1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
8 /* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
10 /* This module provides the TLS (aka SSL) support for Exim using the OpenSSL
11 library. It is #included into the tls.c file when that library is used. The
12 code herein is based on a patch that was originally contributed by Steve
13 Haslam. It was adapted from stunnel, a GPL program by Michal Trojnara.
15 No cryptographic code is included in Exim. All this module does is to call
16 functions from the OpenSSL library. */
21 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
22 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
23 #include <openssl/err.h>
24 #include <openssl/rand.h>
25 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
26 # include <openssl/ec.h>
29 # include <openssl/ocsp.h>
37 # define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
38 # define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
41 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
42 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
44 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000L
45 # define EXIM_HAVE_RSA_GENKEY_EX
47 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
48 # define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
50 # define EXIM_HAVE_EPHEM_RSA_KEX
51 # define EXIM_HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO
53 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
54 # define EXIM_HAVE_SHA256
57 /* X509_check_host provides sane certificate hostname checking, but was added
58 to OpenSSL late, after other projects forked off the code-base. So in
59 addition to guarding against the base version number, beware that LibreSSL
60 does not (at this time) support this function.
62 If LibreSSL gains a different API, perhaps via libtls, then we'll probably
63 opt to disentangle and ask a LibreSSL user to provide glue for a third
64 crypto provider for libtls instead of continuing to tie the OpenSSL glue
65 into even twistier knots. If LibreSSL gains the same API, we can just
66 change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
68 #ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
69 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L
70 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
71 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS
72 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
73 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
75 # define EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
77 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \
78 && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L
79 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
83 #if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \
84 || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20010000L
85 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
86 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
87 # define EXIM_HAVE_ECDH
89 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
90 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_EC_NIST2NID
95 #ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
96 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010101000L
97 # define OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
98 # define OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
102 #if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
103 # warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
104 # define DISABLE_OCSP
107 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
108 # include <openssl/x509v3.h>
111 /*************************************************
112 * OpenSSL option parse *
113 *************************************************/
115 typedef struct exim_openssl_option {
118 } exim_openssl_option;
119 /* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
120 options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
121 all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
124 This list is current as of:
126 Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
127 Plus SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 for 1.1.2-dev
129 static exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
130 /* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
132 { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
134 #ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
135 { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
137 #ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
138 { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
140 #ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
141 { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
143 #ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
144 { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
146 #ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
147 { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
149 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
150 { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
152 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
153 { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
155 #ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
156 { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
158 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
159 { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
161 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
162 { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
164 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
165 { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
167 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
168 { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
170 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
171 { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
173 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
174 { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
176 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
177 { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
179 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
180 { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
182 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
183 #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
184 /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
185 #warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
187 { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
190 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
191 { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
193 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
194 { US"no_tlsv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 },
196 #ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
197 { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
199 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
200 { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
202 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
203 { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
205 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
206 { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
208 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
209 { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
211 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
212 { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
214 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
215 { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
217 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
218 { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
223 static int exim_openssl_options_size = nelem(exim_openssl_options);
232 for (struct exim_openssl_option * o = exim_openssl_options;
233 o < exim_openssl_options + nelem(exim_openssl_options); o++)
235 /* Trailing X is workaround for problem with _OPT_OPENSSL_NO_TLSV1
236 being a ".ifdef _OPT_OPENSSL_NO_TLSV1_3" match */
238 spf(buf, sizeof(buf), US"_OPT_OPENSSL_%T_X", o->name);
239 builtin_macro_create(buf);
244 /******************************************************************************/
246 /* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
248 typedef struct randstuff {
253 /* Local static variables */
255 static BOOL client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
256 static BOOL server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
257 static const uschar *sid_ctx = US"exim";
259 /* We have three different contexts to care about.
261 Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
262 As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
263 a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
264 from the SMTP Transport. We may also concurrently want to make TLS connections
265 to utility daemons, so client-contexts are allocated and passed around in call
266 args rather than using a gobal.
269 There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
270 Given TLS SNI, we can be using different keys, certs and various other
271 configuration settings, because they're re-expanded with $tls_sni set. This
272 allows vhosting with TLS. This SNI is sent in the handshake.
273 A client might not send SNI, so we need a fallback, and an initial setup too.
274 So as a server, we start out using `server_ctx`.
275 If SNI is sent by the client, then we as server, mid-negotiation, try to clone
276 `server_sni` from `server_ctx` and then initialise settings by re-expanding
283 } exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx;
285 static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
286 static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
288 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
289 static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL;
292 static char ssl_errstring[256];
294 static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
295 static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
296 static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
298 static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
301 typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
306 STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack; /* chain for verifying the proof */
310 uschar *file_expanded;
311 OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
314 X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
315 BOOL verify_required;
320 /* these are cached from first expand */
321 uschar *server_cipher_list;
322 /* only passed down to tls_error: */
324 const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
325 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
326 uschar * event_action;
330 /* should figure out a cleanup of API to handle state preserved per
331 implementation, for various reasons, which can be void * in the APIs.
332 For now, we hack around it. */
333 tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
334 tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
337 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
338 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *), uschar ** errstr );
341 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
342 static int tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
345 static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
349 /*************************************************
351 *************************************************/
353 /* Called from lots of places when errors occur before actually starting to do
354 the TLS handshake, that is, while the session is still in clear. Always returns
355 DEFER for a server and FAIL for a client so that most calls can use "return
356 tls_error(...)" to do this processing and then give an appropriate return. A
357 single function is used for both server and client, because it is called from
358 some shared functions.
361 prefix text to include in the logged error
362 host NULL if setting up a server;
363 the connected host if setting up a client
364 msg error message or NULL if we should ask OpenSSL
365 errstr pointer to output error message
367 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
371 tls_error(uschar * prefix, const host_item * host, uschar * msg, uschar ** errstr)
375 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
376 msg = US ssl_errstring;
379 msg = string_sprintf("(%s): %s", prefix, msg);
380 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS error '%s'\n", msg);
381 if (errstr) *errstr = msg;
382 return host ? FAIL : DEFER;
387 /*************************************************
388 * Callback to generate RSA key *
389 *************************************************/
393 s SSL connection (not used)
397 Returns: pointer to generated key
401 rsa_callback(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
404 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_RSA_GENKEY_EX
405 BIGNUM *bn = BN_new();
408 export = export; /* Shut picky compilers up */
409 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Generating %d bit RSA key...\n", keylength);
411 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_RSA_GENKEY_EX
412 if ( !BN_set_word(bn, (unsigned long)RSA_F4)
413 || !(rsa_key = RSA_new())
414 || !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_key, keylength, bn, NULL)
417 if (!(rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL)))
421 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
422 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (RSA_generate_key): %s",
434 x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
436 STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
437 static uschar name[256];
439 for (int i= 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
441 X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
442 if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
444 X509_NAME * sn = X509_get_subject_name(tmp_obj->data.x509);
445 if (X509_NAME_oneline(sn, CS name, sizeof(name)))
447 name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
448 debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
457 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
459 verify_event(tls_support * tlsp, X509 * cert, int depth, const uschar * dn,
460 BOOL *calledp, const BOOL *optionalp, const uschar * what)
466 ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
469 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_event: %s %d\n", what, depth);
470 old_cert = tlsp->peercert;
471 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
472 /* NB we do not bother setting peerdn */
473 if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
475 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] %s verify denied by event-action: "
476 "depth=%d cert=%s: %s",
477 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
478 what, depth, dn, yield);
482 if (old_cert) tlsp->peercert = old_cert; /* restore 1st failing cert */
483 return 1; /* reject (leaving peercert set) */
485 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
486 "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
488 X509_free(tlsp->peercert);
489 tlsp->peercert = old_cert;
495 /*************************************************
496 * Callback for verification *
497 *************************************************/
499 /* The SSL library does certificate verification if set up to do so. This
500 callback has the current yes/no state is in "state". If verification succeeded,
501 we set the certificate-verified flag. If verification failed, what happens
502 depends on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate
505 If verification is optional, we change the state to yes, but still log the
506 verification error. For some reason (it really would help to have proper
507 documentation of OpenSSL), this callback function then gets called again, this
508 time with state = 1. We must take care not to set the private verified flag on
509 the second time through.
511 Note: this function is not called if the client fails to present a certificate
512 when asked. We get here only if a certificate has been received. Handling of
513 optional verification for this case is done when requesting SSL to verify, by
514 setting SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the non-optional case.
516 May be called multiple times for different issues with a certificate, even
517 for a given "depth" in the certificate chain.
520 preverify_ok current yes/no state as 1/0
521 x509ctx certificate information.
522 tlsp per-direction (client vs. server) support data
523 calledp has-been-called flag
524 optionalp verification-is-optional flag
526 Returns: 0 if verification should fail, otherwise 1
530 verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx,
531 tls_support * tlsp, BOOL * calledp, BOOL * optionalp)
533 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
534 int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
537 if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn)))
539 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n");
540 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
541 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address);
544 dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
546 if (preverify_ok == 0)
548 uschar * extra = verify_mode ? string_sprintf(" (during %c-verify for [%s])",
549 *verify_mode, sender_host_address)
551 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error%s: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
552 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
554 X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)), dn);
559 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */
560 return 0; /* reject */
562 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
563 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
568 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, dn);
570 if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
571 { /* client, wanting stapling */
572 /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
573 for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
575 if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
578 sk_X509_push(client_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, cert);
581 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
582 if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
583 return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
588 const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
590 if ( tlsp == &tls_out
591 && ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
592 /* client, wanting hostname check */
595 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
596 # ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
597 # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
599 # ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS
600 # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0
603 const uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
606 while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
607 if ((rc = X509_check_host(cert, CCS name, 0,
608 X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
609 | X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS,
614 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
615 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address);
622 if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
625 uschar * extra = verify_mode
626 ? string_sprintf(" (during %c-verify for [%s])",
627 *verify_mode, sender_host_address)
629 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
630 "[%s] SSL verify error%s: certificate name mismatch: DN=\"%s\" H=\"%s\"",
631 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
632 extra, dn, verify_cert_hostnames);
637 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */
638 return 0; /* reject */
640 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
641 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
645 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
646 if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
647 return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
650 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
651 *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", dn);
652 if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
656 return 1; /* accept, at least for this level */
660 verify_callback_client(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
662 return verify_callback(preverify_ok, x509ctx, &tls_out,
663 &client_verify_callback_called, &client_verify_optional);
667 verify_callback_server(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
669 return verify_callback(preverify_ok, x509ctx, &tls_in,
670 &server_verify_callback_called, &server_verify_optional);
676 /* This gets called *by* the dane library verify callback, which interposes
680 verify_callback_client_dane(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx)
682 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
684 int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
685 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
686 BOOL dummy_called, optional = FALSE;
689 if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn)))
691 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n");
692 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
693 deliver_host_address);
696 dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
698 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s depth %d %s\n",
699 preverify_ok ? "ok":"BAD", depth, dn);
701 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
702 if (verify_event(&tls_out, cert, depth, dn,
703 &dummy_called, &optional, US"DANE"))
704 return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
707 if (preverify_ok == 1)
709 tls_out.dane_verified = tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
711 if (client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
712 { /* client, wanting stapling */
713 /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
714 for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
716 if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
719 sk_X509_push(client_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, cert);
725 int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx);
727 debug_printf(" - err %d '%s'\n", err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
728 if (err == X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION)
734 #endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/
737 /*************************************************
738 * Information callback *
739 *************************************************/
741 /* The SSL library functions call this from time to time to indicate what they
742 are doing. We copy the string to the debugging output when TLS debugging has
754 info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
760 if (where & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
761 str = US"SSL_connect";
762 else if (where & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
763 str = US"SSL_accept";
765 str = US"SSL info (undefined)";
767 if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
768 debug_printf("%s: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
769 else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT)
770 debug_printf("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
771 str = where & SSL_CB_READ ? US"read" : US"write",
772 SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
773 else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT)
775 debug_printf("%s: failed in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
777 debug_printf("%s: error in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
778 else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START)
779 debug_printf("%s: hshake start: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
780 else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)
781 debug_printf("%s: hshake done: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
785 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
787 keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
789 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%.200s\n", line);
795 /*************************************************
796 * Initialize for DH *
797 *************************************************/
799 /* If dhparam is set, expand it, and load up the parameters for DH encryption.
802 sctx The current SSL CTX (inbound or outbound)
803 dhparam DH parameter file or fixed parameter identity string
804 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
805 errstr error string pointer
807 Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked)
811 init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, const host_item *host, uschar ** errstr)
819 if (!expand_check(dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &dhexpanded, errstr))
822 if (!dhexpanded || !*dhexpanded)
823 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS std_dh_prime_default(), -1);
824 else if (dhexpanded[0] == '/')
826 if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r")))
828 tls_error(string_sprintf("could not read dhparams file %s", dhexpanded),
829 host, US strerror(errno), errstr);
835 if (Ustrcmp(dhexpanded, "none") == 0)
837 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n");
841 if (!(pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded)))
843 tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown standard DH prime \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
844 host, US strerror(errno), errstr);
847 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS pem, -1);
850 if (!(dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
853 tls_error(string_sprintf("Could not read tls_dhparams \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
858 /* note: our default limit of 2236 is not a multiple of 8; the limit comes from
859 * an NSS limit, and the GnuTLS APIs handle bit-sizes fine, so we went with
860 * 2236. But older OpenSSL can only report in bytes (octets), not bits.
861 * If someone wants to dance at the edge, then they can raise the limit or use
862 * current libraries. */
863 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS
864 /* Added in commit 26c79d5641d; `git describe --contains` says OpenSSL_1_1_0-pre1~1022
865 * This predates OpenSSL_1_1_0 (before a, b, ...) so is in all 1.1.0 */
866 dh_bitsize = DH_bits(dh);
868 dh_bitsize = 8 * DH_size(dh);
871 /* Even if it is larger, we silently return success rather than cause things
872 * to fail out, so that a too-large DH will not knock out all TLS; it's a
873 * debatable choice. */
874 if (dh_bitsize > tls_dh_max_bits)
877 debug_printf("dhparams file %d bits, is > tls_dh_max_bits limit of %d\n",
878 dh_bitsize, tls_dh_max_bits);
882 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(sctx, dh);
884 debug_printf("Diffie-Hellman initialized from %s with %d-bit prime\n",
885 dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", dh_bitsize);
897 /*************************************************
898 * Initialize for ECDH *
899 *************************************************/
901 /* Load parameters for ECDH encryption.
903 For now, we stick to NIST P-256 because: it's simple and easy to configure;
904 it avoids any patent issues that might bite redistributors; despite events in
905 the news and concerns over curve choices, we're not cryptographers, we're not
906 pretending to be, and this is "good enough" to be better than no support,
907 protecting against most adversaries. Given another year or two, there might
908 be sufficient clarity about a "right" way forward to let us make an informed
909 decision, instead of a knee-jerk reaction.
911 Longer-term, we should look at supporting both various named curves and
912 external files generated with "openssl ecparam", much as we do for init_dh().
913 We should also support "none" as a value, to explicitly avoid initialisation.
918 sctx The current SSL CTX (inbound or outbound)
919 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
920 errstr error string pointer
922 Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked)
926 init_ecdh(SSL_CTX * sctx, host_item * host, uschar ** errstr)
928 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
937 if (host) /* No ECDH setup for clients, only for servers */
940 # ifndef EXIM_HAVE_ECDH
942 debug_printf("No OpenSSL API to define ECDH parameters, skipping\n");
946 if (!expand_check(tls_eccurve, US"tls_eccurve", &exp_curve, errstr))
948 if (!exp_curve || !*exp_curve)
951 /* "auto" needs to be handled carefully.
952 * OpenSSL < 1.0.2: we do not select anything, but fallback to prime256v1
953 * OpenSSL < 1.1.0: we have to call SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto
954 * (openssl/ssl.h defines SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO)
955 * OpenSSL >= 1.1.0: we do not set anything, the libray does autoselection
956 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/fe6ef2472db933f01b59cad82aa925736935984b
958 if (Ustrcmp(exp_curve, "auto") == 0)
960 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L
961 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(
962 "ECDH OpenSSL < 1.0.2: temp key parameter settings: overriding \"auto\" with \"prime256v1\"\n");
963 exp_curve = US"prime256v1";
965 # if defined SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO
966 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(
967 "ECDH OpenSSL 1.0.2+ temp key parameter settings: autoselection\n");
968 SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(sctx, 1);
971 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(
972 "ECDH OpenSSL 1.1.0+ temp key parameter settings: default selection\n");
978 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ECDH: curve '%s'\n", exp_curve);
979 if ( (nid = OBJ_sn2nid (CCS exp_curve)) == NID_undef
980 # ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_EC_NIST2NID
981 && (nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(CCS exp_curve)) == NID_undef
985 tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown curve name tls_eccurve '%s'", exp_curve),
990 if (!(ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)))
992 tls_error(US"Unable to create ec curve", host, NULL, errstr);
996 /* The "tmp" in the name here refers to setting a temporary key
997 not to the stability of the interface. */
999 if ((rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(sctx, ecdh) == 0))
1000 tls_error(string_sprintf("Error enabling '%s' curve", exp_curve), host, NULL, errstr);
1002 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ECDH: enabled '%s' curve\n", exp_curve);
1007 # endif /*EXIM_HAVE_ECDH*/
1008 #endif /*OPENSSL_NO_ECDH*/
1014 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1015 /*************************************************
1016 * Load OCSP information into state *
1017 *************************************************/
1018 /* Called to load the server OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
1019 caller has determined this is needed. Checks validity. Debugs a message
1022 ASSUMES: single response, for single cert.
1025 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
1026 cbinfo various parts of session state
1027 expanded the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
1032 ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
1035 OCSP_RESPONSE * resp;
1036 OCSP_BASICRESP * basic_response;
1037 OCSP_SINGLERESP * single_response;
1038 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * rev, * thisupd, * nextupd;
1039 STACK_OF(X509) * sk;
1040 unsigned long verify_flags;
1041 int status, reason, i;
1043 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
1044 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
1046 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response);
1047 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
1050 if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb")))
1052 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
1053 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
1057 resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
1061 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
1065 if ((status = OCSP_response_status(resp)) != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
1067 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
1068 OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
1072 if (!(basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)))
1075 debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
1079 sk = cbinfo->verify_stack;
1080 verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
1082 /* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
1083 OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
1084 OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
1086 /* This does a full verify on the OCSP proof before we load it for serving
1087 up; possibly overkill - just date-checks might be nice enough.
1089 OCSP_basic_verify takes a "store" arg, but does not
1090 use it for the chain verification, which is all we do
1091 when OCSP_NOVERIFY is set. The content from the wire
1092 "basic_response" and a cert-stack "sk" are all that is used.
1094 We have a stack, loaded in setup_certs() if tls_verify_certificates
1095 was a file (not a directory, or "system"). It is unfortunate we
1096 cannot used the connection context store, as that would neatly
1097 handle the "system" case too, but there seems to be no library
1098 function for getting a stack from a store.
1099 [ In OpenSSL 1.1 - ? X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) ? ]
1100 We do not free the stack since it could be needed a second time for
1103 Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not
1104 be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
1105 But what with? We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback.
1106 And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the
1107 library does it for us anyway? */
1109 if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, sk, NULL, verify_flags)) < 0)
1113 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
1114 debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
1119 /* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
1120 one certificate we use, and nothing for anything else in a chain. If this
1121 proves false, we need to extract a cert id from our issued cert
1122 (tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the
1123 right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
1125 I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
1127 if (!(single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0)))
1130 debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
1134 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single_response, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
1135 if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
1137 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response bad cert status: %s (%d) %s (%d)\n",
1138 OCSP_cert_status_str(status), status,
1139 OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason), reason);
1143 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
1145 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
1150 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp; /*XXX stack?*/
1154 if (f.running_in_test_harness)
1156 extern char ** environ;
1157 if (environ) for (uschar ** p = USS environ; *p; p++)
1158 if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
1160 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
1161 goto supply_response;
1166 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
1171 /* Create and install a selfsigned certificate, for use in server mode */
1174 tls_install_selfsign(SSL_CTX * sctx, uschar ** errstr)
1182 where = US"allocating pkey";
1183 if (!(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()))
1186 where = US"allocating cert";
1187 if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
1190 where = US"generating pkey";
1191 if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 2048)))
1194 where = US"assigning pkey";
1195 if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa))
1198 X509_set_version(x509, 2); /* N+1 - version 3 */
1199 ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 1);
1200 X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509), 0);
1201 X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509), (long)60 * 60); /* 1 hour */
1202 X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey);
1204 name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
1205 X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "C",
1206 MBSTRING_ASC, CUS "UK", -1, -1, 0);
1207 X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "O",
1208 MBSTRING_ASC, CUS "Exim Developers", -1, -1, 0);
1209 X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "CN",
1210 MBSTRING_ASC, CUS smtp_active_hostname, -1, -1, 0);
1211 X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name);
1213 where = US"signing cert";
1214 if (!X509_sign(x509, pkey, EVP_md5()))
1217 where = US"installing selfsign cert";
1218 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(sctx, x509))
1221 where = US"installing selfsign key";
1222 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(sctx, pkey))
1228 (void) tls_error(where, NULL, NULL, errstr);
1229 if (x509) X509_free(x509);
1230 if (pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1238 tls_add_certfile(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, uschar * file,
1241 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file %s\n", file);
1242 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(sctx, CS file))
1243 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
1244 "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file file=%s", file),
1245 cbinfo->host, NULL, errstr);
1250 tls_add_pkeyfile(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, uschar * file,
1253 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file %s\n", file);
1254 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(sctx, CS file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
1255 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
1256 "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", file), cbinfo->host, NULL, errstr);
1261 /*************************************************
1262 * Expand key and cert file specs *
1263 *************************************************/
1265 /* Called once during tls_init and possibly again during TLS setup, for a
1266 new context, if Server Name Indication was used and tls_sni was seen in
1267 the certificate string.
1270 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
1271 cbinfo various parts of session state
1272 errstr error string pointer
1274 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1278 tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo,
1283 if (!cbinfo->certificate)
1285 if (!cbinfo->is_server) /* client */
1288 if (tls_install_selfsign(sctx, errstr) != OK)
1295 if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
1296 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
1297 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
1299 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE;
1301 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded, errstr))
1305 if (cbinfo->is_server)
1307 const uschar * file_list = expanded;
1311 while (file = string_nextinlist(&file_list, &sep, NULL, 0))
1312 if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, file, errstr)))
1315 else /* would there ever be a need for multiple client certs? */
1316 if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, expanded, errstr)))
1319 if ( cbinfo->privatekey
1320 && !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded, errstr))
1323 /* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result
1324 of the expansion is an empty string, ignore it also, and assume the private
1325 key is in the same file as the certificate. */
1327 if (expanded && *expanded)
1328 if (cbinfo->is_server)
1330 const uschar * file_list = expanded;
1334 while (file = string_nextinlist(&file_list, &sep, NULL, 0))
1335 if ((err = tls_add_pkeyfile(sctx, cbinfo, file, errstr)))
1338 else /* would there ever be a need for multiple client certs? */
1339 if ((err = tls_add_pkeyfile(sctx, cbinfo, expanded, errstr)))
1343 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1344 if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
1347 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded, errstr))
1350 if (expanded && *expanded)
1352 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
1353 if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded
1354 && (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
1356 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - value unchanged, using existing values\n");
1359 ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded);
1370 /*************************************************
1371 * Callback to handle SNI *
1372 *************************************************/
1374 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if a Server Name
1375 Indication extension was sent by the client.
1377 API documentation is OpenSSL s_server.c implementation.
1380 s SSL* of the current session
1381 ad unknown (part of OpenSSL API) (unused)
1382 arg Callback of "our" registered data
1384 Returns: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,ALERT_WARNING,ALERT_FATAL,NOACK}
1387 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1389 tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg)
1391 const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
1392 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
1394 int old_pool = store_pool;
1395 uschar * dummy_errstr;
1398 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1400 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", servername,
1401 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)");
1403 /* Make the extension value available for expansion */
1404 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
1405 tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername);
1406 store_pool = old_pool;
1408 if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
1409 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1411 /* Can't find an SSL_CTX_clone() or equivalent, so we do it manually;
1412 not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
1413 Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
1415 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
1416 if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
1418 if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
1421 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
1422 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
1426 /* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
1427 already exists. Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */
1429 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(server_ctx));
1430 SSL_CTX_set_mode(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(server_ctx));
1431 SSL_CTX_set_options(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(server_ctx));
1432 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(server_ctx));
1433 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
1434 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
1436 if ( !init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL, &dummy_errstr)
1437 || !init_ecdh(server_sni, NULL, &dummy_errstr)
1441 if ( cbinfo->server_cipher_list
1442 && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list))
1445 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1446 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
1448 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_sni, tls_server_stapling_cb);
1449 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
1453 if ((rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE,
1454 verify_callback_server, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
1457 /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
1458 OCSP information. */
1459 if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
1462 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
1463 SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
1464 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1466 bad: return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1468 #endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */
1473 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1475 /*************************************************
1476 * Callback to handle OCSP Stapling *
1477 *************************************************/
1479 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if the client
1480 requests OCSP information with a Certificate Status Request.
1482 Documentation via openssl s_server.c and the Apache patch from the OpenSSL
1488 tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
1490 const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
1491 uschar *response_der; /*XXX blob */
1492 int response_der_len;
1494 /*XXX stack: use SSL_get_certificate() to see which cert; from that work
1495 out which ocsp blob to send. Unfortunately, SSL_get_certificate is known
1496 buggy in current OpenSSL; it returns the last cert loaded always rather than
1497 the one actually presented. So we can't support a stack of OCSP proofs at
1501 debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response\n",
1502 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
1504 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
1505 if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
1506 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1508 response_der = NULL;
1509 response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response, /*XXX stack*/
1511 if (response_der_len <= 0)
1512 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1514 SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(server_ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
1515 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
1516 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1521 time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
1523 BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
1524 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
1529 tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
1531 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = arg;
1532 const unsigned char * p;
1534 OCSP_RESPONSE * rsp;
1535 OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
1538 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
1539 len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
1542 /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
1543 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required && LOGGING(tls_cipher))
1544 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
1546 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
1547 return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1550 if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
1552 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1553 if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
1554 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, parse error");
1556 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
1560 if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
1562 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1563 if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
1564 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, error parsing response");
1566 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error parsing response\n");
1567 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
1571 /* We'd check the nonce here if we'd put one in the request. */
1572 /* However that would defeat cacheability on the server so we don't. */
1574 /* This section of code reworked from OpenSSL apps source;
1575 The OpenSSL Project retains copyright:
1576 Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
1581 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
1583 DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1585 /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
1587 /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
1588 /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
1590 if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, cbinfo->verify_stack,
1591 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
1593 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1594 if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1595 "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
1596 ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
1597 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
1598 ERR_print_errors(bp);
1599 OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
1603 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
1605 /*XXX So we have a good stapled OCSP status. How do we know
1606 it is for the cert of interest? OpenSSL 1.1.0 has a routine
1607 OCSP_resp_find_status() which matches on a cert id, which presumably
1608 we should use. Making an id needs OCSP_cert_id_new(), which takes
1609 issuerName, issuerKey, serialNumber. Are they all in the cert?
1611 For now, carry on blindly accepting the resp. */
1614 OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
1616 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
1617 if (OCSP_resp_count(bs) != 1)
1619 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
1620 if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
1623 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1624 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
1625 "with multiple responses not handled");
1628 single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
1629 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
1630 &thisupd, &nextupd);
1633 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
1634 DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
1635 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
1636 EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
1638 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1639 DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
1640 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
1644 DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
1645 OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
1648 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
1649 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
1652 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
1653 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1654 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
1655 reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
1656 reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
1657 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
1660 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1661 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1662 "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
1667 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1672 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
1675 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
1678 /*************************************************
1679 * Initialize for TLS *
1680 *************************************************/
1682 /* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization
1683 of the library. We allocate and return a context structure.
1686 ctxp returned SSL context
1687 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
1688 dhparam DH parameter file
1689 certificate certificate file
1690 privatekey private key
1691 ocsp_file file of stapling info (server); flag for require ocsp (client)
1692 addr address if client; NULL if server (for some randomness)
1693 cbp place to put allocated callback context
1694 errstr error string pointer
1696 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1700 tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
1702 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1703 uschar *ocsp_file, /*XXX stack, in server*/
1705 address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp, uschar ** errstr)
1710 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo;
1712 cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
1713 cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
1714 cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
1715 cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL;
1716 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1717 cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
1720 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
1721 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
1722 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
1725 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
1727 cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
1728 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
1729 cbinfo->host = host;
1730 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
1731 cbinfo->event_action = NULL;
1734 #ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
1735 SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
1736 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
1739 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SHA256
1740 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
1741 list of available digests. */
1742 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1745 /* Create a context.
1746 The OpenSSL docs in 1.0.1b have not been updated to clarify TLS variant
1747 negotiation in the different methods; as far as I can tell, the only
1748 *_{server,client}_method which allows negotiation is SSLv23, which exists even
1749 when OpenSSL is built without SSLv2 support.
1750 By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
1753 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
1754 if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method())))
1756 if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method())))
1758 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL, errstr);
1760 /* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
1761 order to get the full complement of ciphers to work. It took me roughly a day
1762 of work to discover this by experiment.
1764 On systems that have /dev/urandom, SSL may automatically seed itself from
1765 there. Otherwise, we have to make something up as best we can. Double check
1771 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
1774 RAND_seed(US (&r), sizeof(r));
1775 RAND_seed(US big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1776 if (addr != NULL) RAND_seed(US addr, sizeof(addr));
1779 return tls_error(US"RAND_status", host,
1780 US"unable to seed random number generator", errstr);
1783 /* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
1786 DEBUG(D_tls) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, (void (*)())info_callback);
1787 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
1788 DEBUG(D_tls) SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ctx, (void (*)())keylog_callback);
1791 /* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
1792 (void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
1794 /* Apply administrator-supplied work-arounds.
1795 Historically we applied just one requested option,
1796 SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS, but when bug 994 requested a second, we
1797 moved to an administrator-controlled list of options to specify and
1798 grandfathered in the first one as the default value for "openssl_options".
1800 No OpenSSL version number checks: the options we accept depend upon the
1801 availability of the option value macros from OpenSSL. */
1803 if (!tls_openssl_options_parse(openssl_options, &init_options))
1804 return tls_error(US"openssl_options parsing failed", host, NULL, errstr);
1808 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
1809 if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, init_options)))
1810 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
1811 "SSL_CTX_set_option(%#lx)", init_options), host, NULL, errstr);
1814 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
1816 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
1817 SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(ctx, 0); /* send no TLS1.3 stateful-tickets */
1820 /* We'd like to disable session cache unconditionally, but foolish Outlook
1821 Express clients then give up the first TLS connection and make a second one
1822 (which works). Only when there is an IMAP service on the same machine.
1823 Presumably OE is trying to use the cache for A on B. Leave it enabled for
1824 now, until we work out a decent way of presenting control to the config. It
1825 will never be used because we use a new context every time. */
1827 (void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
1830 /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
1831 /* Initialize ECDH temp key parameter selection */
1833 if ( !init_dh(ctx, dhparam, host, errstr)
1834 || !init_ecdh(ctx, host, errstr)
1838 /* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */
1840 if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx, cbinfo, errstr)) != OK)
1843 /* If we need to handle SNI or OCSP, do so */
1845 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1846 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1847 if (!(cbinfo->verify_stack = sk_X509_new_null()))
1849 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create stack for stapling verify\n");
1854 if (!host) /* server */
1856 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1857 /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
1858 the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
1859 change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
1860 callback is invoked. */
1861 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
1863 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, tls_server_stapling_cb);
1864 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
1867 /* We always do this, so that $tls_sni is available even if not used in
1869 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, tls_servername_cb);
1870 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
1872 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1874 if(ocsp_file) /* wanting stapling */
1876 if (!(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = X509_STORE_new()))
1878 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
1881 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, tls_client_stapling_cb);
1882 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, cbinfo);
1887 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
1889 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_EPHEM_RSA_KEX
1890 /* Set up the RSA callback */
1891 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, rsa_callback);
1894 /* Finally, set the timeout, and we are done */
1896 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, ssl_session_timeout);
1897 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialized TLS\n");
1908 /*************************************************
1909 * Get name of cipher in use *
1910 *************************************************/
1913 Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
1914 buffer to use for answer
1916 pointer to number of bits for cipher
1921 construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
1923 /* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, 'c' needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
1924 yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
1925 the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
1927 const uschar * ver = CUS SSL_get_version(ssl);
1928 const SSL_CIPHER * c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
1930 SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
1932 string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
1933 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
1935 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
1940 peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned siz)
1942 /*XXX we might consider a list-of-certs variable for the cert chain.
1943 SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL*). We'd need a new variable type and support
1944 in list-handling functions, also consider the difference between the entire
1945 chain and the elements sent by the peer. */
1947 tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
1949 /* Will have already noted peercert on a verify fail; possibly not the leaf */
1950 if (!tlsp->peercert)
1951 tlsp->peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
1952 /* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
1954 if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tlsp->peercert), CS peerdn, siz))
1955 { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n"); }
1958 peerdn[siz-1] = '\0';
1959 tlsp->peerdn = peerdn; /*XXX a static buffer... */
1967 /*************************************************
1968 * Set up for verifying certificates *
1969 *************************************************/
1971 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1972 /* Load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
1975 chain_from_pem_file(const uschar * file, STACK_OF(X509) * verify_stack)
1980 while (sk_X509_num(verify_stack) > 0)
1981 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(verify_stack));
1983 if (!(bp = BIO_new_file(CS file, "r"))) return FALSE;
1984 while ((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL)))
1985 sk_X509_push(verify_stack, x);
1993 /* Called by both client and server startup; on the server possibly
1994 repeated after a Server Name Indication.
1997 sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
1998 certs certs file or NULL
1999 crl CRL file or NULL
2000 host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
2001 optional TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts;
2002 otherwise passed as FALSE
2003 cert_vfy_cb Callback function for certificate verification
2004 errstr error string pointer
2006 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
2010 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
2011 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *), uschar ** errstr)
2013 uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
2015 if (!expand_check(certs, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts, errstr))
2017 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_verify_certificates: %s\n", expcerts);
2019 if (expcerts && *expcerts)
2021 /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
2022 CA bundle. Then add the ones specified in the config, if any. */
2024 if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
2025 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL, errstr);
2027 if (Ustrcmp(expcerts, "system") != 0)
2029 struct stat statbuf;
2031 if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
2033 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
2034 "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
2040 if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
2041 { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
2044 file = expcerts; dir = NULL;
2045 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2046 /* In the server if we will be offering an OCSP proof, load chain from
2047 file for verifying the OCSP proof at load time. */
2050 && statbuf.st_size > 0
2051 && server_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file
2052 && !chain_from_pem_file(file, server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack)
2055 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
2056 "failed to load cert chain from %s", file);
2062 /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
2063 unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
2064 certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
2065 says no certificate was supplied). But this is better. */
2067 if ( (!file || statbuf.st_size > 0)
2068 && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
2069 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL, errstr);
2071 /* Load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for sending
2072 to the client. This is only for the one-file tls_verify_certificates
2074 If a list isn't loaded into the server, but some verify locations are set,
2075 the server end appears to make a wildcard request for client certs.
2076 Meanwhile, the client library as default behaviour *ignores* the list
2077 we send over the wire - see man SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.
2078 Because of this, and that the dir variant is likely only used for
2079 the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing. */
2083 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
2085 SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
2086 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
2087 sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
2092 /* Handle a certificate revocation list. */
2094 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
2096 /* This bit of code is now the version supplied by Lars Mainka. (I have
2097 merely reformatted it into the Exim code style.)
2099 "From here I changed the code to add support for multiple crl's
2100 in pem format in one file or to support hashed directory entries in
2101 pem format instead of a file. This method now uses the library function
2102 X509_STORE_load_locations to add the CRL location to the SSL context.
2103 OpenSSL will then handle the verify against CA certs and CRLs by
2104 itself in the verify callback." */
2106 if (!expand_check(crl, US"tls_crl", &expcrl, errstr)) return DEFER;
2107 if (expcrl && *expcrl)
2109 struct stat statbufcrl;
2110 if (Ustat(expcrl, &statbufcrl) < 0)
2112 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
2113 "failed to stat %s for certificates revocation lists", expcrl);
2118 /* is it a file or directory? */
2120 X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
2121 if ((statbufcrl.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
2125 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a directory %s\n", dir);
2131 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a file %s\n", file);
2133 if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, CS file, CS dir) == 0)
2134 return tls_error(US"X509_STORE_load_locations", host, NULL, errstr);
2136 /* setting the flags to check against the complete crl chain */
2138 X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
2139 X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
2143 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
2145 /* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */
2147 SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
2148 SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional ? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
2157 /*************************************************
2158 * Start a TLS session in a server *
2159 *************************************************/
2161 /* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received
2162 the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate
2166 require_ciphers allowed ciphers
2167 errstr pointer to error message
2169 Returns: OK on success
2170 DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
2171 FAIL for errors during the negotiation; the server can't
2176 tls_server_start(const uschar * require_ciphers, uschar ** errstr)
2179 uschar * expciphers;
2180 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo;
2181 static uschar peerdn[256];
2182 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
2184 /* Check for previous activation */
2186 if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0)
2188 tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"", errstr);
2189 smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE);
2193 /* Initialize the SSL library. If it fails, it will already have logged
2196 rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
2197 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2198 tls_ocsp_file, /*XXX stack*/
2200 NULL, &server_static_cbinfo, errstr);
2201 if (rc != OK) return rc;
2202 cbinfo = server_static_cbinfo;
2204 if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, errstr))
2207 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
2208 were historically separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my
2209 tests, and also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here.
2211 XXX SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() is replaced by SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites()
2212 for TLS 1.3 . Since we do not call it at present we get the default list:
2213 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
2218 uschar * s = expciphers;
2219 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
2220 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
2221 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_ctx, CS expciphers))
2222 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL, errstr);
2223 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = expciphers;
2226 /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
2227 optional, set up appropriately. */
2229 tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
2231 tls_in.dane_verified = FALSE;
2233 server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
2235 if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
2237 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
2238 FALSE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
2239 if (rc != OK) return rc;
2240 server_verify_optional = FALSE;
2242 else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
2244 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
2245 TRUE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
2246 if (rc != OK) return rc;
2247 server_verify_optional = TRUE;
2250 /* Prepare for new connection */
2252 if (!(server_ssl = SSL_new(server_ctx)))
2253 return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL, errstr);
2255 /* Warning: we used to SSL_clear(ssl) here, it was removed.
2257 * With the SSL_clear(), we get strange interoperability bugs with
2258 * OpenSSL 1.0.1b and TLS1.1/1.2. It looks as though this may be a bug in
2259 * OpenSSL itself, as a clear should not lead to inability to follow protocols.
2261 * The SSL_clear() call is to let an existing SSL* be reused, typically after
2262 * session shutdown. In this case, we have a brand new object and there's no
2263 * obvious reason to immediately clear it. I'm guessing that this was
2264 * originally added because of incomplete initialisation which the clear fixed,
2265 * in some historic release.
2268 /* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
2269 on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
2270 make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out
2271 the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
2272 mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
2274 SSL_set_session_id_context(server_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
2275 if (!tls_in.on_connect)
2277 smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n", FALSE);
2281 /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
2282 that the OpenSSL library doesn't. */
2284 SSL_set_wfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_out));
2285 SSL_set_rfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_in));
2286 SSL_set_accept_state(server_ssl);
2288 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
2290 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
2291 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
2292 rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
2297 (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
2301 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n");
2302 ERR_clear_error(); /* Even success can leave errors in the stack. Seen with
2303 anon-authentication ciphersuite negociated. */
2305 /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
2306 and initialize things. */
2308 peer_cert(server_ssl, &tls_in, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
2313 if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
2314 debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
2316 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
2318 BIO * bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
2321 SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(bp, SSL_get_session(server_ssl));
2322 len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s);
2323 debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
2329 construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
2330 tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
2332 /* Record the certificate we presented */
2334 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(server_ssl);
2335 tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
2338 /* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
2339 Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
2340 smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
2341 Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
2343 if (!ssl_xfer_buffer) ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
2344 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
2345 ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = FALSE;
2347 receive_getc = tls_getc;
2348 receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf;
2349 receive_get_cache = tls_get_cache;
2350 receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
2351 receive_feof = tls_feof;
2352 receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
2353 receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
2355 tls_in.active.sock = fileno(smtp_out);
2356 tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL; /* not using explicit ctx for server-side */
2364 tls_client_basic_ctx_init(SSL_CTX * ctx,
2365 host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo,
2369 /* stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
2370 set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts is not set. Check only
2371 the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
2373 if ( ( !ob->tls_verify_hosts
2374 && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
2376 || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK
2378 client_verify_optional = FALSE;
2379 else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
2380 client_verify_optional = TRUE;
2384 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
2385 ob->tls_crl, host, client_verify_optional, verify_callback_client,
2389 if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
2391 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames =
2393 string_domain_utf8_to_alabel(host->name, NULL);
2397 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
2398 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
2406 dane_tlsa_load(SSL * ssl, host_item * host, dns_answer * dnsa, uschar ** errstr)
2409 const char * hostnames[2] = { CS host->name, NULL };
2412 if (DANESSL_init(ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
2413 return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL, errstr);
2415 for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr;
2416 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
2417 ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA && rr->size > 3)
2419 const uschar * p = rr->data;
2420 uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
2421 const char * mdname;
2425 /* Only DANE-TA(2) and DANE-EE(3) are supported */
2426 if (usage != 2 && usage != 3) continue;
2433 default: continue; /* Only match-types 0, 1, 2 are supported */
2434 case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
2435 case 1: mdname = "sha256"; break;
2436 case 2: mdname = "sha512"; break;
2440 switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(ssl, usage, selector, mdname, p, rr->size - 3))
2443 return tls_error(US"tlsa load", host, NULL, errstr);
2444 case 0: /* action not taken */
2448 tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<<usage;
2454 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: No usable TLSA records");
2457 #endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/
2461 /*************************************************
2462 * Start a TLS session in a client *
2463 *************************************************/
2465 /* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted.
2468 fd the fd of the connection
2469 host connected host (for messages and option-tests)
2470 addr the first address (for some randomness; can be NULL)
2471 tb transport (always smtp)
2472 tlsa_dnsa tlsa lookup, if DANE, else null
2473 tlsp record details of channel configuration here; must be non-NULL
2474 errstr error string pointer
2476 Returns: Pointer to TLS session context, or NULL on error
2480 tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
2481 transport_instance * tb,
2483 dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa,
2485 tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr)
2487 smtp_transport_options_block * ob = tb
2488 ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block
2489 : &smtp_transport_option_defaults;
2490 exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * exim_client_ctx;
2491 static uschar peerdn[256];
2492 uschar * expciphers;
2494 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
2496 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2497 BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
2498 BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
2502 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2503 exim_client_ctx = store_get(sizeof(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx));
2507 tlsp->tlsa_usage = 0;
2510 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2512 # ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
2514 && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
2515 && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
2518 /* Unchanged from default. Use a safer one under DANE */
2519 request_ocsp = TRUE;
2520 ob->hosts_request_ocsp = US"${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} "
2521 " {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } "
2527 verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
2528 request_ocsp = TRUE;
2530 # ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
2534 verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
2538 rc = tls_init(&exim_client_ctx->ctx, host, NULL,
2539 ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
2540 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2541 (void *)(long)request_ocsp,
2543 addr, &client_static_cbinfo, errstr);
2544 if (rc != OK) return NULL;
2546 tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
2547 client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
2553 /* We fall back to tls_require_ciphers if unset, empty or forced failure, but
2554 other failures should be treated as problems. */
2555 if (ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers &&
2556 !expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers",
2557 &expciphers, errstr))
2559 if (expciphers && *expciphers == '\0')
2564 !expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
2565 &expciphers, errstr))
2568 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
2569 are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and
2570 also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here. */
2574 uschar *s = expciphers;
2575 while (*s) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
2576 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
2577 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(exim_client_ctx->ctx, CS expciphers))
2579 tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL, errstr);
2587 SSL_CTX_set_verify(exim_client_ctx->ctx,
2588 SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
2589 verify_callback_client_dane);
2591 if (!DANESSL_library_init())
2593 tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL, errstr);
2596 if (DANESSL_CTX_init(exim_client_ctx->ctx) <= 0)
2598 tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL, errstr);
2606 if (tls_client_basic_ctx_init(exim_client_ctx->ctx, host, ob,
2607 client_static_cbinfo, errstr) != OK)
2610 if (!(exim_client_ctx->ssl = SSL_new(exim_client_ctx->ctx)))
2612 tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
2615 SSL_set_session_id_context(exim_client_ctx->ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
2616 SSL_set_fd(exim_client_ctx->ssl, fd);
2617 SSL_set_connect_state(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
2621 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tlsp->sni, errstr))
2625 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
2627 else if (!Ustrlen(tlsp->sni))
2631 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
2632 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tlsp->sni);
2633 SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp->sni);
2635 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SNI unusable with this OpenSSL library version; ignoring \"%s\"\n",
2643 if (dane_tlsa_load(exim_client_ctx->ssl, host, tlsa_dnsa, errstr) != OK)
2647 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2648 /* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
2649 does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
2650 # ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
2654 if ( ((s = ob->hosts_require_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
2655 || ((s = ob->hosts_request_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
2657 { /* Re-eval now $tls_out_tlsa_usage is populated. If
2658 this means we avoid the OCSP request, we wasted the setup
2659 cost in tls_init(). */
2660 require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
2661 request_ocsp = require_ocsp
2662 || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
2669 SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(exim_client_ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
2670 client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
2671 tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
2675 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
2676 client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb ? tb->event_action : NULL;
2679 /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
2681 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
2682 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
2683 ALARM(ob->command_timeout);
2684 rc = SSL_connect(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
2689 DANESSL_cleanup(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
2694 tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
2700 debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
2701 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
2703 BIO * bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
2706 SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(bp, SSL_get_session(server_ssl));
2707 len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s);
2708 debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
2714 peer_cert(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
2716 construct_cipher_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tlsp->bits);
2717 tlsp->cipher = cipherbuf;
2719 /* Record the certificate we presented */
2721 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
2722 tlsp->ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
2725 tlsp->active.sock = fd;
2726 tlsp->active.tls_ctx = exim_client_ctx;
2727 return exim_client_ctx;
2735 tls_refill(unsigned lim)
2740 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
2741 ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
2743 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
2744 inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer,
2745 MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim));
2746 error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
2747 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM_CLR(0);
2749 if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */
2750 smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */
2751 if (had_command_sigterm)
2752 smtp_command_sigterm_exit();
2753 if (had_data_timeout)
2754 smtp_data_timeout_exit();
2755 if (had_data_sigint)
2756 smtp_data_sigint_exit();
2758 /* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
2759 closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
2760 non-SSL handling. */
2764 case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
2767 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2768 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
2770 receive_getc = smtp_getc;
2771 receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf;
2772 receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
2773 receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
2774 receive_feof = smtp_feof;
2775 receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
2776 receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
2778 if (SSL_get_shutdown(server_ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
2779 SSL_shutdown(server_ssl);
2781 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2782 sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free);
2783 server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
2785 SSL_free(server_ssl);
2786 SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx);
2789 tls_in.active.sock = -1;
2790 tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL;
2792 tls_in.cipher = NULL;
2793 tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
2798 /* Handle genuine errors */
2800 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
2801 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
2802 ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
2806 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
2807 DEBUG(D_tls) if (error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
2808 debug_printf(" - syscall %s\n", strerror(errno));
2809 ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
2813 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2814 dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer, inbytes);
2816 ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = inbytes;
2817 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
2822 /*************************************************
2823 * TLS version of getc *
2824 *************************************************/
2826 /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty,
2827 it refills the buffer via the SSL reading function.
2829 Arguments: lim Maximum amount to read/buffer
2830 Returns: the next character or EOF
2832 Only used by the server-side TLS.
2836 tls_getc(unsigned lim)
2838 if (ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm >= ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm)
2839 if (!tls_refill(lim))
2840 return ssl_xfer_error ? EOF : smtp_getc(lim);
2842 /* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
2844 return ssl_xfer_buffer[ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm++];
2848 tls_getbuf(unsigned * len)
2853 if (ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm >= ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm)
2854 if (!tls_refill(*len))
2856 if (!ssl_xfer_error) return smtp_getbuf(len);
2861 if ((size = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm - ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm) > *len)
2863 buf = &ssl_xfer_buffer[ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm];
2864 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm += size;
2873 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2874 int n = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm - ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm;
2876 dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer+ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm, n);
2882 tls_could_read(void)
2884 return ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm < ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm || SSL_pending(server_ssl) > 0;
2888 /*************************************************
2889 * Read bytes from TLS channel *
2890 *************************************************/
2894 ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
2898 Returns: the number of bytes read
2899 -1 after a failed read, including EOF
2901 Only used by the client-side TLS.
2905 tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len)
2907 SSL * ssl = ct_ctx ? ((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->ssl : server_ssl;
2911 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
2912 buff, (unsigned int)len);
2914 inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS buff, len);
2915 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, inbytes);
2917 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
2919 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
2922 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
2932 /*************************************************
2933 * Write bytes down TLS channel *
2934 *************************************************/
2938 ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
2941 more further data expected soon
2943 Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
2944 -1 after a failed write
2946 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2950 tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar *buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
2953 int outbytes, error;
2954 SSL * ssl = ct_ctx ? ((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->ssl : server_ssl;
2955 static gstring * corked = NULL;
2957 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, %lu%s)\n", __FUNCTION__,
2958 buff, (unsigned long)len, more ? ", more" : "");
2960 /* Lacking a CORK or MSG_MORE facility (such as GnuTLS has) we copy data when
2961 "more" is notified. This hack is only ok if small amounts are involved AND only
2962 one stream does it, in one context (i.e. no store reset). Currently it is used
2963 for the responses to the received SMTP MAIL , RCPT, DATA sequence, only. */
2964 /* + if PIPE_COMMAND, banner & ehlo-resp for smmtp-on-connect. Suspect there's
2965 a store reset there, so use POOL_PERM. */
2966 /* + if CHUNKING, cmds EHLO,MAIL,RCPT(s),BDAT */
2968 if ((more || corked))
2970 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT
2971 int save_pool = store_pool;
2972 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2975 corked = string_catn(corked, buff, len);
2977 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT
2978 store_pool = save_pool;
2983 buff = CUS corked->s;
2988 for (int left = len; left > 0;)
2990 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", ssl, buff, left);
2991 outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
2992 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
2993 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
2997 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
2998 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
3001 case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
3006 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
3007 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
3010 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
3011 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
3012 sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
3017 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
3026 /*************************************************
3027 * Close down a TLS session *
3028 *************************************************/
3030 /* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
3031 daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
3032 would tamper with the SSL session in the parent process).
3035 ct_ctx client TLS context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
3036 shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent,
3037 2 if also response to be waited for
3041 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
3045 tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int shutdown)
3047 exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * o_ctx = ct_ctx;
3048 SSL_CTX **ctxp = o_ctx ? &o_ctx->ctx : &server_ctx;
3049 SSL **sslp = o_ctx ? &o_ctx->ssl : &server_ssl;
3050 int *fdp = o_ctx ? &tls_out.active.sock : &tls_in.active.sock;
3052 if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
3057 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n",
3058 shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
3060 if ( (rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp)) == 0 /* send "close notify" alert */
3064 rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp); /* wait for response */
3068 if (rc < 0) DEBUG(D_tls)
3070 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
3071 debug_printf("SSL_shutdown: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
3075 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
3076 if (!o_ctx) /* server side */
3078 sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free);
3079 server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
3083 SSL_CTX_free(*ctxp);
3093 /*************************************************
3094 * Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup *
3095 *************************************************/
3097 /* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the
3100 Returns: NULL on success, or error message
3104 tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
3107 uschar *s, *expciphers, *err;
3109 /* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global
3110 state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */
3112 #ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
3113 SSL_load_error_strings();
3114 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
3116 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
3117 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
3118 list of available digests. */
3119 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
3122 if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
3125 if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers,
3127 return US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers";
3129 if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
3132 /* normalisation ripped from above */
3134 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
3138 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
3139 if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
3141 if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
3144 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
3145 return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);
3149 debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers);
3151 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
3153 ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
3154 err = string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed: %s",
3155 expciphers, ssl_errstring);
3166 /*************************************************
3167 * Report the library versions. *
3168 *************************************************/
3170 /* There have historically been some issues with binary compatibility in
3171 OpenSSL libraries; if Exim (like many other applications) is built against
3172 one version of OpenSSL but the run-time linker picks up another version,
3173 it can result in serious failures, including crashing with a SIGSEGV. So
3174 report the version found by the compiler and the run-time version.
3176 Note: some OS vendors backport security fixes without changing the version
3177 number/string, and the version date remains unchanged. The _build_ date
3178 will change, so we can more usefully assist with version diagnosis by also
3179 reporting the build date.
3181 Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to
3186 tls_version_report(FILE *f)
3188 fprintf(f, "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
3191 OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
3192 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
3193 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
3194 /* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
3195 the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
3201 /*************************************************
3202 * Random number generation *
3203 *************************************************/
3205 /* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be
3206 cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves
3207 in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or
3208 whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork()
3209 and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us.
3213 Returns a random number in range [0, max-1]
3217 vaguely_random_number(int max)
3221 static pid_t pidlast = 0;
3223 uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
3229 if (pidnow != pidlast)
3231 /* Although OpenSSL documents that "OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state
3232 is unique for each thread", this doesn't apparently apply across processes,
3233 so our own warning from vaguely_random_number_fallback() applies here too.
3234 Fix per PostgreSQL. */
3240 /* OpenSSL auto-seeds from /dev/random, etc, but this a double-check. */
3244 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
3247 RAND_seed(US (&r), sizeof(r));
3249 /* We're after pseudo-random, not random; if we still don't have enough data
3250 in the internal PRNG then our options are limited. We could sleep and hope
3251 for entropy to come along (prayer technique) but if the system is so depleted
3252 in the first place then something is likely to just keep taking it. Instead,
3253 we'll just take whatever little bit of pseudo-random we can still manage to
3256 needed_len = sizeof(r);
3257 /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were
3258 asked for a number less than 10. */
3259 for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i)
3265 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO
3266 /* We do not care if crypto-strong */
3267 i = RAND_pseudo_bytes(smallbuf, needed_len);
3269 i = RAND_bytes(smallbuf, needed_len);
3275 debug_printf("OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() not supported by RAND method, using fallback.\n");
3276 return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
3280 for (uschar * p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
3283 /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
3284 smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
3291 /*************************************************
3292 * OpenSSL option parse *
3293 *************************************************/
3295 /* Parse one option for tls_openssl_options_parse below
3298 name one option name
3299 value place to store a value for it
3300 Returns success or failure in parsing
3306 tls_openssl_one_option_parse(uschar *name, long *value)
3309 int last = exim_openssl_options_size;
3310 while (last > first)
3312 int middle = (first + last)/2;
3313 int c = Ustrcmp(name, exim_openssl_options[middle].name);
3316 *value = exim_openssl_options[middle].value;
3330 /*************************************************
3331 * OpenSSL option parsing logic *
3332 *************************************************/
3334 /* OpenSSL has a number of compatibility options which an administrator might
3335 reasonably wish to set. Interpret a list similarly to decode_bits(), so that
3336 we look like log_selector.
3339 option_spec the administrator-supplied string of options
3340 results ptr to long storage for the options bitmap
3341 Returns success or failure
3345 tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
3350 BOOL adding, item_parsed;
3352 result = SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
3353 /* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
3354 * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
3355 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
3356 result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
3358 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
3359 result |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
3368 for (uschar * s = option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
3370 while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
3373 if (*s != '+' && *s != '-')
3375 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("malformed openssl option setting: "
3376 "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"\n", s);
3379 adding = *s++ == '+';
3380 for (end = s; (*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end); ++end) /**/ ;
3383 item_parsed = tls_openssl_one_option_parse(s, &item);
3387 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
3390 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s from %lx: %lx (%s)\n",
3391 adding ? "adding" : "removing", result, item, s);
3403 #endif /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/
3406 /* End of tls-openssl.c */