-/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.25 2005/03/15 15:36:41 ph10 Exp $ */
+/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.55 2006/02/13 12:02:59 ph10 Exp $ */
/*************************************************
* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2005 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2006 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
#endif
+ ACLC_RATELIMIT,
ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_REGEX,
"log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
-static uschar *conditions[] = { US"acl", US"authenticated",
+static uschar *conditions[] = {
+ US"acl",
+ US"authenticated",
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
US"bmi_optin",
#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
US"mime_regex",
#endif
+ US"ratelimit",
US"recipients",
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
US"regex",
#endif
US"verify" };
-/* ACL control names */
-static uschar *controls[] = { US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
+/* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
+that follows! */
+
+enum {
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
+#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
+ CONTROL_DK_VERIFY,
+#endif
+ CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
+ CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
+ CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION, CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
+#endif
+ CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
+
+/* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
+turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
+control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
+and should be tidied up. */
+
+static uschar *controls[] = {
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ US"bmi_run",
+ #endif
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
+ US"dk_verify",
+ #endif
+ US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze",
- US"queue_only", US"submission", US"no_multiline"};
+ US"queue_only", US"submission", US"suppress_local_fixups",
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ US"no_mbox_unspool",
+ #endif
+
+ US"no_multiline"};
/* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
TRUE, /* mime_regex */
#endif
+ TRUE, /* ratelimit */
FALSE, /* recipients */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
TRUE, /* regex */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
FALSE, /* mime_regex */
#endif
+ FALSE, /* ratelimit */
FALSE, /* recipients */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
FALSE, /* regex */
};
/* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
-each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. */
+each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
+to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
0, /* acl */
0, /* condition */
/* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
- always and check in the control processing itself */
+ always and check in the control processing itself. */
0, /* control */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* decode */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
#endif
0, /* delay */
#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* demime */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* domains */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* local_parts */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
0, /* log_message */
0, /* logwrite */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* malware */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
#endif
0, /* message */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* mime_regex */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
#endif
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* recipients */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
+ 0, /* ratelimit */
+
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* regex */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
#endif
(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
0, /* set */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* spam */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
};
-/* Return values from decode_control() */
-
-enum {
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
-#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- CONTROL_DK_VERIFY,
-#endif
- CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
- CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
- CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
-#endif
- CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
-
/* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
+
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
(unsigned int)
~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
#endif
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+
(unsigned int)
~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
static control_def controls_list[] = {
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE},
+ { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE},
-#endif
- { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
- { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
- { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
- { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, FALSE},
- { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
- { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE},
- { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE},
+ { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE },
+#endif
+ { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
+ { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
+ { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
+ { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
+ { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
+ { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
+ { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE},
+ { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
#endif
- { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE},
- { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE}
+ { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
+ { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
+ { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
+ { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
};
+/* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
+caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
+integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
+explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
+
+static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
+
+enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
+ CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
+
+/* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
+code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
+authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
+so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
+DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
+further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
+the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
+
+static int csa_return_code[] = {
+ OK, OK, OK, OK,
+ FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
+};
+
+static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
+ US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
+ US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
+};
+
+static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
+ US"unknown",
+ US"ok",
+ US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
+ US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
+ US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
+ US"failed (host name not authorized)",
+ US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
+ US"failed (client address mismatch)"
+};
+
/* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
s++;
}
- /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL */
+ /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
+ can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
- if (*s == ':')
- {
- if (negated || name[0] == 0)
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL name in \"%s\"", saveline);
- return NULL;
- }
- break;
- }
+ if (*s == ':' || isupper(name[0] && *s == '=')) return yield;
/* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
continues the previous verb. */
if (c == ACLC_SET)
{
- if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s[4] != 'c' && s[4] != 'm') ||
- !isdigit(s[5]) || (!isspace(s[6]) && s[6] != '='))
+ int offset, max, n;
+ uschar *endptr;
+
+ if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0) goto BAD_ACL_VAR;
+ if (s[4] == 'c')
+ {
+ offset = 0;
+ max = ACL_CVARS;
+ }
+ else if (s[4] == 'm')
{
- *error = string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL "
- "modifier \"set %s\"", s);
+ offset = ACL_CVARS;
+ max = ACL_MVARS;
+ }
+ else goto BAD_ACL_VAR;
+
+ n = Ustrtoul(s + 5, &endptr, 10);
+ if ((*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr)) || n >= max)
+ {
+ BAD_ACL_VAR:
+ *error = string_sprintf("syntax error or unrecognized name after "
+ "\"set\" in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", s);
return NULL;
}
- cond->u.varnumber = s[5] - '0';
- if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX;
- s += 6;
+ cond->u.varnumber = n + offset;
+ s = endptr;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
}
strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
- /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc store so they
- can be freed at the start of a new message. */
+ /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
+ store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
+/*************************************************
+* Check client IP address matches CSA target *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
+response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
+is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
+If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
+authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
+then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
+addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
+an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
+
+Arguments:
+ dnsa the DNS answer block
+ dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
+ reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
+ target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
+
+Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
+ CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
+ CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
+ uschar *target)
+{
+dns_record *rr;
+dns_address *da;
+
+BOOL target_found = FALSE;
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
+ rr != NULL;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+ {
+ /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
+
+ if (rr->type != T_A
+ #if HAVE_IPV6
+ && rr->type != T_AAAA
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_A6
+ && rr->type != T_A6
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ ) continue;
+
+ if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
+
+ target_found = TRUE;
+
+ /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
+ the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
+
+ for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
+ {
+ /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
+
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
+
+ if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
+using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
+addresses. */
+
+if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
+else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+}
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
+to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
+$sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
+client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
+target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
+should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
+not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
+
+Arguments:
+ domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
+
+Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
+ CSA_OK successfully authorized
+ CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
+ CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
+{
+tree_node *t;
+uschar *found, *p;
+int priority, weight, port;
+dns_answer dnsa;
+dns_scan dnss;
+dns_record *rr;
+int rc, type;
+uschar target[256];
+
+/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
+client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
+instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
+
+while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
+if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
+if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
+if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
+into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
+containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
+
+if (domain[0] == '[')
+ {
+ uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
+ if (start == NULL) start = domain;
+ domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
+ }
+
+/* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
+DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
+not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
+address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
+extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
+
+if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
+ {
+ if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
+ domain = target;
+ }
+
+/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
+return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
+for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
+we return from this function. */
+
+t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
+if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
+
+t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
+Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
+(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
+
+/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
+
+found = domain;
+switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
+ {
+ /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
+
+ default:
+ return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+
+ /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
+
+ case DNS_NOMATCH:
+ case DNS_NODATA:
+ return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+ /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
+
+ case DNS_SUCCEED:
+ break;
+ }
+
+/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
+ rr != NULL;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+ {
+ if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
+
+ /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
+
+ p = rr->data;
+ GETSHORT(priority, p);
+ GETSHORT(weight, p);
+ GETSHORT(port, p);
+
+ DEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
+
+ /* Check the CSA version number */
+
+ if (priority != 1) continue;
+
+ /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
+ found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
+ the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
+ assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
+ SRV records of their own. */
+
+ if (found != domain)
+ {
+ if (port & 1)
+ return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
+ else
+ return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
+ /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
+ in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
+ unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
+ address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
+ greater than 3 are undefined. */
+
+ if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
+
+ if (weight > 2) continue;
+
+ /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
+ client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
+ target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
+
+ (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
+ (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
+
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
+
+if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
+A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
+be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
+equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
+root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
+
+if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+
+/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
+to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
+because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
+to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
+
+rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
+if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+
+/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
+
+#if HAVE_IPV6
+if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
+ type = T_AAAA;
+else
+#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
+ type = T_A;
+
+
+#if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
+DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN:
+#endif
+
+switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
+ {
+ /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
+
+ default:
+ return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
+
+ /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
+
+ case DNS_SUCCEED:
+ rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
+ if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+ /* else fall through */
+
+ /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
+ IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
+ we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
+
+ case DNS_NOMATCH:
+ case DNS_NODATA:
+
+ #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
+ if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
+ #endif
+
+ return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+ }
+}
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* Handle verification (address & other) *
*************************************************/
BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
BOOL no_details = FALSE;
+BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
return FAIL;
}
-/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */
+/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
+occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
{
if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
+ if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
}
+/* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
+result code into user-friendly strings. */
+
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
+ {
+ rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
+ *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
+ csa_reason_string[rc]);
+ csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
+ return csa_return_code[rc];
+ }
+
/* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
{
if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
- if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
- "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
- return ERROR;
- }
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
*user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
return rc;
}
+/* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
+recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
+
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
+ {
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
+ rc = verify_check_notblind();
+ if (rc != OK)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
+ if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
+ }
+ return rc;
+ }
/* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
{
- if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
- "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
- return ERROR;
- }
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
verify_header_sender = TRUE;
}
{
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
/* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
+ else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
+ {
+ pm_mailfrom = US"";
+ verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
+ }
else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
{
else
verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
+ if (success_on_redirect)
+ verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
+
/* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
verify_options. */
{
address_item addr2;
+ if (success_on_redirect)
+ verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
+
/* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
get rewritten. */
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
"(this verify item has no options)", arg);
return ERROR;
+
+/* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
+
+WRONG_ACL:
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
+ "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
+return ERROR;
}
+/*************************************************
+* Handle rate limiting *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
+of the ACL ratelimit condition.
+
+Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
+sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
+similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
+ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
+
+Arguments:
+ arg the option string for ratelimit=
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+
+Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
+ FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
+ DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
+ ERROR - Syntax error in options.
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
+{
+double limit, period;
+uschar *ss, *key;
+int sep = '/';
+BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
+BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
+int old_pool, rc;
+tree_node **anchor, *t;
+open_db dbblock, *dbm;
+dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
+struct timeval tv;
+
+/* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
+variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
+error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
+
+/* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
+size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
+rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
+
+sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
+if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
+ limit = -1.0;
+else
+ {
+ limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
+ if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
+ else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
+ else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
+ }
+if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
+ "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
+ sender_rate_limit);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
+/* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
+lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
+if the period or options are different. */
+
+key = arg;
+
+/* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
+constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
+run-time division errors. */
+
+sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
+if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
+else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
+if (period <= 0.0)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
+ "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
+ sender_rate_period);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
+/* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
+used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
+
+while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
+ != NULL)
+ {
+ if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
+ else have_key = TRUE;
+ }
+if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
+/* Default option values */
+if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
+if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
+
+/* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
+sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
+
+if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
+ key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
+
+HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
+ limit, period, key);
+
+/* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
+per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
+so that they survive across resets. */
+
+anchor = NULL;
+old_pool = store_pool;
+
+if (per_conn)
+ {
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ }
+else if (per_mail || per_byte)
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
+else if (per_cmd)
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
+
+if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
+ {
+ dbd = t->data.ptr;
+ /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
+ if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
+ else rc = OK;
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+ sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
+rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
+previous rate for this key, create one. */
+
+dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
+if (dbm == NULL)
+ {
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+ sender_rate = NULL;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
+ *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
+
+gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
+if (dbd == NULL)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
+ dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
+ dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
+ dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+ dbd->rate = 0.0;
+ }
+else
+ {
+ /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
+ average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
+ a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
+ where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
+
+ Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
+ samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
+ is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
+ that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
+ sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
+
+ The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
+ comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
+ message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
+
+ It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
+ to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
+ This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
+ messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
+
+ rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
+ = k + a * rate_0
+ rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
+ = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
+ rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
+ rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
+ = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
+ = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
+
+ When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
+
+ rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
+ a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
+ N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
+ N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
+
+ Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
+ increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
+ rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
+ maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
+ messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
+
+ double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
+ + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
+ double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
+ + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
+
+ /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
+ backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
+ rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
+
+ double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
+ : this_time - prev_time;
+
+ double i_over_p = interval / period;
+ double a = exp(-i_over_p);
+
+ dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
+ dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+
+ /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
+ measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
+ then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
+ decay as if nothing happened. */
+
+ if (per_byte)
+ dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
+ * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
+ else
+ dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
+ }
+
+/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
+matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
+the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
+be completely blocked). */
+
+if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
+ else rc = OK;
+
+/* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
+are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
+the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
+rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
+
+if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
+ dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
+dbfn_close(dbm);
+
+/* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
+
+if (anchor != NULL)
+ {
+ t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
+ t->data.ptr = dbd;
+ Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
+ (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
+ }
+
+/* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
+order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
+
+store_pool = old_pool;
+sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
+
+HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
+
+return rc;
+}
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
*************************************************/
if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
{
int n = cb->u.varnumber;
- int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm';
- if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX;
+ int t = (n < ACL_CVARS)? 'c' : 'm';
+ if (n >= ACL_CVARS) n -= ACL_CVARS;
debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
lhswidth += 7;
}
{
/* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
"discard" verb. */
-
+\
case ACLC_ACL:
rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
break;
+ case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
- fake_reject = TRUE;
+ fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
if (*p == '/')
{
uschar *pp = p + 1;
while (*pp != 0) pp++;
- fake_reject_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p));
+ fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
p = pp;
}
else
{
/* Explicitly reset to default string */
- fake_reject_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
+ fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
}
break;
case CONTROL_FREEZE:
deliver_freeze = TRUE;
deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
+ freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
+ if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ p += 8;
+ freeze_tell = NULL;
+ }
+ if (*p != 0)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
break;
case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
break;
case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
+ originator_name = US"";
submission_mode = TRUE;
while (*p == '/')
{
{
uschar *pp = p + 8;
while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
- submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p);
+ submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
+ the string. */
+ else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
+ {
+ uschar *pp = p + 6;
+ while (*pp != 0) pp++;
+ submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
+ big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
p = pp;
}
else break;
return ERROR;
}
break;
+
+ case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
+ suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
+ break;
}
break;
HDEBUG(D_acl)
debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
}
+
+ /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
+ gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
+ the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
+ that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
+ is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
+ end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
+ Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
+ can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
+ it is not always available.
+
+ NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
+ dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
+ Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
+ case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
+
else
{
while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
break;
#endif
+ case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
+ rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, log_msgptr);
+ break;
+
case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
&recipient_data);
case ACLC_SET:
{
int old_pool = store_pool;
- if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_CVARS) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
store_pool = old_pool;
}
/* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
- only from explicit "message" modifiers. */
+ only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
+ $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
+ (until something changes it). */
case ACLC_VERIFY:
rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
+ acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
break;
return ERROR;
}
acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
- close(fd);
+ (void)close(fd);
acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
case ACL_WARN:
if (cond == OK)
acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
- else if (cond == DEFER)
- acl_warn(where, NULL, string_sprintf("ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
- "condition test deferred: %s",
- (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr));
+ else if (cond == DEFER && (log_extra_selector & LX_acl_warn_skipped) != 0)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
+ "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
+ (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
+ (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
break;
Arguments:
where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
- data_string RCPT address, or SMTP command argument, or NULL
+ recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
*/
int
-acl_check(int where, uschar *data_string, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
+acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
uschar **log_msgptr)
{
int rc;
address_item adb;
-address_item *addr;
+address_item *addr = NULL;
*user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
sender_verified_failed = NULL;
+ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
{
adb = address_defaults;
addr = &adb;
- addr->address = data_string;
+ addr->address = recipient;
if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
{
*log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
deliver_domain = addr->domain;
deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
}
-else
- {
- addr = NULL;
- smtp_command_argument = data_string;
- }
rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
-smtp_command_argument = deliver_domain =
- deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL;
+deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
+ sender_address_data = NULL;
/* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
git://git.exim.org / users / heiko / exim.git / blobdiff