+.new
+.section "TLS Resumption" "SECTresumption"
+.cindex TLS resumption
+TLS Session Resumption for TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 connections can be used (defined
+in RFC 5077 for 1.2). The support for this requires GnuTLS 3.6.3 or OpenSSL 1.1.1
+(or later).
+
+Session resumption (this is the "stateless" variant) involves the server sending
+a "session ticket" to the client on one connection, which can be stored by the
+client and used for a later session. The ticket contains sufficient state for
+the server to reconstruct the TLS session, avoiding some expensive crypto
+calculation and (on TLS1.2) one full packet roundtrip time.
+
+.ilist
+Operational cost/benefit:
+
+ The extra data being transmitted costs a minor amount, and the client has
+ extra costs in storing and retrieving the data.
+
+ In the Exim/Gnutls implementation the extra cost on an initial connection
+ which is TLS1.2 over a loopback path is about 6ms on 2017-laptop class hardware.
+ The saved cost on a subsequent connection is about 4ms; three or more
+ connections become a net win. On longer network paths, two or more
+ connections will have an average lower startup time thanks to the one
+ saved packet roundtrip. TLS1.3 will save the crypto cpu costs but not any
+ packet roundtrips.
+
+.cindex "hints database" tls
+ Since a new hints DB is used on the TLS client,
+ the hints DB maintenance should be updated to additionally handle "tls".
+
+.next
+Security aspects:
+
+ The session ticket is encrypted, but is obviously an additional security
+ vulnarability surface. An attacker able to decrypt it would have access
+ all connections using the resumed session.
+ The session ticket encryption key is not committed to storage by the server
+ and is rotated regularly (OpenSSL: 1hr, and one previous key is used for
+ overlap; GnuTLS 6hr but does not specify any overlap).
+ Tickets have limited lifetime (2hr, and new ones issued after 1hr under
+ OpenSSL. GnuTLS 2hr, appears to not do overlap).
+
+ There is a question-mark over the security of the Diffie-Helman parameters
+ used for session negotiation.
+
+.next
+Observability:
+
+ The &%log_selector%& "tls_resumption" appends an asterisk to the tls_cipher "X="
+ element.
+
+ The variables &$tls_in_resumption$& and &$tls_out_resumption$&
+ have bits 0-4 indicating respectively
+ support built, client requested ticket, client offered session,
+ server issued ticket, resume used. A suitable decode list is provided
+ in the builtin macro _RESUME_DECODE for in &%listextract%& expansions.
+
+.next
+Control:
+
+The &%tls_resumption_hosts%& main option specifies a hostlist for which
+exim, operating as a server, will offer resumption to clients.
+Current best practice is to not offer the feature to MUA connection.
+Commonly this can be done like this:
+.code
+tls_resumption_hosts = ${if inlist {$received_port}{587:465} {:}{*}}
+.endd
+If the peer host matches the list after expansion then resumption
+is offered and/or accepted.
+
+The &%tls_resumption_hosts%& smtp transport option performs the
+equivalent function for operation as a client.
+If the peer host matches the list after expansion then resumption
+is attempted (if a stored session is available) or the information
+stored (if supplied by the peer).
+
+
+.next
+Issues:
+
+ In a resumed session:
+.ilist
+ The variables &$tls_{in,out}_cipher$& will have values different
+ to the original (under GnuTLS).
+.next
+ The variables &$tls_{in,out}_ocsp$& will be "not requested" or "no response",
+ and the &%hosts_require_ocsp%& smtp trasnport option will fail.
+. XXX need to do something with that hosts_require_ocsp
+.endlist
+
+.endlist
+.wen
+
+
+.section DANE "SECDANE"
+.cindex DANE
+DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
+it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
+operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection you make, and make another one to the server (so both
+you and the server still think you have an encrypted connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
+Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
+certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
+
+What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
+that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
+by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set of root CAs.
+
+It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
+fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
+
+DANE scales better than having to maintain (and side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
+for every possible target server. It also scales (slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
+client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
+
+DANE requires a server operator to do three things: 1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
+that DNS lookups they do for the server have not been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
+to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
+DNSSEC.
+2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server certificate for a TLS connection should be.
+3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain, in TLS connections which is is anchored by one of the TLSA records.
+
+There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side operation of DANE.
+Support for client-side operation of DANE can be included at compile time by defining SUPPORT_DANE=yes
+in &_Local/Makefile_&.
+If it has been included, the macro "_HAVE_DANE" will be defined.
+
+A TLSA record consist of 4 fields, the "Certificate Usage", the
+"Selector", the "Matching type", and the "Certificate Association Data".
+For a detailed description of the TLSA record see
+&url(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#page-5,RFC 7671).
+
+The TLSA record for the server may have "Certificate Usage" (1st) field of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3).
+These are the "Trust Anchor" and "End Entity" variants.
+The latter specifies the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved is that of the server
+(and if only DANE-EE is used then it should be the sole one transmitted during the TLS handshake);
+this is appropriate for a single system, using a self-signed certificate.
+DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
+well-known one.
+A private CA at simplest is just a self-signed certificate (with certain
+attributes) which is used to sign server certificates, but running one securely
+does require careful arrangement.
+With DANE-TA, as implemented in Exim and commonly in other MTAs,
+the server TLS handshake must transmit the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.
+DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
+all of which point to a single TLSA record.
+DANE-TA and DANE-EE can both be used together.
+
+Our recommendation is to use DANE with a certificate from a public CA,
+because this enables a variety of strategies for remote clients to verify
+your certificate.
+You can then publish information both via DANE and another technology,
+"MTA-STS", described below.
+
+When you use DANE-TA to publish trust anchor information, you ask entities
+outside your administrative control to trust the Certificate Authority for
+connections to you.
+If using a private CA then you should expect others to still apply the
+technical criteria they'd use for a public CA to your certificates.
+In particular, you should probably try to follow current best practices for CA
+operation around hash algorithms and key sizes.
+Do not expect other organizations to lower their security expectations just
+because a particular profile might be reasonable for your own internal use.
+
+When this text was last updated, this in practice means to avoid use of SHA-1
+and MD5; if using RSA to use key sizes of at least 2048 bits (and no larger
+than 4096, for interoperability); to use keyUsage fields correctly; to use
+random serial numbers.
+The list of requirements is subject to change as best practices evolve.
+If you're not already using a private CA, or it doesn't meet these
+requirements, then we encourage you to avoid all these issues and use a public
+CA such as &url(https://letsencrypt.org/,Let's Encrypt) instead.
+
+The TLSA record should have a "Selector" (2nd) field of SPKI(1) and
+a "Matching Type" (3rd) field of SHA2-512(2).
+
+For the "Certificate Authority Data" (4th) field, commands like
+
+.code
+ openssl x509 -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
+ | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
+ | openssl sha512 \
+ | awk '{print $2}'
+.endd
+
+are workable to create a hash of the certificate's public key.
+
+An example TLSA record for DANE-EE(3), SPKI(1), and SHA-512 (2) looks like
+
+.code
+ _25._tcp.mail.example.com. TLSA 3 1 2 8BA8A336E...
+.endd
+
+At the time of writing, &url(https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa)
+is useful for quickly generating TLSA records.
+
+
+For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
+
+The Certificate issued by the CA published in the DANE-TA model should be
+issued using a strong hash algorithm.
+Exim, and importantly various other MTAs sending to you, will not
+re-enable hash algorithms which have been disabled by default in TLS
+libraries.
+This means no MD5 and no SHA-1. SHA2-256 is the minimum for reliable
+interoperability (and probably the maximum too, in 2018).
+
+The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
+be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However, this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
+default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff DANE is in use, to:
+
+.code
+ hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
+ {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
+ {*}{}}
+.endd
+
+The (new) variable &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$& is a bitfield with numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
+The zero above means DANE was not in use, the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
+found. If the definition of &%hosts_request_ocsp%& includes the
+string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
+control the OCSP request.
+
+This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
+those who use &%hosts_require_ocsp%&, should consider the interaction with DANE in their OCSP settings.
+
+
+For client-side DANE there are three new smtp transport options, &%hosts_try_dane%&, &%hosts_require_dane%&
+and &%dane_require_tls_ciphers%&.
+The &"require"& variant will result in failure if the target host is not
+DNSSEC-secured. To get DNSSEC-secured hostname resolution, use
+the &%dnssec_request_domains%& router or transport option.
+
+DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured MX, A and TLSA records.
+
+A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match and the host-lookup succeeded using dnssec.
+If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
+will be required for the host. If it does not, the host will not
+be used; there is no fallback to non-DANE or non-TLS.
+
+If DANE is requested and usable, then the TLS cipher list configuration
+prefers to use the option &%dane_require_tls_ciphers%& and falls
+back to &%tls_require_ciphers%& only if that is unset.
+This lets you configure "decent crypto" for DANE and "better than nothing
+crypto" as the default. Note though that while GnuTLS lets the string control
+which versions of TLS/SSL will be negotiated, OpenSSL does not and you're
+limited to ciphersuite constraints.
+
+If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport options are ignored:
+.code
+ hosts_require_tls
+ tls_verify_hosts
+ tls_try_verify_hosts
+ tls_verify_certificates
+ tls_crl
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames
+.endd
+
+If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
+verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set appropriately.
+
+The router and transport option &%dnssec_request_domains%& must not be
+set to &"never"&, and &%dnssec_require_domains%& is ignored.
+
+If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
+
+There is a new variable &$tls_out_dane$& which will have "yes" if
+verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
+in combination with events; see &<<CHAPevents>>&),
+and a new variable &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$& (detailed above).
+
+.cindex DANE reporting
+An event (see &<<CHAPevents>>&) of type "dane:fail" will be raised on failures
+to achieve DANE-verified connection, if one was either requested and offered, or
+required. This is intended to support TLS-reporting as defined in
+&url(https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-smtp-tlsrpt-17).
+The &$event_data$& will be one of the Result Types defined in
+Section 4.3 of that document.
+
+Under GnuTLS, DANE is only supported from version 3.0.0 onwards.
+
+DANE is specified in published RFCs and decouples certificate authority trust
+selection from a "race to the bottom" of "you must trust everything for mail
+to get through". There is an alternative technology called MTA-STS, which
+instead publishes MX trust anchor information on an HTTPS website. At the
+time this text was last updated, MTA-STS was still a draft, not yet an RFC.
+Exim has no support for MTA-STS as a client, but Exim mail server operators
+can choose to publish information describing their TLS configuration using
+MTA-STS to let those clients who do use that protocol derive trust
+information.
+
+The MTA-STS design requires a certificate from a public Certificate Authority
+which is recognized by clients sending to you.
+That selection of which CAs are trusted by others is outside your control.
+
+The most interoperable course of action is probably to use
+&url(https://letsencrypt.org/,Let's Encrypt), with automated certificate
+renewal; to publish the anchor information in DNSSEC-secured DNS via TLSA
+records for DANE clients (such as Exim and Postfix) and to publish anchor
+information for MTA-STS as well. This is what is done for the &'exim.org'&
+domain itself (with caveats around occasionally broken MTA-STS because of
+incompatible specification changes prior to reaching RFC status).
+
+
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff