-Exim now has Experimental "Proxy Protocol" support. It was built on
-specifications from:
-http://haproxy.1wt.eu/download/1.5/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
-Above URL revised May 2014 to change version 2 spec:
-http://git.1wt.eu/web?p=haproxy.git;a=commitdiff;h=afb768340c9d7e50d8e
-
-The purpose of this function is so that an application load balancer,
-such as HAProxy, can sit in front of several Exim servers and Exim
-will log the IP that is connecting to the proxy server instead of
-the IP of the proxy server when it connects to Exim. It resets the
-$sender_address_host and $sender_address_port to the IP:port of the
-connection to the proxy. It also re-queries the DNS information for
-this new IP address so that the original sender's hostname and IP
-get logged in the Exim logfile. There is no logging if a host passes or
-fails Proxy Protocol negotiation, but it can easily be determined and
-recorded in an ACL (example is below).
-
-1. To compile Exim with Proxy Protocol support, put this in
-Local/Makefile:
-
-EXPERIMENTAL_PROXY=yes
-
-2. Global configuration settings:
-
-proxy_required_hosts = HOSTLIST
-
-The proxy_required_hosts option will require any IP in that hostlist
-to use Proxy Protocol. The specification of Proxy Protocol is very
-strict, and if proxy negotiation fails, Exim will not allow any SMTP
-command other than QUIT. (See end of this section for an example.)
-The option is expanded when used, so it can be a hostlist as well as
-string of IP addresses. Since it is expanded, specifying an alternate
-separator is supported for ease of use with IPv6 addresses.
-
-To log the IP of the proxy in the incoming logline, add:
- log_selector = +proxy
-
-A default incoming logline (wrapped for appearance) will look like this:
-
- 2013-11-04 09:25:06 1VdNti-0001OY-1V <= me@example.net
- H=mail.example.net [1.2.3.4] P=esmtp S=433
-
-With the log selector enabled, an email that was proxied through a
-Proxy Protocol server at 192.168.1.2 will look like this:
-
- 2013-11-04 09:25:06 1VdNti-0001OY-1V <= me@example.net
- H=mail.example.net [1.2.3.4] P=esmtp PRX=192.168.1.2 S=433
-
-3. In the ACL's the following expansion variables are available.
-
-proxy_host_address The (internal) src IP of the proxy server
- making the connection to the Exim server.
-proxy_host_port The (internal) src port the proxy server is
- using to connect to the Exim server.
-proxy_target_address The dest (public) IP of the remote host to
- the proxy server.
-proxy_target_port The dest port the remote host is using to
- connect to the proxy server.
-proxy_session Boolean, yes/no, the connected host is required
- to use Proxy Protocol.
-
-There is no expansion for a failed proxy session, however you can detect
-it by checking if $proxy_session is true but $proxy_host is empty. As
-an example, in my connect ACL, I have:
-
- warn condition = ${if and{ {bool{$proxy_session}} \
- {eq{$proxy_host_address}{}} } }
- log_message = Failed required proxy protocol negotiation \
- from $sender_host_name [$sender_host_address]
-
- warn condition = ${if and{ {bool{$proxy_session}} \
- {!eq{$proxy_host_address}{}} } }
- # But don't log health probes from the proxy itself
- condition = ${if eq{$proxy_host_address}{$sender_host_address} \
- {false}{true}}
- log_message = Successfully proxied from $sender_host_name \
- [$sender_host_address] through proxy protocol \
- host $proxy_host_address
-
- # Possibly more clear
- warn logwrite = Remote Source Address: $sender_host_address:$sender_host_port
- logwrite = Proxy Target Address: $proxy_target_address:$proxy_target_port
- logwrite = Proxy Internal Address: $proxy_host_address:$proxy_host_port
- logwrite = Internal Server Address: $received_ip_address:$received_port
-
-
-4. Recommended ACL additions:
- - Since the real connections are all coming from your proxy, and the
- per host connection tracking is done before Proxy Protocol is
- evaluated, smtp_accept_max_per_host must be set high enough to
- handle all of the parallel volume you expect per inbound proxy.
- - With the smtp_accept_max_per_host set so high, you lose the ability
- to protect your server from massive numbers of inbound connections
- from one IP. In order to prevent your server from being DOS'd, you
- need to add a per connection ratelimit to your connect ACL. I
- suggest something like this:
-
- # Set max number of connections per host
- LIMIT = 5
- # Or do some kind of IP lookup in a flat file or database
- # LIMIT = ${lookup{$sender_host_address}iplsearch{/etc/exim/proxy_limits}}
-
- defer message = Too many connections from this IP right now
- ratelimit = LIMIT / 5s / per_conn / strict
-
-
-5. Runtime issues to be aware of:
- - The proxy has 3 seconds (hard-coded in the source code) to send the
- required Proxy Protocol header after it connects. If it does not,
- the response to any commands will be:
- "503 Command refused, required Proxy negotiation failed"
- - If the incoming connection is configured in Exim to be a Proxy
- Protocol host, but the proxy is not sending the header, the banner
- does not get sent until the timeout occurs. If the sending host
- sent any input (before the banner), this causes a standard Exim
- synchronization error (i.e. trying to pipeline before PIPELINING
- was advertised).
- - This is not advised, but is mentioned for completeness if you have
- a specific internal configuration that you want this: If the Exim
- server only has an internal IP address and no other machines in your
- organization will connect to it to try to send email, you may
- simply set the hostlist to "*", however, this will prevent local
- mail programs from working because that would require mail from
- localhost to use Proxy Protocol. Again, not advised!
-
-6. Example of a refused connection because the Proxy Protocol header was
-not sent from a host configured to use Proxy Protocol. In the example,
-the 3 second timeout occurred (when a Proxy Protocol banner should have
-been sent), the banner was displayed to the user, but all commands are
-rejected except for QUIT:
-
-# nc mail.example.net 25
-220-mail.example.net, ESMTP Exim 4.82+proxy, Mon, 04 Nov 2013 10:45:59
-220 -0800 RFC's enforced
-EHLO localhost
-503 Command refused, required Proxy negotiation failed
-QUIT
-221 mail.example.net closing connection
-
-
-
-
-SOCKS
-------------------------------------------------------------
-Support for proxying outbound SMTP via a Socks 5 proxy
-(RFC 1928) is included if Exim is compiled with
-EXPERIMENTAL_SOCKS defined.
-
-If an smtp transport has a nonempty socks_proxy option
-defined, this is active. The option is expanded and
-should be a list (colon-separated by default) of
-proxy specifiers. Each proxy specifier is a list
-(space-separated by default) where the initial element
-is an IP address and any subsequent elements are options.
-
-Options are a string <name>=<value>.
-These options are currently defined:
-- "auth", with possible values "none" and "name".
- Using "name" selects username/password authentication
- per RFC 1929. Default is "none".
-- "name" sets the authentication username. Default is empty.
-- "pass" sets the authentication password. Default is empty.
-- "port" sets the tcp port number for the proxy. Default is 1080.
-- "tmo" sets a connection timeout in seconds for this proxy. Default is 5.
-
-Proxies from the list are tried in order until
-one responds. The timeout for the overall connection
-applies to the set of proxied attempts.
-
-If events are used, the remote IP/port during a
-tcp:connect event will be that of the proxy.
-
-
-
-
-DANE
-------------------------------------------------------------
-DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied
-to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
-it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather
-than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
-operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection
-you make, and make another one to the server (so both
-you and the server still think you have an encrypted
-connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
-Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something
-which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
-certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the
-Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
-
-What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the
-trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
-that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the
-admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
-by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set
-of root CAs.
-
-It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that
-connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
-fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
-
-DANE scales better than having to maintain (and
-side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
-for every possible target server. It also scales
-(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
-client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also
-means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
-
-DANE requires a server operator to do three things:
-1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
-that DNS lookups they do for the server have not
-been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
-to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and
-any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
-DNSSEC.
-2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server
-certificate for a TLS connection should be.
-3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain,
-in TLS connections which is traceable to the one
-defined by (one of?) the TSLA records
-
-There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side
-operation of DANE.
-
-The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate
-usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies
-the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved
-is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted
-during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a
-single system, using a self-signed certificate.
- DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA
-to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
-well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just
-a self-signed certificate which is used to sign
-cerver certificates, but running one securely does
-require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used
-then either all clients must be primed with it, or
-(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit
-the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.
-If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it
-(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is
-reduced from all public CAs to that single CA.
-DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or
-servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
-all of which point to a single TLSA record.
-
-The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1)
-and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
-
-At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa
-is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like
-
- openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
- | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
- | openssl sha512 \
- | awk '{print $2}'
-
-are workable for 4th-field hashes.
-
-For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates
-must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
-
-The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing
-for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
-be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However,
-this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
-default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff
-DANE is in use, to:
-
- hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
- {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
- {*}{}}
-
-The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with
-numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
-The zero above means DANE was not in use,
-the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
-found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the
-string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
-control the OCSP request.
-
-This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if
-it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
-those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction
-with DANE in their OCSP settings.
-
-
-For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options,
-hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane. They do the obvious thing.
-[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ]
-
-DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured
-MX, A and TLSA records.
-
-A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match
-and the host-lookup succeded using dnssec.
-If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
-will be required for the host.
-
-(TODO: specify when fallback happens vs. when the host is not used)
-
-If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport
-options are ignored:
- hosts_require_tls
- tls_verify_hosts
- tls_try_verify_hosts
- tls_verify_certificates
- tls_crl
- tls_verify_cert_hostnames
-
-If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
-verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set
-appropriately.
-
-Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that)
-and dnssec_require_domains is ignored.
-
-If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item
-in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
-
-There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if
-verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
-in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable
-$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above).
-
-
-
-SMTPUTF8
-------------------------------------------------------------
-Internationalised mail name handling.
-RFCs 6530, 6533, 5890
-
-Compile with EXPERIMENTAL_INTERNATIONAL and libidn.
-
-New main config option smtputf8_advertise_hosts, default '*',
-a host list. If this matches the sending host and
-accept_8bitmime is true (the default) then the ESMTP option
-SMTPUTF8 will be advertised.
-
-If the sender specifies the SMTPUTF8 option on a MAIL command
-international handling for the message is enabled and
-the expansion variable $message_smtputf8 will have value TRUE.
-
-The option allow_utf8_domains is set to true for this
-message. All DNS lookups are converted to a-label form
-whatever the setting of allow_utf8_domains.
-
-Both localparts and domain are maintained as the original
-utf8 form internally; any matching or regex use will
-require appropriate care. Filenames created, eg. by
-the appendfile transport, will have utf8 name.
+In order to build exim with Queuefile transport support add or uncomment
+
+EXPERIMENTAL_QUEUEFILE=yes
+
+to your Local/Makefile. (Re-)build/install exim. exim -d should show
+Experimental_QUEUEFILE in the line "Support for:".
+
+
+ARC support
+-----------
+Specification: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-11
+Note that this is not an RFC yet, so may change.
+
+ARC is intended to support the utility of SPF and DKIM in the presence of
+intermediaries in the transmission path - forwarders and mailinglists -
+by establishing a cryptographically-signed chain in headers.
+
+Normally one would only bother doing ARC-signing when functioning as
+an intermediary. One might do verify for local destinations.
+
+ARC uses the notion of a "ADministrative Management Domain" (ADMD).
+Described in RFC 5598 (section 2.3), this is essentially the set of
+mail-handling systems that the mail transits. A label should be chosen to
+identify the ADMD. Messages should be ARC-verified on entry to the ADMD,
+and ARC-signed on exit from it.
+
+
+Verification
+--
+An ACL condition is provided to perform the "verifier actions" detailed
+in section 6 of the above specification. It may be called from the DATA ACL
+and succeeds if the result matches any of a given list.
+It also records the highest ARC instance number (the chain size)
+and verification result for later use in creating an Authentication-Results:
+standard header.
+
+ verify = arc/<acceptable_list> none:fail:pass
+
+ add_header = :at_start:${authresults {<admd-identifier>}}
+
+ Note that it would be wise to strip incoming messages of A-R headers
+ that claim to be from our own <admd-identifier>.
+
+There are three new variables: $arc_state, $arc_state_reason, $arc_domains:
+
+ $arc_state One of pass, fail, none
+ $arc_state_reason (if fail, why)
+ $arc_domains colon-sep list of ARC chain domains, in chain order.
+ problematic elements may have empty list elements
+ $arc_oldest_pass lowest passing instance number of chain
+
+Example:
+ logwrite = oldest-p-ams: <${reduce {$lh_ARC-Authentication-Results:} \
+ {} \
+ {${if = {$arc_oldest_pass} \
+ {${extract {i}{${extract {1}{;}{$item}}}}} \
+ {$item} {$value}}} \
+ }>
+
+Receive log lines for an ARC pass will be tagged "ARC".
+
+
+Signing
+--
+arc_sign = <admd-identifier> : <selector> : <privkey> [ : <options> ]
+An option on the smtp transport, which constructs and prepends to the message
+an ARC set of headers. The textually-first Authentication-Results: header
+is used as a basis (you must have added one on entry to the ADMD).
+Expanded as a whole; if unset, empty or forced-failure then no signing is done.
+If it is set, all three elements must be non-empty.
+
+The fourth element is optional, and if present consists of a comma-separated list
+of options. The options implemented are
+
+ timestamps Add a t= tag to the generated AMS and AS headers, with the
+ current time.
+ expire[=<val>] Add an x= tag to the generated AMS header, with an expiry time.
+ If the value <val> is an plain number it is used unchanged.
+ If it starts with a '+' then the following number is added
+ to the current time, as an offset in seconds.
+ If a value is not given it defaults to a one month offset.
+
+[As of writing, gmail insist that a t= tag on the AS is mandatory]
+
+Caveats:
+ * There must be an Authentication-Results header, presumably added by an ACL
+ while receiving the message, for the same ADMD, for arc_sign to succeed.
+ This requires careful coordination between inbound and outbound logic.
+ * If passing a message to another system, such as a mailing-list manager
+ (MLM), between receipt and sending, be wary of manipulations to headers made
+ by the MLM.
+ + For instance, Mailman with REMOVE_DKIM_HEADERS==3 might improve
+ deliverability in a pre-ARC world, but that option also renames the
+ Authentication-Results header, which breaks signing.
+ * Even if you use multiple DKIM keys for different domains, the ARC concept
+ should try to stick to one ADMD, so pick a primary domain and use that for
+ AR headers and outbound signing.
+
+Signing is not compatible with cutthrough delivery; any (before expansion)
+value set for the option will result in cutthrough delivery not being
+used via the transport in question.
+
git://git.exim.org / users / heiko / exim.git / blobdiff