-. $Cambridge: exim/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt,v 1.85 2010/06/07 08:42:15 pdp Exp $
+. $Cambridge: exim/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt,v 1.88 2010/06/14 18:51:09 pdp Exp $
.
. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
. This is the primary source of the Exim Manual. It is an xfpt document that is
.section "Use of tcpwrappers" "SECID27"
.cindex "tcpwrappers, building Exim to support"
.cindex "USE_TCP_WRAPPERS"
+.cindex "TCP_WRAPPERS_DAEMON_NAME"
+.cindex "tcp_wrappers_daemon_name"
Exim can be linked with the &'tcpwrappers'& library in order to check incoming
SMTP calls using the &'tcpwrappers'& control files. This may be a convenient
alternative to Exim's own checking facilities for installations that are
CFLAGS=-O -I/usr/local/include
EXTRALIBS_EXIM=-L/usr/local/lib -lwrap
.endd
-in &_Local/Makefile_&. The name to use in the &'tcpwrappers'& control files is
-&"exim"&. For example, the line
+in &_Local/Makefile_&. The daemon name to use in the &'tcpwrappers'& control
+files is &"exim"&. For example, the line
.code
exim : LOCAL 192.168.1. .friendly.domain.example
.endd
in your &_/etc/hosts.allow_& file allows connections from the local host, from
the subnet 192.168.1.0/24, and from all hosts in &'friendly.domain.example'&.
-All other connections are denied. Consult the &'tcpwrappers'& documentation for
+All other connections are denied. The daemon name used by &'tcpwrappers'&
+can be changed at build time by setting TCP_WRAPPERS_DAEMON_NAME in
+in &_Local/Makefile_&, or by setting tcp_wrappers_daemon_name in the
+configure file. Consult the &'tcpwrappers'& documentation for
further details.
.cindex "testing", "malware"
.cindex "malware scan test"
This debugging option causes Exim to scan the given file,
-using the malware scanning framework. The option of av_scanner influences
-this option, so if av_scanner's value is dependent upon an expansion then
-the expansion should have defaults which apply to this invocation. Exim will
-have changed working directory before resolving the filename, so using fully
-qualified pathnames is advisable. This option requires admin privileges.
+using the malware scanning framework. The option of &%av_scanner%& influences
+this option, so if &%av_scanner%&'s value is dependent upon an expansion then
+the expansion should have defaults which apply to this invocation. ACLs are
+not invoked, so if &%av_scanner%& references an ACL variable then that variable
+will never be populated and &%-bmalware%& will fail.
+
+Exim will have changed working directory before resolving the filename, so
+using fully qualified pathnames is advisable. Exim will be running as the Exim
+user when it tries to open the file, rather than as the invoking user.
+This option requires admin privileges.
+
+The &%-bmalware%& option will not be extended to be more generally useful,
+there are better tools for file-scanning. This option exists to help
+administrators verify their Exim and AV scanner configuration.
.vitem &%-bt%&
.oindex "&%-bt%&"
.cindex "configuration file" "ownership"
.cindex "ownership" "configuration file"
The run time configuration file must be owned by root or by the user that is
-specified at compile time by the EXIM_USER option, or by the user that is
specified at compile time by the CONFIGURE_OWNER option (if set). The
-configuration file must not be world-writeable or group-writeable, unless its
-group is the one specified at compile time by the EXIM_GROUP option or by the
+configuration file must not be world-writeable, or group-writeable unless its
+group is the root group or the one specified at compile time by the
CONFIGURE_GROUP option.
&*Warning*&: In a conventional configuration, where the Exim binary is setuid
to root, anybody who is able to edit the run time configuration file has an
-easy way to run commands as root. If you make your mail administrators members
-of the Exim group, but do not trust them with root, make sure that the run time
-configuration is not group writeable.
+easy way to run commands as root. If you specify a user or group in the
+CONFIGURE_OWNER or CONFIGURE_GROUP options, then that user and/or any users
+who are members of that group will trivially be able to obtain root privileges.
+
+Up to Exim version 4.72, the run time configuration file was also permitted to
+be writeable by the Exim user and/or group. That has been changed in Exim 4.73
+since it offered a simple privilege escalation for any attacker who managed to
+compromise the Exim user account.
A default configuration file, which will work correctly in simple situations,
is provided in the file &_src/configure.default_&. If CONFIGURE_FILE