1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.52 2005/12/06 10:25:59 ph10 Exp $ */
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2005 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
15 /* Default callout timeout */
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
26 static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
30 /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
32 static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK };
34 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
37 enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
38 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
41 ACLC_CONDITION, ACLC_CONTROL,
42 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
46 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
49 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
50 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
52 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
53 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
57 ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, ACLC_ENCRYPTED, ACLC_ENDPASS,
58 ACLC_HOSTS, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE, ACLC_LOGWRITE,
59 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
63 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
68 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
71 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET,
72 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
75 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
80 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
81 "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
82 but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
84 static uschar *conditions[] = {
87 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
92 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
96 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
99 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
100 US"dk_domain_source",
102 US"dk_sender_domains",
103 US"dk_sender_local_parts",
107 US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted",
108 US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite",
109 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
113 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
118 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
121 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
122 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
125 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
131 /* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
135 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
138 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
141 CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
142 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
143 CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION, CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
144 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
145 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
147 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
149 /* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
150 turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
151 control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
152 and should be tidied up. */
154 static uschar *controls[] = {
155 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
158 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
161 US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
162 US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze",
163 US"queue_only", US"submission", US"suppress_local_fixups",
164 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
170 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
171 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
172 checking functions. */
174 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
176 FALSE, /* authenticated */
177 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
178 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
180 TRUE, /* condition */
182 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
186 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
189 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
190 TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
191 TRUE, /* dk_policy */
192 TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
193 TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
194 TRUE, /* dk_senders */
195 TRUE, /* dk_status */
199 FALSE, /* encrypted */
202 FALSE, /* local_parts */
203 TRUE, /* log_message */
205 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
209 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
210 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
212 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
213 FALSE, /* recipients */
214 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
217 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
220 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
223 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
229 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
231 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
233 FALSE, /* authenticated */
234 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
235 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
237 FALSE, /* condition */
239 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
243 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
246 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
247 FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
248 FALSE, /* dk_policy */
249 FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
250 FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
251 FALSE, /* dk_senders */
252 FALSE, /* dk_status */
254 FALSE, /* dnslists */
256 FALSE, /* encrypted */
259 FALSE, /* local_parts */
260 TRUE, /* log_message */
262 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
266 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
267 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
269 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
270 FALSE, /* recipients */
271 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
274 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
277 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
280 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
286 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
287 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
288 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
290 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
293 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* authenticated */
296 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
297 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
298 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
299 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
300 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
301 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
302 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
303 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA),
308 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
309 always and check in the control processing itself. */
313 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
315 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
320 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
322 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
325 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
326 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
328 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
329 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
330 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
334 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
335 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
336 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
337 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
338 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
342 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
343 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
344 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
345 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
346 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
347 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
350 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
351 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
352 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
353 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
354 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
355 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
358 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
359 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
360 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
361 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
362 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
363 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
366 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
367 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
368 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
369 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
370 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
371 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
375 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */
378 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
380 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */
388 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
394 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
396 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
401 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
403 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
409 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
411 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
413 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
414 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
417 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
419 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
420 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
421 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
423 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
425 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
426 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
427 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
431 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
433 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
436 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
437 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
439 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
440 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
441 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
444 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
445 always and check in the verify function itself */
451 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
452 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
453 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
455 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
456 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
459 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
460 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dk_verify */
466 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
469 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
471 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* enforce_sync */
473 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_enforce_sync */
476 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
477 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
478 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
481 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
482 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
483 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
486 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
490 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
491 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
493 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
495 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
496 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
497 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
501 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
502 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
503 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
506 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
507 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
508 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
510 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) /* no_multiline */
513 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
515 typedef struct control_def {
517 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
518 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
521 static control_def controls_list[] = {
522 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
523 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
525 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
526 { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE },
528 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
529 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
530 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
531 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, FALSE },
532 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
533 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
534 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
535 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
536 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
538 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
539 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
540 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
541 { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
544 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
545 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
546 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
547 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
549 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
551 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
552 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
554 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
555 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
556 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
557 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
558 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
559 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
560 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
562 static int csa_return_code[] = {
564 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
567 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
568 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
569 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
572 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
575 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
576 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
577 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
578 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
579 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
580 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
583 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
585 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
589 /*************************************************
590 * Pick out name from list *
591 *************************************************/
593 /* Use a binary chop method
600 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
604 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
610 int mid = (start + end)/2;
611 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
612 if (c == 0) return mid;
613 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
620 /*************************************************
621 * Read and parse one ACL *
622 *************************************************/
624 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
625 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
626 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
627 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
628 blank lines (where relevant).
631 func function to get next line of ACL
632 error where to put an error message
634 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
635 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
639 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
641 acl_block *yield = NULL;
642 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
643 acl_block *this = NULL;
644 acl_condition_block *cond;
645 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
650 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
653 BOOL negated = FALSE;
654 uschar *saveline = s;
657 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
660 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
667 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
668 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
670 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
671 if (*s == ':' || isupper(name[0] && *s == '=')) return yield;
673 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
674 continues the previous verb. */
676 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
681 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline);
692 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
695 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
697 lastp = &(this->next);
700 this->condition = NULL;
701 condp = &(this->condition);
702 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
708 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
711 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
713 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
716 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
721 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
723 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
725 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
726 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
730 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
732 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
733 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
734 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
736 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
737 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
741 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
744 cond->u.negated = negated;
747 condp = &(cond->next);
749 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
750 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
751 gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
755 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s[4] != 'c' && s[4] != 'm') ||
756 !isdigit(s[5]) || (!isspace(s[6]) && s[6] != '='))
758 *error = string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL "
759 "modifier \"set %s\"", s);
763 cond->u.varnumber = s[5] - '0';
764 if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX;
766 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
769 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
770 "endpass" has no data */
772 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
776 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
777 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
780 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
781 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
790 /*************************************************
792 *************************************************/
794 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
795 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
796 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
799 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
800 user_message message for adding to headers
801 log_message message for logging, if different
807 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
811 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
816 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
817 string_printing(log_message));
819 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
820 failed", add the failure message. */
822 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
823 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
824 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
825 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
827 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
828 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
830 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
831 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
835 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
836 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
837 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
838 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
839 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
840 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
841 acl_warn_logged = logged;
845 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
847 if (user_message == NULL) return;
849 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
852 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
854 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
855 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
856 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
860 /* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */
862 hlen = Ustrlen(user_message);
865 uschar *text, *p, *q;
867 /* Add a final newline if not present */
869 text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message :
870 string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message);
872 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
874 for (p = q = text; *p != 0; )
877 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
878 header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers;
880 /* Find next header line within the string */
884 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
885 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
888 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
889 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
893 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
895 newtype = htype_add_rec;
898 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
900 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
903 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
905 newtype = htype_add_top;
908 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
910 newtype = htype_add_bot;
913 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
916 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
917 to the front of it. */
919 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
921 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
924 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
927 /* See if this line has already been added */
929 while (*hptr != NULL)
931 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
932 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
935 /* Add if not previously present */
939 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
948 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
957 /*************************************************
958 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
959 *************************************************/
961 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
962 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
963 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
964 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
967 user_msgptr pointer for user message
968 log_msgptr pointer for log message
970 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
971 FAIL verification failed
972 DEFER there was a problem verifying
976 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
980 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
982 /* Previous success */
984 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
986 /* Previous failure */
988 if (host_lookup_failed)
990 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
994 /* Need to do a lookup */
997 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
999 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1001 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
1002 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1004 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1006 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1009 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1015 /*************************************************
1016 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1017 *************************************************/
1019 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1020 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1021 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1022 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1023 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1024 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1025 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1026 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1029 dnsa the DNS answer block
1030 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1031 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1032 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1034 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1035 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1036 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1040 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1046 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1048 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1050 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1052 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1056 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1063 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1065 target_found = TRUE;
1067 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1068 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1070 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1072 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1074 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1076 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1080 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1081 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1084 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1085 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1090 /*************************************************
1091 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1092 *************************************************/
1094 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1095 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1096 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1097 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1098 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1099 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1100 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1103 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1105 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1106 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1107 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1108 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1112 acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1116 int priority, weight, port;
1123 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1124 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1125 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1127 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1128 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1129 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1130 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1132 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1133 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1134 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1136 if (domain[0] == '[')
1138 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1139 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1140 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1143 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1144 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1145 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1146 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1147 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1149 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1151 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1152 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1156 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1157 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1158 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1159 we return from this function. */
1161 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1162 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1164 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1165 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1166 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1168 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1171 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1173 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1176 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1178 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1182 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1184 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1190 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1192 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1194 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1196 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1198 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1201 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1202 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1206 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1208 /* Check the CSA version number */
1210 if (priority != 1) continue;
1212 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1213 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1214 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1215 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1216 SRV records of their own. */
1218 if (found != domain)
1221 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1223 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1226 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1227 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1228 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1229 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1230 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1232 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1234 if (weight > 2) continue;
1236 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1237 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1238 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1240 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1241 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1243 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1248 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1250 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1252 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1253 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1254 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1255 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1256 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1258 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1260 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1261 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1262 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1263 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1265 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1266 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1268 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1271 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1274 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1278 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1282 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1284 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1287 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1289 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1292 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1293 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1294 /* else fall through */
1296 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1297 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1298 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1303 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1304 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1307 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1313 /*************************************************
1314 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1315 *************************************************/
1317 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1318 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1319 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1320 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1323 where where called from
1324 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1325 arg the argument of "verify"
1326 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1327 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1328 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1330 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1331 FAIL verification failed
1332 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1337 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1338 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1342 int callout_overall = -1;
1343 int callout_connect = -1;
1344 int verify_options = 0;
1346 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1347 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1348 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1349 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1350 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1351 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1352 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1353 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1354 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1356 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1357 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1358 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1361 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1363 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1365 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1367 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1369 if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1371 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1372 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1373 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1376 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1377 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1378 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1380 if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1382 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1383 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1384 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1388 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1389 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1391 if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1393 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1394 if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1395 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1398 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1399 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1401 if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1403 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1404 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1405 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1406 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1407 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1408 return csa_return_code[rc];
1411 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1412 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1413 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1416 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
1418 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1419 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1420 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1421 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1422 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1426 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1427 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1429 if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
1431 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1432 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1433 rc = verify_check_notblind();
1436 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1437 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1438 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1443 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1444 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1445 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1448 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1449 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1450 sender and recipient. */
1452 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1454 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1455 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1458 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1459 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1460 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1462 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1465 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1467 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1468 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1469 acl_wherenames[where]);
1473 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1476 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1477 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1478 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1479 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1484 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1487 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1488 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1493 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1494 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1496 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1499 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1500 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1501 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1503 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1505 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1507 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1508 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1511 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1514 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1517 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1519 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1521 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1525 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1531 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1533 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1534 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1535 kind of table-driven thing. */
1537 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1540 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1541 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1542 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1543 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1544 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1545 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1546 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1547 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1548 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1549 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
1550 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1553 verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
1556 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1558 if (!verify_header_sender)
1560 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1561 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1562 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1566 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1569 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1570 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1573 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1574 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1577 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1580 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1583 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1584 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1587 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1588 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1591 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1594 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1597 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1598 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1601 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1602 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1603 if (callout_overall < 0)
1605 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1606 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1610 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1613 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1616 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1617 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1620 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1621 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1622 if (callout_connect < 0)
1624 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1625 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1629 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1631 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1634 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1635 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1643 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1644 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1650 /* Option not recognized */
1654 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1655 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1660 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1661 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1663 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1664 "for a recipient callout";
1668 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1669 message if giving out verification details. */
1671 if (verify_header_sender)
1674 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1675 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1679 *basic_errno = verrno;
1680 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1682 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1683 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1684 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1689 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1690 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1691 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1692 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1693 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1694 during message reception.
1696 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1697 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1698 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1699 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1700 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1701 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1702 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1704 else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1706 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1709 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1710 "sender verify callout";
1714 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1715 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1716 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1718 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1719 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1720 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1721 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1723 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1725 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1726 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1728 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1731 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1732 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1733 specified (see comments above).
1735 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1736 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1737 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1738 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1739 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1744 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1746 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1747 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1748 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1750 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1751 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1752 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1754 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1755 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1757 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1759 if (success_on_redirect)
1760 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1762 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1765 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1766 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1768 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1772 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1774 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1775 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1779 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1780 verify_sender_address);
1783 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1785 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1787 /* Cache the result code */
1789 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1790 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1791 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1792 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1793 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
1795 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1796 the sender verification. */
1798 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
1801 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1803 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
1806 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1807 the DEFER overrides. */
1813 if (success_on_redirect)
1814 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1816 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1820 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
1821 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
1822 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1824 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
1825 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
1826 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
1827 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1829 /* Make $address_data visible */
1830 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1833 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1835 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1836 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1838 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1839 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1843 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1844 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1846 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1850 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1852 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1854 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1858 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1859 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
1863 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
1866 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1867 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1871 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
1872 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
1876 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1879 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
1880 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1881 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
1882 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1885 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1888 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1889 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1892 /* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
1895 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1896 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1903 /*************************************************
1904 * Check argument for control= modifier *
1905 *************************************************/
1907 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
1910 arg the argument string for control=
1911 pptr set to point to the terminating character
1912 where which ACL we are in
1913 log_msgptr for error messages
1915 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
1919 decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
1924 for (d = controls_list;
1925 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
1928 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
1929 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
1932 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
1933 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
1935 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
1936 return CONTROL_ERROR;
1945 /*************************************************
1946 * Handle rate limiting *
1947 *************************************************/
1949 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
1950 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
1952 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
1953 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
1954 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
1955 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
1958 arg the option string for ratelimit=
1959 log_msgptr for error messages
1961 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
1962 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
1963 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
1964 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
1968 acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
1970 double limit, period;
1973 BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
1974 BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
1976 tree_node **anchor, *t;
1977 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
1978 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
1981 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
1982 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
1983 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
1985 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
1986 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
1987 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
1989 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
1990 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
1994 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
1995 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
1996 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1997 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1999 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
2001 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2002 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
2007 /* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
2008 lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
2009 if the period or options are different. */
2013 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
2014 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2015 run-time division errors. */
2017 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2018 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
2019 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2022 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2023 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
2024 sender_rate_period);
2028 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
2029 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
2031 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2034 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2035 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2036 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
2037 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
2038 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
2039 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
2040 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
2041 else have_key = TRUE;
2043 if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
2045 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
2049 /* Default option values */
2050 if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
2051 if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
2053 /* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
2054 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2056 if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
2057 key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
2059 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2060 limit, period, key);
2062 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2063 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2064 so that they survive across resets. */
2067 old_pool = store_pool;
2071 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2072 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2074 else if (per_mail || per_byte)
2075 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2077 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2079 if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2082 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2083 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2085 store_pool = old_pool;
2086 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2088 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2092 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2093 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2094 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2096 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2099 store_pool = old_pool;
2101 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2102 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2105 dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2107 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2111 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2112 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2113 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2114 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2119 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2120 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2121 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2122 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2124 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2125 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2126 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2127 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2128 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2130 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2131 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2132 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2134 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2135 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2136 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2137 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2139 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2141 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2142 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2143 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2144 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2145 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2146 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2148 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2150 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2151 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2152 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2153 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2155 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2156 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2157 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2158 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2159 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2161 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2162 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2163 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2164 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2166 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2167 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2168 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2170 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2171 : this_time - prev_time;
2173 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2174 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2176 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2177 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2179 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2180 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2181 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2182 decay as if nothing happened. */
2185 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2186 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2188 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2191 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2192 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2193 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2194 be completely blocked). */
2196 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2199 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2200 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2201 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2202 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2204 if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
2205 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2208 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2212 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2214 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2215 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2218 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2219 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2221 store_pool = old_pool;
2222 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2225 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2232 /*************************************************
2233 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2234 *************************************************/
2236 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2240 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2241 where where called from
2242 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2243 level the nesting level
2244 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2245 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2246 user_msgptr user message pointer
2247 log_msgptr log message pointer
2248 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2250 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2251 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2252 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2253 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2254 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2255 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2256 but can be temporary callout problem)
2257 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2262 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2263 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2264 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2266 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2267 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2270 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2274 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2279 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2280 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2282 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2284 user_message = cb->arg;
2288 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2290 log_message = cb->arg;
2294 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2295 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2297 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2303 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2304 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2305 checking functions in some cases. */
2307 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2309 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2312 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2313 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2314 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2315 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2320 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2325 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2326 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2327 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2329 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2331 int n = cb->u.varnumber;
2332 int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm';
2333 if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX;
2334 debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
2338 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2341 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2345 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2347 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2349 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2350 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2351 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2355 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2356 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2360 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2364 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2365 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2367 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2368 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2374 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2375 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2376 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2380 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2381 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2383 int old_pool = store_pool;
2384 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2385 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2386 store_pool = old_pool;
2391 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2392 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2393 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2395 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2396 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2397 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2398 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2400 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2404 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2406 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2408 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2410 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2411 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2415 switch(control_type)
2417 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2418 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2422 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2423 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
2430 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2431 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2434 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2435 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2438 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2439 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2442 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2443 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2446 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2447 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2448 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2452 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2453 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2456 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
2457 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
2458 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
2462 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2463 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
2468 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2469 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2473 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2474 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2475 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2478 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2479 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2482 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
2483 originator_name = US"";
2484 submission_mode = TRUE;
2487 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2490 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
2491 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2493 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2496 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2497 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2500 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
2502 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2505 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2506 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2507 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
2514 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2519 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
2520 suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
2525 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2527 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2533 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2536 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2537 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2542 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2547 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2550 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2551 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2552 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2553 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2554 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2555 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2556 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2557 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2558 it is not always available.
2560 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2561 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2562 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2563 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2567 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
2573 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2579 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2580 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
2581 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2582 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2583 switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
2584 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
2585 rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
2586 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2588 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
2589 rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
2590 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2592 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
2593 rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
2594 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2598 case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
2599 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2600 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2602 if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
2603 rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
2604 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2605 if (dk_verify_block->testing)
2606 rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
2607 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2609 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2610 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2611 if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
2612 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2613 NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2616 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
2617 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2618 if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
2619 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
2620 NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
2623 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
2624 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2625 if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
2626 rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
2629 case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
2630 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2631 if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
2632 switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
2633 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
2634 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
2635 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2637 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
2638 rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
2639 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2641 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
2642 rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
2643 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2645 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
2646 rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
2647 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2649 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
2650 rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
2651 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2653 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
2654 rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
2655 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2657 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
2658 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
2659 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2667 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2671 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2672 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2675 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2676 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2677 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2678 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2679 writing is poorly documented. */
2681 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2682 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2684 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2685 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2686 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2688 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2689 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2691 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2692 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2696 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2697 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2698 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2699 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2700 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2701 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2704 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2705 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2706 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2709 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2710 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2711 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2712 &deliver_localpart_data);
2724 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2725 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2726 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2727 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2728 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2729 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2732 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2733 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2734 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2740 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2741 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2742 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2746 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2749 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2750 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2751 /* Run the malware backend. */
2753 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2754 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2756 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2758 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2765 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2766 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2770 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2771 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, log_msgptr);
2774 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2775 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2779 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2785 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2788 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2789 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2790 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2791 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2796 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
2797 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
2800 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2804 int old_pool = store_pool;
2805 if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2806 acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
2807 store_pool = old_pool;
2811 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2814 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2815 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2816 /* Run the spam backend. */
2818 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2819 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2821 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2823 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2831 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2833 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
2837 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2838 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
2839 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2840 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2841 (until something changes it). */
2844 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
2845 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
2846 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
2850 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2851 "condition %d", cb->type);
2855 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2857 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
2859 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
2860 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
2863 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
2867 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
2868 handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
2869 which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
2870 message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
2871 appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
2872 and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
2874 These modifiers act in different ways:
2876 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
2877 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
2879 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
2880 message that is already set.
2882 If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
2884 if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] ||
2885 (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) ||
2886 (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT))
2890 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
2891 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
2892 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
2893 during expansions. */
2895 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2896 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
2898 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
2900 if (user_message != NULL)
2902 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
2903 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
2904 if (expmessage == NULL)
2906 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2907 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2908 user_message, expand_string_message);
2910 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
2913 if (log_message != NULL)
2915 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
2916 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
2917 if (expmessage == NULL)
2919 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2920 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2921 log_message, expand_string_message);
2923 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
2925 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
2926 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
2930 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
2932 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2935 acl_verify_message = NULL;
2943 /*************************************************
2944 * Get line from a literal ACL *
2945 *************************************************/
2947 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
2948 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
2949 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
2951 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
2952 Exim configuration file. That is:
2954 . Leading spaces are ignored.
2956 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
2957 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
2958 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
2960 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
2961 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
2963 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
2966 Returns: a pointer to the next line
2970 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
2971 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
2979 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
2983 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
2984 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
2985 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
2987 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
2989 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
2990 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
2992 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
2994 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
2995 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
2997 if (*yield != '#') break;
3000 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3001 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3002 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3003 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3008 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3010 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3019 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3020 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3025 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
3026 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
3027 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
3030 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3031 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3032 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3034 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
3035 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
3037 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3038 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
3041 /* Control does not reach here */
3048 /*************************************************
3049 * Check access using an ACL *
3050 *************************************************/
3052 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3053 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3054 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3055 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3056 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3057 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3058 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3059 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3060 appears immediately above.
3063 where where called from
3064 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3065 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3066 level the nesting level
3067 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3068 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3070 Returns: OK access is granted
3071 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3072 FAIL access is denied
3073 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3074 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3079 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3080 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3083 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3084 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3087 /* Catch configuration loops */
3091 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3097 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3101 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3102 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3106 ss = expand_string(s);
3109 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3110 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3111 expand_string_message);
3117 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3119 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3120 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3124 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3125 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3126 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3127 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3128 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3130 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3132 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3135 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3138 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3141 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3142 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3145 else if (*ss == '/')
3147 struct stat statbuf;
3148 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3151 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3156 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3158 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3163 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3164 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3166 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3168 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3169 ss, strerror(errno));
3172 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3175 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3176 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3180 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3181 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3182 persists between multiple messages. */
3186 int old_pool = store_pool;
3187 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3188 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3189 store_pool = old_pool;
3190 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3193 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3194 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3196 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3200 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3205 int basic_errno = 0;
3206 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3208 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3209 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3211 if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
3212 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3213 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3215 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3220 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3222 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3225 search_error_message = NULL;
3226 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3227 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3229 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3230 ERROR always causes a return. */
3235 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3236 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3238 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3239 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3240 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3244 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3246 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3249 default: /* Paranoia */
3251 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3255 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3260 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3263 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3264 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3267 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3272 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3277 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3278 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3279 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3284 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
3287 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3295 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3301 if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
3305 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
3308 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3314 if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
3318 if (cond != OK) return cond;
3323 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
3324 else if (cond == DEFER && (log_extra_selector & LX_acl_warn_skipped) != 0)
3325 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3326 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
3327 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
3328 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
3329 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3333 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3338 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3343 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3345 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
3350 /*************************************************
3351 * Check access using an ACL *
3352 *************************************************/
3354 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3355 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3356 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3359 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3360 recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
3361 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3362 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3363 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3365 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3366 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3367 FAIL access is denied
3368 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3369 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3374 acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
3375 uschar **log_msgptr)
3379 address_item *addr = NULL;
3381 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
3382 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
3383 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
3385 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
3387 adb = address_defaults;
3389 addr->address = recipient;
3390 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
3392 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3395 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
3396 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
3399 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3401 deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
3402 sender_address_data = NULL;
3404 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3405 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3409 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
3411 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3412 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3418 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3420 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
3422 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3423 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3427 /* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
3428 message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3430 if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75)
3432 uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr);
3438 while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++;
3439 if (*ss == 0) break;
3446 while (--t > s + 35)
3450 if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; }
3451 if (tt == NULL) tt = t;
3455 if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
3460 if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n')
3466 if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */