* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2009 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
-/* This module provides TLS (aka SSL) support for Exim using the GnuTLS
-library. It is #included into tls.c when that library is used. The code herein
-is based on a patch that was contributed by Nikos Mavroyanopoulos.
+/* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */
-No cryptographic code is included in Exim. All this module does is to call
-functions from the GnuTLS library. */
+/* This file provides TLS/SSL support for Exim using the GnuTLS library,
+one of the available supported implementations. This file is #included into
+tls.c when USE_GNUTLS has been set.
-/* Note: This appears to be using an old API from compat.h; it is likely that
-someone familiary with GnuTLS programming could rework a lot of this to a
-modern API and perhaps remove the explicit knowledge of crypto algorithms from
-Exim. Such a re-work would be most welcome and we'd sacrifice support for
-older GnuTLS releases without too many qualms -- maturity and experience
-in crypto libraries tends to improve their robustness against attack.
-Frankly, if you maintain it, you decide what's supported and what isn't. */
+The code herein is a revamp of GnuTLS integration using the current APIs; the
+original tls-gnu.c was based on a patch which was contributed by Nikos
+Mavroyanopoulos. The revamp is partially a rewrite, partially cut&paste as
+appropriate.
-/* Heading stuff for GnuTLS */
+APIs current as of GnuTLS 2.12.18; note that the GnuTLS manual is for GnuTLS 3,
+which is not widely deployed by OS vendors. Will note issues below, which may
+assist in updating the code in the future. Another sources of hints is
+mod_gnutls for Apache (SNI callback registration and handling).
+
+Keeping client and server variables more split than before and is currently
+the norm, in anticipation of TLS in ACL callouts.
+
+I wanted to switch to gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() so that
+certificate rejection could happen during handshake where it belongs, rather
+than being dropped afterwards, but that was introduced in 2.10.0 and Debian
+(6.0.5) is still on 2.8.6. So for now we have to stick with sub-par behaviour.
+
+(I wasn't looking for libraries quite that old, when updating to get rid of
+compiler warnings of deprecated APIs. If it turns out that a lot of the rest
+require current GnuTLS, then we'll drop support for the ancient libraries).
+*/
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+/* needed for cert checks in verification and DN extraction: */
#include <gnutls/x509.h>
+/* man-page is incorrect, gnutls_rnd() is not in gnutls.h: */
+#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
+/* needed to disable PKCS11 autoload unless requested */
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00
+# include <gnutls/pkcs11.h>
+#endif
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030103 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
+# warning "GnuTLS library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
+# define DISABLE_OCSP
+#endif
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x020a00 && defined(EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT)
+# warning "GnuTLS library version too old; tls:cert event unsupported"
+# undef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+#endif
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030306
+# define SUPPORT_CA_DIR
+#else
+# undef SUPPORT_CA_DIR
+#endif
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+# include <gnutls/ocsp.h>
+#endif
-#define UNKNOWN_NAME "unknown"
-#define DH_BITS 1024
-#define PARAM_SIZE 2*1024
-
+/* GnuTLS 2 vs 3
-/* Values for verify_requirment */
+GnuTLS 3 only:
+ gnutls_global_set_audit_log_function()
-enum { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED };
+Changes:
+ gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(): is new, drop the 2 for old version
+*/
-/* Local static variables for GNUTLS */
+/* Local static variables for GnuTLS */
-static host_item *client_host;
+/* Values for verify_requirement */
-static gnutls_dh_params dh_params = NULL;
+enum peer_verify_requirement
+ { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED };
-static gnutls_certificate_server_credentials x509_cred = NULL;
-static gnutls_session tls_session = NULL;
+/* This holds most state for server or client; with this, we can set up an
+outbound TLS-enabled connection in an ACL callout, while not stomping all
+over the TLS variables available for expansion.
-static char ssl_errstring[256];
+Some of these correspond to variables in globals.c; those variables will
+be set to point to content in one of these instances, as appropriate for
+the stage of the process lifetime.
-static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
-static int verify_requirement;
+Not handled here: global tls_channelbinding_b64.
+*/
-/* Priorities for TLS algorithms to use. In each case there's a default table,
-and space into which it can be copied and altered. */
+typedef struct exim_gnutls_state {
+ gnutls_session_t session;
+ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t x509_cred;
+ gnutls_priority_t priority_cache;
+ enum peer_verify_requirement verify_requirement;
+ int fd_in;
+ int fd_out;
+ BOOL peer_cert_verified;
+ BOOL trigger_sni_changes;
+ BOOL have_set_peerdn;
+ const struct host_item *host;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert;
+ uschar *peerdn;
+ uschar *ciphersuite;
+ uschar *received_sni;
+
+ const uschar *tls_certificate;
+ const uschar *tls_privatekey;
+ const uschar *tls_sni; /* client send only, not received */
+ const uschar *tls_verify_certificates;
+ const uschar *tls_crl;
+ const uschar *tls_require_ciphers;
+
+ uschar *exp_tls_certificate;
+ uschar *exp_tls_privatekey;
+ uschar *exp_tls_verify_certificates;
+ uschar *exp_tls_crl;
+ uschar *exp_tls_require_ciphers;
+ uschar *exp_tls_ocsp_file;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
+ uschar *exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames;
+#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ uschar *event_action;
+#endif
-static const int default_proto_priority[16] = {
- /* These are gnutls_protocol_t enum values */
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR > 1 || GNUTLS_VERSION_MINOR >= 7
- GNUTLS_TLS1_2,
+ tls_support *tlsp; /* set in tls_init() */
+
+ uschar *xfer_buffer;
+ int xfer_buffer_lwm;
+ int xfer_buffer_hwm;
+ int xfer_eof;
+ int xfer_error;
+} exim_gnutls_state_st;
+
+static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = {
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
+ NULL,
#endif
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR > 1 || GNUTLS_VERSION_MINOR >= 2
- GNUTLS_TLS1_1,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ NULL,
#endif
- GNUTLS_TLS1,
- GNUTLS_SSL3,
- 0 };
+ NULL,
+ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+};
-static int proto_priority[16];
+/* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming
+it's held in globals, GnuTLS doesn't appear to let us register callback data
+for callbacks, or as part of the session, so we have to keep a "this is the
+context we're currently dealing with" pointer and rely upon being
+single-threaded to keep from processing data on an inbound TLS connection while
+talking to another TLS connection for an outbound check. This does mean that
+there's no way for heart-beats to be responded to, for the duration of the
+second connection.
+XXX But see gnutls_session_get_ptr()
+*/
-static const int default_kx_priority[16] = {
- GNUTLS_KX_RSA,
- GNUTLS_KX_DHE_DSS,
- GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA,
- 0 };
+static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server, state_client;
-static int kx_priority[16];
+/* dh_params are initialised once within the lifetime of a process using TLS;
+if we used TLS in a long-lived daemon, we'd have to reconsider this. But we
+don't want to repeat this. */
-static int default_cipher_priority[16] = {
- GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC,
- GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC,
- GNUTLS_CIPHER_3DES_CBC,
- GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
- 0 };
+static gnutls_dh_params_t dh_server_params = NULL;
-static int cipher_priority[16];
+/* No idea how this value was chosen; preserving it. Default is 3600. */
-static const int default_mac_priority[16] = {
- GNUTLS_MAC_SHA,
- GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
- 0 };
+static const int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
-static int mac_priority[16];
+static const char * const exim_default_gnutls_priority = "NORMAL";
-/* These two are currently not changeable. */
+/* Guard library core initialisation */
-static const int comp_priority[16] = { GNUTLS_COMP_NULL, 0 };
-static const int cert_type_priority[16] = { GNUTLS_CRT_X509, 0 };
+static BOOL exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE;
-/* Tables of priority names and equivalent numbers */
-typedef struct pri_item {
- uschar *name;
- int *values;
-} pri_item;
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* macros */
+#define MAX_HOST_LEN 255
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR > 1 || GNUTLS_VERSION_MINOR >= 7
-static int tls1_2_codes[] = { GNUTLS_TLS1_2, 0 };
+/* Set this to control gnutls_global_set_log_level(); values 0 to 9 will setup
+the library logging; a value less than 0 disables the calls to set up logging
+callbacks. */
+#ifndef EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL
+# define EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL -1
#endif
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR > 1 || GNUTLS_VERSION_MINOR >= 2
-static int tls1_1_codes[] = { GNUTLS_TLS1_1, 0 };
+
+#ifndef EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS
+# define EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS 1024
#endif
-/* more recent libraries define this as an equivalent value to the
-canonical GNUTLS_TLS1_0; since they're the same, we stick to the
-older name. */
-static int tls1_0_codes[] = { GNUTLS_TLS1, 0 };
-static int ssl3_codes[] = { GNUTLS_SSL3, 0 };
-
-static pri_item proto_index[] = {
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR > 1 || GNUTLS_VERSION_MINOR >= 7
- { US"TLS1.2", tls1_2_codes },
+
+/* With GnuTLS 2.12.x+ we have gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() with which we
+can ask for a bit-strength. Without that, we stick to the constant we had
+before, for now. */
+#ifndef EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12
+# define EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 1024
#endif
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR > 1 || GNUTLS_VERSION_MINOR >= 2
- { US"TLS1.1", tls1_1_codes },
+
+#define exim_gnutls_err_check(Label) do { \
+ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), host); } } while (0)
+
+#define expand_check_tlsvar(Varname) expand_check(state->Varname, US #Varname, &state->exp_##Varname)
+
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00
+# define HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
+# define HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS
+# define HAVE_GNUTLS_RND
+/* The security fix we provide with the gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11 option
+ * (4.82 PP/09) introduces a compatibility regression. The symbol simply
+ * isn't available sometimes, so this needs to become a conditional
+ * compilation; the sanest way to deal with this being a problem on
+ * older OSes is to block it in the Local/Makefile with this compiler
+ * definition */
+# ifndef AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11
+# define HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11
+# endif /* AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 */
#endif
- { US"TLS1.0", tls1_0_codes },
- { US"TLS1", tls1_0_codes },
- { US"SSL3", ssl3_codes }
-};
-static int kx_rsa_codes[] = { GNUTLS_KX_RSA,
- GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA, 0 };
-static int kx_dhe_codes[] = { GNUTLS_KX_DHE_DSS,
- GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA, 0 };
-static int kx_dhe_dss_codes[] = { GNUTLS_KX_DHE_DSS, 0 };
-static int kx_dhe_rsa_codes[] = { GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA, 0 };
-static pri_item kx_index[] = {
- { US"DHE_DSS", kx_dhe_dss_codes },
- { US"DHE_RSA", kx_dhe_rsa_codes },
- { US"RSA", kx_rsa_codes },
- { US"DHE", kx_dhe_codes }
-};
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Callback declarations */
-static int arcfour_128_codes[] = { GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128, 0 };
-static int arcfour_40_codes[] = { GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_40, 0 };
-static int arcfour_codes[] = { GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
- GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_40, 0 };
-static int aes_256_codes[] = { GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, 0 };
-static int aes_128_codes[] = { GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, 0 };
-static int aes_codes[] = { GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC,
- GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, 0 };
-static int des3_codes[] = { GNUTLS_CIPHER_3DES_CBC, 0 };
-
-static pri_item cipher_index[] = {
- { US"ARCFOUR_128", arcfour_128_codes },
- { US"ARCFOUR_40", arcfour_40_codes },
- { US"ARCFOUR", arcfour_codes },
- { US"AES_256", aes_256_codes },
- { US"AES_128", aes_128_codes },
- { US"AES", aes_codes },
- { US"3DES", des3_codes }
-};
+#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0
+static void exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message);
+#endif
+static int exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session);
-static int mac_sha_codes[] = { GNUTLS_MAC_SHA, 0 };
-static int mac_md5_codes[] = { GNUTLS_MAC_MD5, 0 };
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+static int server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr,
+ gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response);
+#endif
-static pri_item mac_index[] = {
- { US"SHA", mac_sha_codes },
- { US"SHA1", mac_sha_codes },
- { US"MD5", mac_md5_codes }
-};
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Static functions */
/*************************************************
* Handle TLS error *
Argument:
prefix text to include in the logged error
- host NULL if setting up a server;
- the connected host if setting up a client
msg additional error string (may be NULL)
usually obtained from gnutls_strerror()
+ host NULL if setting up a server;
+ the connected host if setting up a client
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-tls_error(uschar *prefix, host_item *host, const char *msg)
+tls_error(const uschar *prefix, const char *msg, const host_item *host)
{
-if (host == NULL)
+if (host)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection (%s)%s%s",
+ host->name, host->address, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : "");
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+else
{
uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
- if (strncmp(conn_info, "SMTP ", 5) == 0)
+ if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
conn_info += 5;
+ /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s)%s%s",
- conn_info, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : "");
+ conn_info, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : "");
return DEFER;
}
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Deal with logging errors during I/O *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* We have to get the identity of the peer from saved data.
+
+Argument:
+ state the current GnuTLS exim state container
+ rc the GnuTLS error code, or 0 if it's a local error
+ when text identifying read or write
+ text local error text when ec is 0
+
+Returns: nothing
+*/
+
+static void
+record_io_error(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, int rc, uschar *when, uschar *text)
+{
+const char *msg;
+
+if (rc == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED)
+ msg = CS string_sprintf("%s: %s", US gnutls_strerror(rc),
+ US gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(state->session)));
else
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on connection to %s [%s] (%s)%s%s",
- host->name, host->address, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : "");
- return FAIL;
- }
+ msg = gnutls_strerror(rc);
+
+tls_error(when, msg, state->host);
}
+
/*************************************************
-* Verify certificate *
+* Set various Exim expansion vars *
*************************************************/
-/* Called after a successful handshake, when certificate verification is
-required or optional, for both server and client.
+#define exim_gnutls_cert_err(Label) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \
+ { \
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert problem: %s: %s\n", \
+ (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \
+ return rc; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
-Arguments:
- session GNUTLS session
- error where to put text giving a reason for failure
+static int
+import_cert(const gnutls_datum * cert, gnutls_x509_crt_t * crtp)
+{
+int rc;
+
+rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(crtp);
+exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"gnutls_x509_crt_init (crt)");
-Returns: TRUE/FALSE
+rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(*crtp, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"failed to import certificate [gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert)]");
+
+return rc;
+}
+
+#undef exim_gnutls_cert_err
+
+
+/* We set various Exim global variables from the state, once a session has
+been established. With TLS callouts, may need to change this to stack
+variables, or just re-call it with the server state after client callout
+has finished.
+
+Make sure anything set here is unset in tls_getc().
+
+Sets:
+ tls_active fd
+ tls_bits strength indicator
+ tls_certificate_verified bool indicator
+ tls_channelbinding_b64 for some SASL mechanisms
+ tls_cipher a string
+ tls_peercert pointer to library internal
+ tls_peerdn a string
+ tls_sni a (UTF-8) string
+ tls_ourcert pointer to library internal
+
+Argument:
+ state the relevant exim_gnutls_state_st *
*/
-static BOOL
-verify_certificate(gnutls_session session, const char **error)
+static void
+extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st * state)
{
+gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
+int old_pool;
int rc;
-uschar *dn_string = US"";
-const gnutls_datum *cert;
-unsigned int verify, cert_size = 0;
+gnutls_datum_t channel;
+#endif
+tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp;
-*error = NULL;
+tlsp->active = state->fd_out;
-/* Get the peer's certificate. If it sent one, extract it's DN, and then
-attempt to verify the certificate. If no certificate is supplied, verification
-is forced to fail. */
+cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session);
+/* returns size in "bytes" */
+tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8;
-cert = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_size);
-if (cert != NULL)
- {
- uschar buff[1024];
- gnutls_x509_crt gcert;
+tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite;
- gnutls_x509_crt_init(&gcert);
- dn_string = US"unknown";
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", state->ciphersuite);
- if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(gcert, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) == 0)
- {
- size_t bufsize = sizeof(buff);
- if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(gcert, CS buff, &bufsize) >= 0)
- dn_string = string_copy_malloc(buff);
- }
+tlsp->certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified;
- rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify);
- }
-else
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no peer certificate supplied\n");
- verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
- *error = "not supplied";
- }
+/* note that tls_channelbinding_b64 is not saved to the spool file, since it's
+only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */
-/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID seems to be set as well
-as REVOKED, but leave the test for both. */
+tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
+channel.data = NULL;
+channel.size = 0;
+rc = gnutls_session_channel_binding(state->session, GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE, &channel);
+if (rc) {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Channel binding error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+} else {
+ old_pool = store_pool;
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ tls_channelbinding_b64 = auth_b64encode(channel.data, (int)channel.size);
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage.\n");
+}
+#endif
-if ((rc < 0) || (verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) != 0)
- {
- tls_certificate_verified = FALSE;
- if (*error == NULL) *error = ((verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) != 0)?
- "revoked" : "invalid";
- if (verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): "
- "peerdn=%s\n", *error, dn_string);
- gnutls_alert_send(session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- return FALSE; /* reject */
- }
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verify failure (%s) overridden "
- "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts): peerdn=%s\n", *error, dn_string);
- }
-else
+/* peercert is set in peer_status() */
+tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn;
+tlsp->sni = state->received_sni;
+
+/* record our certificate */
{
- tls_certificate_verified = TRUE;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=%s\n",
- dn_string);
- }
+ const gnutls_datum * cert = gnutls_certificate_get_ours(state->session);
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
-tls_peerdn = dn_string;
-return TRUE; /* accept */
+ tlsp->ourcert = cert && import_cert(cert, &crt)==0 ? crt : NULL;
+ }
}
+
/*************************************************
* Setup up DH parameters *
*************************************************/
waste a bit of effort, but it doesn't seem worth messing around with locking to
prevent this.
-Argument:
- host NULL for server, server for client (for error handling)
-
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-init_dh(host_item *host)
+init_server_dh(void)
{
-int fd;
-int ret;
+int fd, rc;
+unsigned int dh_bits;
gnutls_datum m;
-uschar filename[200];
+uschar filename_buf[PATH_MAX];
+uschar *filename = NULL;
+size_t sz;
+uschar *exp_tls_dhparam;
+BOOL use_file_in_spool = FALSE;
+BOOL use_fixed_file = FALSE;
+host_item *host = NULL; /* dummy for macros */
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n");
-/* Initialize the data structures for holding the parameters */
+rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params);
+exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_init");
+
+m.data = NULL;
+m.size = 0;
+
+if (!expand_check(tls_dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &exp_tls_dhparam))
+ return DEFER;
+
+if (!exp_tls_dhparam)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loading default hard-coded DH params\n");
+ m.data = US std_dh_prime_default();
+ m.size = Ustrlen(m.data);
+ }
+else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "historic") == 0)
+ use_file_in_spool = TRUE;
+else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "none") == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n");
+ return OK;
+ }
+else if (exp_tls_dhparam[0] != '/')
+ {
+ m.data = US std_dh_prime_named(exp_tls_dhparam);
+ if (m.data == NULL)
+ return tls_error(US"No standard prime named", CS exp_tls_dhparam, NULL);
+ m.size = Ustrlen(m.data);
+ }
+else
+ {
+ use_fixed_file = TRUE;
+ filename = exp_tls_dhparam;
+ }
-ret = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_params);
-if (ret < 0) return tls_error(US"init dh_params", host, gnutls_strerror(ret));
+if (m.data)
+ {
+ rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loaded fixed standard D-H parameters\n");
+ return OK;
+ }
-/* Set up the name of the cache file */
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS
+/* If you change this constant, also change dh_param_fn_ext so that we can use a
+different filename and ensure we have sufficient bits. */
+dh_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_DH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_NORMAL);
+if (!dh_bits)
+ return tls_error(US"gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() failed", NULL, NULL);
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("GnuTLS tells us that for D-H PK, NORMAL is %d bits.\n",
+ dh_bits);
+#else
+dh_bits = EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12;
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("GnuTLS lacks gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(), using %d bits.\n",
+ dh_bits);
+#endif
-if (!string_format(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/gnutls-params",
- spool_directory))
- return tls_error(US"overlong filename", host, NULL);
+/* Some clients have hard-coded limits. */
+if (dh_bits > tls_dh_max_bits)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("tls_dh_max_bits clamping override, using %d bits instead.\n",
+ tls_dh_max_bits);
+ dh_bits = tls_dh_max_bits;
+ }
+
+if (use_file_in_spool)
+ {
+ if (!string_format(filename_buf, sizeof(filename_buf),
+ "%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits))
+ return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL);
+ filename = filename_buf;
+ }
/* Open the cache file for reading and if successful, read it and set up the
parameters. */
if (fd >= 0)
{
struct stat statbuf;
- if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) < 0)
+ FILE *fp;
+ int saved_errno;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) < 0) /* EIO */
+ {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ (void)close(fd);
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache stat failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL);
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
{
(void)close(fd);
- return tls_error(US"TLS cache stat failed", host, strerror(errno));
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache not a file", NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ fp = fdopen(fd, "rb");
+ if (!fp)
+ {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ (void)close(fd);
+ return tls_error(US"fdopen(TLS cache stat fd) failed",
+ strerror(saved_errno), NULL);
}
m.size = statbuf.st_size;
m.data = malloc(m.size);
if (m.data == NULL)
- return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", host, strerror(errno));
- errno = 0;
- if (read(fd, m.data, m.size) != m.size)
- return tls_error(US"TLS cache read failed", host, strerror(errno));
- (void)close(fd);
-
- ret = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- if (ret < 0)
- return tls_error(US"DH params import", host, gnutls_strerror(ret));
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("read D-H parameters from file\n");
+ {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return tls_error(US"malloc failed", strerror(errno), NULL);
+ }
+ sz = fread(m.data, m.size, 1, fp);
+ if (!sz)
+ {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ fclose(fp);
+ free(m.data);
+ return tls_error(US"fread failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
free(m.data);
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("read D-H parameters from file \"%s\"\n", filename);
}
/* If the file does not exist, fall through to compute new data and cache it.
else if (errno == ENOENT)
{
- ret = -1;
+ rc = -1;
DEBUG(D_tls)
- debug_printf("parameter cache file %s does not exist\n", filename);
+ debug_printf("D-H parameter cache file \"%s\" does not exist\n", filename);
}
else
- return tls_error(string_open_failed(errno, "%s for reading", filename),
- host, NULL);
+ return tls_error(string_open_failed(errno, "\"%s\" for reading", filename),
+ NULL, NULL);
/* If ret < 0, either the cache file does not exist, or the data it contains
is not useful. One particular case of this is when upgrading from an older
try to be clever and support both formats; we just regenerate new data in this
case. */
-if (ret < 0)
+if (rc < 0)
{
- uschar tempfilename[sizeof(filename) + 10];
+ uschar *temp_fn;
+ unsigned int dh_bits_gen = dh_bits;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("generating %d bit Diffie-Hellman key...\n",
- DH_BITS);
- ret = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_params, DH_BITS);
- if (ret < 0) return tls_error(US"D-H key generation", host, gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ if ((PATH_MAX - Ustrlen(filename)) < 10)
+ return tls_error(US"Filename too long to generate replacement",
+ CS filename, NULL);
- /* Write the parameters to a file in the spool directory so that we
- can use them from other Exim processes. */
-
- sprintf(CS tempfilename, "%s-%d", filename, (int)getpid());
- fd = Uopen(tempfilename, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, 0400);
+ temp_fn = string_copy(US "%s.XXXXXXX");
+ fd = mkstemp(CS temp_fn); /* modifies temp_fn */
if (fd < 0)
- return tls_error(string_open_failed(errno, "%s for writing", filename),
- host, NULL);
+ return tls_error(US"Unable to open temp file", strerror(errno), NULL);
(void)fchown(fd, exim_uid, exim_gid); /* Probably not necessary */
- /* export the parameters in a format that can be generated using GNUTLS'
- * certtool or other programs.
- *
- * The commands for certtool are:
- * $ certtool --generate-dh-params --bits 1024 > params
+ /* GnuTLS overshoots!
+ * If we ask for 2236, we might get 2237 or more.
+ * But there's no way to ask GnuTLS how many bits there really are.
+ * We can ask how many bits were used in a TLS session, but that's it!
+ * The prime itself is hidden behind too much abstraction.
+ * So we ask for less, and proceed on a wing and a prayer.
+ * First attempt, subtracted 3 for 2233 and got 2240.
*/
+ if (dh_bits >= EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS + 10)
+ {
+ dh_bits_gen = dh_bits - 10;
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("being paranoid about DH generation, make it '%d' bits'\n",
+ dh_bits_gen);
+ }
- m.size = PARAM_SIZE;
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("requesting generation of %d bit Diffie-Hellman prime ...\n",
+ dh_bits_gen);
+ rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits_gen);
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2");
+
+ /* gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() will tell us the exact size, every time,
+ and I confirmed that a NULL call to get the size first is how the GnuTLS
+ sample apps handle this. */
+
+ sz = 0;
+ m.data = NULL;
+ rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
+ m.data, &sz);
+ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing");
+ m.size = sz;
m.data = malloc(m.size);
if (m.data == NULL)
- return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", host, strerror(errno));
-
- m.size = PARAM_SIZE;
- ret = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, m.data,
- &m.size);
- if (ret < 0)
- return tls_error(US"DH params export", host, gnutls_strerror(ret));
-
- m.size = Ustrlen(m.data);
- errno = 0;
- if (write(fd, m.data, m.size) != m.size || write(fd, "\n", 1) != 1)
- return tls_error(US"TLS cache write failed", host, strerror(errno));
+ return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", strerror(errno), NULL);
+ /* this will return a size 1 less than the allocation size above */
+ rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
+ m.data, &sz);
+ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ free(m.data);
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real");
+ }
+ m.size = sz; /* shrink by 1, probably */
+ sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, m.data, (size_t) m.size);
+ if (sz != m.size)
+ {
+ free(m.data);
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache write D-H params failed",
+ strerror(errno), NULL);
+ }
free(m.data);
- (void)close(fd);
+ sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, US"\n", 1);
+ if (sz != 1)
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache write D-H params final newline failed",
+ strerror(errno), NULL);
- if (rename(CS tempfilename, CS filename) < 0)
- return tls_error(string_sprintf("failed to rename %s as %s",
- tempfilename, filename), host, strerror(errno));
+ rc = close(fd);
+ if (rc)
+ return tls_error(US"TLS cache write close() failed",
+ strerror(errno), NULL);
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote D-H parameters to file %s\n", filename);
+ if (Urename(temp_fn, filename) < 0)
+ return tls_error(string_sprintf("failed to rename \"%s\" as \"%s\"",
+ temp_fn, filename), strerror(errno), NULL);
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote D-H parameters to file \"%s\"\n", filename);
}
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialized D-H parameters\n");
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialized server D-H parameters\n");
return OK;
}
/*************************************************
-* Initialize for GnuTLS *
+* Variables re-expanded post-SNI *
*************************************************/
-/* Called from both server and client code. In the case of a server, errors
-before actual TLS negotiation return DEFER.
+/* Called from both server and client code, via tls_init(), and also from
+the SNI callback after receiving an SNI, if tls_certificate includes "tls_sni".
+
+We can tell the two apart by state->received_sni being non-NULL in callback.
+
+The callback should not call us unless state->trigger_sni_changes is true,
+which we are responsible for setting on the first pass through.
Arguments:
- host connected host, if client; NULL if server
- certificate certificate file
- privatekey private key file
- cas CA certs file
- crl CRL file
+ state exim_gnutls_state_st *
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-tls_init(host_item *host, uschar *certificate, uschar *privatekey, uschar *cas,
- uschar *crl)
+tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
{
+struct stat statbuf;
int rc;
-uschar *cert_expanded, *key_expanded, *cas_expanded, *crl_expanded;
-
-client_host = host;
+const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */
+uschar *saved_tls_certificate = NULL;
+uschar *saved_tls_privatekey = NULL;
+uschar *saved_tls_verify_certificates = NULL;
+uschar *saved_tls_crl = NULL;
+int cert_count;
+
+/* We check for tls_sni *before* expansion. */
+if (!host) /* server */
+ {
+ if (!state->received_sni)
+ {
+ if (state->tls_certificate &&
+ (Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
+ Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
+ Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
+ ))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI.\n");
+ state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* useful for debugging */
+ saved_tls_certificate = state->exp_tls_certificate;
+ saved_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_privatekey;
+ saved_tls_verify_certificates = state->exp_tls_verify_certificates;
+ saved_tls_crl = state->exp_tls_crl;
+ }
+ }
-rc = gnutls_global_init();
-if (rc < 0) return tls_error(US"tls-init", host, gnutls_strerror(rc));
+rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&state->x509_cred);
+exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials");
-/* Create D-H parameters, or read them from the cache file. This function does
-its own SMTP error messaging. */
+/* remember: expand_check_tlsvar() is expand_check() but fiddling with
+state members, assuming consistent naming; and expand_check() returns
+false if expansion failed, unless expansion was forced to fail. */
-rc = init_dh(host);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+/* check if we at least have a certificate, before doing expensive
+D-H generation. */
-/* Create the credentials structure */
+if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate))
+ return DEFER;
-rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&x509_cred);
-if (rc < 0)
- return tls_error(US"certificate_allocate_credentials",
- host, gnutls_strerror(rc));
+/* certificate is mandatory in server, optional in client */
-/* This stuff must be done for each session, because different certificates
-may be required for different sessions. */
+if ((state->exp_tls_certificate == NULL) ||
+ (*state->exp_tls_certificate == '\0'))
+ {
+ if (!host)
+ return tls_error(US"no TLS server certificate is specified", NULL, NULL);
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no client certificate specified; okay\n");
+ }
-if (!expand_check(certificate, US"tls_certificate", &cert_expanded))
+if (state->tls_privatekey && !expand_check_tlsvar(tls_privatekey))
return DEFER;
-key_expanded = NULL;
-if (privatekey != NULL)
+/* tls_privatekey is optional, defaulting to same file as certificate */
+
+if (state->tls_privatekey == NULL || *state->tls_privatekey == '\0')
{
- if (!expand_check(privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &key_expanded))
- return DEFER;
+ state->tls_privatekey = state->tls_certificate;
+ state->exp_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_certificate;
}
-/* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result of
-the expansion is an empty string, ignore it also, and assume that the private
-key is in the same file as the certificate. */
-
-if (key_expanded == NULL || *key_expanded == 0)
- key_expanded = cert_expanded;
-
-/* Set the certificate and private keys */
-if (cert_expanded != NULL)
+if (state->exp_tls_certificate && *state->exp_tls_certificate)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("certificate file = %s\nkey file = %s\n",
- cert_expanded, key_expanded);
- rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(x509_cred, CS cert_expanded,
- CS key_expanded, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- if (rc < 0)
+ state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey);
+
+ if (state->received_sni)
{
- uschar *msg = string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s",
- cert_expanded, key_expanded);
- return tls_error(msg, host, gnutls_strerror(rc));
+ if ((Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_certificate, saved_tls_certificate) == 0) &&
+ (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_privatekey, saved_tls_privatekey) == 0))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: cert and key unchanged\n");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: have a changed cert/key pair.\n");
+ }
}
- }
-/* A certificate is mandatory in a server, but not in a client */
+ rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred,
+ CS state->exp_tls_certificate, CS state->exp_tls_privatekey,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(
+ string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s",
+ state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey));
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n");
+ } /* tls_certificate */
-else
+
+/* Set the OCSP stapling server info */
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+if ( !host /* server */
+ && tls_ocsp_file
+ )
{
- if (host == NULL)
- return tls_error(US"no TLS server certificate is specified", NULL, NULL);
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no TLS client certificate is specified\n");
+ if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file",
+ &state->exp_tls_ocsp_file))
+ return DEFER;
+
+ /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get observability.
+ More efficient would be to read the file once only, if it never changed
+ (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update, or watch datestamp. */
+
+ gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function(state->x509_cred,
+ server_ocsp_stapling_cb, state->exp_tls_ocsp_file);
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Set OCSP response file %s\n", &state->exp_tls_ocsp_file);
}
+#endif
+
/* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is
provided. Experiment shows that, if the certificate file is empty, an unhelpful
in that case, certificate verification fails, which seems to be the correct
behaviour. */
-if (cas != NULL)
+if (state->tls_verify_certificates && *state->tls_verify_certificates)
{
- struct stat statbuf;
-
- if (!expand_check(cas, US"tls_verify_certificates", &cas_expanded))
+ if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_verify_certificates))
return DEFER;
+ if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl)
+ if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_crl))
+ return DEFER;
- if (stat(CS cas_expanded, &statbuf) < 0)
+ if (!(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates &&
+ *state->exp_tls_verify_certificates))
{
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "could not stat %s "
- "(tls_verify_certificates): %s", cas_expanded, strerror(errno));
- return DEFER;
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates expanded empty, ignoring\n");
+ /* With no tls_verify_certificates, we ignore tls_crl too */
+ return OK;
}
+ }
+else
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates not set or empty, ignoring\n");
+ return OK;
+ }
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify certificates = %s size=" OFF_T_FMT "\n",
- cas_expanded, statbuf.st_size);
+if (Ustat(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, &statbuf) < 0)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "could not stat %s "
+ "(tls_verify_certificates): %s", state->exp_tls_verify_certificates,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return DEFER;
+ }
- /* If the cert file is empty, there's no point in loading the CRL file. */
+#ifndef SUPPORT_CA_DIR
+/* The test suite passes in /dev/null; we could check for that path explicitly,
+but who knows if someone has some weird FIFO which always dumps some certs, or
+other weirdness. The thing we really want to check is that it's not a
+directory, since while OpenSSL supports that, GnuTLS does not.
+So s/!S_ISREG/S_ISDIR/ and change some messsaging ... */
+if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("verify certificates path is a dir: \"%s\"\n",
+ state->exp_tls_verify_certificates);
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "tls_verify_certificates \"%s\" is a directory",
+ state->exp_tls_verify_certificates);
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+#endif
- if (statbuf.st_size > 0)
- {
- rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(x509_cred, CS cas_expanded,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- if (rc < 0) return tls_error(US"setup_certs", host, gnutls_strerror(rc));
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify certificates = %s size=" OFF_T_FMT "\n",
+ state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, statbuf.st_size);
- if (crl != NULL && *crl != 0)
- {
- if (!expand_check(crl, US"tls_crl", &crl_expanded))
- return DEFER;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("loading CRL file = %s\n", crl_expanded);
- rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(x509_cred, CS crl_expanded,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
- if (rc < 0) return tls_error(US"CRL setup", host, gnutls_strerror(rc));
- }
- }
+if (statbuf.st_size == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("cert file empty, no certs, no verification, ignoring any CRL\n");
+ return OK;
}
-/* Associate the parameters with the x509 credentials structure. */
+cert_count =
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_CA_DIR
+ (statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR
+ ?
+ gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_dir(state->x509_cred,
+ CS state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM)
+ :
+#endif
+ gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(state->x509_cred,
+ CS state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
-gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(x509_cred, dh_params);
+if (cert_count < 0)
+ {
+ rc = cert_count;
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file");
+ }
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n", cert_count);
+
+if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl &&
+ state->exp_tls_crl && *state->exp_tls_crl)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("loading CRL file = %s\n", state->exp_tls_crl);
+ cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(state->x509_cred,
+ CS state->exp_tls_crl, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+ if (cert_count < 0)
+ {
+ rc = cert_count;
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file");
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Processed %d CRLs.\n", cert_count);
+ }
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialized certificate stuff\n");
return OK;
}
/*************************************************
-* Remove from a priority list *
+* Set X.509 state variables *
*************************************************/
-/* Cautiously written so that it will remove duplicates if present.
+/* In GnuTLS, the registered cert/key are not replaced by a later
+set of a cert/key, so for SNI support we need a whole new x509_cred
+structure. Which means various other non-re-expanded pieces of state
+need to be re-set in the new struct, so the setting logic is pulled
+out to this.
Arguments:
- list a zero-terminated list
- remove_list a zero-terminated list to be removed
+ state exim_gnutls_state_st *
-Returns: nothing
+Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
-static void
-remove_priority(int *list, int *remove_list)
+static int
+tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
{
-for (; *remove_list != 0; remove_list++)
+int rc;
+const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */
+
+/* Create D-H parameters, or read them from the cache file. This function does
+its own SMTP error messaging. This only happens for the server, TLS D-H ignores
+client-side params. */
+
+if (!state->host)
{
- int *p = list;
- while (*p != 0)
+ if (!dh_server_params)
{
- if (*p == *remove_list)
- {
- int *pp = p;
- do { pp[0] = pp[1]; pp++; } while (*pp != 0);
- }
- else p++;
+ rc = init_server_dh();
+ if (rc != OK) return rc;
+ }
+ gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->x509_cred, dh_server_params);
+ }
+
+/* Link the credentials to the session. */
+
+rc = gnutls_credentials_set(state->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, state->x509_cred);
+exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_credentials_set");
+
+return OK;
+}
+
+/*************************************************
+* Initialize for GnuTLS *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from both server and client code. In the case of a server, errors
+before actual TLS negotiation return DEFER.
+
+Arguments:
+ host connected host, if client; NULL if server
+ certificate certificate file
+ privatekey private key file
+ sni TLS SNI to send, sometimes when client; else NULL
+ cas CA certs file
+ crl CRL file
+ require_ciphers tls_require_ciphers setting
+ caller_state returned state-info structure
+
+Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
+*/
+
+static int
+tls_init(
+ const host_item *host,
+ const uschar *certificate,
+ const uschar *privatekey,
+ const uschar *sni,
+ const uschar *cas,
+ const uschar *crl,
+ const uschar *require_ciphers,
+ exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state)
+{
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state;
+int rc;
+size_t sz;
+const char *errpos;
+uschar *p;
+BOOL want_default_priorities;
+
+if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS global init required.\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11
+ /* By default, gnutls_global_init will init PKCS11 support in auto mode,
+ which loads modules from a config file, which sounds good and may be wanted
+ by some sysadmin, but also means in common configurations that GNOME keyring
+ environment variables are used and so breaks for users calling mailq.
+ To prevent this, we init PKCS11 first, which is the documented approach. */
+ if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11)
+ {
+ rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL);
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ rc = gnutls_global_init();
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_global_init");
+
+#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ gnutls_global_set_log_function(exim_gnutls_logger_cb);
+ /* arbitrarily chosen level; bump upto 9 for more */
+ gnutls_global_set_log_level(EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL);
}
+#endif
+
+ exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE;
+ }
+
+if (host)
+ {
+ state = &state_client;
+ memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
+ state->tlsp = &tls_out;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS client session\n");
+ rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
}
+else
+ {
+ state = &state_server;
+ memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
+ state->tlsp = &tls_in;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n");
+ rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER);
+ }
+exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_init");
+
+state->host = host;
+
+state->tls_certificate = certificate;
+state->tls_privatekey = privatekey;
+state->tls_require_ciphers = require_ciphers;
+state->tls_sni = sni;
+state->tls_verify_certificates = cas;
+state->tls_crl = crl;
+
+/* This handles the variables that might get re-expanded after TLS SNI;
+that's tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl */
+
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("Expanding various TLS configuration options for session credentials.\n");
+rc = tls_expand_session_files(state);
+if (rc != OK) return rc;
+
+/* These are all other parts of the x509_cred handling, since SNI in GnuTLS
+requires a new structure afterwards. */
+
+rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state);
+if (rc != OK) return rc;
+
+/* set SNI in client, only */
+if (host)
+ {
+ if (!expand_check(sni, US"tls_out_sni", &state->tlsp->sni))
+ return DEFER;
+ if (state->tlsp->sni && *state->tlsp->sni)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("Setting TLS client SNI to \"%s\"\n", state->tlsp->sni);
+ sz = Ustrlen(state->tlsp->sni);
+ rc = gnutls_server_name_set(state->session,
+ GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, state->tlsp->sni, sz);
+ exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_server_name_set");
+ }
+ }
+else if (state->tls_sni)
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \
+ "have an SNI set for a client [%s]\n", state->tls_sni);
+
+/* This is the priority string support,
+http://www.gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html
+and replaces gnutls_require_kx, gnutls_require_mac & gnutls_require_protocols.
+This was backwards incompatible, but means Exim no longer needs to track
+all algorithms and provide string forms for them. */
+
+want_default_priorities = TRUE;
+
+if (state->tls_require_ciphers && *state->tls_require_ciphers)
+ {
+ if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_require_ciphers))
+ return DEFER;
+ if (state->exp_tls_require_ciphers && *state->exp_tls_require_ciphers)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n",
+ state->exp_tls_require_ciphers);
+
+ rc = gnutls_priority_init(&state->priority_cache,
+ CS state->exp_tls_require_ciphers, &errpos);
+ want_default_priorities = FALSE;
+ p = state->exp_tls_require_ciphers;
+ }
+ }
+if (want_default_priorities)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("GnuTLS using default session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n",
+ exim_default_gnutls_priority);
+ rc = gnutls_priority_init(&state->priority_cache,
+ exim_default_gnutls_priority, &errpos);
+ p = US exim_default_gnutls_priority;
+ }
+
+exim_gnutls_err_check(string_sprintf(
+ "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.6s..\"",
+ p, errpos - CS p, errpos));
+
+rc = gnutls_priority_set(state->session, state->priority_cache);
+exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_priority_set");
+
+gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(state->session, ssl_session_timeout);
+
+/* Reduce security in favour of increased compatibility, if the admin
+decides to make that trade-off. */
+if (gnutls_compat_mode)
+ {
+#if LIBGNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020104
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("lowering GnuTLS security, compatibility mode\n");
+ gnutls_session_enable_compatibility_mode(state->session);
+#else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Unable to set gnutls_compat_mode - GnuTLS version too old\n");
+#endif
+ }
+
+*caller_state = state;
+return OK;
}
/*************************************************
-* Add to a priority list *
+* Extract peer information *
*************************************************/
-/* Cautiously written to check the list size
+/* Called from both server and client code.
+Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and state->have_set_peerdn
+and we use that to detect double-calls.
+
+NOTE: the state blocks last while the TLS connection is up, which is fine
+for logging in the server side, but for the client side, we log after teardown
+in src/deliver.c. While the session is up, we can twist about states and
+repoint tls_* globals, but those variables used for logging or other variable
+expansion that happens _after_ delivery need to have a longer life-time.
+
+So for those, we get the data from POOL_PERM; the re-invoke guard keeps us from
+doing this more than once per generation of a state context. We set them in
+the state context, and repoint tls_* to them. After the state goes away, the
+tls_* copies of the pointers remain valid and client delivery logging is happy.
+
+tls_certificate_verified is a BOOL, so the tls_peerdn and tls_cipher issues
+don't apply.
Arguments:
- list a zero-terminated list
- list_max maximum offset in the list
- add_list a zero-terminated list to be added
+ state exim_gnutls_state_st *
-Returns: TRUE if OK; FALSE if list overflows
+Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
-static BOOL
-add_priority(int *list, int list_max, int *add_list)
+static int
+peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
{
-int next = 0;
-while (list[next] != 0) next++;
-while (*add_list != 0)
+uschar cipherbuf[256];
+const gnutls_datum *cert_list;
+int old_pool, rc;
+unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
+gnutls_protocol_t protocol;
+gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
+gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx;
+gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac;
+gnutls_certificate_type_t ct;
+gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+uschar *p, *dn_buf;
+size_t sz;
+
+if (state->have_set_peerdn)
+ return OK;
+state->have_set_peerdn = TRUE;
+
+state->peerdn = NULL;
+
+/* tls_cipher */
+cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session);
+protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session);
+mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session);
+kx = gnutls_kx_get(state->session);
+
+string_format(cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf),
+ "%s:%s:%d",
+ gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol),
+ gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac),
+ (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8);
+
+/* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS
+code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS
+releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */
+for (p = cipherbuf; *p != '\0'; ++p)
+ if (isspace(*p))
+ *p = '-';
+old_pool = store_pool;
+store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+state->ciphersuite = string_copy(cipherbuf);
+store_pool = old_pool;
+state->tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite;
+
+/* tls_peerdn */
+cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &cert_list_size);
+
+if (cert_list == NULL || cert_list_size == 0)
{
- if (next >= list_max) return FALSE;
- list[next++] = *add_list++;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no certificate from peer (%p & %d)\n",
+ cert_list, cert_list_size);
+ if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
+ return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed",
+ "no certificate received from peer", state->host);
+ return OK;
}
-list[next] = 0;
-return TRUE;
+
+ct = gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session);
+if (ct != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
+ {
+ const char *ctn = gnutls_certificate_type_get_name(ct);
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: peer cert not X.509 but instead \"%s\"\n", ctn);
+ if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
+ return tls_error(US"certificate verification not possible, unhandled type",
+ ctn, state->host);
+ return OK;
+ }
+
+#define exim_gnutls_peer_err(Label) \
+ do { \
+ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \
+ { \
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: %s: %s\n", \
+ (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \
+ if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) \
+ return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host); \
+ return OK; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+rc = import_cert(&cert_list[0], &crt);
+exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"cert 0");
+
+state->tlsp->peercert = state->peercert = crt;
+
+sz = 0;
+rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, NULL, &sz);
+if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
+ {
+ exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"getting size for cert DN failed");
+ return FAIL; /* should not happen */
+ }
+dn_buf = store_get_perm(sz);
+rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, CS dn_buf, &sz);
+exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to extract certificate DN [gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert 0)]");
+
+state->peerdn = dn_buf;
+
+return OK;
+#undef exim_gnutls_peer_err
}
+
/*************************************************
-* Adjust a priority list *
+* Verify peer certificate *
*************************************************/
-/* This function is called to adjust the lists of cipher algorithms, MAC
-algorithms, key-exchange methods, and protocols.
+/* Called from both server and client code.
+*Should* be using a callback registered with
+gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() to fail the handshake if we dislike
+the peer information, but that's too new for some OSes.
Arguments:
- plist the appropriate priority list
- psize the length of the list
- s the configuation string
- index the index of recognized strings
- isize the length of the index
+ state exim_gnutls_state_st *
+ error where to put an error message
-
- which text for an error message
-
-Returns: FALSE if the table overflows, else TRUE
+Returns:
+ FALSE if the session should be rejected
+ TRUE if the cert is okay or we just don't care
*/
static BOOL
-set_priority(int *plist, int psize, uschar *s, pri_item *index, int isize,
- uschar *which)
+verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, const char **error)
{
-int sep = 0;
-BOOL first = TRUE;
-uschar *t;
+int rc;
+unsigned int verify;
+
+*error = NULL;
+
+if ((rc = peer_status(state)) != OK)
+ {
+ verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
+ *error = "certificate not supplied";
+ }
+else
+ rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify);
+
+/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID seems to be set as well
+as REVOKED, but leave the test for both. */
-while ((t = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) != NULL)
+if (rc < 0 ||
+ verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)
+ )
{
- int i;
- BOOL exclude = t[0] == '!';
- if (first && !exclude) plist[0] = 0;
- first = FALSE;
- for (i = 0; i < isize; i++)
+ state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE;
+ if (!*error)
+ *error = verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED
+ ? "certificate revoked" : "certificate invalid";
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=\"%s\"\n",
+ *error, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
+
+ if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
{
- uschar *ss = strstric(t, index[i].name, FALSE);
- if (ss != NULL)
- {
- uschar *endss = ss + Ustrlen(index[i].name);
- if ((ss == t || !isalnum(ss[-1])) && !isalnum(*endss))
- {
- if (exclude)
- remove_priority(plist, index[i].values);
- else
- {
- if (!add_priority(plist, psize, index[i].values))
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "GnuTLS init failed: %s "
- "priority table overflow", which);
- return FALSE;
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ gnutls_alert_send(state->session,
+ GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return FALSE;
}
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS verify failure overridden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
}
-DEBUG(D_tls)
+else
{
- int *ptr = plist;
- debug_printf("adjusted %s priorities:", which);
- while (*ptr != 0) debug_printf(" %d", *ptr++);
- debug_printf("\n");
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
+ if (state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames)
+ {
+ int sep = 0;
+ uschar * list = state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames;
+ uschar * name;
+ while (name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0))
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, CS name))
+ break;
+ if (!name)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n");
+ if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
+ {
+ gnutls_alert_send(state->session,
+ GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=\"%s\"\n",
+ state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
}
+state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn;
+
return TRUE;
}
-/*************************************************
-* Initialize a single GNUTLS session *
-*************************************************/
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Callbacks */
-/* Set the algorithm, the db backend, whether to request certificates etc.
+/* Logging function which can be registered with
+ * gnutls_global_set_log_function()
+ * gnutls_global_set_log_level() 0..9
+ */
+#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0
+static void
+exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message)
+{
+ size_t len = strlen(message);
+ if (len < 1)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d> empty debug message\n", level);
+ return;
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d>: %s%s", level, message,
+ message[len-1] == '\n' ? "" : "\n");
+}
+#endif
-TLS in Exim was first implemented using OpenSSL. This has a function to which
-you pass a list of cipher suites that are permitted/not permitted. GnuTLS works
-differently. It operates using priority lists for the different components of
-cipher suites.
-For compatibility of configuration, we scan a list of cipher suites and set
-priorities therefrom. However, at the moment, we pay attention only to the bulk
-cipher.
+/* Called after client hello, should handle SNI work.
+This will always set tls_sni (state->received_sni) if available,
+and may trigger presenting different certificates,
+if state->trigger_sni_changes is TRUE.
-Arguments:
- side one of GNUTLS_SERVER, GNUTLS_CLIENT
- expciphers expanded ciphers list or NULL
- expmac expanded MAC list or NULL
- expkx expanded key-exchange list or NULL
- expproto expanded protocol list or NULL
+Should be registered with
+ gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function()
-Returns: a gnutls_session, or NULL if there is a problem
+"This callback must return 0 on success or a gnutls error code to terminate the
+handshake.".
+
+For inability to get SNI information, we return 0.
+We only return non-zero if re-setup failed.
+Only used for server-side TLS.
*/
-static gnutls_session
-tls_session_init(int side, uschar *expciphers, uschar *expmac, uschar *expkx,
- uschar *expproto)
+static int
+exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session)
{
-gnutls_session session;
+char sni_name[MAX_HOST_LEN];
+size_t data_len = MAX_HOST_LEN;
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server;
+unsigned int sni_type;
+int rc, old_pool;
+
+rc = gnutls_server_name_get(session, sni_name, &data_len, &sni_type, 0);
+if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) {
+ if (rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE)
+ debug_printf("TLS: no SNI presented in handshake.\n");
+ else
+ debug_printf("TLS failure: gnutls_server_name_get(): %s [%d]\n",
+ gnutls_strerror(rc), rc);
+ };
+ return 0;
+ }
-gnutls_init(&session, side);
+if (sni_type != GNUTLS_NAME_DNS)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: ignoring SNI of unhandled type %u\n", sni_type);
+ return 0;
+ }
-/* Initialize the lists of permitted protocols, key-exchange methods, ciphers,
-and MACs. */
+/* We now have a UTF-8 string in sni_name */
+old_pool = store_pool;
+store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+state->received_sni = string_copyn(US sni_name, data_len);
+store_pool = old_pool;
-memcpy(cipher_priority, default_cipher_priority, sizeof(cipher_priority));
-memcpy(mac_priority, default_mac_priority, sizeof(mac_priority));
-memcpy(kx_priority, default_kx_priority, sizeof(kx_priority));
-memcpy(proto_priority, default_proto_priority, sizeof(proto_priority));
+/* We set this one now so that variable expansions below will work */
+state->tlsp->sni = state->received_sni;
-/* The names OpenSSL uses in tls_require_ciphers are of the form DES-CBC3-SHA,
-using hyphen separators. GnuTLS uses underscore separators. So that I can use
-either form for tls_require_ciphers in my tests, and also for general
-convenience, we turn hyphens into underscores before scanning the list. */
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", sni_name,
+ state->trigger_sni_changes ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)");
-if (expciphers != NULL)
- {
- uschar *s = expciphers;
- while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '-') *s = '_'; s++; }
- }
+if (!state->trigger_sni_changes)
+ return 0;
-if ((expciphers != NULL &&
- !set_priority(cipher_priority, sizeof(cipher_priority)/sizeof(int),
- expciphers, cipher_index, sizeof(cipher_index)/sizeof(pri_item),
- US"cipher")) ||
- (expmac != NULL &&
- !set_priority(mac_priority, sizeof(mac_priority)/sizeof(int),
- expmac, mac_index, sizeof(mac_index)/sizeof(pri_item),
- US"MAC")) ||
- (expkx != NULL &&
- !set_priority(kx_priority, sizeof(kx_priority)/sizeof(int),
- expkx, kx_index, sizeof(kx_index)/sizeof(pri_item),
- US"key-exchange")) ||
- (expproto != NULL &&
- !set_priority(proto_priority, sizeof(proto_priority)/sizeof(int),
- expproto, proto_index, sizeof(proto_index)/sizeof(pri_item),
- US"protocol")))
+rc = tls_expand_session_files(state);
+if (rc != OK)
{
- gnutls_deinit(session);
- return NULL;
+ /* If the setup of certs/etc failed before handshake, TLS would not have
+ been offered. The best we can do now is abort. */
+ return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN;
}
-/* Define the various priorities */
+rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state);
+if (rc != OK) return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN;
-gnutls_cipher_set_priority(session, cipher_priority);
-gnutls_compression_set_priority(session, comp_priority);
-gnutls_kx_set_priority(session, kx_priority);
-gnutls_protocol_set_priority(session, proto_priority);
-gnutls_mac_set_priority(session, mac_priority);
-
-gnutls_cred_set(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, x509_cred);
+return 0;
+}
-gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(session, DH_BITS);
-/* Request or demand a certificate of the peer, as configured. This will
-happen only in a server. */
-if (verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE)
- gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(session,
- (verify_requirement == VERIFY_OPTIONAL)?
- GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST : GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE);
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(session, ssl_session_timeout);
+static int
+server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr,
+ gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response)
+{
+int ret;
-/* Reduce security in favour of increased compatibility, if the admin
-decides to make that trade-off. */
-if (gnutls_compat_mode)
+if ((ret = gnutls_load_file(ptr, ocsp_response)) < 0)
{
-#if LIBGNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020104
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("lowering GnuTLS security, compatibility mode\n");
- gnutls_session_enable_compatibility_mode(session);
-#else
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Unable to set gnutls_compat_mode - GnuTLS version too old\n");
-#endif
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to load ocsp stapling file %s\n",
+ (char *)ptr);
+ tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+ return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
}
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialized GnuTLS session\n");
-return session;
+tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED;
+return 0;
}
+#endif
-/*************************************************
-* Get name of cipher in use *
-*************************************************/
-
-/* The answer is left in a static buffer, and tls_cipher is set to point
-to it.
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+/*
+We use this callback to get observability and detail-level control
+for an exim TLS connection (either direction), raising a tls:cert event
+for each cert in the chain presented by the peer. Any event
+can deny verification.
-Argument: pointer to a GnuTLS session
-Returns: nothing
+Return 0 for the handshake to continue or non-zero to terminate.
*/
-static void
-construct_cipher_name(gnutls_session session)
+static int
+verify_cb(gnutls_session_t session)
{
-static uschar cipherbuf[256];
-uschar *ver;
-int bits, c, kx, mac;
+const gnutls_datum * cert_list;
+unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
+gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+int rc;
+uschar * yield;
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session);
+
+cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
+if (cert_list)
+ while (cert_list_size--)
+ {
+ rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt);
+ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: depth %d: %s\n",
+ cert_list_size, gnutls_strerror(rc));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ state->tlsp->peercert = crt;
+ if ((yield = event_raise(state->event_action,
+ US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", cert_list_size))))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "SSL verify denied by event-action: depth=%d: %s",
+ cert_list_size, yield);
+ return 1; /* reject */
+ }
+ state->tlsp->peercert = NULL;
+ }
-ver = string_copy(
- US gnutls_protocol_get_name(gnutls_protocol_get_version(session)));
-if (Ustrncmp(ver, "TLS ", 4) == 0) ver[3] = '-'; /* Don't want space */
+return 0;
+}
-c = gnutls_cipher_get(session);
-bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(c);
+#endif
-mac = gnutls_mac_get(session);
-kx = gnutls_kx_get(session);
-string_format(cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), "%s:%s:%u", ver,
- gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, c, mac), bits);
-tls_cipher = cipherbuf;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
-}
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Exported functions */
+
Arguments:
require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL
- require_mac list of allowed MACs or NULL
- require_kx list of allowed key_exchange methods or NULL
- require_proto list of allowed protocols or NULL
Returns: OK on success
DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
*/
int
-tls_server_start(uschar *require_ciphers, uschar *require_mac,
- uschar *require_kx, uschar *require_proto)
+tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers)
{
int rc;
const char *error;
-uschar *expciphers = NULL;
-uschar *expmac = NULL;
-uschar *expkx = NULL;
-uschar *expproto = NULL;
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL;
/* Check for previous activation */
-
-if (tls_active >= 0)
+if (tls_in.active >= 0)
{
- tls_error("STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, "");
+ tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", "", NULL);
smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n");
return FAIL;
}
/* Initialize the library. If it fails, it will already have logged the error
and sent an SMTP response. */
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initializing GnuTLS as a server\n");
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a server\n");
-rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, tls_verify_certificates,
- tls_crl);
+rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
+ NULL, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl,
+ require_ciphers, &state);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
-if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers) ||
- !expand_check(require_mac, US"gnutls_require_mac", &expmac) ||
- !expand_check(require_kx, US"gnutls_require_kx", &expkx) ||
- !expand_check(require_proto, US"gnutls_require_proto", &expproto))
- return FAIL;
-
/* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
optional, set up appropriately. */
-tls_certificate_verified = FALSE;
-verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE;
-
if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
- verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be required.\n");
+ state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE);
+ }
else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
- verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be requested but not required.\n");
+ state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST);
+ }
+else
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will not be requested.\n");
+ state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE;
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE);
+ }
-/* Prepare for new connection */
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+if (event_action)
+ {
+ state->event_action = event_action;
+ gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state);
+ gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->x509_cred, verify_cb);
+ }
+#endif
+
+/* Register SNI handling; always, even if not in tls_certificate, so that the
+expansion variable $tls_sni is always available. */
-tls_session = tls_session_init(GNUTLS_SERVER, expciphers, expmac, expkx,
- expproto);
-if (tls_session == NULL)
- return tls_error(US"tls_session_init", NULL,
- gnutls_strerror(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR));
+gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function(state->session,
+ exim_sni_handling_cb);
/* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
-if (!tls_on_connect)
+if (!state->tlsp->on_connect)
{
smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n");
fflush(smtp_out);
/* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
that the GnuTLS library doesn't. */
-gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(tls_session, (gnutls_transport_ptr)fileno(smtp_in),
- (gnutls_transport_ptr)fileno(smtp_out));
+gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(state->session,
+ (gnutls_transport_ptr)(long) fileno(smtp_in),
+ (gnutls_transport_ptr)(long) fileno(smtp_out));
+state->fd_in = fileno(smtp_in);
+state->fd_out = fileno(smtp_out);
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
-rc = gnutls_handshake(tls_session);
+do
+ {
+ rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session);
+ } while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) ||
+ (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen));
alarm(0);
-if (rc < 0)
+if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
- tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", NULL,
- sigalrm_seen ? "timed out" : gnutls_strerror(rc));
-
+ tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake",
+ sigalrm_seen ? "timed out" : gnutls_strerror(rc), NULL);
/* It seems that, except in the case of a timeout, we have to close the
connection right here; otherwise if the other end is running OpenSSL it hangs
until the server times out. */
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n");
-if (verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE &&
- !verify_certificate(tls_session, &error))
+/* Verify after the fact */
+
+if ( state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE
+ && !verify_certificate(state, &error))
{
- tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", NULL, error);
- return FAIL;
+ if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_OPTIONAL)
+ {
+ tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, NULL);
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n",
+ error);
}
-construct_cipher_name(tls_session);
+/* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */
+
+rc = peer_status(state);
+if (rc != OK) return rc;
+
+/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */
+
+extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state);
/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
and initialize appropriately. */
-ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
-ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
-ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
+state->xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
receive_getc = tls_getc;
receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
-tls_active = fileno(smtp_out);
-
return OK;
}
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
+static void
+tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host_item * host, exim_gnutls_state_st * state,
+ smtp_transport_options_block * ob)
+{
+if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
+ {
+ state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = host->name;
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: server cert verification includes hostname: \"%s\".\n",
+ state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+
/*************************************************
* Start a TLS session in a client *
*************************************************/
fd the fd of the connection
host connected host (for messages)
addr the first address (not used)
- dhparam DH parameter file
- certificate certificate file
- privatekey private key file
- verify_certs file for certificate verify
- verify_crl CRL for verify
- require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL
- require_mac list of allowed MACs or NULL
- require_kx list of allowed key_exchange methods or NULL
- require_proto list of allowed protocols or NULL
- timeout startup timeout
+ tb transport (always smtp)
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL (because using common functions),
but for a client, DEFER and FAIL have the same meaning
*/
int
-tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr, uschar *dhparam,
- uschar *certificate, uschar *privatekey, uschar *verify_certs,
- uschar *verify_crl, uschar *require_ciphers, uschar *require_mac,
- uschar *require_kx, uschar *require_proto, int timeout)
+tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host,
+ address_item *addr ARG_UNUSED,
+ transport_instance *tb
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+ , dne_answer * unused_tlsa_dnsa
+#endif
+ )
{
-const gnutls_datum *server_certs;
-uschar *expciphers = NULL;
-uschar *expmac = NULL;
-uschar *expkx = NULL;
-uschar *expproto = NULL;
-const char *error;
-unsigned int server_certs_size;
+smtp_transport_options_block *ob =
+ (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
int rc;
+const char *error;
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+BOOL require_ocsp =
+ verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
+BOOL request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE
+ : verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+#endif
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initializing GnuTLS as a client\n");
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", fd);
-verify_requirement = (verify_certs == NULL)? VERIFY_NONE : VERIFY_REQUIRED;
-rc = tls_init(host, certificate, privatekey, verify_certs, verify_crl);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+if ((rc = tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
+ ob->tls_sni, ob->tls_verify_certificates, ob->tls_crl,
+ ob->tls_require_ciphers, &state)) != OK)
+ return rc;
-if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers) ||
- !expand_check(require_mac, US"gnutls_require_mac", &expmac) ||
- !expand_check(require_kx, US"gnutls_require_kx", &expkx) ||
- !expand_check(require_proto, US"gnutls_require_proto", &expproto))
- return FAIL;
+ {
+ int dh_min_bits = ob->tls_dh_min_bits;
+ if (dh_min_bits < EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("WARNING: tls_dh_min_bits far too low,"
+ " clamping %d up to %d\n",
+ dh_min_bits, EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS);
+ dh_min_bits = EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting D-H prime minimum"
+ " acceptable bits to %d\n",
+ dh_min_bits);
+ gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(state->session, dh_min_bits);
+ }
+
+/* Stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
+set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts are unset. Check only
+the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
+
+if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates
+ && !ob->tls_verify_hosts
+ && !ob->tls_try_verify_hosts
+ )
+ || verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK
+ )
+ {
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
+ tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob);
+#endif
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification required.\n");
+ state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE);
+ }
+else if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+ {
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
+ tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob);
+#endif
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification optional.\n");
+ state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST);
+ }
+else
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification not required.\n");
+ state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE;
+ gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE);
+ }
-tls_session = tls_session_init(GNUTLS_CLIENT, expciphers, expmac, expkx,
- expproto);
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ /* supported since GnuTLS 3.1.3 */
+if (request_ocsp)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: will request OCSP stapling\n");
+ if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session,
+ NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK)
+ return tls_error(US"cert-status-req",
+ gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host);
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+ }
+#endif
-if (tls_session == NULL)
- return tls_error(US "tls_session_init", host,
- gnutls_strerror(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR));
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+if (tb->event_action)
+ {
+ state->event_action = tb->event_action;
+ gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state);
+ gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->x509_cred, verify_cb);
+ }
+#endif
-gnutls_transport_set_ptr(tls_session, (gnutls_transport_ptr)fd);
+gnutls_transport_set_ptr(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr)(long) fd);
+state->fd_in = fd;
+state->fd_out = fd;
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("about to gnutls_handshake\n");
/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
-alarm(timeout);
-rc = gnutls_handshake(tls_session);
+alarm(ob->command_timeout);
+do
+ {
+ rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session);
+ } while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) ||
+ (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen));
alarm(0);
-if (rc < 0)
- return tls_error(US "gnutls_handshake", host,
- sigalrm_seen ? "timed out" : gnutls_strerror(rc));
+if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake",
+ sigalrm_seen ? "timed out" : gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host);
-server_certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(tls_session, &server_certs_size);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n");
-if (server_certs != NULL)
- {
- uschar buff[1024];
- gnutls_x509_crt gcert;
+/* Verify late */
- gnutls_x509_crt_init(&gcert);
- tls_peerdn = US"unknown";
+if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE &&
+ !verify_certificate(state, &error))
+ return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, state->host);
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+if (require_ocsp)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ gnutls_datum_t stapling;
+ gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp;
+ gnutls_datum_t printed;
+ if ( (rc= gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(state->session, &stapling)) == 0
+ && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp)) == 0
+ && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, &stapling)) == 0
+ && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_print(resp, GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_FULL, &printed)) == 0
+ )
+ {
+ debug_printf("%.4096s", printed.data);
+ gnutls_free(printed.data);
+ }
+ else
+ (void) tls_error(US"ocsp decode", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host);
+ }
- if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(gcert, server_certs, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) == 0)
+ if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0)
{
- size_t bufsize = sizeof(buff);
- if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(gcert, CS buff, &bufsize) >= 0)
- tls_peerdn = string_copy_malloc(buff);
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ return tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host);
}
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n");
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
}
+#endif
+
+/* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */
+
+if ((rc = peer_status(state)) != OK)
+ return rc;
-/* Should we also verify the hostname here? */
+/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */
-if (verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE &&
- !verify_certificate(tls_session, &error))
- return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", host, error);
+extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state);
-construct_cipher_name(tls_session); /* Sets tls_cipher */
-tls_active = fd;
return OK;
}
+
/*************************************************
-* Deal with logging errors during I/O *
+* Close down a TLS session *
*************************************************/
-/* We have to get the identity of the peer from saved data.
-
-Argument:
- ec the GnuTLS error code, or 0 if it's a local error
- when text identifying read or write
- text local error text when ec is 0
+/* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
+daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
+would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process).
-Returns: nothing
+Arguments: TRUE if gnutls_bye is to be called
+Returns: nothing
*/
-static void
-record_io_error(int ec, uschar *when, uschar *text)
+void
+tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
{
-const char *msg;
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
-if (ec == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED)
- msg = string_sprintf("%s: %s", gnutls_strerror(ec),
- gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(tls_session)));
-else
- msg = gnutls_strerror(ec);
+if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
+
+if (shutdown)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS\n");
+ gnutls_bye(state->session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ }
+
+gnutls_deinit(state->session);
+
+state->tlsp->active = -1;
+memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
+
+if ((state_server.session == NULL) && (state_client.session == NULL))
+ {
+ gnutls_global_deinit();
+ exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE;
+ }
-tls_error(when, client_host, msg);
}
+
/*************************************************
* TLS version of getc *
*************************************************/
/* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty,
it refills the buffer via the GnuTLS reading function.
+Only used by the server-side TLS.
+
+This feeds DKIM and should be used for all message-body reads.
Arguments: none
Returns: the next character or EOF
int
tls_getc(void)
{
-if (ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm >= ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm)
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server;
+if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
{
- int inbytes;
+ ssize_t inbytes;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%lx, %lx, %u)\n",
- (long) tls_session, (long) ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n",
+ state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
- inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(tls_session, CS ssl_xfer_buffer,
+ inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer,
ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
alarm(0);
receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
- gnutls_deinit(tls_session);
- tls_session = NULL;
- tls_active = -1;
- tls_cipher = NULL;
- tls_peerdn = NULL;
+ gnutls_deinit(state->session);
+ state->session = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->active = -1;
+ state->tlsp->bits = 0;
+ state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
+ tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->cipher = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->peercert = NULL;
+ state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
return smtp_getc();
}
else if (inbytes < 0)
{
- record_io_error(inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
- ssl_xfer_error = 1;
+ record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
+ state->xfer_error = 1;
return EOF;
}
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
- dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer, inbytes);
+ dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes);
#endif
- ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = inbytes;
- ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
+ state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes;
+ state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
}
-
/* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
-return ssl_xfer_buffer[ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm++];
+return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++];
}
+
/*************************************************
* Read bytes from TLS channel *
*************************************************/
-/*
+/* This does not feed DKIM, so if the caller uses this for reading message body,
+then the caller must feed DKIM.
+
Arguments:
buff buffer of data
len size of buffer
*/
int
-tls_read(uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
{
-int inbytes;
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
+ssize_t inbytes;
+
+if (len > INT_MAX)
+ len = INT_MAX;
+
+if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm < state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \
+ "tls_read() called with data in the tls_getc() buffer, %d ignored\n",
+ state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm);
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%lx, %lx, %u)\n",
- (long) tls_session, (long) buff, len);
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n",
+ state->session, buff, len);
-inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(tls_session, CS buff, len);
+inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, buff, len);
if (inbytes > 0) return inbytes;
if (inbytes == 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n");
}
-else record_io_error(inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
+else record_io_error(state, (int)inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
return -1;
}
+
/*************************************************
* Write bytes down TLS channel *
*************************************************/
/*
Arguments:
+ is_server channel specifier
buff buffer of data
len number of bytes
*/
int
-tls_write(const uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len)
{
-int outbytes;
-int left = len;
+ssize_t outbytes;
+size_t left = len;
+exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%lx, %d)\n", (long) buff, left);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", buff, left);
while (left > 0)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(SSL, %lx, %d)\n", (long)buff,
- left);
- outbytes = gnutls_record_send(tls_session, CS buff, left);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(SSL, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n",
+ buff, left);
+ outbytes = gnutls_record_send(state->session, buff, left);
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d\n", outbytes);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=" SSIZE_T_FMT "\n", outbytes);
if (outbytes < 0)
{
- record_io_error(outbytes, US"send", NULL);
+ record_io_error(state, outbytes, US"send", NULL);
return -1;
}
if (outbytes == 0)
{
- record_io_error(0, US"send", US"TLS channel closed on write");
+ record_io_error(state, 0, US"send", US"TLS channel closed on write");
return -1;
}
buff += outbytes;
}
-return len;
+if (len > INT_MAX)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("Whoops! Wrote more bytes (" SIZE_T_FMT ") than INT_MAX\n",
+ len);
+ len = INT_MAX;
+ }
+
+return (int) len;
}
+
/*************************************************
-* Close down a TLS session *
+* Random number generation *
*************************************************/
-/* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
-daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
-would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process).
+/* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be
+cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves
+in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or
+whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork()
+and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us.
-Arguments: TRUE if gnutls_bye is to be called
-Returns: nothing
+Arguments:
+ max range maximum
+Returns a random number in range [0, max-1]
*/
-void
-tls_close(BOOL shutdown)
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_RND
+int
+vaguely_random_number(int max)
+{
+unsigned int r;
+int i, needed_len;
+uschar *p;
+uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
+
+if (max <= 1)
+ return 0;
+
+needed_len = sizeof(r);
+/* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were
+ * asked for a number less than 10. */
+for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i)
+ r >>= 1;
+i = (i + 7) / 8;
+if (i < needed_len)
+ needed_len = i;
+
+i = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, smallbuf, needed_len);
+if (i < 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_all) debug_printf("gnutls_rnd() failed, using fallback.\n");
+ return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
+ }
+r = 0;
+for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
+ {
+ r *= 256;
+ r += *p;
+ }
+
+/* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
+ * smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
+return r % max;
+}
+#else /* HAVE_GNUTLS_RND */
+int
+vaguely_random_number(int max)
{
-if (tls_active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
+ return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_GNUTLS_RND */
-if (shutdown)
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the
+library can parse.
+
+Returns: NULL on success, or error message
+*/
+
+uschar *
+tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
+{
+int rc;
+uschar *expciphers = NULL;
+gnutls_priority_t priority_cache;
+const char *errpos;
+
+#define validate_check_rc(Label) do { \
+ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) gnutls_global_deinit(); \
+ return string_sprintf("%s failed: %s", (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); } } while (0)
+#define return_deinit(Label) do { gnutls_global_deinit(); return (Label); } while (0)
+
+if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "already initialised GnuTLS, Exim developer bug");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11
+if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS\n");
- gnutls_bye(tls_session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL);
+ validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init");
}
+#endif
+rc = gnutls_global_init();
+validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_global_init()");
+exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE;
+
+if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
+ return_deinit(NULL);
+
+if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
+ return_deinit(US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers");
+
+if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
+ return_deinit(NULL);
-gnutls_deinit(tls_session);
-tls_session = NULL;
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers);
+
+rc = gnutls_priority_init(&priority_cache, CS expciphers, &errpos);
+validate_check_rc(string_sprintf(
+ "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.8s..\"",
+ expciphers, errpos - CS expciphers, errpos));
+
+#undef return_deinit
+#undef validate_check_rc
gnutls_global_deinit();
-tls_active = -1;
+return NULL;
}
gnutls_check_version(NULL));
}
+/* vi: aw ai sw=2
+*/
/* End of tls-gnu.c */
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff