_sni", &state->tlsp->sni, errstr))
return DEFER;
if (state->tlsp->sni && *state->tlsp->sni)
{
sz = Ustrlen(state->tlsp->sni);
rc = gnutls_server_name_set(state->session,
GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, state->tlsp->sni, sz);
- exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_server_name_set");
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_server_name_set");
}
}
else if (state->tls_sni)
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \
- "have an SNI set for a client [%s]\n", state->tls_sni);
+ "have an SNI set for a server [%s]\n", state->tls_sni);
/* This is the priority string support,
http://www.gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html
if (state->tls_require_ciphers && *state->tls_require_ciphers)
{
- if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_require_ciphers))
+ if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_require_ciphers, errstr))
return DEFER;
if (state->exp_tls_require_ciphers && *state->exp_tls_require_ciphers)
{
p = US exim_default_gnutls_priority;
}
-exim_gnutls_err_check(string_sprintf(
+exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, string_sprintf(
"gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.6s..\"",
p, errpos - CS p, errpos));
rc = gnutls_priority_set(state->session, state->priority_cache);
-exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_priority_set");
+exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_priority_set");
gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(state->session, ssl_session_timeout);
Arguments:
state exim_gnutls_state_st *
+ errstr pointer to error string
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
+peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr)
{
uschar cipherbuf[256];
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
cert_list, cert_list_size);
if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed",
- "no certificate received from peer", state->host);
+ "no certificate received from peer", state->host, errstr);
return OK;
}
debug_printf("TLS: peer cert not X.509 but instead \"%s\"\n", ctn);
if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
return tls_error(US"certificate verification not possible, unhandled type",
- ctn, state->host);
+ ctn, state->host, errstr);
return OK;
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: %s: %s\n", \
(Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \
if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) \
- return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host); \
+ return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr); \
return OK; \
} \
} while (0)
the peer information, but that's too new for some OSes.
Arguments:
- state exim_gnutls_state_st *
- error where to put an error message
+ state exim_gnutls_state_st *
+ errstr where to put an error message
Returns:
FALSE if the session should be rejected
*/
static BOOL
-verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, const char **error)
+verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr)
{
int rc;
-unsigned int verify;
+uint verify;
+
+if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_NONE)
+ return TRUE;
-*error = NULL;
+*errstr = NULL;
-if ((rc = peer_status(state)) != OK)
+if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK)
{
verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
- *error = "certificate not supplied";
+ *errstr = US"certificate not supplied";
}
else
+
+ {
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+ if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_DANE && state->host)
+ {
+ /* Using dane_verify_session_crt() would be easy, as it does it all for us
+ including talking to a DNS resolver. But we want to do that bit ourselves
+ as the testsuite intercepts and fakes its own DNS environment. */
+
+ dane_state_t s;
+ dane_query_t r;
+ uint lsize;
+ const gnutls_datum_t * certlist =
+ gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &lsize);
+ int usage = tls_out.tlsa_usage;
+
+# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
+ /* Split the TLSA records into two sets, TA and EE selectors. Run the
+ dane-verification separately so that we know which selector verified;
+ then we know whether to do CA-chain-verification and name-verification
+ (needed for TA but not EE). */
+
+ if (usage == ((1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA) | (1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)))
+ { /* a mixed-usage bundle */
+ int i, j, nrec;
+ const char ** dd;
+ int * ddl;
+
+ for(nrec = 0; state->dane_data_len[nrec]; ) nrec++;
+ nrec++;
+
+ dd = store_get(nrec * sizeof(uschar *));
+ ddl = store_get(nrec * sizeof(int));
+ nrec--;
+
+ if ((rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0)))
+ goto tlsa_prob;
+
+ for (usage = DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE;
+ usage >= DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA; usage--)
+ { /* take records with this usage */
+ for (j = i = 0; i < nrec; i++)
+ if (state->dane_data[i][0] == usage)
+ {
+ dd[j] = state->dane_data[i];
+ ddl[j++] = state->dane_data_len[i];
+ }
+ if (j)
+ {
+ dd[j] = NULL;
+ ddl[j] = 0;
+
+ if ((rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, (char * const *)dd, ddl, 1, 0)))
+ goto tlsa_prob;
+
+ if ((rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize,
+ gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session),
+ r, 0,
+ usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE
+ ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0,
+ &verify)))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLSA record problem: %s\n", dane_strerror(rc));
+ }
+ else if (verify == 0) /* verification passed */
+ {
+ usage = 1 << usage;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rc) goto tlsa_prob;
+ }
+ else
+# endif
+ {
+ if ( (rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0))
+ || (rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, state->dane_data, state->dane_data_len,
+ 1, 0))
+ || (rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize,
+ gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session),
+ r, 0,
+# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
+ usage == (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)
+ ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0,
+# else
+ 0,
+# endif
+ &verify))
+ )
+ goto tlsa_prob;
+ }
+
+ if (verify != 0) /* verification failed */
+ {
+ gnutls_datum_t str;
+ (void) dane_verification_status_print(verify, &str, 0);
+ *errstr = US str.data; /* don't bother to free */
+ goto badcert;
+ }
+ state->peer_dane_verified = TRUE;
+
+# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
+ /* If a TA-mode TLSA record was used for verification we must additionally
+ verify the CA chain and the cert name. For EE-mode, skip it. */
+
+ if (usage & (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE))
+# endif
+ {
+ state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE;
+ goto goodcert;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify);
+ }
-/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID seems to be set as well
-as REVOKED, but leave the test for both. */
+/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID is set if any others are. */
-if (rc < 0 ||
- verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)
- )
+if (rc < 0 || verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED))
{
state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE;
- if (!*error)
- *error = verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED
- ? "certificate revoked" : "certificate invalid";
+ if (!*errstr)
+ *errstr = verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED
+ ? US"certificate revoked" : US"certificate invalid";
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=\"%s\"\n",
- *error, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
+ *errstr, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
- {
- gnutls_alert_send(state->session,
- GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- return FALSE;
- }
+ goto badcert;
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("TLS verify failure overridden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
}
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n");
if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
- {
- gnutls_alert_send(state->session,
- GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- return FALSE;
- }
+ goto badcert;
return TRUE;
}
}
state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
}
-state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn;
+goodcert:
+ state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn;
+ return TRUE;
-return TRUE;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+tlsa_prob:
+ *errstr = string_sprintf("TLSA record problem: %s", dane_strerror(rc));
+#endif
+
+badcert:
+ gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return FALSE;
}
exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server;
unsigned int sni_type;
int rc, old_pool;
+uschar * dummy_errstr;
rc = gnutls_server_name_get(session, sni_name, &data_len, &sni_type, 0);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
else
debug_printf("TLS failure: gnutls_server_name_get(): %s [%d]\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc), rc);
- };
+ }
return 0;
}
if (!state->trigger_sni_changes)
return 0;
-rc = tls_expand_session_files(state);
-if (rc != OK)
+if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
{
/* If the setup of certs/etc failed before handshake, TLS would not have
been offered. The best we can do now is abort. */
return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN;
}
-rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state);
+rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, &dummy_errstr);
if (rc != OK) return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN;
return 0;
gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response)
{
int ret;
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP stapling callback: %s\n", US ptr);
if ((ret = gnutls_load_file(ptr, ocsp_response)) < 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to load ocsp stapling file %s\n",
- (char *)ptr);
+ CS ptr);
tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
}
uschar * yield;
exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session);
-cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
-if (cert_list)
+if ((cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size)))
while (cert_list_size--)
{
- rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt);
- if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ if ((rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt)) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: depth %d: %s\n",
cert_list_size, gnutls_strerror(rc));
Arguments:
require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL
+ errstr pointer to error string
Returns: OK on success
DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
- FAIL for errors during the negotation; the server can't
+ FAIL for errors during the negotiation; the server can't
continue running.
*/
int
-tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers)
+tls_server_start(const uschar * require_ciphers, uschar ** errstr)
{
int rc;
-const char *error;
-exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL;
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL;
/* Check for previous activation */
if (tls_in.active >= 0)
{
- tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", "", NULL);
- smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n");
+ tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", "", NULL, errstr);
+ smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE);
return FAIL;
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a server\n");
-rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
+if ((rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
NULL, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl,
- require_ciphers, &state);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+ require_ciphers, &state, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
/* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
optional, set up appropriately. */
if (!state->tlsp->on_connect)
{
- smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n");
+ smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n", FALSE);
fflush(smtp_out);
}
if (sigalrm_seen)
{
- tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", NULL);
+ tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", NULL, errstr);
gnutls_db_remove_session(state->session);
}
else
{
- tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), NULL);
+ tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), NULL, errstr);
(void) gnutls_alert_send_appropriate(state->session, rc);
gnutls_deinit(state->session);
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
millisleep(500);
shutdown(state->fd_out, SHUT_WR);
for (rc = 1024; fgetc(smtp_in) != EOF && rc > 0; ) rc--; /* drain skt */
/* Verify after the fact */
-if ( state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE
- && !verify_certificate(state, &error))
+if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr))
{
if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_OPTIONAL)
{
- tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, NULL);
+ (void) tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, NULL, errstr);
return FAIL;
}
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n",
- error);
+ *errstr);
}
/* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */
-if ((rc = peer_status(state)) != OK) return rc;
+if ((rc = peer_status(state, NULL)) != OK) return rc;
/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */
state->xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
receive_getc = tls_getc;
+receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf;
receive_get_cache = tls_get_cache;
receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
receive_feof = tls_feof;
}
+
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+/* Given our list of RRs from the TLSA lookup, build a lookup block in
+GnuTLS-DANE's preferred format. Hang it on the state str for later
+use in DANE verification.
+
+We point at the dnsa data not copy it, so it must remain valid until
+after verification is done.*/
+
+static BOOL
+dane_tlsa_load(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, dns_answer * dnsa)
+{
+dns_record * rr;
+dns_scan dnss;
+int i;
+const char ** dane_data;
+int * dane_data_len;
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS), i = 1;
+ rr;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
+ ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA) i++;
+
+dane_data = store_get(i * sizeof(uschar *));
+dane_data_len = store_get(i * sizeof(int));
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS), i = 0;
+ rr;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
+ ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
+ {
+ const uschar * p = rr->data;
+ uint8_t usage = p[0], sel = p[1], type = p[2];
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLSA: %d %d %d size %d\n", usage, sel, type, rr->size);
+
+ if ( (usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA && usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)
+ || (sel != 0 && sel != 1)
+ )
+ continue;
+ switch(type)
+ {
+ case 0: /* Full: cannot check at present */
+ break;
+ case 1: if (rr->size != 3 + 256/8) continue; /* sha2-256 */
+ break;
+ case 2: if (rr->size != 3 + 512/8) continue; /* sha2-512 */
+ break;
+ default: continue;
+ }
+
+ tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<<usage;
+ dane_data[i] = p;
+ dane_data_len[i++] = rr->size;
+ }
+
+if (!i) return FALSE;
+
+dane_data[i] = NULL;
+dane_data_len[i] = 0;
+
+state->dane_data = (char * const *)dane_data;
+state->dane_data_len = dane_data_len;
+return TRUE;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* Start a TLS session in a client *
*************************************************/
host connected host (for messages)
addr the first address (not used)
tb transport (always smtp)
+ tlsa_dnsa non-NULL, either request or require dane for this host, and
+ a TLSA record found. Therefore, dane verify required.
+ Which implies cert must be requested and supplied, dane
+ verify must pass, and cert verify irrelevant (incl.
+ hostnames), and (caller handled) require_tls
+ errstr error string pointer
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL (because using common functions),
but for a client, DEFER and FAIL have the same meaning
int
tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host,
address_item *addr ARG_UNUSED,
- transport_instance *tb
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
- , dns_answer * unused_tlsa_dnsa
+ transport_instance * tb,
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+ dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa,
#endif
- )
+ uschar ** errstr)
{
smtp_transport_options_block *ob =
(smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
int rc;
-const char *error;
-exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL;
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL;
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
BOOL require_ocsp =
verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
if ((rc = tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
ob->tls_sni, ob->tls_verify_certificates, ob->tls_crl,
- ob->tls_require_ciphers, &state)) != OK)
+ ob->tls_require_ciphers, &state, errstr)) != OK)
return rc;
{
set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts are unset. Check only
the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
-if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates
- && !ob->tls_verify_hosts
- && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
- )
- || verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK
- )
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa && dane_tlsa_load(state, tlsa_dnsa))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: server certificate DANE required.\n");
+ state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_DANE;
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE);
+ }
+else
+#endif
+ if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates
+ && !ob->tls_verify_hosts
+ && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
+ )
+ || verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK
+ )
{
tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob);
DEBUG(D_tls)
if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session,
NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK)
return tls_error(US"cert-status-req",
- gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host);
+ gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr);
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
}
#endif
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
alarm(ob->command_timeout);
do
- {
rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session);
- } while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) ||
- (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen));
+while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen);
alarm(0);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
if (sigalrm_seen)
{
gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_USER_CANCELED);
- return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", state->host);
+ return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", state->host, errstr);
}
else
- return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host);
+ return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n");
/* Verify late */
-if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE &&
- !verify_certificate(state, &error))
- return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, state->host);
+if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr))
+ return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr);
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (require_ocsp)
gnutls_free(printed.data);
}
else
- (void) tls_error(US"ocsp decode", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host);
+ (void) tls_error(US"ocsp decode", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr);
}
if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0)
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- return tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host);
+ return tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr);
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n");
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
/* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */
-if ((rc = peer_status(state)) != OK)
+if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK)
return rc;
/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */
daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process).
-Arguments: TRUE if gnutls_bye is to be called
+Arguments:
+ shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent,
+ 2 if also response to be waited for
+
Returns: nothing
*/
void
-tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
+tls_close(BOOL is_server, int shutdown)
{
exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
if (shutdown)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS\n");
- gnutls_bye(state->session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n",
+ shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
+
+ alarm(2);
+ gnutls_bye(state->session, shutdown > 1 ? GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR : GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ alarm(0);
}
gnutls_deinit(state->session);
+gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
+
state->tlsp->active = -1;
+if (state->xfer_buffer) store_free(state->xfer_buffer);
memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
-if ((state_server.session == NULL) && (state_client.session == NULL))
+if (!state_server.session && !state_client.session)
{
gnutls_global_deinit();
exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE;
}
-
}
+static BOOL
+tls_refill(unsigned lim)
+{
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server;
+ssize_t inbytes;
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n",
+ state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
+
+sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
+inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer,
+ MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim));
+alarm(0);
+
+/* Timeouts do not get this far; see command_timeout_handler().
+ A zero-byte return appears to mean that the TLS session has been
+ closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
+ non-TLS handling. */
+
+if (sigalrm_seen)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n");
+ state->xfer_error = TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+else if (inbytes == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n");
+
+ receive_getc = smtp_getc;
+ receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf;
+ receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
+ receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
+ receive_feof = smtp_feof;
+ receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
+ receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
+
+ gnutls_deinit(state->session);
+ gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
+
+ state->session = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->active = -1;
+ state->tlsp->bits = 0;
+ state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
+ tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->cipher = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->peercert = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
+
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+/* Handle genuine errors */
+
+else if (inbytes < 0)
+ {
+ record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
+ state->xfer_error = TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes);
+#endif
+state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes;
+state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
+return TRUE;
+}
+
/*************************************************
* TLS version of getc *
*************************************************/
This feeds DKIM and should be used for all message-body reads.
-Arguments: none
+Arguments: lim Maximum amount to read/bufffer
Returns: the next character or EOF
*/
int
-tls_getc(void)
+tls_getc(unsigned lim)
{
-exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server;
-if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
- {
- ssize_t inbytes;
-
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n",
- state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
-
- if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
- inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer,
- ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
- alarm(0);
-
- /* Timeouts do not get this far; see command_timeout_handler().
- A zero-byte return appears to mean that the TLS session has been
- closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
- non-TLS handling. */
-
- if (sigalrm_seen)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n");
- state->xfer_error = 1;
- return EOF;
- }
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server;
- else if (inbytes == 0)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n");
+if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
+ if (!tls_refill(lim))
+ return state->xfer_error ? EOF : smtp_getc(lim);
- receive_getc = smtp_getc;
- receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
- receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
- receive_feof = smtp_feof;
- receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
- receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
+/* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
- gnutls_deinit(state->session);
- state->session = NULL;
- state->tlsp->active = -1;
- state->tlsp->bits = 0;
- state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
- tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
- state->tlsp->cipher = NULL;
- state->tlsp->peercert = NULL;
- state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
-
- return smtp_getc();
- }
+return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++];
+}
- /* Handle genuine errors */
+uschar *
+tls_getbuf(unsigned * len)
+{
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server;
+unsigned size;
+uschar * buf;
- else if (inbytes < 0)
+if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
+ if (!tls_refill(*len))
{
- record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
- state->xfer_error = 1;
- return EOF;
+ if (!state->xfer_error) return smtp_getbuf(len);
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
}
-#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
- dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes);
-#endif
- state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes;
- state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
- }
-/* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
-
-return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++];
+if ((size = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm) > *len)
+ size = *len;
+buf = &state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm];
+state->xfer_buffer_lwm += size;
+*len = size;
+return buf;
}
+
void
tls_get_cache()
{
}
+BOOL
+tls_could_read(void)
+{
+return state_server.xfer_buffer_lwm < state_server.xfer_buffer_hwm
+ || gnutls_record_check_pending(state_server.session) > 0;
+}
+
+
/*************************************************
is_server channel specifier
buff buffer of data
len number of bytes
+ more more data expected soon
Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
-1 after a failed write
*/
int
-tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
{
ssize_t outbytes;
size_t left = len;
exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK
+static BOOL corked = FALSE;
+
+if (more && !corked) gnutls_record_cork(state->session);
+#endif
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT "%s)\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ buff, left, more ? ", more" : "");
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", buff, left);
while (left > 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(SSL, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n",
len = INT_MAX;
}
+#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK
+if (more != corked)
+ {
+ if (!more) (void) gnutls_record_uncork(state->session, 0);
+ corked = more;
+ }
+#endif
+
return (int) len;
}
uschar *expciphers = NULL;
gnutls_priority_t priority_cache;
const char *errpos;
+uschar * dummy_errstr;
#define validate_check_rc(Label) do { \
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) gnutls_global_deinit(); \
if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
return_deinit(NULL);
-if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
+if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers,
+ &dummy_errstr))
return_deinit(US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers");
if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff