* Author: Viktor Dukhovni
* License: THIS CODE IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
*
- * Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2014 - 2016
+ * Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2014 - 2019
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
# define X509_up_ref(x) CRYPTO_add(&((x)->references), 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509)
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+
+/* LibreSSL 2.9.0 and later - 2.9.0 has removed a number of macros ... */
+#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+# if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2090000fL
+# define EXIM_HAVE_ASN1_MACROS
+# endif
+#endif
+/* OpenSSL */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
# define EXIM_HAVE_ASN1_MACROS
# define EXIM_OPAQUE_X509
+/* Older OpenSSL and all LibreSSL */
#else
# define X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(ctx) (ctx)->verify
# define X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(ctx) (ctx)->verify_cb
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
#define DANESSL_F_PLACEHOLDER 0 /* FIRST! Value TBD */
static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = {
+ /* error string */
{DANESSL_F_PLACEHOLDER, "DANE library"}, /* FIRST!!! */
{DANESSL_F_ADD_SKID, "add_skid"},
{DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, "DANESSL_add_tlsa"},
{0, NULL}
};
static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = {
+ /* error string */
{DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT, "Bad TLSA record certificate"},
{DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record certificate public key"},
{DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH, "Bad TLSA record digest length"},
};
#endif
-#define DANEerr(f, r) ERR_PUT_error(err_lib_dane, (f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+#define DANEerr(f, r) ERR_PUT_error(err_lib_dane, (f), (r), __FUNCTION__, __LINE__)
static int err_lib_dane = -1;
static int dane_idx = -1;
*/
for (matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next)
{
- dane_mtype_list m;
unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
unsigned char *buf2;
{
case DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT:
len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL);
- buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ buf2 = buf = US OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if(buf) i2d_X509(cert, &buf2);
break;
case DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI:
len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL);
- buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ buf2 = buf = US OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if(buf) i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf2);
break;
}
/*
* Loop over each mtype and data element
*/
- for (m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next)
+ for (dane_mtype_list m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next)
{
- dane_data_list d;
unsigned char *cmpbuf = buf;
unsigned int cmplen = len;
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0))
matched = -1;
}
- for (d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next)
+ for (dane_data_list d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next)
if ( cmplen == d->value->datalen
&& memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0)
matched = slist->value->selector + 1;
{
if (akid && akid->issuer)
{
- int i;
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i)
+ for (int i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i)
{
GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
}
static int
-set_issuer_name(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+set_issuer_name(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509_NAME *subj)
{
X509_NAME *name = akid_issuer_name(akid);
/*
- * If subject's akid specifies an authority key identifer issuer name, we
+ * If subject's akid specifies an authority key identifier issuer name, we
* must use that.
*/
return X509_set_issuer_name(cert,
- name ? name : X509_get_subject_name(cert));
+ name ? name : subj);
}
static int
*/
if ( !X509_set_version(cert, 2)
|| !set_serial(cert, akid, subject)
- || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid)
+ || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid, name)
|| !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L)
|| !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L)
|| !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name)
/*
* If the TA certificate is self-issued, or need not be, use it directly.
- * Otherwise, synthesize requisuite ancestors.
+ * Otherwise, synthesize requisite ancestors.
*/
if ( !wrap_to_root
|| X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK)
static int
ta_signed(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert, int depth)
{
-dane_cert_list x;
-dane_pkey_list k;
EVP_PKEY *pk;
int done = 0;
* first (name comparisons), before we bother with signature checks
* (public key operations).
*/
-for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next)
+for (dane_cert_list x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next)
{
if (X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK)
{
* This may push errors onto the stack when the certificate signature is
* not of the right type or length, throw these away,
*/
-for (k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next)
+for (dane_pkey_list k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next)
if (X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0)
done = wrap_issuer(dane, k->value, cert, depth, WRAP_MID) ? 1 : -1;
else
set_trust_anchor(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert)
{
int matched = 0;
-int n;
-int i;
int depth = 0;
EVP_PKEY *takey;
X509 *ca;
*
* Caller ensures that the initial certificate is not self-signed.
*/
-for (n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth)
+for (int n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth)
{
+ int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
if (X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK)
break;
{
if (grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca))
{
- if (!X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK)
+ if (X509_check_issued(ca, ca) != X509_V_OK)
{
/* Restart with issuer as subject */
cert = ca;
match_name(const char *certid, ssl_dane *dane)
{
int multi = dane->multi;
-dane_host_list hosts;
-for (hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next)
+for (dane_host_list hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next)
{
int match_subdomain = 0;
const char *domain = hosts->value;
return 0;
if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
return 0;
-return check_name((const char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5),
+return check_name(CCS ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5),
ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5));
}
if ((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0)
return 0;
-if (len <= 0 || check_name((char *) namebuf, len) == 0)
+if (len <= 0 || check_name(CS namebuf, len) == 0)
{
OPENSSL_free(namebuf);
return 0;
}
-return (char *) namebuf;
+return CS namebuf;
}
static int
if (gens)
{
int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens);
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
+ for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i)
{
const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
const char *certid;
}
}
- if (dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA])
+if (dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA])
+ {
+ if ((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0)
{
- if ((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0)
- {
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM);
- return -1;
- }
- if (matched)
- {
- /*
- * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected
- * structure member at the expected offset.
- */
- X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain);
- OPENSSL_assert(dane->chain == X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(ctx));
- }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (matched)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected
+ * structure member at the expected offset.
+ */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain);
+ OPENSSL_assert(dane->chain == X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(ctx));
}
+ }
- /*
- * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until
- * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain()
- * wrapper.
- */
- dane->verify = X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(ctx);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_chain);
+/*
+ * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until
+ * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain()
+ * wrapper.
+ */
+dane->verify = X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(ctx);
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_chain);
- if (X509_verify_cert(ctx))
- return 1;
+if (X509_verify_cert(ctx))
+ return 1;
- /*
- * If the chain is invalid, clear any matching cert or hostname, to
- * protect callers that might erroneously rely on these alone without
- * checking the validation status.
- */
- if (dane->match)
- {
- X509_free(dane->match);
- dane->match = 0;
- }
- if (dane->mhost)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost);
- dane->mhost = 0;
- }
- return 0;
+/*
+ * If the chain is invalid, clear any matching cert or hostname, to
+ * protect callers that might erroneously rely on these alone without
+ * checking the validation status.
+ */
+if (dane->match)
+ {
+ X509_free(dane->match);
+ dane->match = 0;
+ }
+if (dane->mhost)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost);
+ dane->mhost = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
static dane_list
static void
list_free(void *list, void (*f)(void *))
{
-dane_list head;
dane_list next;
-for (head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next)
+for (dane_list head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next)
{
next = head->next;
if (f && head->value)
DANESSL_cleanup(SSL *ssl)
{
ssl_dane *dane;
-int u;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane lib-cleanup\n");
dane_reset(dane);
if (dane->hosts)
list_free(dane->hosts, ossl_free);
-for (u = 0; u <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++u)
+for (int u = 0; u <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++u)
if (dane->selectors[u])
list_free(dane->selectors[u], dane_selector_free);
if (dane->pkeys)
return 0;
}
- /* Support built-in standard one-digit mtypes */
- if (mdname && *mdname && mdname[1] == '\0')
- switch (*mdname - '0')
- {
- case DANESSL_MATCHING_FULL: mdname = 0; break;
- case DANESSL_MATCHING_2256: mdname = "sha256"; break;
- case DANESSL_MATCHING_2512: mdname = "sha512"; break;
- }
- if (mdname && *mdname && (md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname)) == 0)
- {
- DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- if (mdname && *mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md))
- {
- DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!data)
- {
- DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
+/* Support built-in standard one-digit mtypes */
+if (mdname && *mdname && mdname[1] == '\0')
+ switch (*mdname - '0')
+ {
+ case DANESSL_MATCHING_FULL: mdname = 0; break;
+ case DANESSL_MATCHING_2256: mdname = "sha256"; break;
+ case DANESSL_MATCHING_2512: mdname = "sha512"; break;
+ }
+if (mdname && *mdname && !(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname)))
+ {
+ DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+if (mdname && *mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md))
+ {
+ DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+if (!data)
+ {
+ DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
- /*
- * Full Certificate or Public Key when NULL or empty digest name
- */
- if (!mdname || !*mdname)
- {
- X509 *x = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *k = 0;
- const unsigned char *p = data;
+/*
+ * Full Certificate or Public Key when NULL or empty digest name
+ */
+if (!mdname || !*mdname)
+ {
+ X509 *x = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *k = 0;
+ const unsigned char *p = data;
#define xklistinit(lvar, ltype, var, freeFunc) do { \
(lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \
DANESSL_init(SSL *ssl, const char *sni_domain, const char **hostnames)
{
ssl_dane *dane;
-int i;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ssl_init\n");
if (dane_idx < 0)
dane->count = 0;
dane->hosts = 0;
-for (i = 0; i <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++i)
+for (int i = 0; i <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++i)
dane->selectors[i] = 0;
if (hostnames && (dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames)) == 0)
}
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
static void
run_once(volatile int * once, void (*init)(void))
{
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff