-/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/exim.c,v 1.65 2009/11/16 19:50:36 nm4 Exp $ */
-
/*************************************************
* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2009 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
#include "exim.h"
+extern void init_lookup_list(void);
+
/*************************************************
+/*************************************************
+* Enums for cmdline interface *
+*************************************************/
+
+enum commandline_info { CMDINFO_NONE=0,
+ CMDINFO_HELP, CMDINFO_SIEVE, CMDINFO_DSCP };
+
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* Compile regular expression and panic on fail *
*************************************************/
+/*************************************************
+* Set up processing details *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Save a text string for dumping when SIGUSR1 is received.
+Do checks for overruns.
+
+Arguments: format and arguments, as for printf()
+Returns: nothing
+*/
+
+void
+set_process_info(const char *format, ...)
+{
+int len;
+va_list ap;
+sprintf(CS process_info, "%5d ", (int)getpid());
+len = Ustrlen(process_info);
+va_start(ap, format);
+if (!string_vformat(process_info + len, PROCESS_INFO_SIZE - len - 2, format, ap))
+ Ustrcpy(process_info + len, "**** string overflowed buffer ****");
+len = Ustrlen(process_info);
+process_info[len+0] = '\n';
+process_info[len+1] = '\0';
+process_info_len = len + 1;
+DEBUG(D_process_info) debug_printf("set_process_info: %s", process_info);
+va_end(ap);
+}
+
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* Handler for SIGUSR1 *
*************************************************/
setting up a handler that causes automatic restarting of any system call
that is in progress at the time.
+This function takes care to be signal-safe.
+
Argument: the signal number (SIGUSR1)
Returns: nothing
*/
static void
usr1_handler(int sig)
{
-sig = sig; /* Keep picky compilers happy */
-log_write(0, LOG_PROCESS, "%s", process_info);
-log_close_all();
-os_restarting_signal(SIGUSR1, usr1_handler);
+int fd;
+
+os_restarting_signal(sig, usr1_handler);
+
+fd = Uopen(process_log_path, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY, LOG_MODE);
+if (fd < 0)
+ {
+ /* If we are already running as the Exim user, try to create it in the
+ current process (assuming spool_directory exists). Otherwise, if we are
+ root, do the creation in an exim:exim subprocess. */
+
+ int euid = geteuid();
+ if (euid == exim_uid)
+ fd = Uopen(process_log_path, O_CREAT|O_APPEND|O_WRONLY, LOG_MODE);
+ else if (euid == root_uid)
+ fd = log_create_as_exim(process_log_path);
+ }
+
+/* If we are neither exim nor root, or if we failed to create the log file,
+give up. There is not much useful we can do with errors, since we don't want
+to disrupt whatever is going on outside the signal handler. */
+
+if (fd < 0) return;
+
+(void)write(fd, process_info, process_info_len);
+(void)close(fd);
}
-/*************************************************
-* Set up processing details *
-*************************************************/
-
-/* Save a text string for dumping when SIGUSR1 is received.
-Do checks for overruns.
-
-Arguments: format and arguments, as for printf()
-Returns: nothing
-*/
-
-void
-set_process_info(char *format, ...)
-{
-int len;
-va_list ap;
-sprintf(CS process_info, "%5d ", (int)getpid());
-len = Ustrlen(process_info);
-va_start(ap, format);
-if (!string_vformat(process_info + len, PROCESS_INFO_SIZE - len, format, ap))
- Ustrcpy(process_info + len, "**** string overflowed buffer ****");
-DEBUG(D_process_info) debug_printf("set_process_info: %s\n", process_info);
-va_end(ap);
-}
-
-
-
-
-
/*************************************************
* Call fopen() with umask 777 and adjust mode *
*************************************************/
*/
FILE *
-modefopen(uschar *filename, char *options, mode_t mode)
+modefopen(const uschar *filename, const char *options, mode_t mode)
{
mode_t saved_umask = umask(0777);
FILE *f = Ufopen(filename, options);
if (smtp_input)
{
#ifdef SUPPORT_TLS
- tls_close(FALSE); /* Shut down the TLS library */
+ tls_close(FALSE, FALSE); /* Shut down the TLS library */
#endif
(void)close(fileno(smtp_in));
(void)close(fileno(smtp_out));
DEBUG(D_uid)
{
- int group_count;
+ int group_count, save_errno;
gid_t group_list[NGROUPS_MAX];
debug_printf("changed uid/gid: %s\n uid=%ld gid=%ld pid=%ld\n", msg,
(long int)geteuid(), (long int)getegid(), (long int)getpid());
group_count = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, group_list);
+ save_errno = errno;
debug_printf(" auxiliary group list:");
if (group_count > 0)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < group_count; i++) debug_printf(" %d", (int)group_list[i]);
}
+ else if (group_count < 0)
+ debug_printf(" <error: %s>", strerror(save_errno));
else debug_printf(" <none>");
debug_printf("\n");
}
-/*************************************************
-* Decode bit settings for log/debug *
-*************************************************/
-
-/* This function decodes a string containing bit settings in the form of +name
-and/or -name sequences, and sets/unsets bits in a bit string accordingly. It
-also recognizes a numeric setting of the form =<number>, but this is not
-intended for user use. It's an easy way for Exim to pass the debug settings
-when it is re-exec'ed.
-
-The log options are held in two unsigned ints (because there became too many
-for one). The top bit in the table means "put in 2nd selector". This does not
-yet apply to debug options, so the "=" facility sets only the first selector.
-
-The "all" selector, which must be equal to 0xffffffff, is recognized specially.
-It sets all the bits in both selectors. However, there is a facility for then
-unsetting certain bits, because we want to turn off "memory" in the debug case.
-
-A bad value for a debug setting is treated as an unknown option - error message
-to stderr and die. For log settings, which come from the configuration file,
-we write to the log on the way out...
-
-Arguments:
- selector1 address of the first bit string
- selector2 address of the second bit string, or NULL
- notall1 bits to exclude from "all" for selector1
- notall2 bits to exclude from "all" for selector2
- string the configured string
- options the table of option names
- count size of table
- which "log" or "debug"
-
-Returns: nothing on success - bomb out on failure
-*/
-
-static void
-decode_bits(unsigned int *selector1, unsigned int *selector2, int notall1,
- int notall2, uschar *string, bit_table *options, int count, uschar *which)
-{
-uschar *errmsg;
-if (string == NULL) return;
-
-if (*string == '=')
- {
- char *end; /* Not uschar */
- *selector1 = strtoul(CS string+1, &end, 0);
- if (*end == 0) return;
- errmsg = string_sprintf("malformed numeric %s_selector setting: %s", which,
- string);
- goto ERROR_RETURN;
- }
-
-/* Handle symbolic setting */
-
-else for(;;)
- {
- BOOL adding;
- uschar *s;
- int len;
- bit_table *start, *end;
-
- while (isspace(*string)) string++;
- if (*string == 0) return;
-
- if (*string != '+' && *string != '-')
- {
- errmsg = string_sprintf("malformed %s_selector setting: "
- "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"", which, string);
- goto ERROR_RETURN;
- }
-
- adding = *string++ == '+';
- s = string;
- while (isalnum(*string) || *string == '_') string++;
- len = string - s;
-
- start = options;
- end = options + count;
-
- while (start < end)
- {
- bit_table *middle = start + (end - start)/2;
- int c = Ustrncmp(s, middle->name, len);
- if (c == 0)
- {
- if (middle->name[len] != 0) c = -1; else
- {
- unsigned int bit = middle->bit;
- unsigned int *selector;
-
- /* The value with all bits set means "force all bits in both selectors"
- in the case where two are being handled. However, the top bit in the
- second selector is never set. When setting, some bits can be excluded.
- */
-
- if (bit == 0xffffffff)
- {
- if (adding)
- {
- *selector1 = 0xffffffff ^ notall1;
- if (selector2 != NULL) *selector2 = 0x7fffffff ^ notall2;
- }
- else
- {
- *selector1 = 0;
- if (selector2 != NULL) *selector2 = 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Otherwise, the 0x80000000 bit means "this value, without the top
- bit, belongs in the second selector". */
-
- else
- {
- if ((bit & 0x80000000) != 0)
- {
- selector = selector2;
- bit &= 0x7fffffff;
- }
- else selector = selector1;
- if (adding) *selector |= bit; else *selector &= ~bit;
- }
- break; /* Out of loop to match selector name */
- }
- }
- if (c < 0) end = middle; else start = middle + 1;
- } /* Loop to match selector name */
-
- if (start >= end)
- {
- errmsg = string_sprintf("unknown %s_selector setting: %c%.*s", which,
- adding? '+' : '-', len, s);
- goto ERROR_RETURN;
- }
- } /* Loop for selector names */
-
-/* Handle disasters */
-
-ERROR_RETURN:
-if (Ustrcmp(which, "debug") == 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "exim: %s\n", errmsg);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-else log_write(0, LOG_CONFIG|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "%s", errmsg);
-}
-
-
-
/*************************************************
* Show supported features *
*************************************************/
-/* This function is called for -bV and for -d to output the optional features
-of the current Exim binary.
+/* This function is called for -bV/--version and for -d to output the optional
+features of the current Exim binary.
Arguments: a FILE for printing
Returns: nothing
static void
show_whats_supported(FILE *f)
{
+ auth_info *authi;
+
#ifdef DB_VERSION_STRING
fprintf(f, "Berkeley DB: %s\n", DB_VERSION_STRING);
#elif defined(BTREEVERSION) && defined(HASHVERSION)
#endif
fprintf(f, "\n");
-fprintf(f, "Lookups:");
-#ifdef LOOKUP_LSEARCH
+fprintf(f, "Lookups (built-in):");
+#if defined(LOOKUP_LSEARCH) && LOOKUP_LSEARCH!=2
fprintf(f, " lsearch wildlsearch nwildlsearch iplsearch");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_CDB
+#if defined(LOOKUP_CDB) && LOOKUP_CDB!=2
fprintf(f, " cdb");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_DBM
- fprintf(f, " dbm dbmnz");
+#if defined(LOOKUP_DBM) && LOOKUP_DBM!=2
+ fprintf(f, " dbm dbmjz dbmnz");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_DNSDB
+#if defined(LOOKUP_DNSDB) && LOOKUP_DNSDB!=2
fprintf(f, " dnsdb");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_DSEARCH
+#if defined(LOOKUP_DSEARCH) && LOOKUP_DSEARCH!=2
fprintf(f, " dsearch");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_IBASE
+#if defined(LOOKUP_IBASE) && LOOKUP_IBASE!=2
fprintf(f, " ibase");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_LDAP
+#if defined(LOOKUP_LDAP) && LOOKUP_LDAP!=2
fprintf(f, " ldap ldapdn ldapm");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_MYSQL
+#if defined(LOOKUP_MYSQL) && LOOKUP_MYSQL!=2
fprintf(f, " mysql");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_NIS
+#if defined(LOOKUP_NIS) && LOOKUP_NIS!=2
fprintf(f, " nis nis0");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_NISPLUS
+#if defined(LOOKUP_NISPLUS) && LOOKUP_NISPLUS!=2
fprintf(f, " nisplus");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_ORACLE
+#if defined(LOOKUP_ORACLE) && LOOKUP_ORACLE!=2
fprintf(f, " oracle");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_PASSWD
+#if defined(LOOKUP_PASSWD) && LOOKUP_PASSWD!=2
fprintf(f, " passwd");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_PGSQL
+#if defined(LOOKUP_PGSQL) && LOOKUP_PGSQL!=2
fprintf(f, " pgsql");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_SQLITE
+#if defined(LOOKUP_SQLITE) && LOOKUP_SQLITE!=2
fprintf(f, " sqlite");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_TESTDB
+#if defined(LOOKUP_TESTDB) && LOOKUP_TESTDB!=2
fprintf(f, " testdb");
#endif
-#ifdef LOOKUP_WHOSON
+#if defined(LOOKUP_WHOSON) && LOOKUP_WHOSON!=2
fprintf(f, " whoson");
#endif
fprintf(f, "\n");
#ifdef AUTH_DOVECOT
fprintf(f, " dovecot");
#endif
+#ifdef AUTH_GSASL
+ fprintf(f, " gsasl");
+#endif
+#ifdef AUTH_HEIMDAL_GSSAPI
+ fprintf(f, " heimdal_gssapi");
+#endif
#ifdef AUTH_PLAINTEXT
fprintf(f, " plaintext");
#endif
fprintf(f, "%d\n", (unsigned int)fixed_never_users[i]);
}
-fprintf(f, "Size of off_t: %d\n", sizeof(off_t));
+fprintf(f, "Size of off_t: " SIZE_T_FMT "\n", sizeof(off_t));
+
+/* Everything else is details which are only worth reporting when debugging.
+Perhaps the tls_version_report should move into this too. */
+DEBUG(D_any) do {
+
+ int i;
+
+/* clang defines __GNUC__ (at least, for me) so test for it first */
+#if defined(__clang__)
+ fprintf(f, "Compiler: CLang [%s]\n", __clang_version__);
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+ fprintf(f, "Compiler: GCC [%s]\n",
+# ifdef __VERSION__
+ __VERSION__
+# else
+ "? unknown version ?"
+# endif
+ );
+#else
+ fprintf(f, "Compiler: <unknown>\n");
+#endif
-/* This runtime check is to help diagnose library linkage mismatches which
-result in segfaults and the like; as such, it's left until the end,
-just in case. There will still be a "Configuration file is" line still to
-come. */
#ifdef SUPPORT_TLS
-tls_version_report(f);
+ tls_version_report(f);
+#endif
+
+ for (authi = auths_available; *authi->driver_name != '\0'; ++authi) {
+ if (authi->version_report) {
+ (*authi->version_report)(f);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* PCRE_PRERELEASE is either defined and empty or a bare sequence of
+ characters; unless it's an ancient version of PCRE in which case it
+ is not defined. */
+#ifndef PCRE_PRERELEASE
+#define PCRE_PRERELEASE
+#endif
+#define QUOTE(X) #X
+#define EXPAND_AND_QUOTE(X) QUOTE(X)
+ fprintf(f, "Library version: PCRE: Compile: %d.%d%s\n"
+ " Runtime: %s\n",
+ PCRE_MAJOR, PCRE_MINOR,
+ EXPAND_AND_QUOTE(PCRE_PRERELEASE) "",
+ pcre_version());
+#undef QUOTE
+#undef EXPAND_AND_QUOTE
+
+ init_lookup_list();
+ for (i = 0; i < lookup_list_count; i++)
+ {
+ if (lookup_list[i]->version_report)
+ lookup_list[i]->version_report(f);
+ }
+
+#ifdef WHITELIST_D_MACROS
+ fprintf(f, "WHITELIST_D_MACROS: \"%s\"\n", WHITELIST_D_MACROS);
+#else
+ fprintf(f, "WHITELIST_D_MACROS unset\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST
+ fprintf(f, "TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST: \"%s\"\n", TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST);
+#else
+ fprintf(f, "TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST unset\n");
#endif
+
+} while (0);
}
+/*************************************************
+* Show auxiliary information about Exim *
+*************************************************/
+
+static void
+show_exim_information(enum commandline_info request, FILE *stream)
+{
+const uschar **pp;
+
+switch(request)
+ {
+ case CMDINFO_NONE:
+ fprintf(stream, "Oops, something went wrong.\n");
+ return;
+ case CMDINFO_HELP:
+ fprintf(stream,
+"The -bI: flag takes a string indicating which information to provide.\n"
+"If the string is not recognised, you'll get this help (on stderr).\n"
+"\n"
+" exim -bI:help this information\n"
+" exim -bI:dscp dscp value keywords known\n"
+" exim -bI:sieve list of supported sieve extensions, one per line.\n"
+);
+ return;
+ case CMDINFO_SIEVE:
+ for (pp = exim_sieve_extension_list; *pp; ++pp)
+ fprintf(stream, "%s\n", *pp);
+ return;
+ case CMDINFO_DSCP:
+ dscp_list_to_stream(stream);
+ return;
+ }
+}
/*************************************************
*/
static void *
-set_readline(char * (**fn_readline_ptr)(char *),
- char * (**fn_addhist_ptr)(char *))
+set_readline(char * (**fn_readline_ptr)(const char *),
+ void (**fn_addhist_ptr)(const char *))
{
void *dlhandle;
-void *dlhandle_curses = dlopen("libcurses.so", RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_LAZY);
+void *dlhandle_curses = dlopen("libcurses." DYNLIB_FN_EXT, RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_LAZY);
-dlhandle = dlopen("libreadline.so", RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NOW);
+dlhandle = dlopen("libreadline." DYNLIB_FN_EXT, RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NOW);
if (dlhandle_curses != NULL) dlclose(dlhandle_curses);
if (dlhandle != NULL)
{
- *fn_readline_ptr = (char *(*)(char*))dlsym(dlhandle, "readline");
- *fn_addhist_ptr = (char *(*)(char*))dlsym(dlhandle, "add_history");
+ /* Checked manual pages; at least in GNU Readline 6.1, the prototypes are:
+ * char * readline (const char *prompt);
+ * void add_history (const char *string);
+ */
+ *fn_readline_ptr = (char *(*)(const char*))dlsym(dlhandle, "readline");
+ *fn_addhist_ptr = (void(*)(const char*))dlsym(dlhandle, "add_history");
}
else
{
*/
static uschar *
-get_stdinput(char *(*fn_readline)(char *), char *(*fn_addhist)(char *))
+get_stdinput(char *(*fn_readline)(const char *), void(*fn_addhist)(const char *))
{
int i;
int size = 0;
+/*************************************************
+* Validate that the macros given are okay *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Typically, Exim will drop privileges if macros are supplied. In some
+cases, we want to not do so.
+
+Arguments: none (macros is a global)
+Returns: true if trusted, false otherwise
+*/
+
+static BOOL
+macros_trusted(void)
+{
+#ifdef WHITELIST_D_MACROS
+macro_item *m;
+uschar *whitelisted, *end, *p, **whites, **w;
+int white_count, i, n;
+size_t len;
+BOOL prev_char_item, found;
+#endif
+
+if (macros == NULL)
+ return TRUE;
+#ifndef WHITELIST_D_MACROS
+return FALSE;
+#else
+
+/* We only trust -D overrides for some invoking users:
+root, the exim run-time user, the optional config owner user.
+I don't know why config-owner would be needed, but since they can own the
+config files anyway, there's no security risk to letting them override -D. */
+if ( ! ((real_uid == root_uid)
+ || (real_uid == exim_uid)
+#ifdef CONFIGURE_OWNER
+ || (real_uid == config_uid)
+#endif
+ ))
+ {
+ debug_printf("macros_trusted rejecting macros for uid %d\n", (int) real_uid);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+/* Get a list of macros which are whitelisted */
+whitelisted = string_copy_malloc(US WHITELIST_D_MACROS);
+prev_char_item = FALSE;
+white_count = 0;
+for (p = whitelisted; *p != '\0'; ++p)
+ {
+ if (*p == ':' || isspace(*p))
+ {
+ *p = '\0';
+ if (prev_char_item)
+ ++white_count;
+ prev_char_item = FALSE;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!prev_char_item)
+ prev_char_item = TRUE;
+ }
+end = p;
+if (prev_char_item)
+ ++white_count;
+if (!white_count)
+ return FALSE;
+whites = store_malloc(sizeof(uschar *) * (white_count+1));
+for (p = whitelisted, i = 0; (p != end) && (i < white_count); ++p)
+ {
+ if (*p != '\0')
+ {
+ whites[i++] = p;
+ if (i == white_count)
+ break;
+ while (*p != '\0' && p < end)
+ ++p;
+ }
+ }
+whites[i] = NULL;
+
+/* The list of macros should be very short. Accept the N*M complexity. */
+for (m = macros; m != NULL; m = m->next)
+ {
+ found = FALSE;
+ for (w = whites; *w; ++w)
+ if (Ustrcmp(*w, m->name) == 0)
+ {
+ found = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!found)
+ return FALSE;
+ if (m->replacement == NULL)
+ continue;
+ len = Ustrlen(m->replacement);
+ if (len == 0)
+ continue;
+ n = pcre_exec(regex_whitelisted_macro, NULL, CS m->replacement, len,
+ 0, PCRE_EOPT, NULL, 0);
+ if (n < 0)
+ {
+ if (n != PCRE_ERROR_NOMATCH)
+ debug_printf("macros_trusted checking %s returned %d\n", m->name, n);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+DEBUG(D_any) debug_printf("macros_trusted overridden to true by whitelisting\n");
+return TRUE;
+#endif
+}
+
+
/*************************************************
* Entry point and high-level code *
*************************************************/
int filter_sfd = -1;
int filter_ufd = -1;
int group_count;
-int i;
+int i, rv;
int list_queue_option = 0;
int msg_action = 0;
int msg_action_arg = -1;
BOOL count_queue = FALSE;
BOOL expansion_test = FALSE;
BOOL extract_recipients = FALSE;
+BOOL flag_G = FALSE;
+BOOL flag_n = FALSE;
BOOL forced_delivery = FALSE;
BOOL f_end_dot = FALSE;
BOOL deliver_give_up = FALSE;
BOOL version_printed = FALSE;
uschar *alias_arg = NULL;
uschar *called_as = US"";
+uschar *cmdline_syslog_name = NULL;
uschar *start_queue_run_id = NULL;
uschar *stop_queue_run_id = NULL;
uschar *expansion_test_message = NULL;
uschar *ftest_localpart = NULL;
uschar *ftest_prefix = NULL;
uschar *ftest_suffix = NULL;
+uschar *malware_test_file = NULL;
uschar *real_sender_address;
uschar *originator_home = US"/";
+size_t sz;
void *reset_point;
struct passwd *pw;
int passed_qr_pipe = -1;
gid_t group_list[NGROUPS_MAX];
+/* For the -bI: flag */
+enum commandline_info info_flag = CMDINFO_NONE;
+BOOL info_stdout = FALSE;
+
/* Possible options for -R and -S */
static uschar *rsopts[] = { US"f", US"ff", US"r", US"rf", US"rff" };
#ifdef EXIM_USERNAME
if (route_finduser(US EXIM_USERNAME, &pw, &exim_uid))
{
- exim_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+ if (exim_uid == 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: refusing to run with uid 0 for \"%s\"\n",
+ EXIM_USERNAME);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ /* If ref:name uses a number as the name, route_finduser() returns
+ TRUE with exim_uid set and pw coerced to NULL. */
+ if (pw)
+ exim_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifndef EXIM_GROUPNAME
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "exim: ref:name should specify a usercode, not a group.\n"
+ "exim: can't let you get away with it unless you also specify a group.\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+#endif
}
else
{
}
#endif
+/* We default the system_filter_user to be the Exim run-time user, as a
+sane non-root value. */
+system_filter_uid = exim_uid;
+
#ifdef CONFIGURE_GROUPNAME
if (!route_findgroup(US CONFIGURE_GROUPNAME, &config_gid))
{
regex_must_compile(US"^\\d\\d\\d\\s(?:\\d\\.\\d\\d?\\d?\\.\\d\\d?\\d?\\s)?",
FALSE, TRUE);
+#ifdef WHITELIST_D_MACROS
+/* Precompile the regular expression used to filter the content of macros
+given to -D for permissibility. */
+
+regex_whitelisted_macro =
+ regex_must_compile(US"^[A-Za-z0-9_/.-]*$", FALSE, TRUE);
+#endif
+
+
/* If the program is called as "mailq" treat it as equivalent to "exim -bp";
this seems to be a generally accepted convention, since one finds symbolic
links called "mailq" in standard OS configurations. */
if (real_uid == root_uid)
{
- setgid(real_gid);
- setuid(real_uid);
+ rv = setgid(real_gid);
+ if (rv)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: setgid(%ld) failed: %s\n",
+ (long int)real_gid, strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ rv = setuid(real_uid);
+ if (rv)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: setuid(%ld) failed: %s\n",
+ (long int)real_uid, strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
}
/* If neither the original real uid nor the original euid was root, Exim is
unprivileged = (real_uid != root_uid && original_euid != root_uid);
-/* If the first argument is --help, set usage_wanted and pretend there
-are no arguments. This will cause a brief message to be given. We do
-the message generation downstream so we can pick up how we were invoked */
-
-if (argc > 1 && Ustrcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0)
- {
- argc = 1;
- usage_wanted = TRUE;
- }
-
/* Scan the program's arguments. Some can be dealt with right away; others are
simply recorded for checking and handling afterwards. Do a high-level switch
on the second character (the one after '-'), to save some effort. */
argrest++;
}
+ /* deal with --option_aliases */
+ else if (switchchar == '-')
+ {
+ if (Ustrcmp(argrest, "help") == 0)
+ {
+ usage_wanted = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrcmp(argrest, "version") == 0)
+ {
+ switchchar = 'b';
+ argrest = US"V";
+ }
+ }
+
/* High-level switch on active initial letter */
switch(switchchar)
{
+
+ /* sendmail uses -Ac and -Am to control which .cf file is used;
+ we ignore them. */
+ case 'A':
+ if (*argrest == '\0') { badarg = TRUE; break; }
+ else
+ {
+ BOOL ignore = FALSE;
+ switch (*argrest)
+ {
+ case 'c':
+ case 'm':
+ if (*(argrest + 1) == '\0')
+ ignore = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ignore) { badarg = TRUE; break; }
+ }
+ break;
+
/* -Btype is a sendmail option for 7bit/8bit setting. Exim is 8-bit clean
so has no need of it. */
else if (Ustrcmp(argrest, "i") == 0) bi_option = TRUE;
+ /* -bI: provide information, of the type to follow after a colon.
+ This is an Exim flag. */
+
+ else if (argrest[0] == 'I' && Ustrlen(argrest) >= 2 && argrest[1] == ':')
+ {
+ uschar *p = &argrest[2];
+ info_flag = CMDINFO_HELP;
+ if (Ustrlen(p))
+ {
+ if (strcmpic(p, CUS"sieve") == 0)
+ {
+ info_flag = CMDINFO_SIEVE;
+ info_stdout = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(p, CUS"dscp") == 0)
+ {
+ info_flag = CMDINFO_DSCP;
+ info_stdout = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(p, CUS"help") == 0)
+ {
+ info_stdout = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* -bm: Accept and deliver message - the default option. Reinstate
receiving_message, which got turned off for all -b options. */
else if (Ustrcmp(argrest, "m") == 0) receiving_message = TRUE;
+ /* -bmalware: test the filename given for malware */
+
+ else if (Ustrcmp(argrest, "malware") == 0)
+ {
+ if (++i >= argc) { badarg = TRUE; break; }
+ malware_test_file = argv[i];
+ }
+
/* -bnq: For locally originating messages, do not qualify unqualified
addresses. In the envelope, this causes errors; in header lines they
just get left. */
show_whats_supported(stdout);
}
+ /* -bw: inetd wait mode, accept a listening socket as stdin */
+
+ else if (*argrest == 'w')
+ {
+ inetd_wait_mode = TRUE;
+ background_daemon = FALSE;
+ daemon_listen = TRUE;
+ if (*(++argrest) != '\0')
+ {
+ inetd_wait_timeout = readconf_readtime(argrest, 0, FALSE);
+ if (inetd_wait_timeout <= 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: bad time value %s: abandoned\n", argv[i]);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
else badarg = TRUE;
break;
}
}
#endif
+ if (real_uid != root_uid)
+ {
+ #ifdef TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST
+
+ if (real_uid != exim_uid
+ #ifdef CONFIGURE_OWNER
+ && real_uid != config_uid
+ #endif
+ )
+ trusted_config = FALSE;
+ else
+ {
+ FILE *trust_list = Ufopen(TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST, "rb");
+ if (trust_list)
+ {
+ struct stat statbuf;
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(trust_list), &statbuf) != 0 ||
+ (statbuf.st_uid != root_uid /* owner not root */
+ #ifdef CONFIGURE_OWNER
+ && statbuf.st_uid != config_uid /* owner not the special one */
+ #endif
+ ) || /* or */
+ (statbuf.st_gid != root_gid /* group not root */
+ #ifdef CONFIGURE_GROUP
+ && statbuf.st_gid != config_gid /* group not the special one */
+ #endif
+ && (statbuf.st_mode & 020) != 0 /* group writeable */
+ ) || /* or */
+ (statbuf.st_mode & 2) != 0) /* world writeable */
+ {
+ trusted_config = FALSE;
+ fclose(trust_list);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Well, the trust list at least is up to scratch... */
+ void *reset_point = store_get(0);
+ uschar *trusted_configs[32];
+ int nr_configs = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ while (Ufgets(big_buffer, big_buffer_size, trust_list))
+ {
+ uschar *start = big_buffer, *nl;
+ while (*start && isspace(*start))
+ start++;
+ if (*start != '/')
+ continue;
+ nl = Ustrchr(start, '\n');
+ if (nl)
+ *nl = 0;
+ trusted_configs[nr_configs++] = string_copy(start);
+ if (nr_configs == 32)
+ break;
+ }
+ fclose(trust_list);
+
+ if (nr_configs)
+ {
+ int sep = 0;
+ uschar *list = argrest;
+ uschar *filename;
+ while (trusted_config && (filename = string_nextinlist(&list,
+ &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) != NULL)
+ {
+ for (i=0; i < nr_configs; i++)
+ {
+ if (Ustrcmp(filename, trusted_configs[i]) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == nr_configs)
+ {
+ trusted_config = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ store_reset(reset_point);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* No valid prefixes found in trust_list file. */
+ trusted_config = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Could not open trust_list file. */
+ trusted_config = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ #else
+ /* Not root; don't trust config */
+ trusted_config = FALSE;
+ #endif
+ }
config_main_filelist = argrest;
config_changed = TRUE;
}
if (*argrest != 0)
decode_bits(&selector, NULL, D_memory, 0, argrest, debug_options,
- debug_options_count, US"debug");
+ debug_options_count, US"debug", 0);
debug_selector = selector;
}
break;
}
break;
- /* This is some Sendmail thing which can be ignored */
+ /* -G: sendmail invocation to specify that it's a gateway submission and
+ sendmail may complain about problems instead of fixing them.
+ We make it equivalent to an ACL "control = suppress_local_fixups" and do
+ not at this time complain about problems. */
case 'G':
+ flag_G = TRUE;
break;
/* -h: Set the hop count for an incoming message. Exim does not currently
break;
+ /* -L: set the identifier used for syslog; equivalent to setting
+ syslog_processname in the config file, but needs to be an admin option. */
+
+ case 'L':
+ if (*argrest == '\0')
+ {
+ if(++i < argc) argrest = argv[i]; else
+ { badarg = TRUE; break; }
+ }
+ sz = Ustrlen(argrest);
+ if (sz > 32)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: the -L syslog name is too long: \"%s\"\n", argrest);
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ if (sz < 1)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: the -L syslog name is too short\n");
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ cmdline_syslog_name = argrest;
+ break;
+
case 'M':
receiving_message = FALSE;
break;
- /* -n: This means "don't alias" in sendmail, apparently. Just ignore
- it. */
+ /* -n: This means "don't alias" in sendmail, apparently.
+ For normal invocations, it has no effect.
+ It may affect some other options. */
case 'n':
+ flag_n = TRUE;
break;
/* -O: Just ignore it. In sendmail, apparently -O option=value means set
/* -tls-on-connect: don't wait for STARTTLS (for old clients) */
#ifdef SUPPORT_TLS
- else if (Ustrcmp(argrest, "ls-on-connect") == 0) tls_on_connect = TRUE;
+ else if (Ustrcmp(argrest, "ls-on-connect") == 0) tls_in.on_connect = TRUE;
#endif
else badarg = TRUE;
if (*argrest != 0) badarg = TRUE;
break;
+ /* -X: in sendmail: takes one parameter, logfile, and sends debugging
+ logs to that file. We swallow the parameter and otherwise ignore it. */
+
+ case 'X':
+ if (*argrest == '\0')
+ {
+ if (++i >= argc)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: string expected after -X\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
/* All other initial characters are errors */
default:
daemon_listen && queue_interval == 0
) ||
(
+ inetd_wait_mode && queue_interval >= 0
+ ) ||
+ (
list_options &&
(checking || smtp_input || extract_recipients ||
filter_test != FTEST_NONE || bi_option)
debug_printf("Exim version %s uid=%ld gid=%ld pid=%d D=%x\n",
version_string, (long int)real_uid, (long int)real_gid, (int)getpid(),
debug_selector);
- show_whats_supported(stderr);
+ if (!version_printed)
+ show_whats_supported(stderr);
}
}
save the group list here first. */
group_count = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, group_list);
+if (group_count < 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: getgroups() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
/* There is a fundamental difference in some BSD systems in the matter of
groups. FreeBSD and BSDI are known to be different; NetBSD and OpenBSD are
/* If the configuration file name has been altered by an argument on the
command line (either a new file name or a macro definition) and the caller is
-not root or the exim user, or if this is a filter testing run, remove any
-setuid privilege the program has, and run as the underlying user.
+not root, or if this is a filter testing run, remove any setuid privilege the
+program has and run as the underlying user.
-If ALT_CONFIG_ROOT_ONLY is defined, the exim user is locked out of this, which
-severely restricts the use of -C for some purposes.
+The exim user is locked out of this, which severely restricts the use of -C
+for some purposes.
Otherwise, set the real ids to the effective values (should be root unless run
from inetd, which it can either be root or the exim uid, if one is configured).
configuration file changes and macro definitions haven't happened. */
if (( /* EITHER */
- (config_changed || macros != NULL) && /* Config changed, and */
+ (!trusted_config || /* Config changed, or */
+ !macros_trusted()) && /* impermissible macros and */
real_uid != root_uid && /* Not root, and */
- #ifndef ALT_CONFIG_ROOT_ONLY /* (when not locked out) */
- real_uid != exim_uid && /* Not exim, and */
- #endif
!running_in_test_harness /* Not fudged */
) || /* OR */
expansion_test /* expansion testing */
and should be used for any logging information because attempts to write
to the log will usually fail. To arrange this, we unset really_exim. However,
if no stderr is available there is no point - we might as well have a go
- at the log (if it fails, syslog will be written). */
+ at the log (if it fails, syslog will be written).
+
+ Note that if the invoker is Exim, the logs remain available. Messing with
+ this causes unlogged successful deliveries. */
- if (log_stderr != NULL) really_exim = FALSE;
+ if ((log_stderr != NULL) && (real_uid != exim_uid))
+ really_exim = FALSE;
}
/* Privilege is to be retained for the moment. It may be dropped later,
}
}
+/* Initialise lookup_list
+If debugging, already called above via version reporting.
+In either case, we initialise the list of available lookups while running
+as root. All dynamically modules are loaded from a directory which is
+hard-coded into the binary and is code which, if not a module, would be
+part of Exim already. Ability to modify the content of the directory
+is equivalent to the ability to modify a setuid binary!
+
+This needs to happen before we read the main configuration. */
+init_lookup_list();
+
/* Read the main runtime configuration data; this gives up if there
is a failure. It leaves the configuration file open so that the subsequent
configuration data for delivery can be read if needed. */
readconf_main();
+/* If an action on specific messages is requested, or if a daemon or queue
+runner is being started, we need to know if Exim was called by an admin user.
+This is the case if the real user is root or exim, or if the real group is
+exim, or if one of the supplementary groups is exim or a group listed in
+admin_groups. We don't fail all message actions immediately if not admin_user,
+since some actions can be performed by non-admin users. Instead, set admin_user
+for later interrogation. */
+
+if (real_uid == root_uid || real_uid == exim_uid || real_gid == exim_gid)
+ admin_user = TRUE;
+else
+ {
+ int i, j;
+ for (i = 0; i < group_count; i++)
+ {
+ if (group_list[i] == exim_gid) admin_user = TRUE;
+ else if (admin_groups != NULL)
+ {
+ for (j = 1; j <= (int)(admin_groups[0]); j++)
+ if (admin_groups[j] == group_list[i])
+ { admin_user = TRUE; break; }
+ }
+ if (admin_user) break;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Another group of privileged users are the trusted users. These are root,
+exim, and any caller matching trusted_users or trusted_groups. Trusted callers
+are permitted to specify sender_addresses with -f on the command line, and
+other message parameters as well. */
+
+if (real_uid == root_uid || real_uid == exim_uid)
+ trusted_caller = TRUE;
+else
+ {
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (trusted_users != NULL)
+ {
+ for (i = 1; i <= (int)(trusted_users[0]); i++)
+ if (trusted_users[i] == real_uid)
+ { trusted_caller = TRUE; break; }
+ }
+
+ if (!trusted_caller && trusted_groups != NULL)
+ {
+ for (i = 1; i <= (int)(trusted_groups[0]); i++)
+ {
+ if (trusted_groups[i] == real_gid)
+ trusted_caller = TRUE;
+ else for (j = 0; j < group_count; j++)
+ {
+ if (trusted_groups[i] == group_list[j])
+ { trusted_caller = TRUE; break; }
+ }
+ if (trusted_caller) break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* Handle the decoding of logging options. */
-decode_bits(&log_write_selector, &log_extra_selector, 0, 0, log_selector_string,
- log_options, log_options_count, US"log");
+decode_bits(&log_write_selector, &log_extra_selector, 0, 0,
+ log_selector_string, log_options, log_options_count, US"log", 0);
DEBUG(D_any)
{
}
}
+/* See if an admin user overrode our logging. */
+
+if (cmdline_syslog_name != NULL)
+ {
+ if (admin_user)
+ {
+ syslog_processname = cmdline_syslog_name;
+ log_file_path = string_copy(CUS"syslog");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* not a panic, non-privileged users should not be able to spam paniclog */
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "exim: you lack sufficient privilege to specify syslog process name\n");
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Paranoia check of maximum lengths of certain strings. There is a check
on the length of the log file path in log.c, which will come into effect
if there are any calls to write the log earlier than this. However, if we
}
/* Handle the case when we have removed the setuid privilege because of -C or
--D. This means that the caller of Exim was not root, and, provided that
-ALT_CONFIG_ROOT_ONLY is not defined, was not the Exim user that is built into
-the binary.
+-D. This means that the caller of Exim was not root.
-If ALT_CONFIG_ROOT_ONLY is not defined, there is a problem if it turns out we
-were running as the exim user defined in the configuration file (different to
-the one in the binary). The sysadmin may expect this case to retain privilege
-because "the binary was called by the Exim user", but it hasn't, because of the
-order in which it handles this stuff. There are two possibilities:
+There is a problem if we were running as the Exim user. The sysadmin may
+expect this case to retain privilege because "the binary was called by the
+Exim user", but it hasn't, because either the -D option set macros, or the
+-C option set a non-trusted configuration file. There are two possibilities:
(1) If deliver_drop_privilege is set, Exim is not going to re-exec in order
to do message deliveries. Thus, the fact that it is running as a
(2) If deliver_drop_privilege is not set, the configuration won't work as
apparently intended, and so we log a panic message. In order to retain
- root for -C or -D, the caller must either be root or the Exim user
- defined in the binary (when deliver_drop_ privilege is false).
+ root for -C or -D, the caller must either be root or be invoking a
+ trusted configuration file (when deliver_drop_privilege is false). */
-If ALT_CONFIG_ROOT_ONLY is defined, we don't know whether we were called by the
-built-in exim user or one defined in the configuration. In either event,
-re-enable log processing, assuming the sysadmin knows what they are doing. */
-
-if (removed_privilege && (config_changed || macros != NULL) &&
+if (removed_privilege && (!trusted_config || macros != NULL) &&
real_uid == exim_uid)
{
- #ifdef ALT_CONFIG_ROOT_ONLY
- really_exim = TRUE; /* let logging work normally */
- #else
-
if (deliver_drop_privilege)
really_exim = TRUE; /* let logging work normally */
else
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
- "exim user (uid=%d) is defined only at runtime; privilege lost for %s",
- (int)exim_uid, config_changed? "-C" : "-D");
- #endif
+ "exim user lost privilege for using %s option",
+ trusted_config? "-D" : "-C");
}
/* Start up Perl interpreter if Perl support is configured and there is a
}
}
-/* If an action on specific messages is requested, or if a daemon or queue
-runner is being started, we need to know if Exim was called by an admin user.
-This is the case if the real user is root or exim, or if the real group is
-exim, or if one of the supplementary groups is exim or a group listed in
-admin_groups. We don't fail all message actions immediately if not admin_user,
-since some actions can be performed by non-admin users. Instead, set admin_user
-for later interrogation. */
-
-if (real_uid == root_uid || real_uid == exim_uid || real_gid == exim_gid)
- admin_user = TRUE;
-else
- {
- int i, j;
- for (i = 0; i < group_count; i++)
- {
- if (group_list[i] == exim_gid) admin_user = TRUE;
- else if (admin_groups != NULL)
- {
- for (j = 1; j <= (int)(admin_groups[0]); j++)
- if (admin_groups[j] == group_list[i])
- { admin_user = TRUE; break; }
- }
- if (admin_user) break;
- }
- }
-
-/* Another group of privileged users are the trusted users. These are root,
-exim, and any caller matching trusted_users or trusted_groups. Trusted callers
-are permitted to specify sender_addresses with -f on the command line, and
-other message parameters as well. */
-
-if (real_uid == root_uid || real_uid == exim_uid)
- trusted_caller = TRUE;
-else
- {
- int i, j;
-
- if (trusted_users != NULL)
- {
- for (i = 1; i <= (int)(trusted_users[0]); i++)
- if (trusted_users[i] == real_uid)
- { trusted_caller = TRUE; break; }
- }
-
- if (!trusted_caller && trusted_groups != NULL)
- {
- for (i = 1; i <= (int)(trusted_groups[0]); i++)
- {
- if (trusted_groups[i] == real_gid)
- trusted_caller = TRUE;
- else for (j = 0; j < group_count; j++)
- {
- if (trusted_groups[i] == group_list[j])
- { trusted_caller = TRUE; break; }
- }
- if (trusted_caller) break;
- }
- }
- }
+/* We moved the admin/trusted check to be immediately after reading the
+configuration file. We leave these prints here to ensure that syslog setup,
+logfile setup, and so on has already happened. */
if (trusted_caller) DEBUG(D_any) debug_printf("trusted user\n");
if (admin_user) DEBUG(D_any) debug_printf("admin user\n");
user may request that a message be returned to its sender forthwith. Only an
admin user may specify a debug level greater than D_v (because it might show
passwords, etc. in lookup queries). Only an admin user may request a queue
-count. */
+count. Only an admin user can use the test interface to scan for email
+(because Exim will be in the spool dir and able to look at mails). */
if (!admin_user)
{
BOOL debugset = (debug_selector & ~D_v) != 0;
- if (deliver_give_up || daemon_listen ||
+ if (deliver_give_up || daemon_listen || malware_test_file ||
(count_queue && queue_list_requires_admin) ||
(list_queue && queue_list_requires_admin) ||
(queue_interval >= 0 && prod_requires_admin) ||
interface_port = check_port(interface_address);
}
+/* If the caller is trusted, then they can use -G to suppress_local_fixups. */
+if (flag_G)
+ {
+ if (trusted_caller)
+ {
+ suppress_local_fixups = suppress_local_fixups_default = TRUE;
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("suppress_local_fixups forced on by -G\n");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "exim: permission denied (-G requires a trusted user)\n");
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
/* If an SMTP message is being received check to see if the standard input is a
TCP/IP socket. If it is, we assume that Exim was called from inetd if the
caller is root or the Exim user, or if the port is a privileged one. Otherwise,
interface_address = host_ntoa(-1, &interface_sock, NULL,
&interface_port);
- if (host_is_tls_on_connect_port(interface_port)) tls_on_connect = TRUE;
+ if (host_is_tls_on_connect_port(interface_port)) tls_in.on_connect = TRUE;
if (real_uid == root_uid || real_uid == exim_uid || interface_port < 1024)
{
/* When we are retaining a privileged uid, we still change to the exim gid. */
-else setgid(exim_gid);
+else
+ {
+ int rv;
+ rv = setgid(exim_gid);
+ /* Impact of failure is that some stuff might end up with an incorrect group.
+ We track this for failures from root, since any attempt to change privilege
+ by root should succeed and failures should be examined. For non-root,
+ there's no security risk. For me, it's { exim -bV } on a just-built binary,
+ no need to complain then. */
+ if (rv == -1)
+ {
+ if (!(unprivileged || removed_privilege))
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "exim: changing group failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_any) debug_printf("changing group to %ld failed: %s\n",
+ (long int)exim_gid, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Handle a request to scan a file for malware */
+if (malware_test_file)
+ {
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ int result;
+ set_process_info("scanning file for malware");
+ result = malware_in_file(malware_test_file);
+ if (result == FAIL)
+ {
+ printf("No malware found.\n");
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ if (result != OK)
+ {
+ printf("Malware lookup returned non-okay/fail: %d\n", result);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (malware_name)
+ printf("Malware found: %s\n", malware_name);
+ else
+ printf("Malware scan detected malware of unknown name.\n");
+#else
+ printf("Malware scanning not enabled at compile time.\n");
+#endif
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
/* Handle a request to list the delivery queue */
}
/* Handle a request to list one or more configuration options */
+/* If -n was set, we suppress some information */
if (list_options)
{
set_process_info("listing variables");
- if (recipients_arg >= argc) readconf_print(US"all", NULL);
+ if (recipients_arg >= argc) readconf_print(US"all", NULL, flag_n);
else for (i = recipients_arg; i < argc; i++)
{
if (i < argc - 1 &&
Ustrcmp(argv[i], "authenticator") == 0 ||
Ustrcmp(argv[i], "macro") == 0))
{
- readconf_print(argv[i+1], argv[i]);
+ readconf_print(argv[i+1], argv[i], flag_n);
i++;
}
- else readconf_print(argv[i], NULL);
+ else readconf_print(argv[i], NULL, flag_n);
}
exim_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
for incoming messages via the daemon. The daemon cannot be run in mua_wrapper
mode. */
-if (daemon_listen || queue_interval > 0)
+if (daemon_listen || inetd_wait_mode || queue_interval > 0)
{
if (mua_wrapper)
{
else
{
- char *(*fn_readline)(char *) = NULL;
- char *(*fn_addhist)(char *) = NULL;
+ char *(*fn_readline)(const char *) = NULL;
+ void (*fn_addhist)(const char *) = NULL;
#ifdef USE_READLINE
void *dlhandle = set_readline(&fn_readline, &fn_addhist);
/* Arrange for message reception if recipients or SMTP were specified;
otherwise complain unless a version print (-bV) happened or this is a filter
-verification test. In the former case, show the configuration file name. */
+verification test or info dump.
+In the former case, show the configuration file name. */
if (recipients_arg >= argc && !extract_recipients && !smtp_input)
{
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
+ if (info_flag != CMDINFO_NONE)
+ {
+ show_exim_information(info_flag, info_stdout ? stdout : stderr);
+ return info_stdout ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
if (filter_test == FTEST_NONE)
exim_usage(called_as);
}
git://git.exim.org / users / heiko / exim.git / blobdiff