-SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support
+SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support (using libsrs_alt)
--------------------------------------------------------------
+See also below, for an alternative native support implementation.
-Exiscan currently includes SRS support via Miles Wilton's
+Exim currently includes SRS support via Miles Wilton's
libsrs_alt library. The current version of the supported
library is 0.5, there are reports of 1.0 working.
in your Local/Makefile.
+The following main-section options become available:
+ srs_config string
+ srs_hashlength int
+ srs_hashmin int
+ srs_maxage int
+ srs_secrets string
+ srs_usehash bool
+ srs_usetimestamp bool
+
+The redirect router gains these options (all of type string, unset by default):
+ srs
+ srs_alias
+ srs_condition
+ srs_dbinsert
+ srs_dbselect
+
+The following variables become available:
+ $srs_db_address
+ $srs_db_key
+ $srs_orig_recipient
+ $srs_orig_sender
+ $srs_recipient
+ $srs_status
+
+The predefined feature-macro _HAVE_SRS will be present.
+Additional delivery log line elements, tagged with "SRS=" will show the srs sender.
+For configuration information see https://github.com/Exim/exim/wiki/SRS .
+
+
+
+
+SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support (native)
+--------------------------------------------------------------
+This is less full-featured than the libsrs_alt version above.
+
+The Exim build needs to be done with this in Local/Makefile:
+EXPERIMENTAL_SRS_NATIVE=yes
+
+The following are provided:
+- an expansion item "srs_encode"
+ This takes three arguments:
+ - a site SRS secret
+ - the return_path
+ - the pre-forwarding domain
+
+- an expansion condition "inbound_srs"
+ This takes two arguments: the local_part to check, and a site SRS secret.
+ If the secret is zero-length, only the pattern of the local_part is checked.
+ The $srs_recipient variable is set as a side-effect.
+
+- an expansion variable $srs_recipient
+ This gets the original return_path encoded in the SRS'd local_part
+
+- predefined macros _HAVE_SRS and _HAVE_NATIVE_SRS
+
+Sample usage:
+
+ #macro
+ SRS_SECRET = <pick something unique for your site for this>
+
+ #routers
+
+ outbound:
+ driver = dnslookup
+ # if outbound, and forwarding has been done, use an alternate transport
+ domains = ! +my_domains
+ transport = ${if eq {$local_part@$domain} \
+ {$original_local_part@$original_domain} \
+ {remote_smtp} {remote_forwarded_smtp}}
+
+ inbound_srs:
+ driver = redirect
+ senders = :
+ domains = +my_domains
+ # detect inbound bounces which are SRS'd, and decode them
+ condition = ${if inbound_srs {$local_part} {SRS_SECRET}}
+ data = $srs_recipient
+
+ inbound_srs_failure:
+ driver = redirect
+ senders = :
+ domains = +my_domains
+ # detect inbound bounces which look SRS'd but are invalid
+ condition = ${if inbound_srs {$local_part} {}}
+ allow_fail
+ data = :fail: Invalid SRS recipient address
+
+ #... further routers here
+
+
+ # transport; should look like the non-forward outbound
+ # one, plus the max_rcpt and return_path options
+ remote_forwarded_smtp:
+ driver = smtp
+ # modify the envelope from, for mails that we forward
+ max_rcpt = 1
+ return_path = ${srs_encode {SRS_SECRET} {$return_path} {$original_domain}}
+
+
DCC Support
-DMARC Support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-DMARC combines feedback from SPF, DKIM, and header From: in order
-to attempt to provide better indicators of the authenticity of an
-email. This document does not explain the fundamentals, you
-should read and understand how it works by visiting the website at
-http://www.dmarc.org/.
-
-DMARC support is added via the libopendmarc library. Visit:
-
- http://sourceforge.net/projects/opendmarc/
-
-to obtain a copy, or find it in your favorite rpm package
-repository. If building from source, this description assumes
-that headers will be in /usr/local/include, and that the libraries
-are in /usr/local/lib.
-
-1. To compile Exim with DMARC support, you must first enable SPF.
-Please read the Local/Makefile comments on enabling the SUPPORT_SPF
-feature. You must also have DKIM support, so you cannot set the
-DISABLE_DKIM feature. Once both of those conditions have been met
-you can enable DMARC in Local/Makefile:
-
-EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC=yes
-LDFLAGS += -lopendmarc
-# CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include
-# LDFLAGS += -L/usr/local/lib
-
-The first line sets the feature to include the correct code, and
-the second line says to link the libopendmarc libraries into the
-exim binary. The commented out lines should be uncommented if you
-built opendmarc from source and installed in the default location.
-Adjust the paths if you installed them elsewhere, but you do not
-need to uncomment them if an rpm (or you) installed them in the
-package controlled locations (/usr/include and /usr/lib).
-
-
-2. Use the following global settings to configure DMARC:
-
-Required:
-dmarc_tld_file Defines the location of a text file of valid
- top level domains the opendmarc library uses
- during domain parsing. Maintained by Mozilla,
- the most current version can be downloaded
- from a link at http://publicsuffix.org/list/.
-
-Optional:
-dmarc_history_file Defines the location of a file to log results
- of dmarc verification on inbound emails. The
- contents are importable by the opendmarc tools
- which will manage the data, send out DMARC
- reports, and expire the data. Make sure the
- directory of this file is writable by the user
- exim runs as.
-
-dmarc_forensic_sender The email address to use when sending a
- forensic report detailing alignment failures
- if a sender domain's dmarc record specifies it
- and you have configured Exim to send them.
- Default: do-not-reply@$default_hostname
-
-
-3. By default, the DMARC processing will run for any remote,
-non-authenticated user. It makes sense to only verify DMARC
-status of messages coming from remote, untrusted sources. You can
-use standard conditions such as hosts, senders, etc, to decide that
-DMARC verification should *not* be performed for them and disable
-DMARC with a control setting:
-
- control = dmarc_disable_verify
-
-A DMARC record can also specify a "forensic address", which gives
-exim an email address to submit reports about failed alignment.
-Exim does not do this by default because in certain conditions it
-results in unintended information leakage (what lists a user might
-be subscribed to, etc). You must configure exim to submit forensic
-reports to the owner of the domain. If the DMARC record contains a
-forensic address and you specify the control statement below, then
-exim will send these forensic emails. It's also advised that you
-configure a dmarc_forensic_sender because the default sender address
-construction might be inadequate.
-
- control = dmarc_enable_forensic
-
-(AGAIN: You can choose not to send these forensic reports by simply
-not putting the dmarc_enable_forensic control line at any point in
-your exim config. If you don't tell it to send them, it will not
-send them.)
-
-There are no options to either control. Both must appear before
-the DATA acl.
-
-
-4. You can now run DMARC checks in incoming SMTP by using the
-"dmarc_status" ACL condition in the DATA ACL. You are required to
-call the spf condition first in the ACLs, then the "dmarc_status"
-condition. Putting this condition in the ACLs is required in order
-for a DMARC check to actually occur. All of the variables are set
-up before the DATA ACL, but there is no actual DMARC check that
-occurs until a "dmarc_status" condition is encountered in the ACLs.
-
-The dmarc_status condition takes a list of strings on its
-right-hand side. These strings describe recommended action based
-on the DMARC check. To understand what the policy recommendations
-mean, refer to the DMARC website above. Valid strings are:
-
- o accept The DMARC check passed and the library recommends
- accepting the email.
- o reject The DMARC check failed and the library recommends
- rejecting the email.
- o quarantine The DMARC check failed and the library recommends
- keeping it for further inspection.
- o none The DMARC check passed and the library recommends
- no specific action, neutral.
- o norecord No policy section in the DMARC record for this
- sender domain.
- o nofrom Unable to determine the domain of the sender.
- o temperror Library error or dns error.
- o off The DMARC check was disabled for this email.
-
-You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert its
-meaning, for example "!accept" will match all results but
-"accept". The string list is evaluated left-to-right in a
-short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of the
-DMARC check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed
-strings matches the outcome of the DMARC check, the condition
-fails.
-
-Of course, you can also use any other lookup method that Exim
-supports, including LDAP, Postgres, MySQL, etc, as long as the
-result is a list of colon-separated strings.
-
-Performing the check sets up information used by the
-${authresults } expansion item.
-
-Several expansion variables are set before the DATA ACL is
-processed, and you can use them in this ACL. The following
-expansion variables are available:
-
- o $dmarc_status
- This is a one word status indicating what the DMARC library
- thinks of the email. It is a combination of the results of
- DMARC record lookup and the SPF/DKIM/DMARC processing results
- (if a DMARC record was found). The actual policy declared
- in the DMARC record is in a separate expansion variable.
-
- o $dmarc_status_text
- This is a slightly longer, human readable status.
-
- o $dmarc_used_domain
- This is the domain which DMARC used to look up the DMARC
- policy record.
-
- o $dmarc_domain_policy
- This is the policy declared in the DMARC record. Valid values
- are "none", "reject" and "quarantine". It is blank when there
- is any error, including no DMARC record.
-
-A now-redundant variable $dmarc_ar_header has now been withdrawn.
-Use the ${authresults } expansion instead.
-
-
-5. How to enable DMARC advanced operation:
-By default, Exim's DMARC configuration is intended to be
-non-intrusive and conservative. To facilitate this, Exim will not
-create any type of logging files without explicit configuration by
-you, the admin. Nor will Exim send out any emails/reports about
-DMARC issues without explicit configuration by you, the admin (other
-than typical bounce messages that may come about due to ACL
-processing or failure delivery issues).
-
-In order to log statistics suitable to be imported by the opendmarc
-tools, you need to:
-a. Configure the global setting dmarc_history_file.
-b. Configure cron jobs to call the appropriate opendmarc history
- import scripts and truncating the dmarc_history_file.
-
-In order to send forensic reports, you need to:
-a. Configure the global setting dmarc_forensic_sender.
-b. Configure, somewhere before the DATA ACL, the control option to
- enable sending DMARC forensic reports.
-
-
-6. Example usage:
-(RCPT ACL)
- warn domains = +local_domains
- hosts = +local_hosts
- control = dmarc_disable_verify
-
- warn !domains = +screwed_up_dmarc_records
- control = dmarc_enable_forensic
-
- warn condition = (lookup if destined to mailing list)
- set acl_m_mailing_list = 1
-
-(DATA ACL)
- warn dmarc_status = accept : none : off
- !authenticated = *
- log_message = DMARC DEBUG: $dmarc_status $dmarc_used_domain
-
- warn dmarc_status = !accept
- !authenticated = *
- log_message = DMARC DEBUG: '$dmarc_status' for $dmarc_used_domain
-
- warn dmarc_status = quarantine
- !authenticated = *
- set $acl_m_quarantine = 1
- # Do something in a transport with this flag variable
-
- deny condition = ${if eq{$dmarc_domain_policy}{reject}}
- condition = ${if eq{$acl_m_mailing_list}{1}}
- message = Messages from $dmarc_used_domain break mailing lists
-
- deny dmarc_status = reject
- !authenticated = *
- message = Message from $dmarc_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
-
- warn add_header = :at_start:${authresults {$primary_hostname}}
-
-
-
DSN extra information
---------------------
If compiled with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO extra information will be added
The spool files can then be processed by external processes and then
requeued into exim spool directories for final delivery.
+However, note carefully the warnings in the main documentation on
+qpool file formats.
The motivation/inspiration for the transport is to allow external
processes to access email queued by exim and have access to all the
Specification: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-11
Note that this is not an RFC yet, so may change.
+[RFC 8617 was published 2019/06. Draft 11 was 2018/01. A review of the
+changes has not yet been done]
+
ARC is intended to support the utility of SPF and DKIM in the presence of
intermediaries in the transmission path - forwarders and mailinglists -
by establishing a cryptographically-signed chain in headers.
an intermediary. One might do verify for local destinations.
ARC uses the notion of a "ADministrative Management Domain" (ADMD).
-Described in RFC 5598 (section 2.3), this is essentially the set of
-mail-handling systems that the mail transits. A label should be chosen to
-identify the ADMD. Messages should be ARC-verified on entry to the ADMD,
-and ARC-signed on exit from it.
+Described in RFC 5598 (section 2.3), this is essentially a set of
+mail-handling systems that mail transits that are all under the control
+of one organisation. A label should be chosen to identify the ADMD.
+Messages should be ARC-verified on entry to the ADMD, and ARC-signed on exit
+from it.
+
+
+Building with ARC Support
+--
+Enable using EXPERIMENTAL_ARC=yes in your Local/Makefile.
+You must also have DKIM present (not disabled), and you very likely
+want to have SPF enabled.
Verification
Note that it would be wise to strip incoming messages of A-R headers
that claim to be from our own <admd-identifier>.
-There are two new variables: $arc_state and $arc_state_reason.
+There are four new variables:
+
+ $arc_state One of pass, fail, none
+ $arc_state_reason (if fail, why)
+ $arc_domains colon-sep list of ARC chain domains, in chain order.
+ problematic elements may have empty list elements
+ $arc_oldest_pass lowest passing instance number of chain
+
+Example:
+ logwrite = oldest-p-ams: <${reduce {$lh_ARC-Authentication-Results:} \
+ {} \
+ {${if = {$arc_oldest_pass} \
+ {${extract {i}{${extract {1}{;}{$item}}}}} \
+ {$item} {$value}}} \
+ }>
Receive log lines for an ARC pass will be tagged "ARC".
Signing
--
-arc_sign = <admd-identifier> : <selector> : <privkey>
+arc_sign = <admd-identifier> : <selector> : <privkey> [ : <options> ]
An option on the smtp transport, which constructs and prepends to the message
an ARC set of headers. The textually-first Authentication-Results: header
is used as a basis (you must have added one on entry to the ADMD).
Expanded as a whole; if unset, empty or forced-failure then no signing is done.
-If it is set, all three elements must be non-empty.
+If it is set, all of the first three elements must be non-empty.
+
+The fourth element is optional, and if present consists of a comma-separated list
+of options. The options implemented are
+
+ timestamps Add a t= tag to the generated AMS and AS headers, with the
+ current time.
+ expire[=<val>] Add an x= tag to the generated AMS header, with an expiry time.
+ If the value <val> is an plain number it is used unchanged.
+ If it starts with a '+' then the following number is added
+ to the current time, as an offset in seconds.
+ If a value is not given it defaults to a one month offset.
+
+[As of writing, gmail insist that a t= tag on the AS is mandatory]
Caveats:
* There must be an Authentication-Results header, presumably added by an ACL
while receiving the message, for the same ADMD, for arc_sign to succeed.
This requires careful coordination between inbound and outbound logic.
+
+ Only one A-R header is taken account of. This is a limitation versus
+ the ARC spec (which says that all A-R headers from within the ADMD must
+ be used).
+
* If passing a message to another system, such as a mailing-list manager
(MLM), between receipt and sending, be wary of manipulations to headers made
by the MLM.
+ For instance, Mailman with REMOVE_DKIM_HEADERS==3 might improve
deliverability in a pre-ARC world, but that option also renames the
Authentication-Results header, which breaks signing.
+
* Even if you use multiple DKIM keys for different domains, the ARC concept
should try to stick to one ADMD, so pick a primary domain and use that for
AR headers and outbound signing.
+Signing is not compatible with cutthrough delivery; any (before expansion)
+value set for the option will result in cutthrough delivery not being
+used via the transport in question.
+
+
+
+
+TLS Session Resumption
+----------------------
+TLS Session Resumption for TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 connections can be used (defined
+in RFC 5077 for 1.2). The support for this can be included by building with
+EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME defined. This requires GnuTLS 3.6.3 or OpenSSL 1.1.1
+(or later).
+
+Session resumption (this is the "stateless" variant) involves the server sending
+a "session ticket" to the client on one connection, which can be stored by the
+client and used for a later session. The ticket contains sufficient state for
+the server to reconstruct the TLS session, avoiding some expensive crypto
+calculation and one full packet roundtrip time.
+
+Operational cost/benefit:
+ The extra data being transmitted costs a minor amount, and the client has
+ extra costs in storing and retrieving the data.
+
+ In the Exim/Gnutls implementation the extra cost on an initial connection
+ which is TLS1.2 over a loopback path is about 6ms on 2017-laptop class hardware.
+ The saved cost on a subsequent connection is about 4ms; three or more
+ connections become a net win. On longer network paths, two or more
+ connections will have an average lower startup time thanks to the one
+ saved packet roundtrip. TLS1.3 will save the crypto cpu costs but not any
+ packet roundtrips.
+
+ Since a new hints DB is used, the hints DB maintenance should be updated
+ to additionally handle "tls".
+
+Security aspects:
+ The session ticket is encrypted, but is obviously an additional security
+ vulnarability surface. An attacker able to decrypt it would have access
+ all connections using the resumed session.
+ The session ticket encryption key is not committed to storage by the server
+ and is rotated regularly (OpenSSL: 1hr, and one previous key is used for
+ overlap; GnuTLS 6hr but does not specify any overlap).
+ Tickets have limited lifetime (2hr, and new ones issued after 1hr under
+ OpenSSL. GnuTLS 2hr, appears to not do overlap).
+
+ There is a question-mark over the security of the Diffie-Helman parameters
+ used for session negotiation. TBD. q-value; cf bug 1895
+
+Observability:
+ New log_selector "tls_resumption", appends an asterisk to the tls_cipher "X="
+ element.
+
+ Variables $tls_{in,out}_resumption have bits 0-4 indicating respectively
+ support built, client requested ticket, client offered session,
+ server issued ticket, resume used. A suitable decode list is provided
+ in the builtin macro _RESUME_DECODE for ${listextract {}{}}.
+
+Issues:
+ In a resumed session:
+ $tls_{in,out}_cipher will have values different to the original (under GnuTLS)
+ $tls_{in,out}_ocsp will be "not requested" or "no response", and
+ hosts_require_ocsp will fail
--------------------------------------------------------------
git://git.exim.org / users / heiko / exim.git / blobdiff