liable to incompatible change.
-PRDR support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-Per-Recipient Data Reponse is an SMTP extension proposed by Eric Hall
-in a (now-expired) IETF draft from 2007. It's not hit mainstream
-use, but has apparently been implemented in the META1 MTA.
-
-There is mention at http://mail.aegee.org/intern/sendmail.html
-of a patch to sendmail "to make it PRDR capable".
-
- ref: http://www.eric-a-hall.com/specs/draft-hall-prdr-00.txt
-
-If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_PRDR there is a new config
-boolean "prdr_enable" which controls whether PRDR is advertised
-as part of an EHLO response, a new "acl_data_smtp_prdr" ACL
-(called for each recipient, after data arrives but before the
-data ACL), and a new smtp transport option "hosts_try_prdr".
-
-PRDR may be used to support per-user content filtering. Without it
-one must defer any recipient after the first that has a different
-content-filter configuration. With PRDR, the RCPT-time check
-for this can be disabled when the MAIL-time $smtp_command included
-"PRDR". Any required difference in behaviour of the main DATA-time
-ACL should however depend on the PRDR-time ACL having run, as Exim
-will avoid doing so in some situations (eg. single-recipient mails).
-
-
-
-OCSP Stapling support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-X.509 PKI certificates expire and can be revoked; to handle this, the
-clients need some way to determine if a particular certificate, from a
-particular Certificate Authority (CA), is still valid. There are three
-main ways to do so.
-
-The simplest way is to serve up a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) with
-an ordinary web-server, regenerating the CRL before it expires. The
-downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially
-huge file from every certificate authority it knows of.
-
-The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
-Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
-against an OCSP server run by the CA. This lets the CA track all
-usage of the certs. This requires running software with access to the
-private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries. OCSP
-is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
-
-The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
-comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
-connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
-re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
-
-The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
-issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
-the OCSP server, then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
-negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
-CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
-resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
-starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
-proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
-
-If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and it was built with OpenSSL,
-then it gains a new global option: "tls_ocsp_file".
-
-The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
-an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
-option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the tls_certificate option
-contains $tls_sni, as per other TLS options.
-
-Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
-proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
-Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
-contents are always valid. Exim will expand the "tls_ocsp_file" option
-on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
-next connection.
-
-Exim will check for a valid next update timestamp in the OCSP proof;
-if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be ignored.
-
-Also, given EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and OpenSSL, the smtp transport gains
-a "hosts_require_ocsp" option; a host-list for which an OCSP Stapling
-is requested and required for the connection to proceed. The host(s)
-should also be in "hosts_require_tls", and "tls_verify_certificates"
-configured for the transport.
-
-For the client to be able to verify the stapled OCSP the server must
-also supply, in its stapled information, any intermediate
-certificates for the chain leading to the OCSP proof from the signer
-of the server certificate. There may be zero or one such. These
-intermediate certificates should be added to the server OCSP stapling
-file (named by tls_ocsp_file).
-
-At this point in time, we're gathering feedback on use, to determine if
-it's worth adding complexity to the Exim daemon to periodically re-fetch
-OCSP files and somehow handling multiple files.
-
- A helper script "ocsp_fetch.pl" for fetching a proof from a CA
- OCSP server is supplied. The server URL may be included in the
- server certificate, if the CA is helpful.
-
- One fail mode seen was the OCSP Signer cert expiring before the end
- of vailidity of the OCSP proof. The checking done by Exim/OpenSSL
- noted this as invalid overall, but the re-fetch script did not.
-
-
-
-
-Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) suppport
+Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) support
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brightmail AntiSpam is a commercial package. Please see
1) Adding support for BMI at compile time
To compile with BMI support, you need to link Exim against
- the Brighmail client SDK, consisting of a library
+ the Brightmail client SDK, consisting of a library
(libbmiclient_single.so) and a header file (bmi_api.h).
You'll also need to explicitly set a flag in the Makefile to
include BMI support in the Exim binary. Both can be achieved
-Sender Policy Framework (SPF) support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-To learn more about SPF, visit http://www.openspf.org. This
-document does not explain the SPF fundamentals, you should
-read and understand the implications of deploying SPF on your
-system before doing so.
-
-SPF support is added via the libspf2 library. Visit
-
- http://www.libspf2.org/
-
-to obtain a copy, then compile and install it. By default,
-this will put headers in /usr/local/include and the static
-library in /usr/local/lib.
-
-To compile Exim with SPF support, set these additional flags in
-Local/Makefile:
-
-EXPERIMENTAL_SPF=yes
-CFLAGS=-DSPF -I/usr/local/include
-EXTRALIBS_EXIM=-L/usr/local/lib -lspf2
-
-This assumes that the libspf2 files are installed in
-their default locations.
-
-You can now run SPF checks in incoming SMTP by using the "spf"
-ACL condition in either the MAIL, RCPT or DATA ACLs. When
-using it in the RCPT ACL, you can make the checks dependent on
-the RCPT address (or domain), so you can check SPF records
-only for certain target domains. This gives you the
-possibility to opt-out certain customers that do not want
-their mail to be subject to SPF checking.
-
-The spf condition takes a list of strings on its right-hand
-side. These strings describe the outcome of the SPF check for
-which the spf condition should succeed. Valid strings are:
-
- o pass The SPF check passed, the sending host
- is positively verified by SPF.
- o fail The SPF check failed, the sending host
- is NOT allowed to send mail for the domain
- in the envelope-from address.
- o softfail The SPF check failed, but the queried
- domain can't absolutely confirm that this
- is a forgery.
- o none The queried domain does not publish SPF
- records.
- o neutral The SPF check returned a "neutral" state.
- This means the queried domain has published
- a SPF record, but wants to allow outside
- servers to send mail under its domain as well.
- o err_perm This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
- record of the queried domain. This should be
- treated like "none".
- o err_temp This indicates a temporary error during all
- processing, including Exim's SPF processing.
- You may defer messages when this occurs.
-
-You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert
-is meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
-"fail". The string list is evaluated left-to-right, in a
-short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of
-the SPF check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed
-strings matches the outcome of the SPF check, the condition
-fails.
-
-Here is an example to fail forgery attempts from domains that
-publish SPF records:
-
-/* -----------------
-deny message = $sender_host_address is not allowed to send mail from ${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address_domain}{$sender_helo_name}}. \
- Please see http://www.openspf.org/Why?scope=${if def:sender_address_domain {mfrom}{helo}};identity=${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address}{$sender_helo_name}};ip=$sender_host_address
- spf = fail
---------------------- */
-
-You can also give special treatment to specific domains:
-
-/* -----------------
-deny message = AOL sender, but not from AOL-approved relay.
- sender_domains = aol.com
- spf = fail:neutral
---------------------- */
-
-Explanation: AOL publishes SPF records, but is liberal and
-still allows non-approved relays to send mail from aol.com.
-This will result in a "neutral" state, while mail from genuine
-AOL servers will result in "pass". The example above takes
-this into account and treats "neutral" like "fail", but only
-for aol.com. Please note that this violates the SPF draft.
-
-When the spf condition has run, it sets up several expansion
-variables.
-
- $spf_header_comment
- This contains a human-readable string describing the outcome
- of the SPF check. You can add it to a custom header or use
- it for logging purposes.
-
- $spf_received
- This contains a complete Received-SPF: header that can be
- added to the message. Please note that according to the SPF
- draft, this header must be added at the top of the header
- list. Please see section 10 on how you can do this.
-
- Note: in case of "Best-guess" (see below), the convention is
- to put this string in a header called X-SPF-Guess: instead.
-
- $spf_result
- This contains the outcome of the SPF check in string form,
- one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, err_perm or
- err_temp.
-
- $spf_smtp_comment
- This contains a string that can be used in a SMTP response
- to the calling party. Useful for "fail".
-
-In addition to SPF, you can also perform checks for so-called
-"Best-guess". Strictly speaking, "Best-guess" is not standard
-SPF, but it is supported by the same framework that enables SPF
-capability. Refer to http://www.openspf.org/FAQ/Best_guess_record
-for a description of what it means.
-
-To access this feature, simply use the spf_guess condition in place
-of the spf one. For example:
-
-/* -----------------
-deny message = $sender_host_address doesn't look trustworthy to me
- spf_guess = fail
---------------------- */
-
-In case you decide to reject messages based on this check, you
-should note that although it uses the same framework, "Best-guess"
-is NOT SPF, and therefore you should not mention SPF at all in your
-reject message.
-
-When the spf_guess condition has run, it sets up the same expansion
-variables as when spf condition is run, described above.
-
-Additionally, since Best-guess is not standardized, you may redefine
-what "Best-guess" means to you by redefining spf_guess variable in
-global config. For example, the following:
-
-/* -----------------
-spf_guess = v=spf1 a/16 mx/16 ptr ?all
---------------------- */
-
-would relax host matching rules to a broader network range.
-
-
SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support
--------------------------------------------------------------
Exiscan currently includes SRS support via Miles Wilton's
libsrs_alt library. The current version of the supported
-library is 0.5.
+library is 0.5, there are reports of 1.0 working.
In order to use SRS, you must get a copy of libsrs_alt from
-http://srs.mirtol.com/
+https://opsec.eu/src/srs/
+
+(not the original source, which has disappeared.)
Unpack the tarball, then refer to MTAs/README.EXIM
to proceed. You need to set
in your Local/Makefile.
+
DCC Support
--------------------------------------------------------------
+Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse; http://www.rhyolite.com/dcc/
*) Building exim
mout-xforward.gmx.net 82.165.159.12
mout.gmx.net 212.227.15.16
-Use a reasonable IP. eg. one the sending cluster acutally uses.
+Use a reasonable IP. eg. one the sending cluster actually uses.
+
+
DMARC Support
--------------------------------------------------------------
are in /usr/local/lib.
1. To compile Exim with DMARC support, you must first enable SPF.
-Please read the above section on enabling the EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+Please read the Local/Makefile comments on enabling the SUPPORT_SPF
feature. You must also have DKIM support, so you cannot set the
DISABLE_DKIM feature. Once both of those conditions have been met
you can enable DMARC in Local/Makefile:
2. Use the following global settings to configure DMARC:
-Required:
+Optional:
dmarc_tld_file Defines the location of a text file of valid
top level domains the opendmarc library uses
during domain parsing. Maintained by Mozilla,
the most current version can be downloaded
from a link at http://publicsuffix.org/list/.
+ If unset, "/etc/exim/opendmarc.tlds" (hardcoded)
+ is used.
Optional:
dmarc_history_file Defines the location of a file to log results
configure a dmarc_forensic_sender because the default sender address
construction might be inadequate.
- control = dmarc_forensic_enable
+ control = dmarc_enable_forensic
(AGAIN: You can choose not to send these forensic reports by simply
-not putting the dmarc_forensic_enable control line at any point in
+not putting the dmarc_enable_forensic control line at any point in
your exim config. If you don't tell it to send them, it will not
send them.)
rejecting the email.
o quarantine The DMARC check failed and the library recommends
keeping it for further inspection.
+ o none The DMARC check passed and the library recommends
+ no specific action, neutral.
o norecord No policy section in the DMARC record for this
sender domain.
o nofrom Unable to determine the domain of the sender.
- o none There is no DMARC record for this sender domain.
- o error Library error or dns error.
+ o temperror Library error or dns error.
+ o off The DMARC check was disabled for this email.
You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert its
meaning, for example "!accept" will match all results but
Of course, you can also use any other lookup method that Exim
supports, including LDAP, Postgres, MySQL, etc, as long as the
-result is a list of colon-separated strings;
+result is a list of colon-separated strings.
Several expansion variables are set before the DATA ACL is
processed, and you can use them in this ACL. The following
o $dmarc_status
This is a one word status indicating what the DMARC library
- thinks of the email.
+ thinks of the email. It is a combination of the results of
+ DMARC record lookup and the SPF/DKIM/DMARC processing results
+ (if a DMARC record was found). The actual policy declared
+ in the DMARC record is in a separate expansion variable.
o $dmarc_status_text
This is a slightly longer, human readable status.
This is the domain which DMARC used to look up the DMARC
policy record.
+ o $dmarc_domain_policy
+ This is the policy declared in the DMARC record. Valid values
+ are "none", "reject" and "quarantine". It is blank when there
+ is any error, including no DMARC record.
+
o $dmarc_ar_header
This is the entire Authentication-Results header which you can
add using an add_header modifier.
warn !domains = +screwed_up_dmarc_records
control = dmarc_enable_forensic
+ warn condition = (lookup if destined to mailing list)
+ set acl_m_mailing_list = 1
+
(DATA ACL)
warn dmarc_status = accept : none : off
!authenticated = *
set $acl_m_quarantine = 1
# Do something in a transport with this flag variable
+ deny condition = ${if eq{$dmarc_domain_policy}{reject}}
+ condition = ${if eq{$acl_m_mailing_list}{1}}
+ message = Messages from $dmarc_used_domain break mailing lists
+
deny dmarc_status = reject
!authenticated = *
- message = Message from $domain_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
+ message = Message from $dmarc_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
+
+
+
+DANE
+------------------------------------------------------------
+DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied
+to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
+it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather
+than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
+operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection
+you make, and make another one to the server (so both
+you and the server still think you have an encrypted
+connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
+Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something
+which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
+certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the
+Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
+
+What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the
+trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
+that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the
+admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
+by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set
+of root CAs.
+
+It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that
+connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
+fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
+
+DANE scales better than having to maintain (and
+side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
+for every possible target server. It also scales
+(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
+client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also
+means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
+
+DANE requires a server operator to do three things:
+1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
+that DNS lookups they do for the server have not
+been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
+to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and
+any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
+DNSSEC.
+2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server
+certificate for a TLS connection should be.
+3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain,
+in TLS connections which is traceable to the one
+defined by (one of?) the TSLA records
+
+There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side
+operation of DANE.
+
+The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate
+usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies
+the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved
+is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted
+during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a
+single system, using a self-signed certificate.
+ DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA
+to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
+well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just
+a self-signed certificate which is used to sign
+cerver certificates, but running one securely does
+require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used
+then either all clients must be primed with it, or
+(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit
+the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.
+If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it
+(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is
+reduced from all public CAs to that single CA.
+DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or
+servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
+all of which point to a single TLSA record.
+
+The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1)
+and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
+
+At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa
+is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like
+
+ openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
+ | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
+ | openssl sha512 \
+ | awk '{print $2}'
+
+are workable for 4th-field hashes.
+
+For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates
+must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
+
+The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing
+for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
+be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However,
+this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
+default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff
+DANE is in use, to:
+
+ hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
+ {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
+ {*}{}}
+
+The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with
+numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
+The zero above means DANE was not in use,
+the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
+found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the
+string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
+control the OCSP request.
+
+This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if
+it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
+those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction
+with DANE in their OCSP settings.
+
+
+For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options,
+hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane.
+[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ]
+
+Hosts_require_dane will result in failure if the target host
+is not DNSSEC-secured.
+
+DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured
+MX, A and TLSA records.
+
+A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match
+and the host-lookup succeeded using dnssec.
+If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
+will be required for the host. If it does not, the host will not
+be used; there is no fallback to non-DANE or non-TLS.
+
+If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport
+options are ignored:
+ hosts_require_tls
+ tls_verify_hosts
+ tls_try_verify_hosts
+ tls_verify_certificates
+ tls_crl
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames
+
+If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
+verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set
+appropriately.
+
+Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that)
+and dnssec_require_domains is ignored.
+
+If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item
+in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
+
+There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if
+verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
+in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable
+$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above).
+
+Under GnuTLS, DANE is only supported from versin 3.0.0 onwards
+
+
+
+DSN extra information
+---------------------
+If compiled with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO extra information will be added
+to DSN fail messages ("bounces"), when available. The intent is to aid
+tracing of specific failing messages, when presented with a "bounce"
+complaint and needing to search logs.
+
+
+The remote MTA IP address, with port number if nonstandard.
+Example:
+ Remote-MTA: X-ip; [127.0.0.1]:587
+Rationale:
+ Several addresses may correspond to the (already available)
+ dns name for the remote MTA.
+
+The remote MTA connect-time greeting.
+Example:
+ X-Remote-MTA-smtp-greeting: X-str; 220 the.local.host.name ESMTP Exim x.yz Tue, 2 Mar 1999 09:44:33 +0000
+Rationale:
+ This string sometimes presents the remote MTA's idea of its
+ own name, and sometimes identifies the MTA software.
+
+The remote MTA response to HELO or EHLO.
+Example:
+ X-Remote-MTA-helo-response: X-str; 250-the.local.host.name Hello localhost [127.0.0.1]
+Limitations:
+ Only the first line of a multiline response is recorded.
+Rationale:
+ This string sometimes presents the remote MTA's view of
+ the peer IP connecting to it.
+
+The reporting MTA detailed diagnostic.
+Example:
+ X-Exim-Diagnostic: X-str; SMTP error from remote mail server after RCPT TO:<d3@myhost.test.ex>: 550 hard error
+Rationale:
+ This string sometimes give extra information over the
+ existing (already available) Diagnostic-Code field.
+
+
+Note that non-RFC-documented field names and data types are used.
+
+
+LMDB Lookup support
+-------------------
+LMDB is an ultra-fast, ultra-compact, crash-proof key-value embedded data store.
+It is modeled loosely on the BerkeleyDB API. You should read about the feature
+set as well as operation modes at https://symas.com/products/lightning-memory-mapped-database/
+
+LMDB single key lookup support is provided by linking to the LMDB C library.
+The current implementation does not support writing to the LMDB database.
+
+Visit https://github.com/LMDB/lmdb to download the library or find it in your
+operating systems package repository.
+
+If building from source, this description assumes that headers will be in
+/usr/local/include, and that the libraries are in /usr/local/lib.
+
+1. In order to build exim with LMDB lookup support add or uncomment
+
+EXPERIMENTAL_LMDB=yes
+
+to your Local/Makefile. (Re-)build/install exim. exim -d should show
+Experimental_LMDB in the line "Support for:".
+
+EXPERIMENTAL_LMDB=yes
+LDFLAGS += -llmdb
+# CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include
+# LDFLAGS += -L/usr/local/lib
+
+The first line sets the feature to include the correct code, and
+the second line says to link the LMDB libraries into the
+exim binary. The commented out lines should be uncommented if you
+built LMDB from source and installed in the default location.
+Adjust the paths if you installed them elsewhere, but you do not
+need to uncomment them if an rpm (or you) installed them in the
+package controlled locations (/usr/include and /usr/lib).
+
+2. Create your LMDB files, you can use the mdb_load utility which is
+part of the LMDB distribution our your favourite language bindings.
+
+3. Add the single key lookups to your exim.conf file, example lookups
+are below.
+
+${lookup{$sender_address_domain}lmdb{/var/lib/baruwa/data/db/relaydomains.mdb}{$value}}
+${lookup{$sender_address_domain}lmdb{/var/lib/baruwa/data/db/relaydomains.mdb}{$value}fail}
+${lookup{$sender_address_domain}lmdb{/var/lib/baruwa/data/db/relaydomains.mdb}}
+
+
+Queuefile transport
+-------------------
+Queuefile is a pseudo transport which does not perform final delivery.
+It simply copies the exim spool files out of the spool directory into
+an external directory retaining the exim spool format.
+
+The spool files can then be processed by external processes and then
+requeued into exim spool directories for final delivery.
+
+The motivation/inspiration for the transport is to allow external
+processes to access email queued by exim and have access to all the
+information which would not be available if the messages were delivered
+to the process in the standard email formats.
+
+The mailscanner package is one of the processes that can take advantage
+of this transport to filter email.
+
+The transport can be used in the same way as the other existing transports,
+i.e by configuring a router to route mail to a transport configured with
+the queuefile driver.
+
+The transport only takes one option:
+
+* directory - This is used to specify the directory messages should be
+copied to
+
+The generic transport options (body_only, current_directory, disable_logging,
+debug_print, delivery_date_add, envelope_to_add, event_action, group,
+headers_add, headers_only, headers_remove, headers_rewrite, home_directory,
+initgroups, max_parallel, message_size_limit, rcpt_include_affixes,
+retry_use_local_part, return_path, return_path_add, shadow_condition,
+shadow_transport, transport_filter, transport_filter_timeout, user) are
+ignored.
+
+Sample configuration:
+
+(Router)
+
+scan:
+ driver = accept
+ transport = scan
+
+(Transport)
+
+scan:
+ driver = queuefile
+ directory = /var/spool/baruwa-scanner/input
+
+
+In order to build exim with Queuefile transport support add or uncomment
+EXPERIMENTAL_QUEUEFILE=yes
+to your Local/Makefile. (Re-)build/install exim. exim -d should show
+Experimental_QUEUEFILE in the line "Support for:".
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git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff