. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
.set previousversion "4.75"
-.set version "4.76"
+.set version "4.77"
.set ACL "access control lists (ACLs)"
.set I " "
<author><firstname>Exim</firstname><surname>Maintainers</surname></author>
<authorinitials>EM</authorinitials>
<revhistory><revision>
- <revnumber>4.76</revnumber>
- <date>06 May 2011</date>
+ <revnumber>4.77</revnumber>
+ <date>10 Oct 2011</date>
<authorinitials>EM</authorinitials>
</revision></revhistory>
<copyright><year>2011</year><holder>University of Cambridge</holder></copyright>
The following Exim mailing lists exist:
.table2 140pt
+.row &'exim-announce@exim.org'& "Moderated, low volume announcements list"
.row &'exim-users@exim.org'& "General discussion list"
.row &'exim-dev@exim.org'& "Discussion of bugs, enhancements, etc."
-.row &'exim-announce@exim.org'& "Moderated, low volume announcements list"
-.row &'exim-future@exim.org'& "Discussion of long-term development"
+.row &'exim-cvs@exim.org'& "Automated commit messages from the VCS"
.endtable
You can subscribe to these lists, change your existing subscriptions, and view
chapter &<<CHAPfdlookup>>&. For example:
.code
hold_domains = mysql;select domain from holdlist \
- where domain = '$domain';
+ where domain = '${quote_mysql:$domain}';
.endd
In most cases, the data that is looked up is not used (so for an SQL query, for
example, it doesn't matter what field you select). Exim is interested only in
This condition turns a string holding a true or false representation into
a boolean state. It parses &"true"&, &"false"&, &"yes"& and &"no"&
(case-insensitively); also positive integer numbers map to true if non-zero,
-false if zero. Leading and trailing whitespace is ignored.
+false if zero.
+An empty string is treated as false.
+Leading and trailing whitespace is ignored;
+thus a string consisting only of whitespace is false.
All other string values will result in expansion failure.
When combined with ACL variables, this expansion condition will let you
includes the case of letters, whereas for &%gti%& the comparison is
case-independent.
+.new
+.vitem &*inlist&~{*&<&'string1'&>&*}{*&<&'string2'&>&*}*& &&&
+ &*inlisti&~{*&<&'string1'&>&*}{*&<&'string2'&>&*}*&
+.cindex "string" "comparison"
+.cindex "list" "iterative conditions"
+Both strings are expanded; the second string is treated as a list of simple
+strings; if the first string is a member of the second, then the condition
+is true.
+
+These are simpler to use versions of the more powerful &*forany*& condition.
+Examples, and the &*forany*& equivalents:
+.code
+${if inlist{needle}{foo:needle:bar}}
+ ${if forany{foo:needle:bar}{eq{$item}{needle}}}
+${if inlisti{Needle}{fOo:NeeDLE:bAr}}
+ ${if forany{fOo:NeeDLE:bAr}{eqi{$item}{Needle}}}
+.endd
+.wen
+
.vitem &*isip&~{*&<&'string'&>&*}*& &&&
&*isip4&~{*&<&'string'&>&*}*& &&&
&*isip6&~{*&<&'string'&>&*}*&
.vitem &*match_ip&~{*&<&'string1'&>&*}{*&<&'string2'&>&*}*&
.cindex "&%match_ip%& expansion condition"
+.new
This condition matches an IP address to a list of IP address patterns. It must
be followed by two argument strings. The first (after expansion) must be an IP
-address or an empty string. The second (after expansion) is a restricted host
+address or an empty string. The second (not expanded) is a restricted host
list that can match only an IP address, not a host name. For example:
+.wen
.code
${if match_ip{$sender_host_address}{1.2.3.4:5.6.7.8}{...}{...}}
.endd
.endd
.endlist ilist
+.new
+Note that <&'string2'&> is not itself subject to string expansion, unless
+Exim was built with the EXPAND_LISTMATCH_RHS option.
+.wen
+
Consult section &<<SECThoslispatip>>& for further details of these patterns.
.vitem &*match_local_part&~{*&<&'string1'&>&*}{*&<&'string2'&>&*}*&
have their local parts matched casefully. Domains are always matched
caselessly.
+.new
+Note that <&'string2'&> is not itself subject to string expansion, unless
+Exim was built with the EXPAND_LISTMATCH_RHS option.
+.wen
+
&*Note*&: Host lists are &'not'& supported in this way. This is because
hosts have two identities: a name and an IP address, and it is not clear
how to specify cleanly how such a test would work. However, IP addresses can be
.cindex "binary zero" "in message body"
.vindex "&$body_zerocount$&"
When a message is being received or delivered, this variable contains the
-number of binary zero bytes in the message's body.
+number of binary zero bytes (ASCII NULs) in the message's body.
.vitem &$bounce_recipient$&
.vindex "&$bounce_recipient$&"
This option defines the &"random"& local part that can be used as part of
callout verification. The default value is
.code
-$primary_host_name-$tod_epoch-testing
+$primary_hostname-$tod_epoch-testing
.endd
See section &<<CALLaddparcall>>& for details of how this value is used.
.code
AUTH_CRAM_MD5=yes
AUTH_CYRUS_SASL=yes
+.new
+AUTH_DOVECOT=yes
+AUTH_GSASL=yes
+.wen
AUTH_PLAINTEXT=yes
AUTH_SPA=yes
.endd
in &_Local/Makefile_&, respectively. The first of these supports the CRAM-MD5
authentication mechanism (RFC 2195), and the second provides an interface to
-the Cyrus SASL authentication library. The third can be configured to support
+the Cyrus SASL authentication library.
+.new
+The third is an interface to Dovecot's authentication system, delegating the
+work via a socket interface.
+The fourth provides an interface to the GNU SASL authentication library, which
+provides mechanisms but typically not data sources.
+The fifth can be configured to support
the PLAIN authentication mechanism (RFC 2595) or the LOGIN mechanism, which is
-not formally documented, but used by several MUAs. The fourth authenticator
+not formally documented, but used by several MUAs. The sixth authenticator
supports Microsoft's &'Secure Password Authentication'& mechanism.
+.wen
The authenticators are configured using the same syntax as other drivers (see
section &<<SECTfordricon>>&). If no authenticators are required, no
authenticators, followed by general discussion of the way authentication works
in Exim.
+.new
+&*Beware:*& the meaning of &$auth1$&, &$auth2$&, ... varies on a per-driver and
+per-mechanism basis. Please read carefully to determine which variables hold
+account labels such as usercodes and which hold passwords or other
+authenticating data.
+
+Note that some mechanisms support two different identifiers for accounts: the
+&'authentication id'& and the &'authorization id'&. The contractions &'authn'&
+and &'authz'& are commonly encountered. The American spelling is standard here.
+Conceptually, authentication data such as passwords are tied to the identifier
+used to authenticate; servers may have rules to permit one user to act as a
+second user, so that after login the session is treated as though that second
+user had logged in. That second user is the &'authorization id'&. A robust
+configuration might confirm that the &'authz'& field is empty or matches the
+&'authn'& field. Often this is just ignored.
+
+A &'realm'& is a text string, typically a domain name, presented by a server
+to a client to help it select an account and credentials to use. In some
+mechanisms, the client and server provably agree on the realm, but clients
+typically can not treat the realm as secure data to be blindly trusted.
+.wen
+
.section "Generic options for authenticators" "SECID168"
is used directly to control authentication. See section &<<SECTplainserver>>&
for details.
+.new
+For the &(gsasl)& authenticator, this option is required for various
+mechanisms; see chapter &<<CHAPgsasl>>& for details.
+.wen
+
For the other authenticators, &%server_condition%& can be used as an additional
authentication or authorization mechanism that is applied after the other
authenticator conditions succeed. If it is set, it is expanded when the
may be set to point to an alternative keytab file. Exim will pass this
variable through from its own inherited environment when started as root or the
Exim user. The keytab file needs to be readable by the Exim user.
+.new
+With some releases of Heimdal, a setuid Exim may cause Heimdal to discard the
+environment variable. In practice, for those releases, the Cyrus authenticator
+is not a suitable interface for GSSAPI (Kerberos) support.
+.wen
.section "Using cyrus_sasl as a server" "SECID178"
.ecindex IIDdcotauth2
+. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+.new
+.chapter "The gsasl authenticator" "CHAPgsasl"
+.scindex IIDgsaslauth1 "&(gsasl)& authenticator"
+.scindex IIDgsaslauth2 "authenticators" "&(gsasl)&"
+.cindex "authentication" "GNU SASL"
+.cindex "authentication" "SASL"
+.cindex "authentication" "EXTERNAL"
+.cindex "authentication" "ANONYMOUS"
+.cindex "authentication" "PLAIN"
+.cindex "authentication" "LOGIN"
+.cindex "authentication" "DIGEST-MD5"
+.cindex "authentication" "CRAM-MD5"
+.cindex "authentication" "SCRAM-SHA-1"
+The &(gsasl)& authenticator provides server integration for the GNU SASL
+library and the mechanisms it provides. This is new as of the 4.78 release
+and there are a few areas where the library does not let Exim smoothly
+scale to handle future authentication mechanisms, so no guarantee can be
+made that any particular new authentication mechanism will be supported
+without code changes in Exim.
+
+
+.option server_channelbinding gsasl bool false
+Some authentication mechanisms are able to use external context at both ends
+of the session to bind the authentication to that context, and fail the
+authentication process if that context differs. Specifically, some TLS
+ciphersuites can provide identifying information about the cryptographic
+context.
+
+This means that certificate identity and verification becomes a non-issue,
+as a man-in-the-middle attack will cause the correct client and server to
+see different identifiers and authentication will fail.
+
+This is currently only supported when using the GnuTLS library. This is
+only usable by mechanisms which support "channel binding"; at time of
+writing, that's the SCRAM family.
+
+This defaults off to ensure smooth upgrade across Exim releases, in case
+this option causes some clients to start failing. Some future release
+of Exim may switch the default to be true.
+
+
+.option server_hostname gsasl string&!! "see below"
+This option selects the hostname that is used when communicating with the
+library. The default value is &`$primary_hostname`&.
+Some mechanisms will use this data.
+
+
+.option server_mech gsasl string "see below"
+This option selects the authentication mechanism this driver should use. The
+default is the value of the generic &%public_name%& option. This option allows
+you to use a different underlying mechanism from the advertised name. For
+example:
+.code
+sasl:
+ driver = gsasl
+ public_name = X-ANYTHING
+ server_mech = CRAM-MD5
+ server_set_id = $auth1
+.endd
+
+
+.option server_password gsasl string&!! unset
+Various mechanisms need access to the cleartext password on the server, so
+that proof-of-possession can be demonstrated on the wire, without sending
+the password itself.
+
+The data available for lookup varies per mechanism.
+In all cases, &$auth1$& is set to the &'authentication id'&.
+The &$auth2$& variable will always be the &'authorization id'& (&'authz'&)
+if available, else the empty string.
+The &$auth3$& variable will always be the &'realm'& if available,
+else the empty string.
+
+A forced failure will cause authentication to defer.
+
+If using this option, it may make sense to set the &%server_condition%&
+option to be simply "true".
+
+
+.option server_realm gsasl string&!! unset
+This specifies the SASL realm that the server claims to be in.
+Some mechanisms will use this data.
+
+
+.option server_scram_iter gsasl string&!! unset
+This option provides data for the SCRAM family of mechanisms.
+&$auth1$& is not available at evaluation time.
+(This may change, as we receive feedback on use)
+
+
+.option server_scram_salt gsasl string&!! unset
+This option provides data for the SCRAM family of mechanisms.
+&$auth1$& is not available at evaluation time.
+(This may change, as we receive feedback on use)
+
+
+.option server_service gsasl string &`smtp`&
+This is the SASL service that the server claims to implement.
+Some mechanisms will use this data.
+
+
+.section "&(gsasl)& auth variables" "SECTgsaslauthvar"
+.vindex "&$auth1$&, &$auth2$&, etc"
+These may be set when evaluating specific options, as detailed above.
+They will also be set when evaluating &%server_condition%&.
+
+Unless otherwise stated below, the &(gsasl)& integration will use the following
+meanings for these variables:
+
+.ilist
+.vindex "&$auth1$&"
+&$auth1$&: the &'authentication id'&
+.next
+.vindex "&$auth2$&"
+&$auth2$&: the &'authorization id'&
+.next
+.vindex "&$auth3$&"
+&$auth3$&: the &'realm'&
+.endlist
+
+On a per-mechanism basis:
+
+.ilist
+.cindex "authentication" "EXTERNAL"
+EXTERNAL: only &$auth1$& is set, to the possibly empty &'authorization id'&;
+the &%server_condition%& option must be present.
+.next
+.cindex "authentication" "ANONYMOUS"
+ANONYMOUS: only &$auth1$& is set, to the possibly empty &'anonymous token'&;
+the &%server_condition%& option must be present.
+.next
+.cindex "authentication" "GSSAPI"
+GSSAPI: &$auth1$& will be set to the &'authorization id'&,
+&$auth2$& will be set to the &'GSSAPI Display Name'&;
+the &%server_condition%& option must be present.
+.endlist
+
+An &'anonymous token'& is something passed along as an unauthenticated
+identifier; this is analogous to FTP anonymous authentication passing an
+email address, or software-identifier@, as the "password".
+
+.wen
+
. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
For &%gnutls_require_mac%&, the recognized names are SHA (synonym SHA1), and
MD5. The default list contains SHA, MD5.
-For &%gnutls_require_protocols%&, the recognized names are TLS1 and SSL3.
-The default list contains TLS1, SSL3.
+.new
+For &%gnutls_require_protocols%&, the recognized names are TLS1.2, TLS1.1,
+TLS1.0, (TLS1) and SSL3.
+The default list contains TLS1.2, TLS1.1, TLS1.0, SSL3.
+TLS1 is an alias for TLS1.0, for backwards compatibility.
+For sufficiently old versions of the GnuTLS library, TLS1.2 or TLS1.1 might
+not be supported and will not be recognised by Exim.
+.wen
In a server, the order of items in these lists is unimportant. The server
advertises the availability of all the relevant cipher suites. However, in a
really random &-- it is defined by the expansion of the option
&%callout_random_local_part%&, which defaults to
.code
-$primary_host_name-$tod_epoch-testing
+$primary_hostname-$tod_epoch-testing
.endd
The idea here is to try to determine whether the remote host accepts all local
parts without checking. If it does, there is no point in doing callouts for
A colon-separated list of names of headers included in the signature.
.vitem &%$dkim_key_testing%&
"1" if the key record has the "testing" flag set, "0" if not.
-.vitem &%$dkim_key_nosubdomaining%&
+.vitem &%$nosubdomains%&
"1" if the key record forbids subdomaining, "0" otherwise.
.vitem &%$dkim_key_srvtype%&
Service type (tag s=) from the key record. Defaults to "*" if not specified
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff