configure a dmarc_forensic_sender because the default sender address
construction might be inadequate.
- control = dmarc_forensic_enable
+ control = dmarc_enable_forensic
(AGAIN: You can choose not to send these forensic reports by simply
-not putting the dmarc_forensic_enable control line at any point in
+not putting the dmarc_enable_forensic control line at any point in
your exim config. If you don't tell it to send them, it will not
send them.)
deny dmarc_status = reject
!authenticated = *
- message = Message from $domain_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
+ message = Message from $dmarc_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
-Transport post-delivery actions
+Event Actions
--------------------------------------------------------------
-An arbitrary per-transport string can be expanded on successful delivery,
-and (for SMTP transports) a second string on deferrals caused by a host error.
+(Renamed from TPDA, Transport post-delivery actions)
+
+An arbitrary per-transport string can be expanded upon various transport events.
+Additionally a main-section configuration option can be expanded on some
+per-message events.
This feature may be used, for example, to write exim internal log information
(not available otherwise) into a database.
In order to use the feature, you must compile with
-EXPERIMENTAL_TPDA=yes
+EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT=yes
in your Local/Makefile
-and define the tpda_event_action option in the transport, to
-be expanded when the event fires.
+and define one or both of
+- the event_action option in the transport
+- the event_action main option
+to be expanded when the event fires.
-A new variable, $tpda_event, is set to the event type when the
+A new variable, $event_name, is set to the event type when the
expansion is done. The current list of events is:
- msg:delivery
- msg:host:defer
- tcp:connect
- tcp:close
- tls:cert
- smtp:connect
-
-The expansion is called for all event types, and should use the $tpda_event
+ msg:complete after main per message
+ msg:delivery after transport per recipient
+ msg:host:defer after transport per attempt
+ msg:fail:delivery after main per recipient
+ msg:fail:internal after main per recipient
+ tcp:connect before transport per connection
+ tcp:close after transport per connection
+ tls:cert before both per certificate in verification chain
+ smtp:connect after transport per connection
+
+The expansion is called for all event types, and should use the $event_name
value to decide when to act. The variable data is a colon-separated
list, describing an event tree.
-There is an auxilary variable, $tpda_data, for which the
+There is an auxilary variable, $event_data, for which the
content is event_dependent:
msg:delivery smtp confirmation mssage
tls:cert verification chain depth
smtp:connect smtp banner
-The msg:host:defer event populates one extra variable, $tpda_defer_errno.
+The msg:host:defer event populates one extra variable, $event_defer_errno.
-The following variables are likely to be useful for most event types:
+The following variables are likely to be useful depending on the event type:
router_name, transport_name
local_part, domain
tls_out_peercert
lookup_dnssec_authenticated, tls_out_dane
sending_ip_address, sending_port
+ message_exim_id, verify_mode
An example might look like:
-tpda_event_action = ${if = {msg:delivery}{$tpda_event} \
+event_action = ${if eq {msg:delivery}{$event_name} \
{${lookup pgsql {SELECT * FROM record_Delivery( \
'${quote_pgsql:$sender_address_domain}',\
'${quote_pgsql:${lc:$sender_address_local_part}}', \
'${quote_pgsql:$message_exim_id}')}} \
} {}}
-The string is expanded after the delivery completes and any
-side-effects will happen. The result is then discarded.
+The string is expanded when each of the supported events occur
+and any side-effects of the expansion will happen.
Note that for complex operations an ACL expansion can be used.
-During the expansion the tpda_event variable will contain the
-string-list "msg:delivery".
-
-The expansion of the tpda_event_action option should normally
+The expansion of the event_action option should normally
return an empty string. Should it return anything else the
following will be forced:
msg:delivery (ignored)
msg:host:defer (ignored)
+ msg:fail:delivery (ignored)
tcp:connect do not connect
tcp:close (ignored)
tls:cert refuse verification
smtp:connect close connection
+No other use is made of the result string.
+Known issues:
+- the tls:cert event is only called for the cert chain elements
+ received over the wire, with GnuTLS. OpenSSL gives the entire
+ chain including thse loaded locally.
Redis Lookup
221 mail.example.net closing connection
-DSN Support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-DSN Support tries to add RFC 3461 support to Exim. It adds support for
-*) the additional parameters for MAIL FROM and RCPT TO
-*) RFC complient MIME DSN messages for all of
- success, failure and delay notifications
-*) dsn_advertise_hosts main option to select which hosts are able
- to use the extension
-*) dsn_lasthop router switch to end DSN processing
-In case of failure reports this means that the last three parts, the message body
-intro, size info and final text, of the defined template are ignored since there is no
-logical place to put them in the MIME message.
+SOCKS
+------------------------------------------------------------
+Support for proxying outbound SMTP via a Socks 5 proxy
+(RFC 1928) is included if Exim is compiled with
+EXPERIMENTAL_SOCKS defined.
+
+If an smtp transport has a nonempty socks_proxy option
+defined, this is active. The option is expanded and
+should be a list (colon-separated by default) of
+proxy specifiers. Each proxy specifier is a list
+(space-separated by default) where the initial element
+is an IP address and any subsequent elements are options.
+
+Options are a string <name>=<value>.
+These options are currently defined:
+- "auth", with possible values "none" and "name".
+ Using "name" selects username/password authentication
+ per RFC 1929. Default is "none".
+- "name" sets the authentication username. Default is empty.
+- "pass" sets the authentication password. Default is empty.
+- "port" sets the tcp port number for the proxy. Default is 1080.
+- "tmo" sets a connection timeout in seconds for this proxy. Default is 5.
+
+Proxies from the list are tried in order until
+one responds. The timeout for the overall connection
+applies to the set of proxied attempts.
+
+If events are used, the remote IP/port during a
+tcp:connect event will be that of the proxy.
+
+
+
+
+DANE
+------------------------------------------------------------
+DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied
+to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
+it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather
+than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
+operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection
+you make, and make another one to the server (so both
+you and the server still think you have an encrypted
+connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
+Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something
+which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
+certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the
+Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
+
+What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the
+trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
+that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the
+admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
+by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set
+of root CAs.
+
+It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that
+connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
+fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
+
+DANE scales better than having to maintain (and
+side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
+for every possible target server. It also scales
+(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
+client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also
+means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
+
+DANE requires a server operator to do three things:
+1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
+that DNS lookups they do for the server have not
+been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
+to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and
+any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
+DNSSEC.
+2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server
+certificate for a TLS connection should be.
+3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain,
+in TLS connections which is traceable to the one
+defined by (one of?) the TSLA records
+
+There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side
+operation of DANE.
+
+The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate
+usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies
+the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved
+is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted
+during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a
+single system, using a self-signed certificate.
+ DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA
+to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
+well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just
+a self-signed certificate which is used to sign
+cerver certificates, but running one securely does
+require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used
+then either all clients must be primed with it, or
+(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit
+the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.
+If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it
+(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is
+reduced from all public CAs to that single CA.
+DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or
+servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
+all of which point to a single TLSA record.
+
+The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1)
+and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
+
+At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa
+is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like
+
+ openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
+ | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
+ | openssl sha512 \
+ | awk '{print $2}'
+
+are workable for 4th-field hashes.
+
+For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates
+must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
+
+The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing
+for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
+be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However,
+this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
+default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff
+DANE is in use, to:
+
+ hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
+ {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
+ {*}{}}
+
+The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with
+numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
+The zero above means DANE was not in use,
+the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
+found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the
+string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
+control the OCSP request.
+
+This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if
+it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
+those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction
+with DANE in their OCSP settings.
+
+
+For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options,
+hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane. They do the obvious thing.
+[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ]
+
+DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured
+MX, A and TLSA records.
+
+A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match
+and the host-lookup succeded using dnssec.
+If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
+will be required for the host.
+
+(TODO: specify when fallback happens vs. when the host is not used)
+
+If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport
+options are ignored:
+ hosts_require_tls
+ tls_verify_hosts
+ tls_try_verify_hosts
+ tls_verify_certificates
+ tls_crl
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames
+
+If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
+verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set
+appropriately.
+
+Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that)
+and dnssec_require_domains is ignored.
+
+If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item
+in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
+
+There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if
+verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
+in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable
+$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above).
+
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL
+------------------------------------------------------------
+SMTPUTF8
+Internationalised mail name handling.
+RFCs 6530, 6533, 5890
+
+Compile with EXPERIMENTAL_INTERNATIONAL and libidn.
-All the other changes are made without changing any defaults
+New main config option smtputf8_advertise_hosts, default '*',
+a host list. If this matches the sending host and
+accept_8bitmime is true (the default) then the ESMTP option
+SMTPUTF8 will be advertised.
-Building exim:
---------------
+If the sender specifies the SMTPUTF8 option on a MAIL command
+international handling for the message is enabled and
+the expansion variable $message_smtputf8 will have value TRUE.
-Define
-EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES
-in your Local/Makefile.
+The option allow_utf8_domains is set to true for this
+message. All DNS lookups are converted to a-label form
+whatever the setting of allow_utf8_domains.
-Configuration:
---------------
-All DSNs are sent in MIME format if you built exim with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES
-No option needed to activate it, and no way to turn it off.
+Both localparts and domain are maintained as the original
+utf8 form internally; any matching or regex use will
+require appropriate care. Filenames created, eg. by
+the appendfile transport, will have utf8 name.
-Failure and delay DSNs are triggered as usual except a sender used NOTIFY=...
-to prevent them.
+Helo names sent by the smtp transport will have any utf8
+components expanded to a-label form.
-Support for Success DSNs is added and activated by NOTIFY=SUCCESS by clients.
+Any certificate name checks will be done using the a-label
+form of the name.
-Add
-dsn_advertise_hosts = *
-or a more restrictive host_list to announce DSN in EHLO answers
+Log lines and Received-by: header lines will aquire a "utf8"
+prefix on the protocol element, eg. utf8esmtp.
-Those hosts can then use NOTIFY,ENVID,RET,ORCPT options.
+New expansion operators:
+ ${utf8_domain_to_alabel:str}
+ ${utf8_domain_from_alabel:str}
+ ${utf8_localpart_to_alabel:str}
+ ${utf8_localpart_from_alabel:str}
-If a message is relayed to a DSN aware host without changing the envelope
-recipient the options are passed along and no success DSN is generated.
+New "control = utf8_downconvert" ACL modifier,
+sets a flag requiring that addresses are converted to
+a-label form before smtp delivery, for use in a
+Message Submission Agent context. Can also be
+phrased as "control = utf8_downconvert/1" and is
+mandatory. The flag defaults to zero and can be cleared
+by "control = utf8_downconvert/0". The value "-1"
+may also be used, to use a-label for only if the
+destination host does not support SMTPUTF8.
-A redirect router will always trigger a success DSN if requested and the DSN
-options are not passed any further.
+If mua_wrapper is set, the utf8_downconvert control
+defaults to -1 (convert if needed).
-A success DSN always contains the recipient address as submitted by the
-client as required by RFC. Rewritten addresses are never exposed.
-If you used DSN patch up to 1.3 before remove all "dsn_process" switches from
-your routers since you don't need them anymore. There is no way to "gag"
-success DSNs anymore. Announcing DSN means answering as requested.
+There is no explicit support for VRFY and EXPN.
+Configurations supporting these should inspect
+$smtp_command_argument for an SMTPUTF8 argument.
-You can prevent Exim from passing DSN options along to other DSN aware hosts by defining
-dsn_lasthop
-in a router. Exim will then send the success DSN himself if requested as if
-the next hop does not support DSN.
-Adding it to a redirect router makes no difference.
+There is no support for LMTP on Unix sockets.
+Using the "lmtp" protocol option on an smtp transport,
+for LMTP over TCP, should work as expected.
+
+Known issues:
+ - DSN unitext handling is not present
+ - no provision for converting logging from or to UTF-8
+
+----
+IMAP folder names
+
+New expansion operator:
+
+${imapfolder {<string>} {<sep>} {<specials>}}
+
+The string is converted from the charset specified by the headers charset
+command (in a filter file) or headers_charset global option, to the
+modified UTF-7 encoding specified by RFC 2060, with the following
+exception: All occurences of <sep> (which has to be a single character)
+are replaced with periods ("."), and all periods and slashes that aren't
+<sep> and are not in the <specials> string are BASE64 encoded.
+
+The third argument can be omitted, defaulting to an empty string.
+The second argument can be omitted, defaulting to "/".
+
+This is the encoding used by Courier for Maildir names on disk, and followed
+by many other IMAP servers.
+
+ Example 1: ${imapfolder {Foo/Bar}} yields "Foo.Bar".
+ Example 2: ${imapfolder {Foo/Bar}{.}{/}} yields "Foo&AC8-Bar".
+ Example 3: ${imapfolder {Räksmörgås}} yields "R&AOQ-ksm&APY-rg&AOU-s".
+
+Note that the source charset setting is vital, and also that characters
+must be representable in UTF-16.
-Certificate name checking
---------------------------------------------------------------
-The X509 certificates used for TLS are supposed be verified
-that they are owned by the expected host. The coding of TLS
-support to date has not made these checks.
-
-If built with EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES defined, code is
-included to do so, and a new smtp transport option
-"tls_verify_cert_hostname" supported which takes a list of
-names for which the checks must be made. The host must
-also be in "tls_verify_hosts".
-
-Both Subject and Subject-Alternate-Name certificate fields
-are supported, as are wildcard certificates (limited to
-a single wildcard being the initial component of a 3-or-more
-component FQDN).
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff