1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2016 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
8 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
13 /* Default callout timeout */
15 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
17 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
19 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
24 static uschar *verbs[] = {
33 /* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
34 are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
35 "accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
38 static int msgcond[] = {
39 (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* accept */
42 (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* discard */
44 (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* require */
48 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
49 follows, and the cond_expand_at_top and uschar cond_modifiers tables lower
55 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
61 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
64 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
72 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
82 ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
84 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
88 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
94 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
101 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
104 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
111 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
112 "message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", "queue" and "set" are
113 modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
114 their side effects. */
116 static uschar *conditions[] = {
120 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
126 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
129 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
137 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
147 US"log_reject_target",
149 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
153 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
159 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
166 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
169 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
177 /* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
181 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
182 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
189 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
190 CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY,
191 CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC,
195 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
196 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
197 CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY,
198 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
199 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
203 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
204 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
205 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
210 CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT,
212 CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
213 CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
214 CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
215 CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH
218 /* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
219 turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
220 control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
221 and should be tidied up. */
223 static uschar *controls[] = {
224 US"allow_auth_unadvertised",
225 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
230 US"dkim_disable_verify",
232 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
233 US"dmarc_disable_verify",
234 US"dmarc_enable_forensic",
238 US"caseful_local_part",
239 US"caselower_local_part",
240 US"cutthrough_delivery",
246 US"suppress_local_fixups",
247 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
253 US"utf8_downconvert",
255 US"no_multiline_responses",
261 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions/modifiers a string expansion is done
262 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
263 checking functions. */
265 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
267 TRUE, /* add_header */
268 FALSE, /* authenticated */
269 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
270 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
272 TRUE, /* condition */
275 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
278 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
283 TRUE, /* dkim_signers */
284 TRUE, /* dkim_status */
286 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
287 TRUE, /* dmarc_status */
291 FALSE, /* encrypted */
294 FALSE, /* local_parts */
295 TRUE, /* log_message */
296 TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
298 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
302 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
303 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
306 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
307 FALSE, /* recipients */
308 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
311 TRUE, /* remove_header */
312 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
315 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
318 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
320 TRUE, /* spf_guess */
326 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
328 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
330 TRUE, /* add_header */
331 FALSE, /* authenticated */
332 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
333 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
335 FALSE, /* condition */
338 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
341 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
346 FALSE, /* dkim_signers */
347 FALSE, /* dkim_status */
349 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
350 FALSE, /* dmarc_status */
352 FALSE, /* dnslists */
354 FALSE, /* encrypted */
357 FALSE, /* local_parts */
358 TRUE, /* log_message */
359 TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
361 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
365 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
366 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
369 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
370 FALSE, /* recipients */
371 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
374 TRUE, /* remove_header */
375 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
378 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
381 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
383 FALSE, /* spf_guess */
389 /* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
390 times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
391 For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
394 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
398 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* add_header */
399 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
405 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
407 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* authenticated */
408 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
409 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
411 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
412 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
413 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
414 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
418 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
419 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
420 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
421 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
422 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
429 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
430 always and check in the control processing itself. */
434 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
436 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| /* dcc */
440 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)),
443 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
445 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
448 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT), /* delay */
452 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_DKIM), /* dkim_signers */
455 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_DKIM), /* dkim_status */
458 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
460 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA), /* dmarc_status */
463 /* Explicit key lookups can be made in non-smtp ACLs so pass
464 always and check in the verify processing itself. */
469 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT) /* domains */
476 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* encrypted */
477 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|
478 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
483 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* hosts */
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
487 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT) /* local_parts */
496 0, /* log_reject_target */
500 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
502 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| /* malware */
506 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)),
511 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
513 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
516 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* queue */
525 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
527 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
529 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| /* regex */
533 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
534 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
538 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* remove_header */
539 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
543 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
544 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
546 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
548 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
549 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
550 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
552 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
554 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
555 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
556 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
560 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
562 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| /* spam */
566 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)),
569 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
570 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
572 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
573 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
574 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
575 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
576 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
578 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf_guess */
580 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
581 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
582 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
583 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
584 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
589 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
590 always and check in the verify function itself */
596 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
597 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
598 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
600 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
602 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)), /* allow_auth_unadvertised */
604 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
611 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dkim_disable_verify */
612 # ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
615 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
618 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
619 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dmarc_disable_verify */
620 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
621 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dmarc_enable_forensic */
622 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
625 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
626 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
627 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT), /* dscp */
632 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
635 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
638 0, /* cutthrough_delivery */
640 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* enforce_sync */
641 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
643 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_enforce_sync */
644 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
647 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
648 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
649 // (1<<ACL_WHERE_PRDR)| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
650 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
653 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
654 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
655 // (1<<ACL_WHERE_PRDR)| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
656 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
659 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
660 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
663 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
664 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
665 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
667 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
669 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
670 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
671 // (1<<ACL_WHERE_PRDR)| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
672 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
676 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
677 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
681 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
684 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
685 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
689 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
692 0, /* utf8_downconvert */
695 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_multiline */
696 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
698 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_pipelining */
699 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
701 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_delay_flush */
702 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
704 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_callout_flush */
705 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
708 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
710 typedef struct control_def {
712 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
713 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
716 static control_def controls_list[] = {
717 { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED, FALSE },
718 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
719 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
721 { US"debug", CONTROL_DEBUG, TRUE },
723 { US"dkim_disable_verify", CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY, FALSE },
725 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
726 { US"dmarc_disable_verify", CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY, FALSE },
727 { US"dmarc_enable_forensic", CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC, FALSE },
729 { US"dscp", CONTROL_DSCP, TRUE },
730 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
731 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
732 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
733 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
734 { US"no_callout_flush", CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH, FALSE },
735 { US"no_delay_flush", CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH, FALSE },
736 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
737 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
738 { US"no_pipelining", CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING, FALSE },
739 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
740 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
741 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
743 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
744 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
745 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
746 { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE },
747 { US"cutthrough_delivery", CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY, TRUE },
749 { US"utf8_downconvert", CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT, TRUE }
753 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
754 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
755 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
756 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
758 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
760 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
761 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
763 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
764 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
765 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
766 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
767 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
768 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
769 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
771 static int csa_return_code[] = {
773 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
776 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
777 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
778 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
781 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
784 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
785 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
786 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
787 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
788 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
789 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
792 /* Options for the ratelimit condition. Note that there are two variants of
793 the per_rcpt option, depending on the ACL that is used to measure the rate.
794 However any ACL must be able to look up per_rcpt rates in /noupdate mode,
795 so the two variants must have the same internal representation as well as
796 the same configuration string. */
799 RATE_PER_WHAT, RATE_PER_CLASH, RATE_PER_ADDR, RATE_PER_BYTE, RATE_PER_CMD,
800 RATE_PER_CONN, RATE_PER_MAIL, RATE_PER_RCPT, RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS
803 #define RATE_SET(var,new) \
804 (((var) == RATE_PER_WHAT) ? ((var) = RATE_##new) : ((var) = RATE_PER_CLASH))
806 static uschar *ratelimit_option_string[] = {
807 US"?", US"!", US"per_addr", US"per_byte", US"per_cmd",
808 US"per_conn", US"per_mail", US"per_rcpt", US"per_rcpt"
811 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
813 static int acl_check_wargs(int, address_item *, const uschar *, int, uschar **,
817 /*************************************************
818 * Pick out name from list *
819 *************************************************/
821 /* Use a binary chop method
828 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
832 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
838 int mid = (start + end)/2;
839 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
840 if (c == 0) return mid;
841 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
848 /*************************************************
849 * Read and parse one ACL *
850 *************************************************/
852 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
853 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
854 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
855 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
856 blank lines (where relevant).
859 func function to get next line of ACL
860 error where to put an error message
862 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
863 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
867 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
869 acl_block *yield = NULL;
870 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
871 acl_block *this = NULL;
872 acl_condition_block *cond;
873 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
878 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
881 BOOL negated = FALSE;
882 uschar *saveline = s;
885 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
888 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
895 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
896 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
898 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
899 if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
901 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
902 continues the previous verb. */
904 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
909 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
921 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
924 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
926 lastp = &(this->next);
929 this->condition = NULL;
930 condp = &(this->condition);
931 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
937 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
940 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
942 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
945 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
950 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
952 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
954 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
955 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
959 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
961 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
962 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
963 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
965 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
966 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
970 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
973 cond->u.negated = negated;
976 condp = &(cond->next);
978 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
979 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
980 gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
981 variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
982 extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
983 arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
984 After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
985 after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
992 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 &&
993 Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
995 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
996 "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
1001 if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
1003 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
1004 "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
1009 while (*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
1011 if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
1013 *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
1014 "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
1020 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
1022 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1025 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
1026 "endpass" has no data */
1028 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
1032 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
1033 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
1036 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1037 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
1046 /*************************************************
1047 * Set up added header line(s) *
1048 *************************************************/
1050 /* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
1051 to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
1052 "warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
1053 added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
1055 Argument: string of header lines
1060 setup_header(const uschar *hstring)
1062 const uschar *p, *q;
1063 int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
1065 /* Ignore any leading newlines */
1066 while (*hstring == '\n') hstring++, hlen--;
1068 /* An empty string does nothing; ensure exactly one final newline. */
1069 if (hlen <= 0) return;
1070 if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n') /* no newline */
1071 q = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
1072 else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n') /* double newline */
1074 uschar * s = string_copy(hstring);
1075 while(s[--hlen] == '\n')
1082 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
1084 for (p = q; *p != 0; )
1088 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
1089 header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
1091 /* Find next header line within the string */
1095 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); /* we know there was a newline */
1096 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
1099 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
1100 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
1104 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
1106 newtype = htype_add_rec;
1109 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
1111 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
1114 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
1116 newtype = htype_add_top;
1119 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
1121 newtype = htype_add_bot;
1124 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
1127 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
1128 to the front of it. */
1130 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
1132 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
1135 hdr = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", (int) (q - p), p);
1136 hlen = Ustrlen(hdr);
1138 /* See if this line has already been added */
1140 while (*hptr != NULL)
1142 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, hdr, hlen) == 0) break;
1143 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
1146 /* Add if not previously present */
1150 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
1159 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
1167 /*************************************************
1168 * List the added header lines *
1169 *************************************************/
1173 uschar * ret = NULL;
1176 header_line * h = acl_added_headers;
1180 if (!h) return NULL;
1185 while ((cp = Ustrchr(s, '\n')) != NULL)
1187 if (cp[1] == '\0') break;
1189 /* contains embedded newline; needs doubling */
1190 ret = string_catn(ret, &size, &ptr, s, cp-s+1);
1191 ret = string_catn(ret, &size, &ptr, US"\n", 1);
1194 /* last bit of header */
1196 ret = string_catn(ret, &size, &ptr, s, cp-s+1); /* newline-sep list */
1198 while((h = h->next));
1200 ret[ptr-1] = '\0'; /* overwrite last newline */
1205 /*************************************************
1206 * Set up removed header line(s) *
1207 *************************************************/
1209 /* This function is called by the remove_header modifier. The argument is
1210 treated as a sequence of header names which are added to a colon separated
1211 list, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
1213 Argument: string of header names
1218 setup_remove_header(const uschar *hnames)
1221 acl_removed_headers = acl_removed_headers
1222 ? string_sprintf("%s : %s", acl_removed_headers, hnames)
1223 : string_copy(hnames);
1228 /*************************************************
1230 *************************************************/
1232 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
1233 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
1234 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
1236 ** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
1237 its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
1240 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
1241 user_message message for adding to headers
1242 log_message message for logging, if different
1248 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
1250 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
1253 string_item *logged;
1255 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
1256 string_printing(log_message));
1258 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1259 failed", add the failure message. */
1261 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
1262 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
1263 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
1264 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
1266 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1267 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
1269 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
1270 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
1274 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
1275 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
1276 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
1277 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
1278 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
1279 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
1280 acl_warn_logged = logged;
1284 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1286 if (user_message == NULL) return;
1288 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1291 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1293 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1294 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1295 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
1299 /* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1300 function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
1302 setup_header(user_message);
1307 /*************************************************
1308 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
1309 *************************************************/
1311 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1312 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1313 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1314 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1317 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1318 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1320 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1321 FAIL verification failed
1322 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1326 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
1330 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
1332 /* Previous success */
1334 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1336 /* Previous failure */
1338 if (host_lookup_failed)
1340 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1344 /* Need to do a lookup */
1347 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1349 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1351 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
1352 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1354 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1356 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1359 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1365 /*************************************************
1366 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1367 *************************************************/
1369 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1370 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1371 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1372 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1373 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1374 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1375 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1376 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1379 dnsa the DNS answer block
1380 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1381 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1382 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1384 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1385 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1386 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1390 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1396 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1398 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1400 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1402 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1406 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1410 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1412 target_found = TRUE;
1414 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1415 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1417 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1419 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1421 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1423 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1427 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1428 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1431 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1432 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1437 /*************************************************
1438 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1439 *************************************************/
1441 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1442 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1443 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1444 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1445 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1446 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1447 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1450 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1452 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1453 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1454 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1455 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1459 acl_verify_csa(const uschar *domain)
1462 const uschar *found;
1464 int priority, weight, port;
1471 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1472 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1473 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1475 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1476 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1477 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1478 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1480 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1481 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1482 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1484 if (domain[0] == '[')
1486 const uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1487 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1488 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1491 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1492 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1493 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1494 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1495 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1497 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1499 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1500 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1504 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1505 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1506 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1507 we return from this function. */
1509 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1510 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1512 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1513 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1514 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1516 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1519 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1521 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1524 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1526 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1530 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1532 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1538 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1540 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1542 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1544 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1546 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1549 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1550 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1554 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1556 /* Check the CSA version number */
1558 if (priority != 1) continue;
1560 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1561 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1562 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1563 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1564 SRV records of their own. */
1566 if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
1569 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1571 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1574 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1575 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1576 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1577 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1578 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1580 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1582 if (weight > 2) continue;
1584 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1585 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1586 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1588 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1589 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1591 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1596 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1598 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1600 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1601 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1602 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1603 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1604 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1606 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1608 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1609 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1610 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1611 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1613 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1614 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1616 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1619 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1622 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1626 lookup_dnssec_authenticated = NULL;
1627 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1629 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1632 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1634 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1637 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1638 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1639 /* else fall through */
1641 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1642 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1643 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1647 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1653 /*************************************************
1654 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1655 *************************************************/
1657 enum { VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, VERIFY_CERT, VERIFY_HELO, VERIFY_CSA, VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX,
1658 VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT,
1659 VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII
1664 unsigned where_allowed; /* bitmap */
1665 BOOL no_options; /* Never has /option(s) following */
1666 unsigned alt_opt_sep; /* >0 Non-/ option separator (custom parser) */
1668 static verify_type_t verify_type_list[] = {
1669 { US"reverse_host_lookup", VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, ~0, FALSE, 0 },
1670 { US"certificate", VERIFY_CERT, ~0, TRUE, 0 },
1671 { US"helo", VERIFY_HELO, ~0, TRUE, 0 },
1672 { US"csa", VERIFY_CSA, ~0, FALSE, 0 },
1673 { US"header_syntax", VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), TRUE, 0 },
1674 { US"not_blind", VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), TRUE, 0 },
1675 { US"header_sender", VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), FALSE, 0 },
1676 { US"sender", VERIFY_SNDR, (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
1677 |(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP),
1679 { US"recipient", VERIFY_RCPT, (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), FALSE, 0 },
1680 { US"header_names_ascii", VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), TRUE, 0 }
1684 enum { CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, CALLOUT_NOCACHE, CALLOUT_RANDOM, CALLOUT_USE_SENDER,
1685 CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,
1686 CALLOUT_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, CALLOUT_CONNECT,
1693 BOOL has_option; /* Has =option(s) following */
1694 BOOL timeval; /* Has a time value */
1696 static callout_opt_t callout_opt_list[] = {
1697 { US"defer_ok", CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1698 { US"no_cache", CALLOUT_NOCACHE, vopt_callout_no_cache, FALSE, FALSE },
1699 { US"random", CALLOUT_RANDOM, vopt_callout_random, FALSE, FALSE },
1700 { US"use_sender", CALLOUT_USE_SENDER, vopt_callout_recipsender, FALSE, FALSE },
1701 { US"use_postmaster", CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER,vopt_callout_recippmaster, FALSE, FALSE },
1702 { US"postmaster_mailfrom",CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM,0, TRUE, FALSE },
1703 { US"postmaster", CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1704 { US"fullpostmaster", CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,vopt_callout_fullpm, FALSE, FALSE },
1705 { US"mailfrom", CALLOUT_MAILFROM, 0, TRUE, FALSE },
1706 { US"maxwait", CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
1707 { US"connect", CALLOUT_CONNECT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
1708 { NULL, CALLOUT_TIME, 0, FALSE, TRUE }
1713 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1714 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1715 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1716 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1719 where where called from
1720 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1721 arg the argument of "verify"
1722 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1723 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1724 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1726 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1727 FAIL verification failed
1728 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1733 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *arg,
1734 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1738 int callout_overall = -1;
1739 int callout_connect = -1;
1740 int verify_options = 0;
1742 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1743 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1744 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1745 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1746 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1747 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1748 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1749 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1750 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1752 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1753 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them.
1756 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1757 const uschar *list = arg;
1758 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1761 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1763 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1765 for (vp= verify_type_list;
1766 (char *)vp < (char *)verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list);
1769 if (vp->alt_opt_sep ? strncmpic(ss, vp->name, vp->alt_opt_sep) == 0
1770 : strcmpic (ss, vp->name) == 0)
1772 if ((char *)vp >= (char *)verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list))
1775 if (vp->no_options && slash != NULL)
1777 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1778 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1781 if (!(vp->where_allowed & (1<<where)))
1783 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify %s in ACL for %s", vp->name, acl_wherenames[where]);
1788 case VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP:
1789 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1790 if ((rc = acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr)) == DEFER)
1791 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
1792 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0)
1797 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1798 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1799 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1801 if (tls_in.certificate_verified) return OK;
1802 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1806 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1807 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1809 if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1810 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1813 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1814 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1816 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1817 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1818 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1819 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1820 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1821 return csa_return_code[rc];
1823 case VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX:
1824 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1825 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1826 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1829 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1830 if (rc != OK && *log_msgptr)
1831 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1832 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1834 acl_verify_message = *log_msgptr;
1837 case VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII:
1838 /* Check that all header names are true 7 bit strings
1839 See RFC 5322, 2.2. and RFC 6532, 3. */
1841 rc = verify_check_header_names_ascii(log_msgptr);
1842 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1843 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1846 case VERIFY_NOT_BLIND:
1847 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1848 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1850 rc = verify_check_notblind();
1853 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1854 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1855 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1859 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1860 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1861 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1863 case VERIFY_HDR_SNDR:
1864 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1868 /* In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1869 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1873 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1876 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1877 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1878 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1879 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1890 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1891 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1893 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1896 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1897 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1898 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1900 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1902 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1904 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1905 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1908 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1911 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1914 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1916 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1918 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1922 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1925 const uschar * sublist = ss;
1929 while (isspace(*sublist)) sublist++;
1931 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1935 double period = 1.0F;
1937 for (op= callout_opt_list; op->name; op++)
1938 if (strncmpic(opt, op->name, Ustrlen(op->name)) == 0)
1941 verify_options |= op->flag;
1944 opt += Ustrlen(op->name);
1945 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1948 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1949 "\"%s\" in ACL verify condition \"%s\"", op->name, arg);
1952 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1956 period = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1959 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1960 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1967 case CALLOUT_DEFER_OK: callout_defer_ok = TRUE; break;
1968 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1969 case CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1970 case CALLOUT_MAILFROM:
1971 if (!verify_header_sender)
1973 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1974 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1975 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1978 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1980 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM: pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); break;
1981 case CALLOUT_MAXWAIT: callout_overall = period; break;
1982 case CALLOUT_CONNECT: callout_connect = period; break;
1983 case CALLOUT_TIME: callout = period; break;
1989 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1990 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1996 /* Option not recognized */
2000 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
2001 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
2006 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
2007 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
2009 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
2010 "for a recipient callout";
2014 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
2015 message if giving out verification details. */
2017 if (verify_header_sender)
2021 if ((rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
2022 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
2025 *basic_errno = verrno;
2026 if (smtp_return_error_details)
2028 if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
2029 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
2030 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
2035 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
2036 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
2037 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
2038 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
2039 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
2040 during message reception.
2042 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
2043 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
2044 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
2045 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
2046 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
2047 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
2048 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
2050 else if (verify_sender_address)
2052 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)))
2054 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
2055 "sender verify callout";
2059 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
2060 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
2061 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
2063 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
2064 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
2065 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
2066 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
2068 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed))
2072 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
2073 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
2075 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
2078 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
2079 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
2080 specified (see comments above).
2082 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
2083 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
2084 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
2085 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
2086 more in esoteric circumstances. */
2091 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
2093 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
2095 if ((sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
2097 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
2098 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
2101 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
2102 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
2104 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
2105 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
2106 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
2108 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
2109 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
2111 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
2113 if (success_on_redirect)
2114 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
2116 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
2119 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
2120 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
2122 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
2125 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
2129 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
2130 debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
2131 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
2133 debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
2134 verify_sender_address);
2138 rc = OK; /* Null sender */
2140 /* Cache the result code */
2142 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
2143 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
2144 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
2145 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
2146 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
2148 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
2149 the sender verification. */
2151 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
2154 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
2156 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->prop.address_data;
2159 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
2160 the DEFER overrides. */
2166 if (success_on_redirect)
2167 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
2169 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
2173 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
2174 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
2175 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
2177 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
2178 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
2179 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
2180 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
2182 /* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
2183 if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
2185 /* Make $address_data visible */
2186 deliver_address_data = addr2.prop.address_data;
2189 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
2191 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
2192 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
2194 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
2195 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
2199 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
2200 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
2202 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
2205 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
2206 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
2207 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
2210 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
2211 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
2215 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
2218 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
2219 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
2223 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
2224 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
2228 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
2231 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
2232 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\", \"header_names_ascii\" "
2233 "or \"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
2234 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
2241 /*************************************************
2242 * Check argument for control= modifier *
2243 *************************************************/
2245 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
2248 arg the argument string for control=
2249 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2250 where which ACL we are in
2251 log_msgptr for error messages
2253 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2257 decode_control(const uschar *arg, const uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2262 for (d = controls_list;
2263 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
2266 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
2267 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
2270 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
2271 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
2273 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2274 return CONTROL_ERROR;
2284 /*************************************************
2285 * Return a ratelimit error *
2286 *************************************************/
2288 /* Called from acl_ratelimit() below
2291 log_msgptr for error messages
2292 format format string
2293 ... supplementary arguments
2294 ss ratelimit option name
2295 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2301 ratelimit_error(uschar **log_msgptr, const char *format, ...)
2304 uschar buffer[STRING_SPRINTF_BUFFER_SIZE];
2305 va_start(ap, format);
2306 if (!string_vformat(buffer, sizeof(buffer), format, ap))
2307 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
2308 "string_sprintf expansion was longer than " SIZE_T_FMT, sizeof(buffer));
2310 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
2311 "error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: %s", buffer);
2318 /*************************************************
2319 * Handle rate limiting *
2320 *************************************************/
2322 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2323 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2325 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2326 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2327 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2328 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2331 arg the option string for ratelimit=
2332 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2333 log_msgptr for error messages
2335 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2336 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2337 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2338 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2342 acl_ratelimit(const uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2344 double limit, period, count;
2347 uschar *unique = NULL;
2349 BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, readonly = FALSE;
2350 BOOL noupdate = FALSE, badacl = FALSE;
2351 int mode = RATE_PER_WHAT;
2353 tree_node **anchor, *t;
2354 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
2356 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
2357 dbdata_ratelimit_unique *dbdb;
2360 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2361 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2362 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2364 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period / maximum burst
2365 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2366 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2368 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2369 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
2370 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "sender rate limit not set");
2372 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2373 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2374 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2375 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2377 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
2378 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2379 "\"%s\" is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);
2381 /* Second is the rate measurement period / exponential smoothing time
2382 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2383 run-time division errors. */
2385 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2386 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
2387 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2389 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2390 "\"%s\" is not a time value", sender_rate_period);
2392 /* By default we are counting one of something, but the per_rcpt,
2393 per_byte, and count options can change this. */
2397 /* Parse the other options. */
2399 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2402 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2403 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2404 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
2405 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"readonly") == 0) readonly = TRUE;
2406 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) RATE_SET(mode, PER_CMD);
2407 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0)
2409 RATE_SET(mode, PER_CONN);
2410 if (where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
2413 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0)
2415 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2416 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
2418 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0)
2420 /* If we are running in the RCPT ACL, then we'll count the recipients
2421 one by one, but if we are running when we have accumulated the whole
2422 list then we'll add them all in one batch. */
2423 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
2424 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
2425 else if (where >= ACL_WHERE_PREDATA && where <= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2426 RATE_SET(mode, PER_ALLRCPTS), count = (double)recipients_count;
2427 else if (where == ACL_WHERE_MAIL || where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2428 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT), badacl = TRUE;
2430 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0)
2432 /* If we have not yet received the message data and there was no SIZE
2433 declaration on the MAIL comand, then it's safe to just use a value of
2434 zero and let the recorded rate decay as if nothing happened. */
2435 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2436 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
2437 else count = message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size;
2439 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_addr") == 0)
2441 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
2442 if (where != ACL_WHERE_RCPT) badacl = TRUE, unique = US"*";
2443 else unique = string_sprintf("%s@%s", deliver_localpart, deliver_domain);
2445 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"count=", 6) == 0)
2448 count = Ustrtod(ss+6, &e);
2449 if (count < 0.0 || *e != '\0')
2450 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2451 "\"%s\" is not a positive number", ss);
2453 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"unique=", 7) == 0)
2454 unique = string_copy(ss + 7);
2455 else if (key == NULL)
2456 key = string_copy(ss);
2458 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s", key, ss);
2461 /* Sanity check. When the badacl flag is set the update mode must either
2462 be readonly (which is the default if it is omitted) or, for backwards
2463 compatibility, a combination of noupdate and strict or leaky. */
2465 if (mode == RATE_PER_CLASH)
2466 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting per_* options");
2467 if (leaky + strict + readonly > 1)
2468 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting update modes");
2469 if (badacl && (leaky || strict) && !noupdate)
2470 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2471 "\"%s\" must not have /leaky or /strict option in %s ACL",
2472 ratelimit_option_string[mode], acl_wherenames[where]);
2474 /* Set the default values of any unset options. In readonly mode we
2475 perform the rate computation without any increment so that its value
2476 decays to eventually allow over-limit senders through. */
2478 if (noupdate) readonly = TRUE, leaky = strict = FALSE;
2479 if (badacl) readonly = TRUE;
2480 if (readonly) count = 0.0;
2481 if (!strict && !readonly) leaky = TRUE;
2482 if (mode == RATE_PER_WHAT) mode = RATE_PER_MAIL;
2484 /* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
2485 If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
2486 omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
2487 are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */
2490 key = (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address;
2492 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s%s",
2494 ratelimit_option_string[mode],
2495 unique == NULL ? "" : "unique/",
2499 debug_printf("ratelimit condition count=%.0f %.1f/%s\n", count, limit, key);
2501 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
2502 For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
2503 pool so that they survive across resets. In readonly mode we only remember the
2504 result for the rest of this command in case a later command changes it. After
2505 this bit of logic the code is independent of the per_* mode. */
2507 old_pool = store_pool;
2510 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2513 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2514 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2518 case RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS:
2519 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2524 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2527 anchor = NULL; /* silence an "unused" complaint */
2528 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
2529 "internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
2533 t = tree_search(*anchor, key);
2537 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2538 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
2539 store_pool = old_pool;
2540 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2542 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2546 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
2547 from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */
2549 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2552 store_pool = old_pool;
2554 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2555 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2558 dbdb = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, &dbdb_size);
2561 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2565 /* Locate the basic ratelimit block inside the DB data. */
2566 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit found key in database\n");
2569 /* Forget the old Bloom filter if it is too old, so that we count each
2570 repeating event once per period. We don't simply clear and re-use the old
2571 filter because we want its size to change if the limit changes. Note that
2572 we keep the dbd pointer for copying the rate into the new data block. */
2574 if(unique != NULL && tv.tv_sec > dbdb->bloom_epoch + period)
2576 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit discarding old Bloom filter\n");
2582 if(unique != NULL && dbdb_size < sizeof(*dbdb))
2584 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit discarding undersize Bloom filter\n");
2589 /* Allocate a new data block if the database lookup failed
2590 or the Bloom filter passed its age limit. */
2596 /* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
2597 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
2598 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
2599 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size);
2604 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit creating new Bloom filter\n");
2606 /* See the long comment below for an explanation of the magic number 2.
2607 The filter has a minimum size in case the rate limit is very small;
2608 this is determined by the definition of dbdata_ratelimit_unique. */
2610 extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
2611 if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
2612 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
2613 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size);
2614 dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
2615 dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
2616 memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);
2618 /* Preserve any basic ratelimit data (which is our longer-term memory)
2619 by copying it from the discarded block. */
2629 /* If we are counting unique events, find out if this event is new or not.
2630 If the client repeats the event during the current period then it should be
2631 counted. We skip this code in readonly mode for efficiency, because any
2632 changes to the filter will be discarded and because count is already set to
2635 if (unique != NULL && !readonly)
2637 /* We identify unique events using a Bloom filter. (You can find my
2638 notes on Bloom filters at http://fanf.livejournal.com/81696.html)
2639 With the per_addr option, an "event" is a recipient address, though the
2640 user can use the unique option to define their own events. We only count
2641 an event if we have not seen it before.
2643 We size the filter according to the rate limit, which (in leaky mode)
2644 is the limit on the population of the filter. We allow 16 bits of space
2645 per entry (see the construction code above) and we set (up to) 8 of them
2646 when inserting an element (see the loop below). The probability of a false
2647 positive (an event we have not seen before but which we fail to count) is
2651 allzero = exp(-numhash * pop / size)
2652 = exp(-0.5 * pop / limit)
2653 fpr = pow(1 - allzero, numhash)
2655 For senders at the limit the fpr is 0.06% or 1 in 1700
2656 and for senders at half the limit it is 0.0006% or 1 in 170000
2658 In strict mode the Bloom filter can fill up beyond the normal limit, in
2659 which case the false positive rate will rise. This means that the
2660 measured rate for very fast senders can bogusly drop off after a while.
2662 At twice the limit, the fpr is 2.5% or 1 in 40
2663 At four times the limit, it is 31% or 1 in 3.2
2665 It takes ln(pop/limit) periods for an over-limit burst of pop events to
2666 decay below the limit, and if this is more than one then the Bloom filter
2667 will be discarded before the decay gets that far. The false positive rate
2668 at this threshold is 9.3% or 1 in 10.7. */
2671 unsigned n, hash, hinc;
2675 /* Instead of using eight independent hash values, we combine two values
2676 using the formula h1 + n * h2. This does not harm the Bloom filter's
2677 performance, and means the amount of hash we need is independent of the
2678 number of bits we set in the filter. */
2680 md5_start(&md5info);
2681 md5_end(&md5info, unique, Ustrlen(unique), md5sum);
2682 hash = md5sum[0] | md5sum[1] << 8 | md5sum[2] << 16 | md5sum[3] << 24;
2683 hinc = md5sum[4] | md5sum[5] << 8 | md5sum[6] << 16 | md5sum[7] << 24;
2685 /* Scan the bits corresponding to this event. A zero bit means we have
2686 not seen it before. Ensure all bits are set to record this event. */
2688 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit checking uniqueness of %s\n", unique);
2691 for (n = 0; n < 8; n++, hash += hinc)
2693 int bit = 1 << (hash % 8);
2694 int byte = (hash / 8) % dbdb->bloom_size;
2695 if ((dbdb->bloom[byte] & bit) == 0)
2697 dbdb->bloom[byte] |= bit;
2702 /* If this event has occurred before, do not count it. */
2706 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit event found in Bloom filter\n");
2710 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit event added to Bloom filter\n");
2713 /* If there was no previous ratelimit data block for this key, initialize
2714 the new one, otherwise update the block from the database. The initial rate
2715 is what would be computed by the code below for an infinite interval. */
2719 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's rate data\n");
2721 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2722 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2727 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2728 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2729 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2730 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2732 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2733 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2734 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2735 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2736 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2738 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2739 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2740 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2742 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2743 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2744 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2745 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2747 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2749 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2750 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2751 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2752 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2753 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2754 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2756 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2758 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2759 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2760 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2761 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2763 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2764 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2765 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2766 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2767 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2769 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2770 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2771 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2772 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2774 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2775 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2776 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2778 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2779 : this_time - prev_time;
2781 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2782 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2784 /* Combine the instantaneous rate (period / interval) with the previous rate
2785 using the smoothing factor a. In order to measure sized events, multiply the
2786 instantaneous rate by the count of bytes or recipients etc. */
2788 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2789 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2790 dbd->rate = (1 - a) * count / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2792 /* When events are very widely spaced the computed rate tends towards zero.
2793 Although this is accurate it turns out not to be useful for our purposes,
2794 especially when the first event after a long silence is the start of a spam
2795 run. A more useful model is that the rate for an isolated event should be the
2796 size of the event per the period size, ignoring the lack of events outside
2797 the current period and regardless of where the event falls in the period. So,
2798 if the interval was so long that the calculated rate is unhelpfully small, we
2799 re-intialize the rate. In the absence of higher-rate bursts, the condition
2800 below is true if the interval is greater than the period. */
2802 if (dbd->rate < count) dbd->rate = count;
2805 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit.
2806 This matters for edge cases such as a limit of zero, when the client
2807 should be completely blocked. */
2809 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
2811 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2812 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2813 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2814 rate preventing them from getting any email through. If readonly is set,
2815 neither leaky nor strict are set, so we do not do any updates. */
2817 if ((rc == FAIL && leaky) || strict)
2819 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbdb, dbdb_size);
2820 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db updated\n");
2824 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
2825 readonly? "readonly mode" : "over the limit, but leaky");
2830 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference. */
2832 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2834 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2835 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2837 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2838 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2840 store_pool = old_pool;
2841 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2844 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2851 /*************************************************
2852 * The udpsend ACL modifier *
2853 *************************************************/
2855 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below.
2858 arg the option string for udpsend=
2859 log_msgptr for error messages
2861 Returns: OK - Completed.
2862 DEFER - Problem with DNS lookup.
2863 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2867 acl_udpsend(const uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
2879 hostname = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2880 portstr = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2882 if (hostname == NULL)
2884 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination host in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2887 if (portstr == NULL)
2889 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2894 *log_msgptr = US"missing datagram payload in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2897 portnum = Ustrtol(portstr, &portend, 10);
2898 if (*portend != '\0')
2900 *log_msgptr = US"bad destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2904 /* Make a single-item host list. */
2905 h = store_get(sizeof(host_item));
2906 memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item));
2911 if (string_is_ip_address(hostname, NULL))
2912 h->address = hostname, r = HOST_FOUND;
2914 r = host_find_byname(h, NULL, 0, NULL, FALSE);
2915 if (r == HOST_FIND_FAILED || r == HOST_FIND_AGAIN)
2917 *log_msgptr = US"DNS lookup failed in \"udpsend\" modifier";
2922 debug_printf("udpsend [%s]:%d %s\n", h->address, portnum, arg);
2924 r = s = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_DGRAM, h->address, portnum, portnum,
2926 if (r < 0) goto defer;
2928 r = send(s, arg, len, 0);
2931 errstr = US strerror(errno);
2939 string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" truncated from %d to %d octets", len, r);
2944 debug_printf("udpsend %d bytes\n", r);
2949 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" failed: %s", errstr);
2955 /*************************************************
2956 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2957 *************************************************/
2959 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2963 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2964 where where called from
2965 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2966 level the nesting level
2967 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2968 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2969 user_msgptr user message pointer
2970 log_msgptr log message pointer
2971 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2973 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2974 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2975 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2976 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2977 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2978 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2979 but can be temporary callout problem)
2980 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2985 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2986 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2987 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2989 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2990 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2992 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2996 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
3001 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
3002 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
3004 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
3006 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf(" message: %s\n", cb->arg);
3007 user_message = cb->arg;
3011 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
3013 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("l_message: %s\n", cb->arg);
3014 log_message = cb->arg;
3018 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
3019 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
3021 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
3027 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
3028 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
3029 checking functions in some cases. */
3031 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
3033 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
3036 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
3037 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
3038 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
3039 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
3044 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
3049 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
3050 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
3051 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
3053 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
3055 debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
3056 lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
3059 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
3062 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
3066 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
3068 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
3070 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
3071 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
3072 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
3076 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
3077 action for the remaining modifiers. */
3081 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
3085 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
3089 rc = acl_check_wargs(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3090 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
3092 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
3093 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
3099 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
3100 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
3101 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
3105 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
3106 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
3108 int old_pool = store_pool;
3109 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3110 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
3111 store_pool = old_pool;
3116 case ACLC_CONDITION:
3117 /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
3118 expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
3119 different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
3121 ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */
3122 : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
3123 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
3125 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
3126 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
3127 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
3128 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
3130 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
3133 case ACLC_CONTINUE: /* Always succeeds */
3138 const uschar *p = NULL;
3139 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
3141 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
3143 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
3145 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
3146 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
3150 switch(control_type)
3152 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
3153 allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
3156 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
3157 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
3162 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3163 case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
3164 dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
3165 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
3166 /* Since DKIM was blocked, skip DMARC too */
3167 dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3168 dmarc_enable_forensic = FALSE;
3173 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
3174 case CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY:
3175 dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3178 case CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC:
3179 dmarc_enable_forensic = TRUE;
3186 int fd, af, level, optname, value;
3187 /* If we are acting on stdin, the setsockopt may fail if stdin is not
3188 a socket; we can accept that, we'll just debug-log failures anyway. */
3189 fd = fileno(smtp_in);
3190 af = ip_get_address_family(fd);
3194 debug_printf("smtp input is probably not a socket [%s], not setting DSCP\n",
3198 if (dscp_lookup(p+1, af, &level, &optname, &value))
3200 if (setsockopt(fd, level, optname, &value, sizeof(value)) < 0)
3202 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("failed to set input DSCP[%s]: %s\n",
3203 p+1, strerror(errno));
3207 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("set input DSCP to \"%s\"\n", p+1);
3212 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised DSCP value in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3218 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3226 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
3227 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
3230 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
3231 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
3234 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
3235 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
3238 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
3239 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
3242 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3243 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
3244 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
3248 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
3249 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
3252 case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
3253 pipelining_enable = FALSE;
3256 case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
3257 disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
3260 case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
3261 disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
3264 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
3265 cancel_cutthrough_connection("fakereject");
3266 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
3267 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
3270 const uschar *pp = p + 1;
3271 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
3272 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
3277 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
3278 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
3282 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
3283 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
3284 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
3285 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
3286 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
3293 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3296 cancel_cutthrough_connection("item frozen");
3299 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
3300 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
3301 cancel_cutthrough_connection("queueing forced");
3304 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
3305 originator_name = US"";
3306 submission_mode = TRUE;
3309 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
3312 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
3313 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
3315 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
3317 const uschar *pp = p + 8;
3318 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
3319 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
3322 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
3324 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
3326 const uschar *pp = p + 6;
3327 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
3328 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
3329 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
3336 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3343 uschar * debug_tag = NULL;
3344 uschar * debug_opts = NULL;
3349 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3350 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "tag=", 4) == 0)
3352 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3353 debug_tag = string_copyn(p+5, pp-p-5);
3355 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "opts=", 5) == 0)
3357 for (pp += 5; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3358 debug_opts = string_copyn(p+6, pp-p-6);
3360 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "kill", 4) == 0)
3362 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3366 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3371 debug_logging_stop();
3373 debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
3377 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
3378 suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
3381 case CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY:
3382 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
3387 /* Too hard to think about for now. We might in future cutthrough
3388 the case where both sides handle prdr and this-node prdr acl
3390 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("PRDR on %s reception\n", arg);
3394 *log_msgptr = US"frozen";
3395 else if (queue_only_policy)
3396 *log_msgptr = US"queue-only";
3397 else if (fake_response == FAIL)
3398 *log_msgptr = US"fakereject";
3401 if (rcpt_count == 1)
3403 cutthrough.delivery = TRUE;
3406 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3407 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
3410 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
3411 /* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool") == 0) ; default */
3414 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3420 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"control=%s\" on %s item",
3426 case CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT:
3431 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3432 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
3433 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3439 message_utf8_downconvert = 0;
3440 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3441 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3445 if (p[1] == '-' && p[2] == '1')
3447 message_utf8_downconvert = -1;
3448 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3449 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = TRUE;
3453 *log_msgptr = US"bad option value for control=utf8_downconvert";
3457 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3458 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
3459 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3469 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
3472 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3473 const uschar * list = arg;
3474 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
3475 /* Run the dcc backend. */
3476 rc = dcc_process(&ss);
3477 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
3478 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
3479 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3480 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3485 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3487 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
3493 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
3496 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
3497 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
3502 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
3507 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
3510 /* NOTE 1: Remember that we may be
3511 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
3512 Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
3513 smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
3515 NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
3516 apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
3521 if (smtp_out != NULL && !disable_delay_flush)
3524 #if !defined(NO_POLL_H) && defined (POLLRDHUP)
3530 p.fd = fileno(smtp_out);
3531 p.events = POLLRDHUP;
3534 if (poll(&p, n, delay*1000) > 0)
3535 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay cancelled by peer close\n");
3538 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
3539 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
3540 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
3541 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
3542 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
3543 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
3544 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
3545 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
3546 it is not always available.
3549 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
3556 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3557 case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
3558 if (dkim_cur_signer != NULL)
3559 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
3560 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3565 case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
3566 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_exim_expand_query(DKIM_VERIFY_STATUS),
3567 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3571 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC
3572 case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS:
3573 if (!dmarc_has_been_checked)
3575 dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
3576 /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
3577 * view into the process in the future. */
3578 rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS),
3579 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3584 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, &arg, log_msgptr);
3588 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
3589 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
3592 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
3593 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
3594 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
3595 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
3596 writing is poorly documented. */
3598 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
3599 if (tls_in.cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
3601 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
3602 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':');
3603 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_in.cipher; else
3605 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
3606 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
3608 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
3609 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
3613 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
3614 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
3615 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
3616 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
3617 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
3618 message in the same SMTP connection. */
3621 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
3622 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address,
3624 if (rc == DEFER) *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3625 if (host_data) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
3628 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
3629 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
3630 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
3631 CUSS &deliver_localpart_data);
3634 case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
3638 const uschar *s = arg;
3640 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
3642 if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
3643 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
3644 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT;
3647 logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
3648 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name \"%s\" in "
3649 "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]);
3652 log_reject_target = logbits;
3659 const uschar *s = arg;
3665 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
3666 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
3667 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
3668 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
3669 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
3670 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
3673 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
3674 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
3675 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
3681 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
3684 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
3685 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
3689 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3690 case ACLC_MALWARE: /* Run the malware backend. */
3692 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3693 const uschar * list = arg;
3694 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
3696 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
3699 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
3700 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0)
3702 else if ( strncmpic(opt, US"tmo=", 4) == 0
3703 && (timeout = readconf_readtime(opt+4, '\0', FALSE)) < 0
3706 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad timeout value in '%s'", opt);
3710 rc = malware(ss, timeout);
3711 if (rc == DEFER && defer_ok)
3712 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3716 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
3717 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
3722 queue_name = string_copy_malloc(arg);
3725 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
3726 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
3729 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
3730 rc = match_address_list((const uschar *)addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
3731 CUSS &recipient_data);
3734 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3740 case ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER:
3741 setup_remove_header(arg);
3744 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
3747 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
3748 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
3749 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
3750 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
3755 rc = match_address_list((const uschar *)sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
3756 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, CUSS &sender_data);
3759 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
3763 int old_pool = store_pool;
3764 if ( cb->u.varname[0] == 'c'
3765 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
3766 || event_name /* An event is being delivered */
3769 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3770 acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
3771 store_pool = old_pool;
3775 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3778 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3779 const uschar * list = arg;
3780 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
3781 /* Run the spam backend. */
3782 rc = spam(CUSS &ss);
3783 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
3784 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
3786 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3788 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3796 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
3798 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL);
3800 case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
3801 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
3806 rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr);
3809 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
3810 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
3811 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
3812 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
3813 (until something changes it). */
3816 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
3818 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
3819 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
3823 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
3824 "condition %d", cb->type);
3828 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
3830 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
3832 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
3833 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
3836 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
3840 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
3841 handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make
3842 it the same as the user message.
3844 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
3845 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
3847 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
3848 message that is already set.
3850 Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but
3851 for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and
3852 when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no
3853 "endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is
3856 if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;
3858 if (((1<<rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
3861 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3862 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
3864 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
3865 nested ACLs) are always discarded. This also happens for acceptance verbs
3866 when they actually do accept. Only messages specified at this level are used.
3867 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
3868 during expansions. */
3870 if (verb == ACL_WARN ||
3871 (rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
3872 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3874 if (user_message != NULL)
3876 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
3877 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
3878 if (expmessage == NULL)
3880 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3881 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3882 user_message, expand_string_message);
3884 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
3887 if (log_message != NULL)
3889 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
3890 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
3891 if (expmessage == NULL)
3893 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3894 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3895 log_message, expand_string_message);
3897 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
3899 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
3900 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
3904 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
3906 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3909 acl_verify_message = NULL;
3917 /*************************************************
3918 * Get line from a literal ACL *
3919 *************************************************/
3921 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
3922 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
3923 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
3925 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
3926 Exim configuration file. That is:
3928 . Leading spaces are ignored.
3930 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
3931 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
3932 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
3934 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
3935 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
3937 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
3940 Returns: a pointer to the next line
3944 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
3945 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3953 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3957 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3958 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
3959 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
3961 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3963 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3964 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3966 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
3968 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3969 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3971 if (*yield != '#') break;
3974 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3975 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3976 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3977 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3982 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3984 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3993 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3994 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3999 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
4000 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
4001 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
4004 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
4005 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
4006 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
4008 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
4009 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
4011 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
4012 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
4015 /* Control does not reach here */
4022 /*************************************************
4023 * Check access using an ACL *
4024 *************************************************/
4026 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
4027 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
4028 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
4029 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
4030 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
4031 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
4032 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
4033 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
4034 appears immediately above.
4037 where where called from
4038 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
4039 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
4040 level the nesting level
4041 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
4042 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
4044 Returns: OK access is granted
4045 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
4046 FAIL access is denied
4047 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
4048 DEFER can't tell at the moment
4053 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
4054 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
4057 acl_block *acl = NULL;
4058 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
4061 /* Catch configuration loops */
4065 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
4071 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
4075 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
4076 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
4080 ss = expand_string(s);
4083 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
4084 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
4085 expand_string_message);
4091 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
4093 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
4094 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
4098 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
4099 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
4100 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
4101 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
4102 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
4104 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
4106 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
4109 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
4112 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
4115 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
4116 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
4119 else if (*ss == '/')
4121 struct stat statbuf;
4122 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
4125 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
4130 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
4132 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
4137 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
4138 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
4140 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
4142 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
4143 ss, strerror(errno));
4146 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
4149 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
4150 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
4154 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
4155 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
4156 persists between multiple messages. */
4160 int old_pool = store_pool;
4161 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
4162 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
4163 store_pool = old_pool;
4164 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
4167 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
4168 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
4170 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
4174 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
4179 int basic_errno = 0;
4180 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
4181 BOOL acl_quit_check = level == 0
4182 && (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT);
4184 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
4185 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
4187 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
4189 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
4192 search_error_message = NULL;
4193 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
4194 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
4196 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
4197 ERROR always causes a return. */
4202 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred in %s\n", verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4203 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
4205 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
4206 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
4207 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4211 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4213 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
4216 default: /* Paranoia */
4218 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error in %s\n", verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4222 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded in %s\n",
4223 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4227 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed in %s\n", verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4230 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
4231 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
4234 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\" in %s\n",
4235 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4239 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\" in %s\n",
4240 verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
4244 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
4245 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
4246 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
4251 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
4253 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: ACCEPT\n", acl_name);
4258 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
4266 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: DEFER\n", acl_name);
4267 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4268 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4276 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: DENY\n", acl_name);
4277 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4283 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
4285 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: DISCARD\n", acl_name);
4286 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4291 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
4299 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: DROP\n", acl_name);
4300 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4308 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: not OK\n", acl_name);
4309 if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
4316 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
4317 else if (cond == DEFER && LOGGING(acl_warn_skipped))
4318 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
4319 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
4320 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
4321 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
4322 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
4326 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
4331 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
4336 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
4338 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
4342 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("QUIT or not-QUIT teplevel ACL may not fail "
4343 "('%s' verb used incorrectly)", verbs[acl->verb]);
4350 /* Same args as acl_check_internal() above, but the string s is
4351 the name of an ACL followed optionally by up to 9 space-separated arguments.
4352 The name and args are separately expanded. Args go into $acl_arg globals. */
4354 acl_check_wargs(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *s, int level,
4355 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
4358 uschar * tmp_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
4359 uschar * sav_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
4365 if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(name = expand_string(tmp)))
4368 for (i = 0; i < 9; i++)
4370 while (*s && isspace(*s)) s++;
4372 if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(tmp_arg[i] = expand_string(tmp)))
4379 sav_narg = acl_narg;
4381 for (i = 0; i < acl_narg; i++)
4383 sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
4384 acl_arg[i] = tmp_arg[i];
4388 sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
4389 acl_arg[i++] = NULL;
4392 ret = acl_check_internal(where, addr, name, level, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4394 acl_narg = sav_narg;
4395 for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) acl_arg[i] = sav_arg[i];
4399 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return ERROR;
4400 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
4401 tmp, expand_string_message);
4402 return search_find_defer?DEFER:ERROR;
4407 /*************************************************
4408 * Check access using an ACL *
4409 *************************************************/
4411 /* Alternate interface for ACL, used by expansions */
4413 acl_eval(int where, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
4416 address_item *addr = NULL;
4418 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
4419 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
4420 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
4421 log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
4423 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
4425 adb = address_defaults;
4427 addr->address = expand_string(US"$local_part@$domain");
4428 addr->domain = deliver_domain;
4429 addr->local_part = deliver_localpart;
4430 addr->cc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
4431 addr->lc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
4434 return acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4439 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
4440 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
4441 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
4444 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
4445 recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
4446 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
4447 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
4448 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
4450 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
4451 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
4452 FAIL access is denied
4453 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
4454 DEFER can't tell at the moment
4457 int acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
4460 acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
4461 uschar **log_msgptr)
4465 address_item *addr = NULL;
4467 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
4468 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
4469 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
4470 log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
4472 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
4473 if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY || where==ACL_WHERE_PRDR)
4475 if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY)
4478 adb = address_defaults;
4480 addr->address = recipient;
4481 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
4483 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
4487 if ((addr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
4489 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
4490 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
4493 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
4494 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
4498 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
4499 acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
4501 /* Cutthrough - if requested,
4502 and WHERE_RCPT and not yet opened conn as result of recipient-verify,
4503 and rcpt acl returned accept,
4504 and first recipient (cancel on any subsequents)
4505 open one now and run it up to RCPT acceptance.
4506 A failed verify should cancel cutthrough request,
4507 and will pass the fail to the originator.
4508 Initial implementation: dual-write to spool.
4509 Assume the rxd datastream is now being copied byte-for-byte to an open cutthrough connection.
4511 Cease cutthrough copy on rxd final dot; do not send one.
4513 On a data acl, if not accept and a cutthrough conn is open, hard-close it (no SMTP niceness).
4515 On data acl accept, terminate the dataphase on an open cutthrough conn. If accepted or
4516 perm-rejected, reflect that to the original sender - and dump the spooled copy.
4517 If temp-reject, close the conn (and keep the spooled copy).
4518 If conn-failure, no action (and keep the spooled copy).
4522 case ACL_WHERE_RCPT:
4523 #ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
4524 case ACL_WHERE_PRDR:
4526 if (host_checking_callout) /* -bhc mode */
4527 cancel_cutthrough_connection("host-checking mode");
4530 && cutthrough.delivery
4531 && rcpt_count > cutthrough.nrcpt
4532 && (rc = open_cutthrough_connection(addr)) == DEFER
4534 if (cutthrough.defer_pass)
4536 uschar * s = addr->message;
4537 /* Horrid kludge to recover target's SMTP message */
4539 do --s; while (!isdigit(*s));
4540 if (*--s && isdigit(*s) && *--s && isdigit(*s)) *user_msgptr = s;
4541 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
4545 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("cutthrough defer; will spool\n");
4550 case ACL_WHERE_PREDATA:
4552 cutthrough_predata();
4554 cancel_cutthrough_connection("predata acl not ok");
4557 case ACL_WHERE_QUIT:
4558 case ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT:
4559 cancel_cutthrough_connection("quit or notquit");
4566 deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
4567 sender_address_data = NULL;
4569 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
4570 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
4574 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
4576 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
4577 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
4583 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
4585 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
4587 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
4588 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
4592 /* Before giving a response, take a look at the length of any user message, and
4593 split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
4595 *user_msgptr = string_split_message(*user_msgptr);
4596 if (fake_response != OK)
4597 fake_response_text = string_split_message(fake_response_text);
4603 /*************************************************
4604 * Create ACL variable *
4605 *************************************************/
4607 /* Create an ACL variable or reuse an existing one. ACL variables are in a
4608 binary tree (see tree.c) with acl_var_c and acl_var_m as root nodes.
4611 name pointer to the variable's name, starting with c or m
4613 Returns the pointer to variable's tree node
4617 acl_var_create(uschar *name)
4619 tree_node *node, **root;
4620 root = (name[0] == 'c')? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
4621 node = tree_search(*root, name);
4624 node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name));
4625 Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
4626 (void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
4628 node->data.ptr = NULL;
4634 /*************************************************
4635 * Write an ACL variable in spool format *
4636 *************************************************/
4638 /* This function is used as a callback for tree_walk when writing variables to
4639 the spool file. To retain spool file compatibility, what is written is -aclc or
4640 -aclm followed by the rest of the name and the data length, space separated,
4641 then the value itself, starting on a new line, and terminated by an additional
4642 newline. When we had only numbered ACL variables, the first line might look
4643 like this: "-aclc 5 20". Now it might be "-aclc foo 20" for the variable called
4647 name of the variable
4648 value of the variable
4649 ctx FILE pointer (as a void pointer)
4655 acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx)
4657 FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx;
4658 fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);