--- /dev/null
+/*************************************************
+* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */
+/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+
+/* Copyright (c) Twitter Inc 2012 */
+
+/* Interface to GNU SASL library for generic authentication. */
+
+/* Trade-offs:
+
+GNU SASL does not provide authentication data itself, so we have to expose
+that decision to configuration. For some mechanisms, we need to act much
+like plaintext. For others, we only need to be able to provide some
+evaluated data on demand. There's no abstracted way (ie, without hardcoding
+knowledge of authenticators here) to know which need what properties; we
+can't query a session or the library for "we will need these for mechanism X".
+
+So: we always require server_condition, even if sometimes it will just be
+set as "yes". We do provide a number of other hooks, which might not make
+sense in all contexts. For some, we can do checks at init time.
+*/
+
+#include "../exim.h"
+
+#ifndef AUTH_GSASL
+/* dummy function to satisfy compilers when we link in an "empty" file. */
+static void dummy(int x) { dummy(x-1); }
+#else
+
+#include <gsasl.h>
+#include "gsasl_exim.h"
+
+/* Authenticator-specific options. */
+/* I did have server_*_condition options for various mechanisms, but since
+we only ever handle one mechanism at a time, I didn't see the point in keeping
+that. In case someone sees a point, I've left the condition_check() API
+alone. */
+optionlist auth_gsasl_options[] = {
+ { "server_channelbinding", opt_bool,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_channelbinding)) },
+ { "server_hostname", opt_stringptr,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_hostname)) },
+ { "server_mech", opt_stringptr,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_mech)) },
+ { "server_password", opt_stringptr,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_password)) },
+ { "server_realm", opt_stringptr,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_realm)) },
+ { "server_scram_iter", opt_stringptr,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_scram_iter)) },
+ { "server_scram_salt", opt_stringptr,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_scram_salt)) },
+ { "server_service", opt_stringptr,
+ (void *)(offsetof(auth_gsasl_options_block, server_service)) }
+};
+/* GSASL_SCRAM_SALTED_PASSWORD documented only for client, so not implementing
+hooks to avoid cleartext passwords in the Exim server. */
+
+int auth_gsasl_options_count =
+ sizeof(auth_gsasl_options)/sizeof(optionlist);
+
+/* Defaults for the authenticator-specific options. */
+auth_gsasl_options_block auth_gsasl_option_defaults = {
+ US"smtp", /* server_service */
+ US"$primary_hostname", /* server_hostname */
+ NULL, /* server_realm */
+ NULL, /* server_mech */
+ NULL, /* server_password */
+ NULL, /* server_scram_iter */
+ NULL, /* server_scram_salt */
+ FALSE /* server_channelbinding */
+};
+
+/* "Globals" for managing the gsasl interface. */
+
+static Gsasl *gsasl_ctx = NULL;
+static int
+ main_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop);
+static int
+ server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock);
+static int
+ client_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock);
+
+static BOOL sasl_error_should_defer = FALSE;
+static Gsasl_property callback_loop = 0;
+static BOOL checked_server_condition = FALSE;
+
+enum { CURRENTLY_SERVER = 1, CURRENTLY_CLIENT = 2 };
+
+struct callback_exim_state {
+ auth_instance *ablock;
+ int currently;
+};
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Initialization entry point *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called for each instance, after its options have been read, to
+enable consistency checks to be done, or anything else that needs
+to be set up. */
+
+void
+auth_gsasl_init(auth_instance *ablock)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int rc, supported;
+ auth_gsasl_options_block *ob =
+ (auth_gsasl_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
+
+ /* As per existing Cyrus glue, use the authenticator's public name as
+ the default for the mechanism name; we don't handle multiple mechanisms
+ in one authenticator, but the same driver can be used multiple times. */
+
+ if (ob->server_mech == NULL)
+ ob->server_mech = string_copy(ablock->public_name);
+
+ /* Can get multiple session contexts from one library context, so just
+ initialise the once. */
+ if (gsasl_ctx == NULL) {
+ rc = gsasl_init(&gsasl_ctx);
+ if (rc != GSASL_OK) {
+ log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
+ "couldn't initialise GNU SASL library: %s (%s)",
+ ablock->name, gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+ }
+ gsasl_callback_set(gsasl_ctx, main_callback);
+ }
+
+ /* We don't need this except to log it for debugging. */
+ rc = gsasl_server_mechlist(gsasl_ctx, &p);
+ if (rc != GSASL_OK)
+ log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
+ "failed to retrieve list of mechanisms: %s (%s)",
+ ablock->name, gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("GNU SASL supports: %s\n", p);
+
+ supported = gsasl_client_support_p(gsasl_ctx, (const char *)ob->server_mech);
+ if (!supported)
+ log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
+ "GNU SASL does not support mechanism \"%s\"",
+ ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+
+ if ((ablock->server_condition == NULL) &&
+ (strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"EXTERNAL") ||
+ strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"ANONYMOUS") ||
+ strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"PLAIN") ||
+ strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"LOGIN")))
+ log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
+ "Need server_condition for %s mechanism",
+ ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+
+ /* At present, for mechanisms we don't panic on absence of server_condition;
+ need to figure out the most generically correct approach to deciding when
+ it's critical and when it isn't. Eg, for simple validation (PLAIN mechanism,
+ etc) it clearly is critical.
+
+ So don't activate without server_condition, this might be relaxed in the future.
+ */
+ if (ablock->server_condition != NULL) ablock->server = TRUE;
+ ablock->client = FALSE;
+}
+
+
+/* GNU SASL uses one top-level callback, registered at library level.
+We dispatch to client and server functions instead. */
+
+static int
+main_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct callback_exim_state *cb_state =
+ (struct callback_exim_state *)gsasl_session_hook_get(sctx);
+
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Callback entered, prop=%d (loop prop=%d)\n",
+ prop, callback_loop);
+
+ if (cb_state == NULL) {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf(" not from our server/client processing.\n");
+ return GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+ }
+
+ if (callback_loop > 0) {
+ /* Most likely is that we were asked for property foo, and to
+ expand the string we asked for property bar to put into an auth
+ variable, but property bar is not supplied for this mechanism. */
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("Loop, asked for property %d while handling property %d\n",
+ prop, callback_loop);
+ return GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+ }
+ callback_loop = prop;
+
+ if (cb_state->currently == CURRENTLY_CLIENT)
+ rc = client_callback(ctx, sctx, prop, cb_state->ablock);
+ else if (cb_state->currently == CURRENTLY_SERVER)
+ rc = server_callback(ctx, sctx, prop, cb_state->ablock);
+ else {
+ log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
+ "unhandled callback state, bug in Exim", cb_state->ablock->name);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+
+ callback_loop = 0;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Server entry point *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* For interface, see auths/README */
+
+int
+auth_gsasl_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *initial_data)
+{
+ char *tmps;
+ char *to_send, *received;
+ Gsasl_session *sctx = NULL;
+ auth_gsasl_options_block *ob =
+ (auth_gsasl_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
+ struct callback_exim_state cb_state;
+ int rc, auth_result, exim_error, exim_error_override;
+
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("GNU SASL: initialising session for %s, mechanism %s.\n",
+ ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+
+ rc = gsasl_server_start(gsasl_ctx, (const char *)ob->server_mech, &sctx);
+ if (rc != GSASL_OK) {
+ auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf("GNU SASL: session start failure: %s (%s)",
+ gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("%s\n", auth_defer_msg);
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+ /* Hereafter: gsasl_finish(sctx) please */
+
+ gsasl_session_hook_set(sctx, (void *)ablock);
+ cb_state.ablock = ablock;
+ cb_state.currently = CURRENTLY_SERVER;
+ gsasl_session_hook_set(sctx, (void *)&cb_state);
+
+ tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_service);
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SERVICE, tmps);
+ tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_hostname);
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_HOSTNAME, tmps);
+ if (ob->server_realm) {
+ tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_realm);
+ if (tmps && *tmps) {
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_REALM, tmps);
+ }
+ }
+ /* We don't support protection layers. */
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_QOPS, "qop-auth");
+#ifdef SUPPORT_TLS
+ if (tls_channelbinding_b64) {
+ /* Some auth mechanisms can ensure that both sides are talking withing the
+ same security context; for TLS, this means that even if a bad certificate
+ has been accepted, they remain MitM-proof because both sides must be within
+ the same negotiated session; if someone is terminating one sesson and
+ proxying data on within a second, authentication will fail.
+
+ We might not have this available, depending upon TLS implementation,
+ ciphersuite, phase of moon ...
+
+ If we do, it results in extra SASL mechanisms being available; here,
+ Exim's one-mechanism-per-authenticator potentially causes problems.
+ It depends upon how GNU SASL will implement the PLUS variants of GS2
+ and whether it automatically mandates a switch to the bound PLUS
+ if the data is available. Since default-on, despite being more secure,
+ would then result in mechanism name changes on a library update, we
+ have little choice but to default it off and let the admin choose to
+ enable it. *sigh*
+ */
+ if (ob->server_channelbinding) {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Auth %s: Enabling channel-binding\n",
+ ablock->name);
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_CB_TLS_UNIQUE,
+ (const char *) tls_channelbinding_b64);
+ } else {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("Auth %s: Not enabling channel-binding (data available)\n",
+ ablock->name);
+ }
+ } else {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("Auth %s: no channel-binding data available\n",
+ ablock->name);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ checked_server_condition = FALSE;
+
+ received = CS initial_data;
+ to_send = NULL;
+ exim_error = exim_error_override = OK;
+
+ do {
+ rc = gsasl_step64(sctx, received, &to_send);
+
+ switch (rc) {
+ case GSASL_OK:
+ goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+
+ case GSASL_NEEDS_MORE:
+ break;
+
+ case GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR:
+ case GSASL_INTEGRITY_ERROR:
+ case GSASL_NO_AUTHID:
+ case GSASL_NO_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN:
+ case GSASL_NO_AUTHZID:
+ case GSASL_NO_PASSWORD:
+ case GSASL_NO_PASSCODE:
+ case GSASL_NO_PIN:
+ case GSASL_BASE64_ERROR:
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("GNU SASL permanent error: %s (%s)\n",
+ gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+ log_write(0, LOG_REJECT, "%s authenticator (%s):\n "
+ "GNU SASL permanent failure: %s (%s)",
+ ablock->name, ob->server_mech,
+ gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+ if (rc == GSASL_BASE64_ERROR)
+ exim_error_override = BAD64;
+ goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+
+ default:
+ auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf("GNU SASL temporary error: %s (%s)",
+ gsasl_strerror_name(rc), gsasl_strerror(rc));
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("%s\n", auth_defer_msg);
+ exim_error_override = DEFER;
+ goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+ }
+
+ exim_error =
+ auth_get_no64_data((uschar **)&received, (uschar *)to_send);
+ if (exim_error)
+ break; /* handles * cancelled check */
+
+ } while (rc == GSASL_NEEDS_MORE);
+
+STOP_INTERACTION:
+ auth_result = rc;
+
+ gsasl_finish(sctx);
+
+ /* Can return: OK DEFER FAIL CANCELLED BAD64 UNEXPECTED */
+
+ if (exim_error != OK)
+ return exim_error;
+
+ if (auth_result != GSASL_OK) {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("authentication returned %s (%s)\n",
+ gsasl_strerror_name(auth_result), gsasl_strerror(auth_result));
+ if (exim_error_override != OK)
+ return exim_error_override; /* might be DEFER */
+ if (sasl_error_should_defer) /* overriding auth failure SASL error */
+ return DEFER;
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Auth succeeded, check server_condition unless already done in callback */
+ return checked_server_condition ? OK : auth_check_serv_cond(ablock);
+}
+
+/* returns the GSASL status of expanding the Exim string given */
+static int
+condition_check(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *label, uschar *condition_string)
+{
+ int exim_rc;
+
+ exim_rc = auth_check_some_cond(ablock, label, condition_string, FAIL);
+
+ if (exim_rc == OK) {
+ return GSASL_OK;
+ } else if (exim_rc == DEFER) {
+ sasl_error_should_defer = TRUE;
+ return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+ } else if (exim_rc == FAIL) {
+ return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
+ "Unhandled return from checking %s: %d",
+ ablock->name, label, exim_rc);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock)
+{
+ char *tmps;
+ uschar *propval;
+ int cbrc = GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+ int i;
+ auth_gsasl_options_block *ob =
+ (auth_gsasl_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
+
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("GNU SASL callback %d for %s/%s as server\n",
+ prop, ablock->name, ablock->public_name);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VARS; i++) auth_vars[i] = NULL;
+ expand_nmax = 0;
+
+ switch (prop) {
+ case GSASL_VALIDATE_SIMPLE:
+ /* GSASL_AUTHID, GSASL_AUTHZID, and GSASL_PASSWORD */
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+ auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD);
+ auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ expand_nmax = 3;
+ for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)
+ expand_nlength[i] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[i]);
+
+ cbrc = condition_check(ablock, US"server_condition", ablock->server_condition);
+ checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case GSASL_VALIDATE_EXTERNAL:
+ if (ablock->server_condition == NULL) {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("No server_condition supplied, to validate EXTERNAL.\n");
+ cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ /* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
+ auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
+ expand_nmax = 1;
+
+ cbrc = condition_check(ablock,
+ US"server_condition (EXTERNAL)", ablock->server_condition);
+ checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case GSASL_VALIDATE_ANONYMOUS:
+ if (ablock->server_condition == NULL) {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("No server_condition supplied, to validate ANONYMOUS.\n");
+ cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN);
+ /* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
+ auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
+ expand_nmax = 1;
+
+ cbrc = condition_check(ablock,
+ US"server_condition (ANONYMOUS)", ablock->server_condition);
+ checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case GSASL_VALIDATE_GSSAPI:
+ /* GSASL_AUTHZID and GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME */
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME);
+ auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ expand_nmax = 2;
+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; ++i)
+ expand_nlength[i] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[i]);
+
+ /* In this one case, it perhaps makes sense to default back open?
+ But for consistency, let's just mandate server_condition here too. */
+ cbrc = condition_check(ablock,
+ US"server_condition (GSSAPI family)", ablock->server_condition);
+ checked_server_condition = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case GSASL_PASSWORD:
+ /* DIGEST-MD5: GSASL_AUTHID, GSASL_AUTHZID and GSASL_REALM
+ CRAM-MD5: GSASL_AUTHID
+ PLAIN: GSASL_AUTHID and GSASL_AUTHZID
+ LOGIN: GSASL_AUTHID
+ */
+ if (ob->server_scram_iter) {
+ tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_scram_iter);
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SCRAM_ITER, tmps);
+ }
+ if (ob->server_scram_salt) {
+ tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_scram_salt);
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SCRAM_SALT, tmps);
+ }
+ /* Asking for GSASL_AUTHZID will probably call back into us.
+ Do we really want to hardcode limits per mechanism? What happens when
+ a new mechanism is added to the library. It *shouldn't* result in us
+ needing to add more glue, since avoiding that is a large part of the
+ point of SASL. */
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+ auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_REALM);
+ auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
+ expand_nmax = 3;
+ for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)
+ expand_nlength[i] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[i]);
+
+ tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_password);
+ if (tmps == NULL) {
+ sasl_error_should_defer = expand_string_forcedfail ? FALSE : TRUE;
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("server_password expansion failed, so "
+ "can't tell GNU SASL library the password for %s\n", auth_vars[0]);
+ return GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
+ }
+ gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD, tmps);
+ /* This is inadequate; don't think Exim's store stacks are geared
+ for memory wiping, so expanding strings will leave stuff laying around.
+ But no need to compound the problem, so get rid of the one we can. */
+ memset(tmps, '\0', strlen(tmps));
+ cbrc = GSASL_OK;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Unrecognised callback: %d\n", prop);
+ cbrc = GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+ }
+
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Returning %s (%s)\n",
+ gsasl_strerror_name(cbrc), gsasl_strerror(cbrc));
+
+ return cbrc;
+}
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Client entry point *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* For interface, see auths/README */
+
+int
+auth_gsasl_client(
+ auth_instance *ablock, /* authenticator block */
+ smtp_inblock *inblock, /* connection inblock */
+ smtp_outblock *outblock, /* connection outblock */
+ int timeout, /* command timeout */
+ uschar *buffer, /* buffer for reading response */
+ int buffsize) /* size of buffer */
+{
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("Client side NOT IMPLEMENTED: you should not see this!\n");
+ /* NOT IMPLEMENTED */
+ return FAIL;
+}
+
+static int
+client_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_instance *ablock)
+{
+ int cbrc = GSASL_NO_CALLBACK;
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("GNU SASL callback %d for %s/%s as client\n",
+ prop, ablock->name, ablock->public_name);
+
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("Client side NOT IMPLEMENTED: you should not see this!\n");
+
+ return cbrc;
+}
+
+/*************************************************
+* Diagnostic API *
+*************************************************/
+
+void
+auth_gsasl_version_report(FILE *f)
+{
+ const char *runtime;
+ runtime = gsasl_check_version(NULL);
+ fprintf(f, "Library version: GNU SASL: Compile: %s\n"
+ " Runtime: %s\n",
+ GSASL_VERSION, runtime);
+}
+
+#endif /* AUTH_GSASL */
+
+/* End of gsasl_exim.c */
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff