1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
8 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
13 /* Default callout timeout */
15 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
17 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
19 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
24 static uschar *verbs[] = {
25 [ACL_ACCEPT] = US"accept",
26 [ACL_DEFER] = US"defer",
27 [ACL_DENY] = US"deny",
28 [ACL_DISCARD] = US"discard",
29 [ACL_DROP] = US"drop",
30 [ACL_REQUIRE] = US"require",
34 /* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
35 are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
36 "accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
39 static int msgcond[] = {
40 [ACL_ACCEPT] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
41 [ACL_DEFER] = BIT(OK),
43 [ACL_DISCARD] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
45 [ACL_REQUIRE] = BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
49 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
56 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
62 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
65 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
73 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
83 ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
85 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
89 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
95 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
102 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
112 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
113 "message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", "queue" and "set" are
114 modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
115 their side effects. */
117 typedef struct condition_def {
120 /* Flag to indicate the condition/modifier has a string expansion done
121 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
122 checking functions. */
123 BOOL expand_at_top:1;
127 /* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
128 times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
129 For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
135 static condition_def conditions[] = {
136 [ACLC_ACL] = { US"acl", FALSE, FALSE, 0 },
138 [ACLC_ADD_HEADER] = { US"add_header", TRUE, TRUE,
140 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
141 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
145 ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
147 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
150 [ACLC_AUTHENTICATED] = { US"authenticated", FALSE, FALSE,
151 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
152 ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO,
154 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
155 [ACLC_BMI_OPTIN] = { US"bmi_optin", TRUE, TRUE,
157 ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO |
158 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_MIME |
159 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
162 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
164 ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_STARTTLS |
165 ACL_BIT_VRFY | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
166 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
169 [ACLC_CONDITION] = { US"condition", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
170 [ACLC_CONTINUE] = { US"continue", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
172 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
173 always and check in the control processing itself. */
174 [ACLC_CONTROL] = { US"control", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
176 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
177 [ACLC_DCC] = { US"dcc", TRUE, FALSE,
180 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
186 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
187 [ACLC_DECODE] = { US"decode", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
190 [ACLC_DELAY] = { US"delay", TRUE, TRUE, ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT },
192 [ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER] = { US"dkim_signers", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
193 [ACLC_DKIM_STATUS] = { US"dkim_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
195 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
196 [ACLC_DMARC_STATUS] = { US"dmarc_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DATA },
199 /* Explicit key lookups can be made in non-smtp ACLs so pass
200 always and check in the verify processing itself. */
201 [ACLC_DNSLISTS] = { US"dnslists", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
203 [ACLC_DOMAINS] = { US"domains", FALSE, FALSE,
205 ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
211 [ACLC_ENCRYPTED] = { US"encrypted", FALSE, FALSE,
212 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
216 [ACLC_ENDPASS] = { US"endpass", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
218 [ACLC_HOSTS] = { US"hosts", FALSE, FALSE,
219 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
221 [ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS] = { US"local_parts", FALSE, FALSE,
223 ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
230 [ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE] = { US"log_message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
231 [ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET] = { US"log_reject_target", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
232 [ACLC_LOGWRITE] = { US"logwrite", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
234 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
235 [ACLC_MALWARE] = { US"malware", TRUE, FALSE,
238 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
245 [ACLC_MESSAGE] = { US"message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
246 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
247 [ACLC_MIME_REGEX] = { US"mime_regex", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
250 [ACLC_QUEUE] = { US"queue", TRUE, TRUE,
258 [ACLC_RATELIMIT] = { US"ratelimit", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
259 [ACLC_RECIPIENTS] = { US"recipients", FALSE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
261 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
262 [ACLC_REGEX] = { US"regex", TRUE, FALSE,
265 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
273 [ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER] = { US"remove_header", TRUE, TRUE,
275 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL|ACL_BIT_RCPT |
276 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
280 ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
281 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
283 [ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS] = { US"sender_domains", FALSE, FALSE,
284 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
286 ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
287 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
288 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
290 [ACLC_SENDERS] = { US"senders", FALSE, FALSE,
291 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
293 ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
294 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
295 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
298 [ACLC_SET] = { US"set", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
300 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
301 [ACLC_SPAM] = { US"spam", TRUE, FALSE,
302 (unsigned int) ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
303 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
310 [ACLC_SPF] = { US"spf", TRUE, FALSE,
311 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
312 ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
313 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
314 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
315 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
317 [ACLC_SPF_GUESS] = { US"spf_guess", TRUE, FALSE,
318 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
319 ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
320 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
321 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
322 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
325 [ACLC_UDPSEND] = { US"udpsend", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
327 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
328 always and check in the verify function itself */
329 [ACLC_VERIFY] = { US"verify", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
334 /* Return values from decode_control(); used as index so keep in step
335 with the controls_list table that follows! */
338 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
339 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
342 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
343 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
344 CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY,
349 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
350 CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY,
351 CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC,
354 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
355 CONTROL_ERROR, /* pseudo-value for decode errors */
360 CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH,
361 CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
362 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
363 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
364 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
366 CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
367 CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
371 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
373 CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT,
379 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics.
380 For each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
381 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
383 typedef struct control_def {
385 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
386 unsigned forbids; /* bitmap of dis-allowed times */
389 static control_def controls_list[] = {
390 /* name has_option forbids */
391 [CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED] =
392 { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", FALSE,
394 ~(ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO)
396 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
398 { US"bmi_run", FALSE, 0 },
400 [CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART] =
401 { US"caseful_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
402 [CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART] =
403 { US"caselower_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
404 [CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY] =
405 { US"cutthrough_delivery", TRUE, 0 },
407 { US"debug", TRUE, 0 },
410 [CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY] =
411 { US"dkim_disable_verify", FALSE,
412 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
413 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
416 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
420 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
421 [CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY] =
422 { US"dmarc_disable_verify", FALSE,
423 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
425 [CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC] =
426 { US"dmarc_enable_forensic", FALSE,
427 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
433 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START | ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT
435 [CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
436 { US"enforce_sync", FALSE,
437 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
440 /* Pseudo-value for decode errors */
442 { US"error", FALSE, 0 },
444 [CONTROL_FAKEDEFER] =
445 { US"fakedefer", TRUE,
447 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
448 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
454 [CONTROL_FAKEREJECT] =
455 { US"fakereject", TRUE,
457 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
458 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
467 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
468 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
469 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
470 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
473 [CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH] =
474 { US"no_callout_flush", FALSE,
475 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
477 [CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH] =
478 { US"no_delay_flush", FALSE,
479 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
482 [CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
483 { US"no_enforce_sync", FALSE,
484 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
486 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
487 [CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL] =
488 { US"no_mbox_unspool", FALSE,
490 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
491 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
492 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
496 [CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE] =
497 { US"no_multiline_responses", FALSE,
498 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
500 [CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING] =
501 { US"no_pipelining", FALSE,
502 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
505 [CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY] =
506 { US"queue_only", FALSE,
508 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
509 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
510 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
511 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
513 [CONTROL_SUBMISSION] =
514 { US"submission", TRUE,
516 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA)
518 [CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS] =
519 { US"suppress_local_fixups", FALSE,
521 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
522 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START)
525 [CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT] =
526 { US"utf8_downconvert", TRUE, (unsigned) ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY)
531 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
532 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
533 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
534 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
536 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
538 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
539 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
541 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
542 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
543 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
544 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
545 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
546 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
547 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
549 static int csa_return_code[] = {
552 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = OK,
553 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = OK,
554 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = FAIL,
555 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = FAIL,
556 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = FAIL,
557 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = FAIL
560 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
561 [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
563 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"defer",
564 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"defer",
565 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"fail",
566 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"fail",
567 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"fail",
568 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"fail"
571 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
572 [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
574 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
575 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
576 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
577 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"failed (host name not authorized)",
578 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
579 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"failed (client address mismatch)"
582 /* Options for the ratelimit condition. Note that there are two variants of
583 the per_rcpt option, depending on the ACL that is used to measure the rate.
584 However any ACL must be able to look up per_rcpt rates in /noupdate mode,
585 so the two variants must have the same internal representation as well as
586 the same configuration string. */
589 RATE_PER_WHAT, RATE_PER_CLASH, RATE_PER_ADDR, RATE_PER_BYTE, RATE_PER_CMD,
590 RATE_PER_CONN, RATE_PER_MAIL, RATE_PER_RCPT, RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS
593 #define RATE_SET(var,new) \
594 (((var) == RATE_PER_WHAT) ? ((var) = RATE_##new) : ((var) = RATE_PER_CLASH))
596 static uschar *ratelimit_option_string[] = {
597 [RATE_PER_WHAT] = US"?",
598 [RATE_PER_CLASH] = US"!",
599 [RATE_PER_ADDR] = US"per_addr",
600 [RATE_PER_BYTE] = US"per_byte",
601 [RATE_PER_CMD] = US"per_cmd",
602 [RATE_PER_CONN] = US"per_conn",
603 [RATE_PER_MAIL] = US"per_mail",
604 [RATE_PER_RCPT] = US"per_rcpt",
605 [RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS] = US"per_rcpt"
608 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
610 static int acl_check_wargs(int, address_item *, const uschar *, uschar **,
614 /*************************************************
615 * Find control in list *
616 *************************************************/
618 /* The lists are always in order, so binary chop can be used.
621 name the control name to search for
622 ol the first entry in the control list
623 last one more than the offset of the last entry in the control list
625 Returns: index of a control entry, or -1 if not found
629 find_control(const uschar * name, control_def * ol, int last)
634 int middle = (first + last)/2;
635 uschar * s = ol[middle].name;
636 int c = Ustrncmp(name, s, Ustrlen(s));
637 if (c == 0) return middle;
638 else if (c > 0) first = middle + 1;
646 /*************************************************
647 * Pick out condition from list *
648 *************************************************/
650 /* Use a binary chop method
654 list list of conditions
657 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
661 acl_checkcondition(uschar * name, condition_def * list, int end)
666 int mid = (start + end)/2;
667 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid].name);
668 if (c == 0) return mid;
669 if (c < 0) end = mid;
670 else start = mid + 1;
676 /*************************************************
677 * Pick out name from list *
678 *************************************************/
680 /* Use a binary chop method
687 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
691 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
697 int mid = (start + end)/2;
698 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
699 if (c == 0) return mid;
700 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
707 /*************************************************
708 * Read and parse one ACL *
709 *************************************************/
711 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
712 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
713 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
714 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
715 blank lines (where relevant).
718 func function to get next line of ACL
719 error where to put an error message
721 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
722 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
726 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
728 acl_block *yield = NULL;
729 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
730 acl_block *this = NULL;
731 acl_condition_block *cond;
732 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
737 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
740 BOOL negated = FALSE;
741 uschar *saveline = s;
744 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
747 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
754 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
755 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
757 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
758 if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
760 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
761 continues the previous verb. */
763 if ((v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, nelem(verbs))) < 0)
767 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
779 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
782 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
784 lastp = &(this->next);
787 this->condition = NULL;
788 condp = &(this->condition);
789 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
795 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
798 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
800 if ((c = acl_checkcondition(name, conditions, nelem(conditions))) < 0)
802 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
807 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
809 if (negated && conditions[c].is_modifier)
811 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
812 "\"%s\"", conditions[c].name);
816 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
818 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
819 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
820 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
822 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
823 conditions[c].name, verbs[this->verb]);
827 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
830 cond->u.negated = negated;
833 condp = &(cond->next);
835 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
836 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
837 gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
838 variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
839 extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
840 arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
841 After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
842 after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
847 if ( Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_status", 18) == 0
848 || Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_reason", 18) == 0)
850 uschar * endptr = s+18;
852 if (isalnum(*endptr))
854 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
855 "modifier \"set %s\" "
856 "(only \"dkim_verify_status\" or \"dkim_verify_reason\" permitted)",
860 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s, 18);
862 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
869 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 &&
870 Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
872 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
873 "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
878 if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
880 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
881 "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
886 while (*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
888 if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
890 *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
891 "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
897 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
899 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
902 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
903 "endpass" has no data */
905 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
909 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
910 conditions[c].is_modifier ? US"modifier" : US"condition");
913 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
914 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
923 /*************************************************
924 * Set up added header line(s) *
925 *************************************************/
927 /* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
928 to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
929 "warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
930 added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
932 Argument: string of header lines
937 setup_header(const uschar *hstring)
940 int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
942 /* Ignore any leading newlines */
943 while (*hstring == '\n') hstring++, hlen--;
945 /* An empty string does nothing; ensure exactly one final newline. */
946 if (hlen <= 0) return;
947 if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n') /* no newline */
948 q = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
949 else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n') /* double newline */
951 uschar * s = string_copy(hstring);
952 while(s[--hlen] == '\n')
959 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
961 for (p = q; *p != 0; )
965 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
966 header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
968 /* Find next header line within the string */
972 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); /* we know there was a newline */
973 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
976 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
977 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
981 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
983 newtype = htype_add_rec;
986 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
988 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
991 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
993 newtype = htype_add_top;
996 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
998 newtype = htype_add_bot;
1001 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
1004 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
1005 to the front of it. */
1007 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
1009 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
1012 hdr = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", (int) (q - p), p);
1013 hlen = Ustrlen(hdr);
1015 /* See if this line has already been added */
1017 while (*hptr != NULL)
1019 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, hdr, hlen) == 0) break;
1020 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
1023 /* Add if not previously present */
1027 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
1036 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
1044 /*************************************************
1045 * List the added header lines *
1046 *************************************************/
1051 header_line * h = acl_added_headers;
1055 if (!h) return NULL;
1060 while ((cp = Ustrchr(s, '\n')) != NULL)
1062 if (cp[1] == '\0') break;
1064 /* contains embedded newline; needs doubling */
1065 g = string_catn(g, s, cp-s+1);
1066 g = string_catn(g, US"\n", 1);
1069 /* last bit of header */
1071 /*XXX could we use add_listele? */
1072 g = string_catn(g, s, cp-s+1); /* newline-sep list */
1074 while((h = h->next));
1076 g->s[g->ptr - 1] = '\0'; /* overwrite last newline */
1081 /*************************************************
1082 * Set up removed header line(s) *
1083 *************************************************/
1085 /* This function is called by the remove_header modifier. The argument is
1086 treated as a sequence of header names which are added to a colon separated
1087 list, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
1089 Argument: string of header names
1094 setup_remove_header(const uschar *hnames)
1097 acl_removed_headers = acl_removed_headers
1098 ? string_sprintf("%s : %s", acl_removed_headers, hnames)
1099 : string_copy(hnames);
1104 /*************************************************
1106 *************************************************/
1108 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
1109 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
1110 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
1112 ** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
1113 its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
1116 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
1117 user_message message for adding to headers
1118 log_message message for logging, if different
1124 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
1126 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
1129 string_item *logged;
1131 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
1132 string_printing(log_message));
1134 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1135 failed", add the failure message. */
1137 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
1138 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
1139 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
1140 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
1142 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1143 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
1145 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
1146 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
1150 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
1151 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
1152 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
1153 logged->text = US logged + sizeof(string_item);
1154 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
1155 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
1156 acl_warn_logged = logged;
1160 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1162 if (user_message == NULL) return;
1164 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1167 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1169 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1170 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1171 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
1175 /* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1176 function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
1178 setup_header(user_message);
1183 /*************************************************
1184 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
1185 *************************************************/
1187 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1188 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1189 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1190 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1193 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1194 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1196 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1197 FAIL verification failed
1198 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1202 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
1206 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
1208 /* Previous success */
1210 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1212 /* Previous failure */
1214 if (host_lookup_failed)
1216 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1220 /* Need to do a lookup */
1223 debug_printf_indent("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1225 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1227 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
1228 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1230 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1232 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1235 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1241 /*************************************************
1242 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1243 *************************************************/
1245 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1246 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1247 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1248 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1249 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1250 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1251 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1252 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1255 dnsa the DNS answer block
1256 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1257 reset option specifying what portion to scan, as described above
1258 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1260 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1261 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1262 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1266 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1272 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1274 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1276 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1278 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1282 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1286 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1288 target_found = TRUE;
1290 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1291 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1293 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1295 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1297 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1299 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1303 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1304 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1307 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1308 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1313 /*************************************************
1314 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1315 *************************************************/
1317 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1318 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1319 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1320 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1321 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1322 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1323 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1326 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1328 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1329 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1330 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1331 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1335 acl_verify_csa(const uschar *domain)
1338 const uschar *found;
1339 int priority, weight, port;
1346 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1347 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1348 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1350 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1351 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1352 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1353 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1355 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1356 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1357 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1359 if (domain[0] == '[')
1361 const uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1362 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1363 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1366 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1367 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1368 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1369 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1370 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1372 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1374 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1375 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1379 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1380 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1381 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1382 we return from this function. */
1384 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1385 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1387 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1388 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1389 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1391 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1394 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1396 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1399 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1401 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1405 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1407 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1413 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1415 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1417 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)) if (rr->type == T_SRV)
1419 const uschar * p = rr->data;
1421 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1423 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1424 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1428 debug_printf_indent("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1430 /* Check the CSA version number */
1432 if (priority != 1) continue;
1434 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1435 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1436 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1437 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1438 SRV records of their own. */
1440 if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
1441 return t->data.val = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN;
1443 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1444 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1445 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1446 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1447 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1449 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1451 if (weight > 2) continue;
1453 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1454 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1455 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1457 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1458 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1460 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1465 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1467 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1469 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1470 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1471 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1472 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1473 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1475 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1477 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1478 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1479 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1480 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1482 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1483 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1485 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1488 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1491 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1495 lookup_dnssec_authenticated = NULL;
1496 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1498 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1501 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1503 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1506 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1507 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1508 /* else fall through */
1510 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1511 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1512 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1516 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1522 /*************************************************
1523 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1524 *************************************************/
1526 enum { VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, VERIFY_CERT, VERIFY_HELO, VERIFY_CSA, VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX,
1527 VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT,
1528 VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, VERIFY_ARC
1533 unsigned where_allowed; /* bitmap */
1534 BOOL no_options; /* Never has /option(s) following */
1535 unsigned alt_opt_sep; /* >0 Non-/ option separator (custom parser) */
1537 static verify_type_t verify_type_list[] = {
1538 /* name value where no-opt opt-sep */
1539 { US"reverse_host_lookup", VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, ~0, FALSE, 0 },
1540 { US"certificate", VERIFY_CERT, ~0, TRUE, 0 },
1541 { US"helo", VERIFY_HELO, ~0, TRUE, 0 },
1542 { US"csa", VERIFY_CSA, ~0, FALSE, 0 },
1543 { US"header_syntax", VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
1544 { US"not_blind", VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
1545 { US"header_sender", VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, FALSE, 0 },
1546 { US"sender", VERIFY_SNDR, ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT
1547 |ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP,
1549 { US"recipient", VERIFY_RCPT, ACL_BIT_RCPT, FALSE, 0 },
1550 { US"header_names_ascii", VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
1551 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
1552 { US"arc", VERIFY_ARC, ACL_BIT_DATA, TRUE , 0 },
1557 enum { CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, CALLOUT_NOCACHE, CALLOUT_RANDOM, CALLOUT_USE_SENDER,
1558 CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,
1559 CALLOUT_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, CALLOUT_CONNECT,
1560 CALLOUT_HOLD, CALLOUT_TIME /* TIME must be last */
1566 BOOL has_option; /* Has =option(s) following */
1567 BOOL timeval; /* Has a time value */
1569 static callout_opt_t callout_opt_list[] = {
1570 /* name value flag has-opt has-time */
1571 { US"defer_ok", CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1572 { US"no_cache", CALLOUT_NOCACHE, vopt_callout_no_cache, FALSE, FALSE },
1573 { US"random", CALLOUT_RANDOM, vopt_callout_random, FALSE, FALSE },
1574 { US"use_sender", CALLOUT_USE_SENDER, vopt_callout_recipsender, FALSE, FALSE },
1575 { US"use_postmaster", CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER,vopt_callout_recippmaster, FALSE, FALSE },
1576 { US"postmaster_mailfrom",CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM,0, TRUE, FALSE },
1577 { US"postmaster", CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1578 { US"fullpostmaster", CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,vopt_callout_fullpm, FALSE, FALSE },
1579 { US"mailfrom", CALLOUT_MAILFROM, 0, TRUE, FALSE },
1580 { US"maxwait", CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
1581 { US"connect", CALLOUT_CONNECT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
1582 { US"hold", CALLOUT_HOLD, vopt_callout_hold, FALSE, FALSE },
1583 { NULL, CALLOUT_TIME, 0, FALSE, TRUE }
1588 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1589 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1590 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1591 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1594 where where called from
1595 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1596 arg the argument of "verify"
1597 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1598 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1599 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1601 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1602 FAIL verification failed
1603 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1608 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *arg,
1609 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1613 int callout_overall = -1;
1614 int callout_connect = -1;
1615 int verify_options = 0;
1617 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1618 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1619 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1620 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1621 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1622 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1623 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1624 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1625 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1627 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1628 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them.
1631 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1632 const uschar *list = arg;
1633 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1636 if (!ss) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1638 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1640 for (vp= verify_type_list;
1641 CS vp < CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list);
1644 if (vp->alt_opt_sep ? strncmpic(ss, vp->name, vp->alt_opt_sep) == 0
1645 : strcmpic (ss, vp->name) == 0)
1647 if (CS vp >= CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list))
1650 if (vp->no_options && slash)
1652 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1653 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1656 if (!(vp->where_allowed & BIT(where)))
1658 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify %s in ACL for %s",
1659 vp->name, acl_wherenames[where]);
1664 case VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP:
1665 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1666 if ((rc = acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr)) == DEFER)
1667 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
1668 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0)
1673 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1674 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1675 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1677 if (tls_in.certificate_verified) return OK;
1678 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1682 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1683 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1685 if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1686 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1689 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1690 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1692 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1693 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1694 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1695 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1696 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1697 return csa_return_code[rc];
1699 case VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX:
1700 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct 5322-syntax. If there is
1701 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1702 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1705 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1706 if (rc != OK && *log_msgptr)
1707 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1708 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1710 acl_verify_message = *log_msgptr;
1713 case VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII:
1714 /* Check that all header names are true 7 bit strings
1715 See RFC 5322, 2.2. and RFC 6532, 3. */
1717 rc = verify_check_header_names_ascii(log_msgptr);
1718 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1719 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1722 case VERIFY_NOT_BLIND:
1723 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1724 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1726 rc = verify_check_notblind();
1729 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1730 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1731 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1735 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1736 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1737 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1739 case VERIFY_HDR_SNDR:
1740 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1744 /* In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1745 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1749 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1752 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1753 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1754 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1755 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1766 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1767 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1769 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1772 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1773 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1774 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1776 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1778 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1780 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1781 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1784 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1787 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1790 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1792 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1794 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1798 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1801 const uschar * sublist = ss;
1805 while (isspace(*sublist)) sublist++;
1807 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer))))
1810 double period = 1.0F;
1812 for (op= callout_opt_list; op->name; op++)
1813 if (strncmpic(opt, op->name, Ustrlen(op->name)) == 0)
1816 verify_options |= op->flag;
1819 opt += Ustrlen(op->name);
1820 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1823 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1824 "\"%s\" in ACL verify condition \"%s\"", op->name, arg);
1827 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1829 if (op->timeval && (period = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
1831 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1832 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1838 case CALLOUT_DEFER_OK: callout_defer_ok = TRUE; break;
1839 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1840 case CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1841 case CALLOUT_MAILFROM:
1842 if (!verify_header_sender)
1844 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1845 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1846 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1849 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1851 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM: pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); break;
1852 case CALLOUT_MAXWAIT: callout_overall = period; break;
1853 case CALLOUT_CONNECT: callout_connect = period; break;
1854 case CALLOUT_TIME: callout = period; break;
1860 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1861 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1867 /* Option not recognized */
1871 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1872 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1877 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1878 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1880 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1881 "for a recipient callout";
1885 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1886 message if giving out verification details. */
1888 if (verify_header_sender)
1892 if ((rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1893 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1896 *basic_errno = verrno;
1897 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1899 if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
1900 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1901 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1906 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1907 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1908 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1909 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1910 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1911 during message reception.
1913 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1914 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1915 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1916 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1917 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1918 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1919 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1921 else if (verify_sender_address)
1923 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)))
1925 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1926 "sender verify callout";
1930 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1931 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1932 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1934 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1935 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1936 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1937 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1939 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed))
1943 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1944 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1946 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("using cached sender verify result\n");
1949 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1950 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1951 specified (see comments above).
1953 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1954 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1955 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1956 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1957 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1962 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1964 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1966 if ((sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
1968 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
1969 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
1972 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1973 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1975 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1976 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1977 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1979 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1980 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1982 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1984 if (success_on_redirect)
1985 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1987 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1990 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1991 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1993 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1996 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
2000 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
2001 debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
2002 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
2004 debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok\n",
2005 verify_sender_address);
2009 rc = OK; /* Null sender */
2011 /* Cache the result code */
2013 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
2014 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
2015 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
2016 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
2017 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
2019 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
2020 the sender verification. */
2022 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
2025 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
2027 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->prop.address_data;
2030 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
2031 the DEFER overrides. */
2037 if (success_on_redirect)
2038 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
2040 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
2044 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
2045 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
2046 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
2048 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
2049 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
2050 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
2051 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
2053 /* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
2054 if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
2056 /* Make $address_data visible */
2057 deliver_address_data = addr2.prop.address_data;
2060 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
2062 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
2063 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
2065 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
2066 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
2070 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
2071 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
2073 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
2076 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
2077 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
2078 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
2081 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
2082 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
2086 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
2089 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
2090 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
2094 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
2095 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
2099 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
2102 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
2103 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\", \"header_names_ascii\" "
2104 "or \"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
2105 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
2112 /*************************************************
2113 * Check argument for control= modifier *
2114 *************************************************/
2116 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
2119 arg the argument string for control=
2120 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2121 where which ACL we are in
2122 log_msgptr for error messages
2124 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2128 decode_control(const uschar *arg, const uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2133 if ( (idx = find_control(arg, controls_list, nelem(controls_list))) < 0
2134 || ( arg[len = Ustrlen((d = controls_list+idx)->name)] != 0
2135 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')
2138 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2139 return CONTROL_ERROR;
2149 /*************************************************
2150 * Return a ratelimit error *
2151 *************************************************/
2153 /* Called from acl_ratelimit() below
2156 log_msgptr for error messages
2157 format format string
2158 ... supplementary arguments
2159 ss ratelimit option name
2160 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2166 ratelimit_error(uschar **log_msgptr, const char *format, ...)
2169 uschar buffer[STRING_SPRINTF_BUFFER_SIZE];
2170 va_start(ap, format);
2171 if (!string_vformat(buffer, sizeof(buffer), format, ap))
2172 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
2173 "string_sprintf expansion was longer than " SIZE_T_FMT, sizeof(buffer));
2175 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
2176 "error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: %s", buffer);
2183 /*************************************************
2184 * Handle rate limiting *
2185 *************************************************/
2187 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2188 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2190 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2191 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2192 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2193 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2196 arg the option string for ratelimit=
2197 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2198 log_msgptr for error messages
2200 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2201 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2202 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2203 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2207 acl_ratelimit(const uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2209 double limit, period, count;
2212 uschar *unique = NULL;
2214 BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, readonly = FALSE;
2215 BOOL noupdate = FALSE, badacl = FALSE;
2216 int mode = RATE_PER_WHAT;
2218 tree_node **anchor, *t;
2219 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
2221 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
2222 dbdata_ratelimit_unique *dbdb;
2225 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2226 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2227 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2229 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period / maximum burst
2230 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2231 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2233 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2234 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
2235 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "sender rate limit not set");
2237 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2238 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2239 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2240 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2242 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
2243 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2244 "\"%s\" is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);
2246 /* Second is the rate measurement period / exponential smoothing time
2247 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2248 run-time division errors. */
2250 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2251 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
2252 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2254 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2255 "\"%s\" is not a time value", sender_rate_period);
2257 /* By default we are counting one of something, but the per_rcpt,
2258 per_byte, and count options can change this. */
2262 /* Parse the other options. */
2264 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2267 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2268 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2269 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
2270 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"readonly") == 0) readonly = TRUE;
2271 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) RATE_SET(mode, PER_CMD);
2272 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0)
2274 RATE_SET(mode, PER_CONN);
2275 if (where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
2278 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0)
2280 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2281 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
2283 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0)
2285 /* If we are running in the RCPT ACL, then we'll count the recipients
2286 one by one, but if we are running when we have accumulated the whole
2287 list then we'll add them all in one batch. */
2288 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
2289 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
2290 else if (where >= ACL_WHERE_PREDATA && where <= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2291 RATE_SET(mode, PER_ALLRCPTS), count = (double)recipients_count;
2292 else if (where == ACL_WHERE_MAIL || where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2293 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT), badacl = TRUE;
2295 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0)
2297 /* If we have not yet received the message data and there was no SIZE
2298 declaration on the MAIL command, then it's safe to just use a value of
2299 zero and let the recorded rate decay as if nothing happened. */
2300 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2301 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
2302 else count = message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size;
2304 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_addr") == 0)
2306 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
2307 if (where != ACL_WHERE_RCPT) badacl = TRUE, unique = US"*";
2308 else unique = string_sprintf("%s@%s", deliver_localpart, deliver_domain);
2310 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"count=", 6) == 0)
2313 count = Ustrtod(ss+6, &e);
2314 if (count < 0.0 || *e != '\0')
2315 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2316 "\"%s\" is not a positive number", ss);
2318 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"unique=", 7) == 0)
2319 unique = string_copy(ss + 7);
2320 else if (key == NULL)
2321 key = string_copy(ss);
2323 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s", key, ss);
2326 /* Sanity check. When the badacl flag is set the update mode must either
2327 be readonly (which is the default if it is omitted) or, for backwards
2328 compatibility, a combination of noupdate and strict or leaky. */
2330 if (mode == RATE_PER_CLASH)
2331 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting per_* options");
2332 if (leaky + strict + readonly > 1)
2333 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting update modes");
2334 if (badacl && (leaky || strict) && !noupdate)
2335 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2336 "\"%s\" must not have /leaky or /strict option in %s ACL",
2337 ratelimit_option_string[mode], acl_wherenames[where]);
2339 /* Set the default values of any unset options. In readonly mode we
2340 perform the rate computation without any increment so that its value
2341 decays to eventually allow over-limit senders through. */
2343 if (noupdate) readonly = TRUE, leaky = strict = FALSE;
2344 if (badacl) readonly = TRUE;
2345 if (readonly) count = 0.0;
2346 if (!strict && !readonly) leaky = TRUE;
2347 if (mode == RATE_PER_WHAT) mode = RATE_PER_MAIL;
2349 /* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
2350 If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
2351 omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
2352 are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */
2355 key = (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address;
2357 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s%s",
2359 ratelimit_option_string[mode],
2360 unique == NULL ? "" : "unique/",
2364 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit condition count=%.0f %.1f/%s\n", count, limit, key);
2366 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
2367 For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
2368 pool so that they survive across resets. In readonly mode we only remember the
2369 result for the rest of this command in case a later command changes it. After
2370 this bit of logic the code is independent of the per_* mode. */
2372 old_pool = store_pool;
2375 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2378 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2379 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2383 case RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS:
2384 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2389 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2392 anchor = NULL; /* silence an "unused" complaint */
2393 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
2394 "internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
2398 t = tree_search(*anchor, key);
2402 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2403 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
2404 store_pool = old_pool;
2405 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2407 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2411 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
2412 from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */
2414 if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE)))
2416 store_pool = old_pool;
2418 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit database not available\n");
2419 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2422 dbdb = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, &dbdb_size);
2425 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2429 /* Locate the basic ratelimit block inside the DB data. */
2430 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found key in database\n");
2433 /* Forget the old Bloom filter if it is too old, so that we count each
2434 repeating event once per period. We don't simply clear and re-use the old
2435 filter because we want its size to change if the limit changes. Note that
2436 we keep the dbd pointer for copying the rate into the new data block. */
2438 if(unique != NULL && tv.tv_sec > dbdb->bloom_epoch + period)
2440 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding old Bloom filter\n");
2446 if(unique != NULL && dbdb_size < sizeof(*dbdb))
2448 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding undersize Bloom filter\n");
2453 /* Allocate a new data block if the database lookup failed
2454 or the Bloom filter passed its age limit. */
2460 /* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
2461 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
2462 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
2463 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size);
2468 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new Bloom filter\n");
2470 /* See the long comment below for an explanation of the magic number 2.
2471 The filter has a minimum size in case the rate limit is very small;
2472 this is determined by the definition of dbdata_ratelimit_unique. */
2474 extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
2475 if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
2476 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
2477 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size);
2478 dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
2479 dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
2480 memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);
2482 /* Preserve any basic ratelimit data (which is our longer-term memory)
2483 by copying it from the discarded block. */
2493 /* If we are counting unique events, find out if this event is new or not.
2494 If the client repeats the event during the current period then it should be
2495 counted. We skip this code in readonly mode for efficiency, because any
2496 changes to the filter will be discarded and because count is already set to
2499 if (unique != NULL && !readonly)
2501 /* We identify unique events using a Bloom filter. (You can find my
2502 notes on Bloom filters at http://fanf.livejournal.com/81696.html)
2503 With the per_addr option, an "event" is a recipient address, though the
2504 user can use the unique option to define their own events. We only count
2505 an event if we have not seen it before.
2507 We size the filter according to the rate limit, which (in leaky mode)
2508 is the limit on the population of the filter. We allow 16 bits of space
2509 per entry (see the construction code above) and we set (up to) 8 of them
2510 when inserting an element (see the loop below). The probability of a false
2511 positive (an event we have not seen before but which we fail to count) is
2515 allzero = exp(-numhash * pop / size)
2516 = exp(-0.5 * pop / limit)
2517 fpr = pow(1 - allzero, numhash)
2519 For senders at the limit the fpr is 0.06% or 1 in 1700
2520 and for senders at half the limit it is 0.0006% or 1 in 170000
2522 In strict mode the Bloom filter can fill up beyond the normal limit, in
2523 which case the false positive rate will rise. This means that the
2524 measured rate for very fast senders can bogusly drop off after a while.
2526 At twice the limit, the fpr is 2.5% or 1 in 40
2527 At four times the limit, it is 31% or 1 in 3.2
2529 It takes ln(pop/limit) periods for an over-limit burst of pop events to
2530 decay below the limit, and if this is more than one then the Bloom filter
2531 will be discarded before the decay gets that far. The false positive rate
2532 at this threshold is 9.3% or 1 in 10.7. */
2535 unsigned n, hash, hinc;
2539 /* Instead of using eight independent hash values, we combine two values
2540 using the formula h1 + n * h2. This does not harm the Bloom filter's
2541 performance, and means the amount of hash we need is independent of the
2542 number of bits we set in the filter. */
2544 md5_start(&md5info);
2545 md5_end(&md5info, unique, Ustrlen(unique), md5sum);
2546 hash = md5sum[0] | md5sum[1] << 8 | md5sum[2] << 16 | md5sum[3] << 24;
2547 hinc = md5sum[4] | md5sum[5] << 8 | md5sum[6] << 16 | md5sum[7] << 24;
2549 /* Scan the bits corresponding to this event. A zero bit means we have
2550 not seen it before. Ensure all bits are set to record this event. */
2552 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit checking uniqueness of %s\n", unique);
2555 for (n = 0; n < 8; n++, hash += hinc)
2557 int bit = 1 << (hash % 8);
2558 int byte = (hash / 8) % dbdb->bloom_size;
2559 if ((dbdb->bloom[byte] & bit) == 0)
2561 dbdb->bloom[byte] |= bit;
2566 /* If this event has occurred before, do not count it. */
2570 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event found in Bloom filter\n");
2574 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event added to Bloom filter\n");
2577 /* If there was no previous ratelimit data block for this key, initialize
2578 the new one, otherwise update the block from the database. The initial rate
2579 is what would be computed by the code below for an infinite interval. */
2583 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit initializing new key's rate data\n");
2585 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2586 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2591 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2592 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2593 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2594 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2596 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2597 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2598 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2599 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2600 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2602 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2603 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2604 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2606 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2607 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2608 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2609 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2611 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2613 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2614 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2615 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2616 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2617 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2618 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2620 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2622 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2623 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2624 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2625 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2627 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2628 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2629 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2630 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2631 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2633 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2634 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2635 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2636 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2638 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2639 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2640 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2642 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2643 : this_time - prev_time;
2645 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2646 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2648 /* Combine the instantaneous rate (period / interval) with the previous rate
2649 using the smoothing factor a. In order to measure sized events, multiply the
2650 instantaneous rate by the count of bytes or recipients etc. */
2652 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2653 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2654 dbd->rate = (1 - a) * count / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2656 /* When events are very widely spaced the computed rate tends towards zero.
2657 Although this is accurate it turns out not to be useful for our purposes,
2658 especially when the first event after a long silence is the start of a spam
2659 run. A more useful model is that the rate for an isolated event should be the
2660 size of the event per the period size, ignoring the lack of events outside
2661 the current period and regardless of where the event falls in the period. So,
2662 if the interval was so long that the calculated rate is unhelpfully small, we
2663 re-initialize the rate. In the absence of higher-rate bursts, the condition
2664 below is true if the interval is greater than the period. */
2666 if (dbd->rate < count) dbd->rate = count;
2669 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit.
2670 This matters for edge cases such as a limit of zero, when the client
2671 should be completely blocked. */
2673 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
2675 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2676 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2677 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2678 rate preventing them from getting any email through. If readonly is set,
2679 neither leaky nor strict are set, so we do not do any updates. */
2681 if ((rc == FAIL && leaky) || strict)
2683 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbdb, dbdb_size);
2684 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db updated\n");
2688 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
2689 readonly? "readonly mode" : "over the limit, but leaky");
2694 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference. */
2696 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2698 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2699 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2701 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2702 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2704 store_pool = old_pool;
2705 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2708 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2715 /*************************************************
2716 * The udpsend ACL modifier *
2717 *************************************************/
2719 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below.
2722 arg the option string for udpsend=
2723 log_msgptr for error messages
2725 Returns: OK - Completed.
2726 DEFER - Problem with DNS lookup.
2727 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2731 acl_udpsend(const uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
2743 hostname = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2744 portstr = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2748 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination host in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2753 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2758 *log_msgptr = US"missing datagram payload in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2761 portnum = Ustrtol(portstr, &portend, 10);
2762 if (*portend != '\0')
2764 *log_msgptr = US"bad destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2768 /* Make a single-item host list. */
2769 h = store_get(sizeof(host_item));
2770 memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item));
2775 if (string_is_ip_address(hostname, NULL))
2776 h->address = hostname, r = HOST_FOUND;
2778 r = host_find_byname(h, NULL, 0, NULL, FALSE);
2779 if (r == HOST_FIND_FAILED || r == HOST_FIND_AGAIN)
2781 *log_msgptr = US"DNS lookup failed in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2786 debug_printf_indent("udpsend [%s]:%d %s\n", h->address, portnum, arg);
2788 /*XXX this could better use sendto */
2789 r = s = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_DGRAM, h->address, portnum, portnum,
2790 1, NULL, &errstr, NULL);
2791 if (r < 0) goto defer;
2793 r = send(s, arg, len, 0);
2796 errstr = US strerror(errno);
2804 string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" truncated from %d to %d octets", len, r);
2809 debug_printf_indent("udpsend %d bytes\n", r);
2814 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" failed: %s", errstr);
2820 /*************************************************
2821 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2822 *************************************************/
2824 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2828 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2829 where where called from
2830 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2831 level the nesting level
2832 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2833 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2834 user_msgptr user message pointer
2835 log_msgptr log message pointer
2836 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2838 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2839 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2840 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2841 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2842 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2843 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2844 but can be temporary callout problem)
2845 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2850 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2851 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2852 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2854 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2855 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2857 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2861 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2866 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2867 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2869 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2871 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent(" message: %s\n", cb->arg);
2872 user_message = cb->arg;
2876 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2878 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("l_message: %s\n", cb->arg);
2879 log_message = cb->arg;
2883 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2884 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2886 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2892 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2893 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2894 checking functions in some cases. */
2896 if (!conditions[cb->type].expand_at_top)
2898 else if (!(arg = expand_string(cb->arg)))
2900 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2901 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2902 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2903 return search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
2906 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2911 debug_printf_indent("check %s%s %n",
2912 (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2913 conditions[cb->type].name, &lhswidth);
2915 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2917 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2918 if ( Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0
2919 || Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
2921 debug_printf("%s ", cb->u.varname);
2927 debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
2928 lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
2932 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2935 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2939 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2941 if ((conditions[cb->type].forbids & (1 << where)) != 0)
2943 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2944 conditions[cb->type].is_modifier ? "use" : "test",
2945 conditions[cb->type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
2949 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2950 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2954 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
2958 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2962 rc = acl_check_wargs(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2963 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2965 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2966 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2972 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2973 rc = sender_host_authenticated ? match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated,
2974 &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL) : FAIL;
2977 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2978 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2980 int old_pool = store_pool;
2981 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2982 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2983 store_pool = old_pool;
2988 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2989 /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
2990 expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
2991 different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
2993 ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */
2994 : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2995 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2997 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2998 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2999 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
3000 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
3002 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
3005 case ACLC_CONTINUE: /* Always succeeds */
3010 const uschar *p = NULL;
3011 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
3013 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
3015 if (controls_list[control_type].forbids & (1 << where))
3017 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
3018 controls_list[control_type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
3022 switch(control_type)
3024 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
3025 allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
3028 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
3029 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
3034 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3035 case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
3036 dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
3037 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
3038 /* Since DKIM was blocked, skip DMARC too */
3039 dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3040 dmarc_enable_forensic = FALSE;
3045 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
3046 case CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY:
3047 dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3050 case CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC:
3051 dmarc_enable_forensic = TRUE;
3058 int fd, af, level, optname, value;
3059 /* If we are acting on stdin, the setsockopt may fail if stdin is not
3060 a socket; we can accept that, we'll just debug-log failures anyway. */
3061 fd = fileno(smtp_in);
3062 af = ip_get_address_family(fd);
3066 debug_printf_indent("smtp input is probably not a socket [%s], not setting DSCP\n",
3070 if (dscp_lookup(p+1, af, &level, &optname, &value))
3072 if (setsockopt(fd, level, optname, &value, sizeof(value)) < 0)
3074 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("failed to set input DSCP[%s]: %s\n",
3075 p+1, strerror(errno));
3079 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("set input DSCP to \"%s\"\n", p+1);
3084 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised DSCP value in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3090 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3098 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
3099 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
3102 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
3103 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
3106 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
3107 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
3110 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
3111 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
3114 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3115 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
3116 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
3120 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
3121 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
3124 case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
3125 pipelining_enable = FALSE;
3128 case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
3129 disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
3132 case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
3133 disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
3136 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
3137 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"fakereject");
3138 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
3139 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
3142 const uschar *pp = p + 1;
3143 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
3144 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
3149 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
3150 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
3154 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
3155 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
3156 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
3157 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
3158 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
3165 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3168 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"item frozen");
3171 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
3172 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
3173 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"queueing forced");
3176 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
3177 originator_name = US"";
3178 submission_mode = TRUE;
3181 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
3184 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
3185 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
3187 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
3189 const uschar *pp = p + 8;
3190 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
3191 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
3194 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
3196 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
3198 const uschar *pp = p + 6;
3199 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
3200 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
3201 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
3208 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3215 uschar * debug_tag = NULL;
3216 uschar * debug_opts = NULL;
3221 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3222 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "tag=", 4) == 0)
3224 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3225 debug_tag = string_copyn(p+5, pp-p-5);
3227 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "opts=", 5) == 0)
3229 for (pp += 5; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3230 debug_opts = string_copyn(p+6, pp-p-6);
3232 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "kill", 4) == 0)
3234 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3238 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3243 debug_logging_stop();
3245 debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
3249 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
3250 suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
3253 case CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY:
3255 uschar * ignored = NULL;
3256 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
3261 /* Too hard to think about for now. We might in future cutthrough
3262 the case where both sides handle prdr and this-node prdr acl
3264 ignored = US"PRDR active";
3268 ignored = US"frozen";
3269 else if (queue_only_policy)
3270 ignored = US"queue-only";
3271 else if (fake_response == FAIL)
3272 ignored = US"fakereject";
3275 if (rcpt_count == 1)
3277 cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
3280 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3281 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
3284 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
3285 /* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool") == 0) ; default */
3288 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3293 ignored = US"nonfirst rcpt";
3296 DEBUG(D_acl) if (ignored)
3297 debug_printf(" cutthrough request ignored on %s item\n", ignored);
3302 case CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT:
3307 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3308 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
3309 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3315 message_utf8_downconvert = 0;
3316 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3317 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3321 if (p[1] == '-' && p[2] == '1')
3323 message_utf8_downconvert = -1;
3324 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3325 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = TRUE;
3329 *log_msgptr = US"bad option value for control=utf8_downconvert";
3333 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3334 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
3335 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3345 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
3348 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3349 const uschar * list = arg;
3350 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
3351 /* Run the dcc backend. */
3352 rc = dcc_process(&ss);
3353 /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
3354 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
3355 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3356 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3361 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3363 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
3369 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
3372 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
3373 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
3378 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
3383 debug_printf_indent("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
3386 /* NOTE 1: Remember that we may be
3387 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
3388 Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
3389 smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
3391 NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
3392 apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
3397 if (smtp_out != NULL && !disable_delay_flush)
3400 #if !defined(NO_POLL_H) && defined (POLLRDHUP)
3406 p.fd = fileno(smtp_out);
3407 p.events = POLLRDHUP;
3410 if (poll(&p, n, delay*1000) > 0)
3411 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay cancelled by peer close\n");
3414 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
3415 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
3416 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
3417 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
3418 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
3419 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
3420 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
3421 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
3422 it is not always available.
3425 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
3432 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3433 case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
3434 if (dkim_cur_signer)
3435 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
3436 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3441 case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
3442 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_verify_status,
3443 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3447 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
3448 case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS:
3449 if (!dmarc_has_been_checked)
3451 dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
3452 /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
3453 * view into the process in the future. */
3454 rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS),
3455 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3460 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, &arg, log_msgptr);
3464 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
3465 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
3468 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
3469 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
3470 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
3471 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
3472 writing is poorly documented. */
3474 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
3475 if (tls_in.cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
3477 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
3478 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':');
3479 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_in.cipher; else
3481 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
3482 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
3484 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
3485 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
3489 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
3490 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
3491 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
3492 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
3493 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
3494 message in the same SMTP connection. */
3497 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
3498 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address,
3500 if (rc == DEFER) *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3501 if (host_data) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
3504 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
3505 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
3506 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
3507 CUSS &deliver_localpart_data);
3510 case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
3514 const uschar *s = arg;
3516 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
3518 if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
3519 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
3520 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT;
3523 logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
3524 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name \"%s\" in "
3525 "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]);
3528 log_reject_target = logbits;
3535 const uschar *s = arg;
3541 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
3542 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
3543 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
3544 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
3545 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
3546 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
3549 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
3550 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
3551 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
3557 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
3560 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
3561 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
3565 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3566 case ACLC_MALWARE: /* Run the malware backend. */
3568 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3569 const uschar * list = arg;
3570 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
3572 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
3575 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
3576 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0)
3578 else if ( strncmpic(opt, US"tmo=", 4) == 0
3579 && (timeout = readconf_readtime(opt+4, '\0', FALSE)) < 0
3582 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad timeout value in '%s'", opt);
3586 rc = malware(ss, timeout);
3587 if (rc == DEFER && defer_ok)
3588 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3592 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
3593 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
3598 if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
3600 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
3601 "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
3604 queue_name = string_copy_malloc(arg);
3607 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
3608 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
3611 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
3612 rc = match_address_list(CUS addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
3613 CUSS &recipient_data);
3616 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3622 case ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER:
3623 setup_remove_header(arg);
3626 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
3629 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
3630 sdomain = sdomain ? sdomain + 1 : US"";
3631 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
3632 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
3637 rc = match_address_list(CUS sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
3638 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, CUSS &sender_data);
3641 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
3645 int old_pool = store_pool;
3646 if ( cb->u.varname[0] == 'c'
3647 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3648 || cb->u.varname[0] == 'd'
3650 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
3651 || event_name /* An event is being delivered */
3654 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3655 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM /* Overwriteable dkim result variables */
3656 if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0)
3657 dkim_verify_status = string_copy(arg);
3658 else if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
3659 dkim_verify_reason = string_copy(arg);
3662 acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
3663 store_pool = old_pool;
3667 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3670 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3671 const uschar * list = arg;
3672 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
3674 rc = spam(CUSS &ss);
3675 /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
3676 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
3677 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3678 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3685 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL);
3687 case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
3688 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
3693 rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr);
3696 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
3697 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
3698 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
3699 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
3700 (until something changes it). */
3703 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
3705 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
3706 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
3710 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
3711 "condition %d", cb->type);
3715 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
3717 if (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)
3718 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
3719 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
3721 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
3725 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
3726 handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make
3727 it the same as the user message.
3729 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
3730 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
3732 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
3733 message that is already set.
3735 Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but
3736 for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and
3737 when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no
3738 "endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is
3741 if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;
3743 if ((BIT(rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
3746 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3747 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
3749 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
3750 nested ACLs) are always discarded. This also happens for acceptance verbs
3751 when they actually do accept. Only messages specified at this level are used.
3752 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
3753 during expansions. */
3755 if (verb == ACL_WARN ||
3756 (rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
3757 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3761 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
3762 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
3765 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3766 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3767 user_message, expand_string_message);
3769 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
3774 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
3775 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
3778 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3779 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3780 log_message, expand_string_message);
3782 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
3784 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
3785 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
3789 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
3791 if (!*log_msgptr) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3794 acl_verify_message = NULL;
3802 /*************************************************
3803 * Get line from a literal ACL *
3804 *************************************************/
3806 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
3807 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
3808 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
3810 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
3811 Exim configuration file. That is:
3813 . Leading spaces are ignored.
3815 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
3816 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
3817 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
3819 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
3820 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
3822 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
3825 Returns: a pointer to the next line
3829 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
3830 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3838 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3842 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3843 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
3844 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
3846 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3848 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3849 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3851 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
3853 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3854 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3856 if (*yield != '#') break;
3859 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3860 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3861 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3862 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3867 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3869 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3878 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3879 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3884 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
3885 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
3886 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
3889 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3890 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3891 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3893 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
3894 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
3896 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3897 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
3900 /* Control does not reach here */
3907 /*************************************************
3908 * Check access using an ACL *
3909 *************************************************/
3911 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3912 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3913 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3914 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3915 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3916 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3917 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3918 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3919 appears immediately above.
3922 where where called from
3923 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3924 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3925 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3926 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3928 Returns: OK access is granted
3929 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3930 FAIL access is denied
3931 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3932 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3937 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s,
3938 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3941 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3942 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3945 /* Catch configuration loops */
3949 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3955 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3959 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3960 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3964 if (!(ss = expand_string(s)))
3966 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3967 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3968 expand_string_message);
3974 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
3976 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3977 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3981 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3982 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3983 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3984 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3985 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3987 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3989 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3992 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3995 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3998 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3999 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
4002 else if (*ss == '/')
4004 struct stat statbuf;
4005 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
4008 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
4013 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
4015 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
4020 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
4021 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
4023 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
4025 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
4026 ss, strerror(errno));
4029 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
4032 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
4033 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
4037 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
4038 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
4039 persists between multiple messages. */
4043 int old_pool = store_pool;
4044 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
4045 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
4046 store_pool = old_pool;
4047 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
4050 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
4051 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
4053 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
4057 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
4062 int basic_errno = 0;
4063 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
4064 BOOL acl_quit_check = acl_level == 0
4065 && (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT);
4067 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
4068 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
4070 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
4072 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
4075 search_error_message = NULL;
4076 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, acl_level,
4077 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
4079 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
4080 ERROR always causes a return. */
4085 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test deferred in %s\n", verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4086 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
4088 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
4089 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
4090 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4094 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4096 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
4099 default: /* Paranoia */
4101 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test error in %s\n", verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4105 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test succeeded in %s\n",
4106 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4110 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test failed in %s\n", verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4113 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
4114 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
4117 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\" in %s\n",
4118 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4122 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\" in %s\n",
4123 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4127 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
4128 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
4129 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
4134 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
4136 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: ACCEPT\n", acl_name);
4141 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
4149 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DEFER\n", acl_name);
4150 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4151 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4159 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DENY\n", acl_name);
4160 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4166 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
4168 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DISCARD\n", acl_name);
4169 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4174 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
4182 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DROP\n", acl_name);
4183 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4191 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: not OK\n", acl_name);
4192 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4199 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
4200 else if (cond == DEFER && LOGGING(acl_warn_skipped))
4201 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
4202 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
4203 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
4204 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
4205 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
4209 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
4214 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
4219 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
4221 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
4225 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("QUIT or not-QUIT toplevel ACL may not fail "
4226 "('%s' verb used incorrectly)", verbs[acl->verb]);
4233 /* Same args as acl_check_internal() above, but the string s is
4234 the name of an ACL followed optionally by up to 9 space-separated arguments.
4235 The name and args are separately expanded. Args go into $acl_arg globals. */
4237 acl_check_wargs(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *s,
4238 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
4241 uschar * tmp_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
4242 uschar * sav_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
4248 if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(name = expand_string(tmp)))
4251 for (i = 0; i < 9; i++)
4253 while (*s && isspace(*s)) s++;
4255 if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(tmp_arg[i] = expand_string(tmp)))
4262 sav_narg = acl_narg;
4264 for (i = 0; i < acl_narg; i++)
4266 sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
4267 acl_arg[i] = tmp_arg[i];
4271 sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
4272 acl_arg[i++] = NULL;
4276 ret = acl_check_internal(where, addr, name, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4279 acl_narg = sav_narg;
4280 for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) acl_arg[i] = sav_arg[i];
4284 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return ERROR;
4285 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
4286 tmp, expand_string_message);
4287 return search_find_defer?DEFER:ERROR;
4292 /*************************************************
4293 * Check access using an ACL *
4294 *************************************************/
4296 /* Alternate interface for ACL, used by expansions */
4298 acl_eval(int where, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
4301 address_item *addr = NULL;
4304 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
4305 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
4306 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
4307 log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
4309 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
4311 adb = address_defaults;
4313 addr->address = expand_string(US"$local_part@$domain");
4314 addr->domain = deliver_domain;
4315 addr->local_part = deliver_localpart;
4316 addr->cc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
4317 addr->lc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
4321 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4328 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
4329 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
4330 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
4333 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
4334 recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
4335 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
4336 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
4337 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
4339 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
4340 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
4341 FAIL access is denied
4342 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
4343 DEFER can't tell at the moment
4346 int acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
4349 acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
4350 uschar **log_msgptr)
4354 address_item *addr = NULL;
4356 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
4357 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
4358 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
4359 log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
4361 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
4362 if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY || where==ACL_WHERE_PRDR)
4364 if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY)
4367 adb = address_defaults;
4369 addr->address = recipient;
4370 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
4372 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
4376 if ((addr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
4378 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
4379 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
4382 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
4383 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
4388 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4390 acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
4392 /* Cutthrough - if requested,
4393 and WHERE_RCPT and not yet opened conn as result of recipient-verify,
4394 and rcpt acl returned accept,
4395 and first recipient (cancel on any subsequents)
4396 open one now and run it up to RCPT acceptance.
4397 A failed verify should cancel cutthrough request,
4398 and will pass the fail to the originator.
4399 Initial implementation: dual-write to spool.
4400 Assume the rxd datastream is now being copied byte-for-byte to an open cutthrough connection.
4402 Cease cutthrough copy on rxd final dot; do not send one.
4404 On a data acl, if not accept and a cutthrough conn is open, hard-close it (no SMTP niceness).
4406 On data acl accept, terminate the dataphase on an open cutthrough conn. If accepted or
4407 perm-rejected, reflect that to the original sender - and dump the spooled copy.
4408 If temp-reject, close the conn (and keep the spooled copy).
4409 If conn-failure, no action (and keep the spooled copy).
4413 case ACL_WHERE_RCPT:
4414 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
4415 case ACL_WHERE_PRDR:
4418 if (host_checking_callout) /* -bhc mode */
4419 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"host-checking mode");
4422 && cutthrough.delivery
4423 && rcpt_count > cutthrough.nrcpt
4426 if ((rc = open_cutthrough_connection(addr)) == DEFER)
4427 if (cutthrough.defer_pass)
4429 uschar * s = addr->message;
4430 /* Horrid kludge to recover target's SMTP message */
4432 do --s; while (!isdigit(*s));
4433 if (*--s && isdigit(*s) && *--s && isdigit(*s)) *user_msgptr = s;
4434 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4438 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("cutthrough defer; will spool\n");
4442 else HDEBUG(D_acl) if (cutthrough.delivery)
4443 if (rcpt_count <= cutthrough.nrcpt)
4444 debug_printf_indent("ignore cutthrough request; nonfirst message\n");
4446 debug_printf_indent("ignore cutthrough request; ACL did not accept\n");
4449 case ACL_WHERE_PREDATA:
4451 cutthrough_predata();
4453 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"predata acl not ok");
4456 case ACL_WHERE_QUIT:
4457 case ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT:
4458 /* Drop cutthrough conns, and drop heldopen verify conns if
4459 the previous was not DATA */
4461 uschar prev = smtp_connection_had[smtp_ch_index-2];
4462 BOOL dropverify = !(prev == SCH_DATA || prev == SCH_BDAT);
4464 cancel_cutthrough_connection(dropverify, US"quit or conndrop");
4472 deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
4473 sender_address_data = NULL;
4475 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
4476 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
4480 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
4482 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
4483 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
4489 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
4491 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
4493 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
4494 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
4498 /* Before giving a response, take a look at the length of any user message, and
4499 split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
4501 *user_msgptr = string_split_message(*user_msgptr);
4502 if (fake_response != OK)
4503 fake_response_text = string_split_message(fake_response_text);
4509 /*************************************************
4510 * Create ACL variable *
4511 *************************************************/
4513 /* Create an ACL variable or reuse an existing one. ACL variables are in a
4514 binary tree (see tree.c) with acl_var_c and acl_var_m as root nodes.
4517 name pointer to the variable's name, starting with c or m
4519 Returns the pointer to variable's tree node
4523 acl_var_create(uschar * name)
4525 tree_node * node, ** root = name[0] == 'c' ? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
4526 if (!(node = tree_search(*root, name)))
4528 node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name));
4529 Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
4530 (void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
4532 node->data.ptr = NULL;
4538 /*************************************************
4539 * Write an ACL variable in spool format *
4540 *************************************************/
4542 /* This function is used as a callback for tree_walk when writing variables to
4543 the spool file. To retain spool file compatibility, what is written is -aclc or
4544 -aclm followed by the rest of the name and the data length, space separated,
4545 then the value itself, starting on a new line, and terminated by an additional
4546 newline. When we had only numbered ACL variables, the first line might look
4547 like this: "-aclc 5 20". Now it might be "-aclc foo 20" for the variable called
4551 name of the variable
4552 value of the variable
4553 ctx FILE pointer (as a void pointer)
4559 acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx)
4561 FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx;
4562 fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);