-Sender Policy Framework (SPF) support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-To learn more about SPF, visit http://www.openspf.org. This
-document does not explain the SPF fundamentals, you should
-read and understand the implications of deploying SPF on your
-system before doing so.
-
-SPF support is added via the libspf2 library. Visit
-
- http://www.libspf2.org/
-
-to obtain a copy, then compile and install it. By default,
-this will put headers in /usr/local/include and the static
-library in /usr/local/lib.
-
-To compile Exim with SPF support, set these additional flags in
-Local/Makefile:
-
-EXPERIMENTAL_SPF=yes
-CFLAGS=-DSPF -I/usr/local/include
-EXTRALIBS_EXIM=-L/usr/local/lib -lspf2
-
-This assumes that the libspf2 files are installed in
-their default locations.
-
-You can now run SPF checks in incoming SMTP by using the "spf"
-ACL condition in either the MAIL, RCPT or DATA ACLs. When
-using it in the RCPT ACL, you can make the checks dependent on
-the RCPT address (or domain), so you can check SPF records
-only for certain target domains. This gives you the
-possibility to opt-out certain customers that do not want
-their mail to be subject to SPF checking.
-
-The spf condition takes a list of strings on its right-hand
-side. These strings describe the outcome of the SPF check for
-which the spf condition should succeed. Valid strings are:
-
- o pass The SPF check passed, the sending host
- is positively verified by SPF.
- o fail The SPF check failed, the sending host
- is NOT allowed to send mail for the domain
- in the envelope-from address.
- o softfail The SPF check failed, but the queried
- domain can't absolutely confirm that this
- is a forgery.
- o none The queried domain does not publish SPF
- records.
- o neutral The SPF check returned a "neutral" state.
- This means the queried domain has published
- a SPF record, but wants to allow outside
- servers to send mail under its domain as well.
- This should be treated like "none".
- o permerror This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
- record of the queried domain. You may deny
- messages when this occurs. (Changed in 4.83)
- o temperror This indicates a temporary error during all
- processing, including Exim's SPF processing.
- You may defer messages when this occurs.
- (Changed in 4.83)
- o err_temp Same as permerror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
- removed in a future release.
- o err_perm Same as temperror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
- removed in a future release.
-
-You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert
-its meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
-"fail". The string list is evaluated left-to-right, in a
-short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of
-the SPF check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed
-strings matches the outcome of the SPF check, the condition
-fails.
-
-Here is an example to fail forgery attempts from domains that
-publish SPF records:
-
-/* -----------------
-deny message = $sender_host_address is not allowed to send mail from ${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address_domain}{$sender_helo_name}}. \
- Please see http://www.openspf.org/Why?scope=${if def:sender_address_domain {mfrom}{helo}};identity=${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address}{$sender_helo_name}};ip=$sender_host_address
- spf = fail
---------------------- */
-
-You can also give special treatment to specific domains:
-
-/* -----------------
-deny message = AOL sender, but not from AOL-approved relay.
- sender_domains = aol.com
- spf = fail:neutral
---------------------- */
-
-Explanation: AOL publishes SPF records, but is liberal and
-still allows non-approved relays to send mail from aol.com.
-This will result in a "neutral" state, while mail from genuine
-AOL servers will result in "pass". The example above takes
-this into account and treats "neutral" like "fail", but only
-for aol.com. Please note that this violates the SPF draft.
-
-When the spf condition has run, it sets up several expansion
-variables.
-
- $spf_header_comment
- This contains a human-readable string describing the outcome
- of the SPF check. You can add it to a custom header or use
- it for logging purposes.
-
- $spf_received
- This contains a complete Received-SPF: header that can be
- added to the message. Please note that according to the SPF
- draft, this header must be added at the top of the header
- list. Please see section 10 on how you can do this.
-
- Note: in case of "Best-guess" (see below), the convention is
- to put this string in a header called X-SPF-Guess: instead.
-
- $spf_result
- This contains the outcome of the SPF check in string form,
- one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, permerror or
- temperror.
-
- $spf_smtp_comment
- This contains a string that can be used in a SMTP response
- to the calling party. Useful for "fail".
-
-In addition to SPF, you can also perform checks for so-called
-"Best-guess". Strictly speaking, "Best-guess" is not standard
-SPF, but it is supported by the same framework that enables SPF
-capability. Refer to http://www.openspf.org/FAQ/Best_guess_record
-for a description of what it means.
-
-To access this feature, simply use the spf_guess condition in place
-of the spf one. For example:
-
-/* -----------------
-deny message = $sender_host_address doesn't look trustworthy to me
- spf_guess = fail
---------------------- */
-
-In case you decide to reject messages based on this check, you
-should note that although it uses the same framework, "Best-guess"
-is NOT SPF, and therefore you should not mention SPF at all in your
-reject message.
-
-When the spf_guess condition has run, it sets up the same expansion
-variables as when spf condition is run, described above.
-
-Additionally, since Best-guess is not standardized, you may redefine
-what "Best-guess" means to you by redefining spf_guess variable in
-global config. For example, the following:
-
-/* -----------------
-spf_guess = v=spf1 a/16 mx/16 ptr ?all
---------------------- */
-
-would relax host matching rules to a broader network range.
-
-
-A lookup expansion is also available. It takes an email
-address as the key and an IP address as the database:
-
- ${lookup {username@domain} spf {ip.ip.ip.ip}}
-
-The lookup will return the same result strings as they can appear in
-$spf_result (pass,fail,softfail,neutral,none,err_perm,err_temp).
-Currently, only IPv4 addresses are supported.
-
-
-
SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support
--------------------------------------------------------------
Use a reasonable IP. eg. one the sending cluster actually uses.
+
+
DMARC Support
--------------------------------------------------------------
are in /usr/local/lib.
1. To compile Exim with DMARC support, you must first enable SPF.
-Please read the above section on enabling the EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+Please read the Local/Makefile comments on enabling the SUPPORT_SPF
feature. You must also have DKIM support, so you cannot set the
DISABLE_DKIM feature. Once both of those conditions have been met
you can enable DMARC in Local/Makefile:
2. Use the following global settings to configure DMARC:
-Optional:
+Required:
dmarc_tld_file Defines the location of a text file of valid
top level domains the opendmarc library uses
during domain parsing. Maintained by Mozilla,
the most current version can be downloaded
from a link at http://publicsuffix.org/list/.
- If unset, "/etc/exim/opendmarc.tlds" (hardcoded)
- is used.
+ See also util/renew-opendmarc-tlds.sh script.
Optional:
dmarc_history_file Defines the location of a file to log results
directory of this file is writable by the user
exim runs as.
-dmarc_forensic_sender The email address to use when sending a
+dmarc_forensic_sender Alternate email address to use when sending a
forensic report detailing alignment failures
if a sender domain's dmarc record specifies it
and you have configured Exim to send them.
- Default: do-not-reply@$default_hostname
+
+ If set, this is expanded and used for the
+ From: header line; the address is extracted
+ from it and used for the envelope from.
+ If not set, the From: header is expanded from
+ the dsn_from option, and <> is used for the
+ envelope from.
+
+ Default: unset.
3. By default, the DMARC processing will run for any remote,
supports, including LDAP, Postgres, MySQL, etc, as long as the
result is a list of colon-separated strings.
+Performing the check sets up information used by the
+${authresults } expansion item.
+
Several expansion variables are set before the DATA ACL is
processed, and you can use them in this ACL. The following
expansion variables are available:
are "none", "reject" and "quarantine". It is blank when there
is any error, including no DMARC record.
- o $dmarc_ar_header
- This is the entire Authentication-Results header which you can
- add using an add_header modifier.
+A now-redundant variable $dmarc_ar_header has now been withdrawn.
+Use the ${authresults } expansion instead.
5. How to enable DMARC advanced operation:
warn dmarc_status = accept : none : off
!authenticated = *
log_message = DMARC DEBUG: $dmarc_status $dmarc_used_domain
- add_header = $dmarc_ar_header
warn dmarc_status = !accept
!authenticated = *
!authenticated = *
message = Message from $dmarc_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
-
-
-DANE
-------------------------------------------------------------
-DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied
-to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
-it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather
-than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
-operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection
-you make, and make another one to the server (so both
-you and the server still think you have an encrypted
-connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
-Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something
-which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
-certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the
-Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
-
-What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the
-trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
-that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the
-admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
-by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set
-of root CAs.
-
-It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that
-connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
-fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
-
-DANE scales better than having to maintain (and
-side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
-for every possible target server. It also scales
-(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
-client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also
-means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
-
-DANE requires a server operator to do three things:
-1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
-that DNS lookups they do for the server have not
-been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
-to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and
-any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
-DNSSEC.
-2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server
-certificate for a TLS connection should be.
-3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain,
-in TLS connections which is traceable to the one
-defined by (one of?) the TSLA records
-
-There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side
-operation of DANE.
-
-The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate
-usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies
-the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved
-is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted
-during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a
-single system, using a self-signed certificate.
- DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA
-to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
-well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just
-a self-signed certificate which is used to sign
-cerver certificates, but running one securely does
-require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used
-then either all clients must be primed with it, or
-(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit
-the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.
-If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it
-(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is
-reduced from all public CAs to that single CA.
-DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or
-servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
-all of which point to a single TLSA record.
-
-The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1)
-and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
-
-At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa
-is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like
-
- openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
- | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
- | openssl sha512 \
- | awk '{print $2}'
-
-are workable for 4th-field hashes.
-
-For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates
-must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
-
-The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing
-for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
-be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However,
-this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
-default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff
-DANE is in use, to:
-
- hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
- {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
- {*}{}}
-
-The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with
-numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
-The zero above means DANE was not in use,
-the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
-found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the
-string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
-control the OCSP request.
-
-This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if
-it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
-those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction
-with DANE in their OCSP settings.
-
-
-For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options,
-hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane.
-[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ]
-
-Hosts_require_dane will result in failure if the target host
-is not DNSSEC-secured.
-
-DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured
-MX, A and TLSA records.
-
-A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match
-and the host-lookup succeeded using dnssec.
-If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
-will be required for the host. If it does not, the host will not
-be used; there is no fallback to non-DANE or non-TLS.
-
-If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport
-options are ignored:
- hosts_require_tls
- tls_verify_hosts
- tls_try_verify_hosts
- tls_verify_certificates
- tls_crl
- tls_verify_cert_hostnames
-
-If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
-verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set
-appropriately.
-
-Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that)
-and dnssec_require_domains is ignored.
-
-If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item
-in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
-
-There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if
-verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
-in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable
-$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above).
-
-Under GnuTLS, DANE is only supported from versin 3.0.0 onwards
+ warn add_header = :at_start:${authresults {$primary_hostname}}
The spool files can then be processed by external processes and then
requeued into exim spool directories for final delivery.
+However, note carefully the warnings in the main documentation on
+qpool file formats.
The motivation/inspiration for the transport is to allow external
processes to access email queued by exim and have access to all the
The transport only takes one option:
* directory - This is used to specify the directory messages should be
-copied to
+copied to. Expanded.
The generic transport options (body_only, current_directory, disable_logging,
debug_print, delivery_date_add, envelope_to_add, event_action, group,
Experimental_QUEUEFILE in the line "Support for:".
+ARC support
+-----------
+Specification: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-11
+Note that this is not an RFC yet, so may change.
+
+ARC is intended to support the utility of SPF and DKIM in the presence of
+intermediaries in the transmission path - forwarders and mailinglists -
+by establishing a cryptographically-signed chain in headers.
+
+Normally one would only bother doing ARC-signing when functioning as
+an intermediary. One might do verify for local destinations.
+
+ARC uses the notion of a "ADministrative Management Domain" (ADMD).
+Described in RFC 5598 (section 2.3), this is essentially the set of
+mail-handling systems that the mail transits. A label should be chosen to
+identify the ADMD. Messages should be ARC-verified on entry to the ADMD,
+and ARC-signed on exit from it.
+
+
+Verification
+--
+An ACL condition is provided to perform the "verifier actions" detailed
+in section 6 of the above specification. It may be called from the DATA ACL
+and succeeds if the result matches any of a given list.
+It also records the highest ARC instance number (the chain size)
+and verification result for later use in creating an Authentication-Results:
+standard header.
+
+ verify = arc/<acceptable_list> none:fail:pass
+
+ add_header = :at_start:${authresults {<admd-identifier>}}
+
+ Note that it would be wise to strip incoming messages of A-R headers
+ that claim to be from our own <admd-identifier>.
+
+There are four new variables:
+
+ $arc_state One of pass, fail, none
+ $arc_state_reason (if fail, why)
+ $arc_domains colon-sep list of ARC chain domains, in chain order.
+ problematic elements may have empty list elements
+ $arc_oldest_pass lowest passing instance number of chain
+
+Example:
+ logwrite = oldest-p-ams: <${reduce {$lh_ARC-Authentication-Results:} \
+ {} \
+ {${if = {$arc_oldest_pass} \
+ {${extract {i}{${extract {1}{;}{$item}}}}} \
+ {$item} {$value}}} \
+ }>
+
+Receive log lines for an ARC pass will be tagged "ARC".
+
+
+Signing
+--
+arc_sign = <admd-identifier> : <selector> : <privkey> [ : <options> ]
+An option on the smtp transport, which constructs and prepends to the message
+an ARC set of headers. The textually-first Authentication-Results: header
+is used as a basis (you must have added one on entry to the ADMD).
+Expanded as a whole; if unset, empty or forced-failure then no signing is done.
+If it is set, all of the first three elements must be non-empty.
+
+The fourth element is optional, and if present consists of a comma-separated list
+of options. The options implemented are
+
+ timestamps Add a t= tag to the generated AMS and AS headers, with the
+ current time.
+ expire[=<val>] Add an x= tag to the generated AMS header, with an expiry time.
+ If the value <val> is an plain number it is used unchanged.
+ If it starts with a '+' then the following number is added
+ to the current time, as an offset in seconds.
+ If a value is not given it defaults to a one month offset.
+
+[As of writing, gmail insist that a t= tag on the AS is mandatory]
+
+Caveats:
+ * There must be an Authentication-Results header, presumably added by an ACL
+ while receiving the message, for the same ADMD, for arc_sign to succeed.
+ This requires careful coordination between inbound and outbound logic.
+
+ Only one A-R header is taken account of. This is a limitation versus
+ the ARC spec (which says that all A-R headers from within the ADMD must
+ be used).
+
+ * If passing a message to another system, such as a mailing-list manager
+ (MLM), between receipt and sending, be wary of manipulations to headers made
+ by the MLM.
+ + For instance, Mailman with REMOVE_DKIM_HEADERS==3 might improve
+ deliverability in a pre-ARC world, but that option also renames the
+ Authentication-Results header, which breaks signing.
+
+ * Even if you use multiple DKIM keys for different domains, the ARC concept
+ should try to stick to one ADMD, so pick a primary domain and use that for
+ AR headers and outbound signing.
+
+Signing is not compatible with cutthrough delivery; any (before expansion)
+value set for the option will result in cutthrough delivery not being
+used via the transport in question.
+
+
+
+
+REQUIRETLS support
+------------------
+Ref: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-03
+
+If compiled with EXPERIMENTAL_REQUIRETLS support is included for this
+feature, where a REQUIRETLS option is added to the MAIL command.
+The client may not retry in clear if the MAIL+REQUIRETLS fails (or was never
+offered), and the server accepts an obligation that any onward transmission
+by SMTP of the messages accepted will also use REQUIRETLS - or generate a
+fail DSN.
+
+The Exim implementation includes
+- a main-part option tls_advertise_requiretls; host list, default "*"
+- an observability variable $requiretls returning yes/no
+- an ACL "control = requiretls" modifier for setting the requirement
+- Log lines and Received: headers capitalise the S in the protocol
+ element: "P=esmtpS"
+
+Differences from spec:
+- we support upgrading the requirement for REQUIRETLS, including adding
+ it from cold, within an MTA. The spec only define the sourcing MUA
+ as being able to source the requirement, and makes no mention of upgrade.
+- No support is coded for the RequireTLS header (which can be used
+ to annul DANE and/or STS policiy). [this can _almost_ be done in
+ transport option expansions, but not quite: it requires tha DANE-present
+ but STARTTLS-failing targets fallback to cleartext, which current DANE
+ coding specifically blocks]
+
+Note that REQUIRETLS is only advertised once a TLS connection is achieved
+(in contrast to STARTTLS). If you want to check the advertising, do something
+like "swaks -s 127.0.0.1 -tls -q HELO".
+
+
--------------------------------------------------------------
End of file
--------------------------------------------------------------
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff