* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+/* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
+
/* This module provides the TLS (aka SSL) support for Exim using the OpenSSL
library. It is #included into the tls.c file when that library is used. The
code herein is based on a patch that was originally contributed by Steve
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+# include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+# include <danessl.h>
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
-#define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
-#define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+# define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
+# define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
-#define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \
+ && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
+# warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
+# define DISABLE_OCSP
#endif
/* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
/* Local static variables */
-static BOOL verify_callback_called = FALSE;
+static BOOL client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
+static BOOL server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
static const uschar *sid_ctx = US"exim";
-static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+/* We have three different contexts to care about.
+
+Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
+ As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
+ a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
+ from the SMTP Transport.
+
+Server:
+ There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
+ Given TLS SNI, we can be using different keys, certs and various other
+ configuration settings, because they're re-expanded with $tls_sni set. This
+ allows vhosting with TLS. This SNI is sent in the handshake.
+ A client might not send SNI, so we need a fallback, and an initial setup too.
+ So as a server, we start out using `server_ctx`.
+ If SNI is sent by the client, then we as server, mid-negotiation, try to clone
+ `server_sni` from `server_ctx` and then initialise settings by re-expanding
+ configuration.
+*/
+
+static SSL_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
+static SSL *client_ssl = NULL;
+static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
+
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
-static SSL_CTX *ctx_sni = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL;
#endif
-static SSL *ssl = NULL;
static char ssl_errstring[256];
static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
-static BOOL verify_optional = FALSE;
+static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
+static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
-static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
+static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
uschar *certificate;
uschar *privatekey;
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
- uschar *ocsp_file;
- uschar *ocsp_file_expanded;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *ocsp_response;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ BOOL is_server;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ uschar *file;
+ uschar *file_expanded;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
+ } server;
+ struct {
+ X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
+ BOOL verify_required;
+ } client;
+ } u_ocsp;
#endif
uschar *dhparam;
/* these are cached from first expand */
uschar *server_cipher_list;
/* only passed down to tls_error: */
host_item *host;
+ const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ uschar * event_action;
+#endif
} tls_ext_ctx_cb;
/* should figure out a cleanup of API to handle state preserved per
implementation, for various reasons, which can be void * in the APIs.
For now, we hack around it. */
-tls_ext_ctx_cb *static_cbinfo = NULL;
+tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
+tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
static int
-setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional);
+setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
+ int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) );
/* Callbacks */
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
static int tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
-static int tls_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
#endif
*/
static int
-tls_error(uschar *prefix, host_item *host, uschar *msg)
+tls_error(uschar * prefix, const host_item * host, uschar * msg)
{
-if (msg == NULL)
+if (!msg)
{
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
msg = (uschar *)ssl_errstring;
}
-if (host == NULL)
+if (host)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection (%s): %s",
+ host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+else
{
uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
conn_info += 5;
+ /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s): %s",
conn_info, prefix, msg);
return DEFER;
}
-else
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on connection to %s [%s] (%s): %s",
- host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
- return FAIL;
- }
}
+/* Extreme debug
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+void
+x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
+{
+STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
+int i;
+static uschar name[256];
+
+for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
+ {
+ X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
+ if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
+ {
+ X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
+ txt[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
+ debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
+ }
+ }
+}
+#endif
+*/
+
/*************************************************
* Callback for verification *
optional verification for this case is done when requesting SSL to verify, by
setting SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the non-optional case.
+May be called multiple times for different issues with a certificate, even
+for a given "depth" in the certificate chain.
+
Arguments:
state current yes/no state as 1/0
x509ctx certificate information.
+ client TRUE for client startup, FALSE for server startup
Returns: 1 if verified, 0 if not
*/
static int
-verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
+verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
+ tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
{
+X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
+int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
static uschar txt[256];
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+uschar * ev;
+uschar * yield;
+#endif
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509ctx->current_cert),
- CS txt, sizeof(txt));
+X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
+txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
if (state == 0)
{
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
- x509ctx->error_depth,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(x509ctx->error),
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ depth,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
txt);
- tls_certificate_verified = FALSE;
- verify_callback_called = TRUE;
- if (!verify_optional) return 0; /* reject */
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ {
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
"tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
- return 1; /* accept */
}
-if (x509ctx->error_depth != 0)
+else if (depth != 0)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d cert=%s\n",
- x509ctx->error_depth, txt);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, txt);
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
+ { /* client, wanting stapling */
+ /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
+ for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
+ cert))
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
+ if (ev)
+ {
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+ if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify denied by event-action: "
+ "depth=%d cert=%s: %s",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ depth, txt, yield);
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
+ "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ }
+ X509_free(tlsp->peercert);
+ tlsp->peercert = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
}
else
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s peer: %s\n",
- verify_callback_called? "" : " authenticated", txt);
- tls_peerdn = txt;
+ const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
+
+ tlsp->peerdn = txt;
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+
+ if ( tlsp == &tls_out
+ && ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
+ /* client, wanting hostname check */
+
+# if EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
+# endif
+# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0
+# endif
+ {
+ int sep = 0;
+ const uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
+ uschar * name;
+ int rc;
+ while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
+ if ((rc = X509_check_host(cert, name, 0,
+ X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
+ | X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS)))
+ {
+ if (rc < 0)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address);
+ name = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!name)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "[%s] SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ txt);
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
+ "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ }
+ }
+# else
+ if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "[%s] SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ txt);
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
+ "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ }
+# endif
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
+ if (ev)
+ if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", US"0")))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify denied by event-action: "
+ "depth=0 cert=%s: %s",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ txt, yield);
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
+ "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
+ *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
+ if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
+ *calledp = TRUE;
}
-if (!verify_callback_called) tls_certificate_verified = TRUE;
-verify_callback_called = TRUE;
+return 1; /* accept, at least for this level */
+}
-return 1; /* accept */
+static int
+verify_callback_client(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
+{
+return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_out, &client_verify_callback_called, &client_verify_optional);
}
+static int
+verify_callback_server(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
+{
+return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_in, &server_verify_callback_called, &server_verify_optional);
+}
+
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+
+/* This gets called *by* the dane library verify callback, which interposes
+itself.
+*/
+static int
+verify_callback_client_dane(int state, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx)
+{
+X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
+static uschar txt[256];
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
+uschar * yield;
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
+txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", txt);
+tls_out.peerdn = txt;
+tls_out.peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ if (client_static_cbinfo->event_action)
+ {
+ if ((yield = event_raise(client_static_cbinfo->event_action,
+ US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE verify denied by event-action: "
+ "depth=%d cert=%s: %s", depth, txt, yield);
+ tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ }
+ if (depth != 0)
+ {
+ X509_free(tls_out.peercert);
+ tls_out.peercert = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+if (state == 1)
+ tls_out.dane_verified =
+ tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
+return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
/*************************************************
*/
static BOOL
-init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, host_item *host)
+init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, const host_item *host)
{
BIO *bio;
DH *dh;
if (!expand_check(dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &dhexpanded))
return FALSE;
-if (dhexpanded == NULL || *dhexpanded == '\0')
- {
+if (!dhexpanded || !*dhexpanded)
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS std_dh_prime_default(), -1);
- }
else if (dhexpanded[0] == '/')
{
- bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r");
- if (bio == NULL)
+ if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r")))
{
tls_error(string_sprintf("could not read dhparams file %s", dhexpanded),
host, US strerror(errno));
return TRUE;
}
- pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded);
- if (!pem)
+ if (!(pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded)))
{
tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown standard DH prime \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
host, US strerror(errno));
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS pem, -1);
}
-dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-if (dh == NULL)
+if (!(dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
{
BIO_free(bio);
tls_error(string_sprintf("Could not read tls_dhparams \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/*************************************************
* Load OCSP information into state *
*************************************************/
-/* Called to load the OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
+/* Called to load the server OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
caller has determined this is needed. Checks validity. Debugs a message
if invalid.
*/
static void
-ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx,
- tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo,
- const uschar *expanded)
+ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
{
BIO *bio;
OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
unsigned long verify_flags;
int status, reason, i;
-cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
-if (cbinfo->ocsp_response)
+cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
+if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
{
- OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->ocsp_response);
- cbinfo->ocsp_response = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response);
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
}
-bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded, "rb");
+bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb");
if (!bio)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
- cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded);
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
return;
}
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
- return;
+ goto bad;
}
basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
- return;
+ goto bad;
}
store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
DEBUG(D_tls) {
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
- }
- return;
+ }
+ goto bad;
}
/* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
- return;
+ goto bad;
}
status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single_response, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
-/* how does this status differ from the one above? */
-if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
+if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid (take 2): %s (%d)\n",
- OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
- return;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response bad cert status: %s (%d) %s (%d)\n",
+ OCSP_cert_status_str(status), status,
+ OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason), reason);
+ goto bad;
}
if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
- return;
+ goto bad;
}
-cbinfo->ocsp_response = resp;
+supply_response:
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
+return;
+
+bad:
+ if (running_in_test_harness)
+ {
+ extern char ** environ;
+ uschar ** p;
+ for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
+ if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
+ goto supply_response;
+ }
+ }
+return;
}
-#endif
+#endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
* Expand key and cert file specs *
*************************************************/
-/* Called once during tls_init and possibly againt during TLS setup, for a
+/* Called once during tls_init and possibly again during TLS setup, for a
new context, if Server Name Indication was used and tls_sni was seen in
the certificate string.
if (cbinfo->certificate == NULL)
return OK;
-if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni"))
+if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
+ Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
+ Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
+ )
reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE;
if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded))
"SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", expanded), cbinfo->host, NULL);
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
-if (cbinfo->ocsp_file != NULL)
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file != NULL)
{
- if (!expand_check(cbinfo->ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded))
+ if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded))
return DEFER;
if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
- if (cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded &&
- (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->ocsp_file_expanded) == 0))
+ if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded &&
+ (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file value unchanged, using existing values.\n");
/* Make the extension value available for expansion */
store_pool = POOL_PERM;
-tls_sni = string_copy(US servername);
+tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername);
store_pool = old_pool;
if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
-ctx_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
-if (!ctx_sni)
+if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
{
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
/* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
already exists. Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */
-SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(ctx));
-SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx));
-SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx));
-SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(ctx));
-SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx_sni, tls_servername_cb);
-SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx_sni, cbinfo);
+SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(server_ctx));
+SSL_CTX_set_mode(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(server_ctx));
+SSL_CTX_set_options(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(server_ctx));
+SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(server_ctx));
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
-if (cbinfo->ocsp_file)
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
{
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx_sni, tls_stapling_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_sni, tls_server_stapling_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
}
#endif
-rc = setup_certs(ctx_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE);
+rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server);
if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
/* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
OCSP information. */
-rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx_sni, cbinfo);
+rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo);
if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-rc = init_dh(ctx_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL);
-if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+if (!init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL))
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
-SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx_sni);
+SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+
/*************************************************
* Callback to handle OCSP Stapling *
*************************************************/
*/
static int
-tls_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
{
const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
uschar *response_der;
int response_der_len;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.\n",
- cbinfo->ocsp_response ? "have" : "lack");
-if (!cbinfo->ocsp_response)
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.",
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
+
+tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
response_der = NULL;
-response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->ocsp_response, &response_der);
+response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response,
+ &response_der);
if (response_der_len <= 0)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(server_ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
+tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
-#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP */
+static void
+time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
+{
+BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
+BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+}
+
+static int
+tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = arg;
+const unsigned char * p;
+int len;
+OCSP_RESPONSE * rsp;
+OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
+int i;
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
+len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
+if(!p)
+ {
+ /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
+ if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required
+ && log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
+ return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ }
+
+if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, parse error");
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, error parsing response");
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error parsing response\n");
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* We'd check the nonce here if we'd put one in the request. */
+/* However that would defeat cacheability on the server so we don't. */
+
+/* This section of code reworked from OpenSSL apps source;
+ The OpenSSL Project retains copyright:
+ Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+*/
+ {
+ BIO * bp = NULL;
+ int status, reason;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
+
+ /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
+ /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
+
+ if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL,
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable");
+ BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
+
+ {
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
+
+ if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
+ "with multiple responses not handled");
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
+ status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
+ &thisupd, &nextupd);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
+ EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
+ OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
+ i = 1;
+ break;
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
+ reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
+ reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ out:
+ BIO_free(bp);
+ }
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+return i;
+}
+#endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
/*************************************************
* Initialize for TLS *
*************************************************/
-/* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization of
-the library.
+/* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization
+of the library. We allocate and return a context structure.
Arguments:
+ ctxp returned SSL context
host connected host, if client; NULL if server
dhparam DH parameter file
certificate certificate file
privatekey private key
+ ocsp_file file of stapling info (server); flag for require ocsp (client)
addr address if client; NULL if server (for some randomness)
+ cbp place to put allocated callback context
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-tls_init(host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
+tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
uschar *privatekey,
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
uschar *ocsp_file,
#endif
- address_item *addr)
+ address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp)
{
long init_options;
int rc;
BOOL okay;
-tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
+tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo;
cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
-cbinfo->ocsp_file = ocsp_file;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+if ((cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL))
+ {
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
+ }
+else
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
#endif
cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
+cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
cbinfo->host = host;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+cbinfo->event_action = NULL;
+#endif
SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
existing knob. */
-ctx = SSL_CTX_new((host == NULL)?
+*ctxp = SSL_CTX_new((host == NULL)?
SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method());
-if (ctx == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL);
+if (*ctxp == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL);
/* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
order to get the full complement of ciphers to work. It took me roughly a day
/* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
level. */
-SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, (void (*)())info_callback);
+SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
/* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
-(void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+(void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(*ctxp, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
/* Apply administrator-supplied work-arounds.
Historically we applied just one requested option,
if (init_options)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
- if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, init_options)))
+ if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctxp, init_options)))
return tls_error(string_sprintf(
"SSL_CTX_set_option(%#lx)", init_options), host, NULL);
}
/* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
-if (!init_dh(ctx, dhparam, host)) return DEFER;
+if (!init_dh(*ctxp, dhparam, host)) return DEFER;
/* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */
-rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx, cbinfo);
+rc = tls_expand_session_files(*ctxp, cbinfo);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
/* If we need to handle SNI, do so */
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
-if (host == NULL)
+if (host == NULL) /* server */
{
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
- /* We check ocsp_file, not ocsp_response, because we care about if
+# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
callback is invoked. */
- if (cbinfo->ocsp_file)
+ if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
{
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, tls_stapling_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, tls_server_stapling_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, cbinfo);
}
-#endif
+# endif
/* We always do this, so that $tls_sni is available even if not used in
tls_certificate */
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, tls_servername_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(*ctxp, tls_servername_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
}
+# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+else /* client */
+ if(ocsp_file) /* wanting stapling */
+ {
+ if (!(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = X509_STORE_new()))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(*ctxp, tls_client_stapling_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
+ }
+# endif
#endif
+cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
+
/* Set up the RSA callback */
-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, rsa_callback);
+SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctxp, rsa_callback);
/* Finally, set the timeout, and we are done */
-SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, ssl_session_timeout);
+SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctxp, ssl_session_timeout);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialized TLS\n");
-static_cbinfo = cbinfo;
+*cbp = cbinfo;
return OK;
}
* Get name of cipher in use *
*************************************************/
-/* The answer is left in a static buffer, and tls_cipher is set to point
-to it.
-
+/*
Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
+ buffer to use for answer
+ size of buffer
+ pointer to number of bits for cipher
Returns: nothing
*/
static void
-construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl)
+construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
{
-static uschar cipherbuf[256];
/* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-uschar *ver;
-
-switch (ssl->session->ssl_version)
- {
- case SSL2_VERSION:
- ver = US"SSLv2";
- break;
+const uschar *ver;
- case SSL3_VERSION:
- ver = US"SSLv3";
- break;
-
- case TLS1_VERSION:
- ver = US"TLSv1";
- break;
-
-#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
- case TLS1_1_VERSION:
- ver = US"TLSv1.1";
- break;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
- case TLS1_2_VERSION:
- ver = US"TLSv1.2";
- break;
-#endif
-
- default:
- ver = US"UNKNOWN";
- }
+ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
-SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, &tls_bits);
+SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
-string_format(cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), "%s:%s:%u", ver,
- SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), tls_bits);
-tls_cipher = cipherbuf;
+string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
}
host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
optional TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts;
otherwise passed as FALSE
+ cert_vfy_cb Callback function for certificate verification
Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
*/
static int
-setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional)
+setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
+ int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) )
{
uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
if (!expand_check(certs, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts))
return DEFER;
-if (expcerts != NULL)
+if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0')
{
- struct stat statbuf;
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
- return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
-
- if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
+ if (Ustrcmp(expcerts, "system") == 0)
{
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
- "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
- return DEFER;
+ /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
+ CA bundle, only */
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
+ return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
}
else
{
- uschar *file, *dir;
- if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
- { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
- else
- { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
+ struct stat statbuf;
- /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
- unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
- certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
- says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
+ /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
+ CA bundle. Those given by the exim config are additional to these */
- if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
- !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
- return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
+ return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
- if (file != NULL)
+ if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
{
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file));
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ uschar *file, *dir;
+ if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
+ { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
+ else
+ { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
+
+ /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
+ unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
+ certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
+ says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
+
+ if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
+ !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
+ return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
+
+ /* Load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for sending
+ to the client. This is only for the one-file tls_verify_certificates
+ variant.
+ If a list isn't loaded into the server, but
+ some verify locations are set, the server end appears to make
+ a wildcard reqest for client certs.
+ Meanwhile, the client library as deafult behaviour *ignores* the list
+ we send over the wire - see man SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.
+ Because of this, and that the dir variant is likely only used for
+ the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing.
+ */
+ if (file != NULL)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
+ sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
+ }
}
}
SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
- verify_callback);
+ cert_vfy_cb);
}
return OK;
int rc;
uschar *expciphers;
tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
+static uschar cipherbuf[256];
/* Check for previous activation */
-if (tls_active >= 0)
+if (tls_in.active >= 0)
{
tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"");
smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n");
/* Initialize the SSL library. If it fails, it will already have logged
the error. */
-rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
+rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
tls_ocsp_file,
#endif
- NULL);
+ NULL, &server_static_cbinfo);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
-cbinfo = static_cbinfo;
+cbinfo = server_static_cbinfo;
if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
return FAIL;
uschar *s = expciphers;
while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_ctx, CS expciphers))
return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL);
cbinfo->server_cipher_list = expciphers;
}
/* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
optional, set up appropriately. */
-tls_certificate_verified = FALSE;
-verify_callback_called = FALSE;
+tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+tls_in.dane_verified = FALSE;
+#endif
+server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
{
- rc = setup_certs(ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE);
+ rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
+ FALSE, verify_callback_server);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
- verify_optional = FALSE;
+ server_verify_optional = FALSE;
}
else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
{
- rc = setup_certs(ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, TRUE);
+ rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
+ TRUE, verify_callback_server);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
- verify_optional = TRUE;
+ server_verify_optional = TRUE;
}
/* Prepare for new connection */
-if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL);
+if ((server_ssl = SSL_new(server_ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL);
/* Warning: we used to SSL_clear(ssl) here, it was removed.
*
the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
-SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
-if (!tls_on_connect)
+SSL_set_session_id_context(server_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
+if (!tls_in.on_connect)
{
smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n");
fflush(smtp_out);
/* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
that the OpenSSL library doesn't. */
-SSL_set_wfd(ssl, fileno(smtp_out));
-SSL_set_rfd(ssl, fileno(smtp_in));
-SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+SSL_set_wfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_out));
+SSL_set_rfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_in));
+SSL_set_accept_state(server_ssl);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
-rc = SSL_accept(ssl);
+rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
alarm(0);
if (rc <= 0)
/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
and initialize things. */
-construct_cipher_name(ssl);
+construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
+tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
DEBUG(D_tls)
{
uschar buf[2048];
- if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
+ if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
}
+/* Record the certificate we presented */
+ {
+ X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(server_ssl);
+ tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
+ }
+/* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
+ Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
+ smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
+ Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
+ */
ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
-tls_active = fileno(smtp_out);
+tls_in.active = fileno(smtp_out);
return OK;
}
+static int
+tls_client_basic_ctx_init(SSL_CTX * ctx,
+ host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo
+ )
+{
+int rc;
+/* stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
+ set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts is not set. Check only
+ the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
+
+if ( ( !ob->tls_verify_hosts
+ && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
+ )
+ || (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+ )
+ client_verify_optional = FALSE;
+else if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+ client_verify_optional = TRUE;
+else
+ return OK;
+
+if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
+ ob->tls_crl, host, client_verify_optional, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
+ return rc;
+
+if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
+ {
+ cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = host->name;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
+ cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
+ }
+return OK;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+static int
+dane_tlsa_load(SSL * ssl, host_item * host, dns_answer * dnsa)
+{
+dns_record * rr;
+dns_scan dnss;
+const char * hostnames[2] = { CS host->name, NULL };
+int found = 0;
+
+if (DANESSL_init(ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
+ return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL);
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
+ rr;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
+ ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
+ {
+ uschar * p = rr->data;
+ uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
+ const char * mdname;
+
+ usage = *p++;
+
+ /* Only DANE-TA(2) and DANE-EE(3) are supported */
+ if (usage != 2 && usage != 3) continue;
+
+ selector = *p++;
+ mtype = *p++;
+
+ switch (mtype)
+ {
+ default: continue; /* Only match-types 0, 1, 2 are supported */
+ case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
+ case 1: mdname = "sha256"; break;
+ case 2: mdname = "sha512"; break;
+ }
+
+ found++;
+ switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(ssl, usage, selector, mdname, p, rr->size - 3))
+ {
+ default:
+ case 0: /* action not taken */
+ return tls_error(US"tlsa load", host, NULL);
+ case 1: break;
+ }
+
+ tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<<usage;
+ }
+
+if (found)
+ return OK;
+
+log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: No usable TLSA records");
+return DEFER;
+}
+#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
+
+
/*************************************************
* Start a TLS session in a client *
fd the fd of the connection
host connected host (for messages)
addr the first address
- dhparam DH parameter file
- certificate certificate file
- privatekey private key file
- sni TLS SNI to send to remote host
- verify_certs file for certificate verify
- crl file containing CRL
- require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers
- timeout startup timeout
+ tb transport (always smtp)
+ tlsa_dnsa tlsa lookup, if DANE, else null
Returns: OK on success
FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
*/
int
-tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr, uschar *dhparam,
- uschar *certificate, uschar *privatekey, uschar *sni,
- uschar *verify_certs, uschar *crl,
- uschar *require_ciphers, int timeout)
+tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
+ transport_instance *tb
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+ , dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa
+#endif
+ )
{
+smtp_transport_options_block * ob =
+ (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
static uschar txt[256];
-uschar *expciphers;
-X509* server_cert;
+uschar * expciphers;
+X509 * server_cert;
int rc;
+static uschar cipherbuf[256];
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
+BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
+#endif
-rc = tls_init(host, dhparam, certificate, privatekey,
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
- NULL,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+tls_out.tlsa_usage = 0;
#endif
- addr);
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ {
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+ if ( tlsa_dnsa
+ && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
+ && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
+ )
+ {
+ /* Unchanged from default. Use a safer one under DANE */
+ request_ocsp = TRUE;
+ ob->hosts_request_ocsp = US"${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} "
+ " {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } "
+ " {*}{}}";
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if ((require_ocsp =
+ verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
+ request_ocsp = TRUE;
+ else
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+ if (!request_ocsp)
+# endif
+ request_ocsp =
+ verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ }
+#endif
+
+rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
+ ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ (void *)(long)request_ocsp,
+#endif
+ addr, &client_static_cbinfo);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
-tls_certificate_verified = FALSE;
-verify_callback_called = FALSE;
+tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
+client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
-if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
+if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
+ &expciphers))
return FAIL;
/* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
uschar *s = expciphers;
while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(client_ctx, CS expciphers))
return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL);
}
-rc = setup_certs(ctx, verify_certs, crl, host, FALSE);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+ verify_callback_client_dane);
+
+ if (!DANESSL_library_init())
+ return tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL);
+ if (DANESSL_CTX_init(client_ctx) <= 0)
+ return tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL);
+ }
+else
+
+#endif
-if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL);
-SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
-SSL_set_fd(ssl, fd);
-SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob, client_static_cbinfo))
+ != OK)
+ return rc;
-if (sni)
+if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
+ return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL);
+SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
+SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
+SSL_set_connect_state(client_ssl);
+
+if (ob->tls_sni)
{
- if (!expand_check(sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_sni))
+ if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_out.sni))
return FAIL;
- if (!Ustrlen(tls_sni))
- tls_sni = NULL;
+ if (tls_out.sni == NULL)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
+ }
+ else if (!Ustrlen(tls_out.sni))
+ tls_out.sni = NULL;
else
{
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_sni);
- SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, tls_sni);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_out.sni);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client_ssl, tls_out.sni);
#else
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("OpenSSL at build-time lacked SNI support, ignoring \"%s\"\n",
- tls_sni);
+ tls_out.sni);
#endif
}
}
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
+ if ((rc = dane_tlsa_load(client_ssl, host, tlsa_dnsa)) != OK)
+ return rc;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+/* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
+does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+if (request_ocsp)
+ {
+ const uschar * s;
+ if ( ((s = ob->hosts_require_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
+ || ((s = ob->hosts_request_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
+ )
+ { /* Re-eval now $tls_out_tlsa_usage is populated. If
+ this means we avoid the OCSP request, we wasted the setup
+ cost in tls_init(). */
+ require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ request_ocsp = require_ocsp
+ || verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
+if (request_ocsp)
+ {
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+ client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb->event_action;
+#endif
+
/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
-alarm(timeout);
-rc = SSL_connect(ssl);
+alarm(ob->command_timeout);
+rc = SSL_connect(client_ssl);
alarm(0);
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
+ DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl);
+#endif
+
if (rc <= 0)
return tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
/* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
-server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (ssl);
+/*XXX server_cert is never freed... use X509_free() */
+server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (client_ssl);
if (server_cert)
{
- tls_peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
+ tls_out.peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
CS txt, sizeof(txt));
- tls_peerdn = txt;
+ txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
+ tls_out.peerdn = txt; /*XXX a static buffer... */
}
else
- tls_peerdn = NULL;
+ tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
-construct_cipher_name(ssl); /* Sets tls_cipher */
+construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
+tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
-tls_active = fd;
+/* Record the certificate we presented */
+ {
+ X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(client_ssl);
+ tls_out.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
+ }
+
+tls_out.active = fd;
return OK;
}
Arguments: none
Returns: the next character or EOF
+
+Only used by the server-side TLS.
*/
int
int error;
int inbytes;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
- inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
- error = SSL_get_error(ssl, inbytes);
+ inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
+ error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
alarm(0);
/* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
- SSL_free(ssl);
- ssl = NULL;
- tls_active = -1;
- tls_bits = 0;
- tls_cipher = NULL;
- tls_peerdn = NULL;
- tls_sni = NULL;
+ SSL_free(server_ssl);
+ server_ssl = NULL;
+ tls_in.active = -1;
+ tls_in.bits = 0;
+ tls_in.cipher = NULL;
+ tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
+ tls_in.sni = NULL;
return smtp_getc();
}
Returns: the number of bytes read
-1 after a failed read
+
+Only used by the client-side TLS.
*/
int
-tls_read(uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
{
+SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
int inbytes;
int error;
/*
Arguments:
+ is_server channel specifier
buff buffer of data
len number of bytes
Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
-1 after a failed write
+
+Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
*/
int
-tls_write(const uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len)
{
int outbytes;
int error;
int left = len;
+SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, %d)\n", buff, left);
while (left > 0)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
return -1;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
+ sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
+ strerror(errno));
+
default:
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
return -1;
Arguments: TRUE if SSL_shutdown is to be called
Returns: nothing
+
+Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
*/
void
-tls_close(BOOL shutdown)
+tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
{
-if (tls_active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
+SSL **sslp = is_server ? &server_ssl : &client_ssl;
+int *fdp = is_server ? &tls_in.active : &tls_out.active;
+
+if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
if (shutdown)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down SSL\n");
- SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+ SSL_shutdown(*sslp);
}
-SSL_free(ssl);
-ssl = NULL;
+SSL_free(*sslp);
+*sslp = NULL;
-tls_active = -1;
+*fdp = -1;
}
it can result in serious failures, including crashing with a SIGSEGV. So
report the version found by the compiler and the run-time version.
+Note: some OS vendors backport security fixes without changing the version
+number/string, and the version date remains unchanged. The _build_ date
+will change, so we can more usefully assist with version diagnosis by also
+reporting the build date.
+
Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to
Returns: nothing
*/
tls_version_report(FILE *f)
{
fprintf(f, "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
- " Runtime: %s\n",
+ " Runtime: %s\n"
+ " : %s\n",
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
+/* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
+the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
}
{
unsigned int r;
int i, needed_len;
+static pid_t pidlast = 0;
+pid_t pidnow;
uschar *p;
uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
if (max <= 1)
return 0;
+pidnow = getpid();
+if (pidnow != pidlast)
+ {
+ /* Although OpenSSL documents that "OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state
+ is unique for each thread", this doesn't apparently apply across processes,
+ so our own warning from vaguely_random_number_fallback() applies here too.
+ Fix per PostgreSQL. */
+ if (pidlast != 0)
+ RAND_cleanup();
+ pidlast = pidnow;
+ }
+
/* OpenSSL auto-seeds from /dev/random, etc, but this a double-check. */
if (!RAND_status())
{
to apply.
This list is current as of:
- ==> 1.0.1b <== */
+ ==> 1.0.1b <==
+Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
+*/
static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
/* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
{ US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
+ { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
{ US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
#endif
return TRUE;
}
+/* vi: aw ai sw=2
+*/
/* End of tls-openssl.c */
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff