1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
8 /* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */
10 /* This file provides TLS/SSL support for Exim using the GnuTLS library,
11 one of the available supported implementations. This file is #included into
12 tls.c when USE_GNUTLS has been set.
14 The code herein is a revamp of GnuTLS integration using the current APIs; the
15 original tls-gnu.c was based on a patch which was contributed by Nikos
16 Mavrogiannopoulos. The revamp is partially a rewrite, partially cut&paste as
19 APIs current as of GnuTLS 2.12.18; note that the GnuTLS manual is for GnuTLS 3,
20 which is not widely deployed by OS vendors. Will note issues below, which may
21 assist in updating the code in the future. Another sources of hints is
22 mod_gnutls for Apache (SNI callback registration and handling).
24 Keeping client and server variables more split than before and is currently
25 the norm, in anticipation of TLS in ACL callouts.
27 I wanted to switch to gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() so that
28 certificate rejection could happen during handshake where it belongs, rather
29 than being dropped afterwards, but that was introduced in 2.10.0 and Debian
30 (6.0.5) is still on 2.8.6. So for now we have to stick with sub-par behaviour.
32 (I wasn't looking for libraries quite that old, when updating to get rid of
33 compiler warnings of deprecated APIs. If it turns out that a lot of the rest
34 require current GnuTLS, then we'll drop support for the ancient libraries).
37 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
38 /* needed for cert checks in verification and DN extraction: */
39 #include <gnutls/x509.h>
40 /* man-page is incorrect, gnutls_rnd() is not in gnutls.h: */
41 #include <gnutls/crypto.h>
43 /* needed to disable PKCS11 autoload unless requested */
44 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00
45 # include <gnutls/pkcs11.h>
46 # define SUPPORT_PARAM_TO_PK_BITS
48 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030103 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
49 # warning "GnuTLS library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
52 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x020a00 && !defined(DISABLE_EVENT)
53 # warning "GnuTLS library version too old; tls:cert event unsupported"
54 # define DISABLE_EVENT
56 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030306
57 # define SUPPORT_CA_DIR
59 # undef SUPPORT_CA_DIR
61 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030014
62 # define SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE
64 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030104
65 # define GNUTLS_CERT_VFY_STATUS_PRINT
67 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030109
70 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03010a
71 # define SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC
73 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030500
74 # define SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG
76 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030506 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
77 # define SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK
81 # if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000
82 # define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA 2
83 # define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE 3
85 # error GnuTLS version too early for DANE
87 # if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x999999
88 # define GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
93 # include <gnutls/ocsp.h>
96 # include <gnutls/dane.h>
99 #include "tls-cipher-stdname.c"
105 gnutls_global_set_audit_log_function()
108 gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(): is new, drop the 2 for old version
111 /* Local static variables for GnuTLS */
113 /* Values for verify_requirement */
115 enum peer_verify_requirement
116 { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED, VERIFY_DANE };
118 /* This holds most state for server or client; with this, we can set up an
119 outbound TLS-enabled connection in an ACL callout, while not stomping all
120 over the TLS variables available for expansion.
122 Some of these correspond to variables in globals.c; those variables will
123 be set to point to content in one of these instances, as appropriate for
124 the stage of the process lifetime.
126 Not handled here: global tls_channelbinding_b64.
129 typedef struct exim_gnutls_state {
130 gnutls_session_t session;
131 gnutls_certificate_credentials_t x509_cred;
132 gnutls_priority_t priority_cache;
133 enum peer_verify_requirement verify_requirement;
136 BOOL peer_cert_verified;
137 BOOL peer_dane_verified;
138 BOOL trigger_sni_changes;
139 BOOL have_set_peerdn;
140 const struct host_item *host; /* NULL if server */
141 gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert;
144 uschar *received_sni;
146 const uschar *tls_certificate;
147 const uschar *tls_privatekey;
148 const uschar *tls_sni; /* client send only, not received */
149 const uschar *tls_verify_certificates;
150 const uschar *tls_crl;
151 const uschar *tls_require_ciphers;
153 uschar *exp_tls_certificate;
154 uschar *exp_tls_privatekey;
155 uschar *exp_tls_verify_certificates;
157 uschar *exp_tls_require_ciphers;
158 const uschar *exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames;
159 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
160 uschar *event_action;
163 char * const * dane_data;
164 const int * dane_data_len;
167 tls_support *tlsp; /* set in tls_init() */
172 BOOL xfer_eof; /*XXX never gets set! */
174 } exim_gnutls_state_st;
176 static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = {
179 .priority_cache = NULL,
180 .verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE,
183 .peer_cert_verified = FALSE,
184 .peer_dane_verified = FALSE,
185 .trigger_sni_changes =FALSE,
186 .have_set_peerdn = FALSE,
191 .received_sni = NULL,
193 .tls_certificate = NULL,
194 .tls_privatekey = NULL,
196 .tls_verify_certificates = NULL,
198 .tls_require_ciphers =NULL,
200 .exp_tls_certificate = NULL,
201 .exp_tls_privatekey = NULL,
202 .exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL,
204 .exp_tls_require_ciphers = NULL,
205 .exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = NULL,
206 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
207 .event_action = NULL,
212 .xfer_buffer_lwm = 0,
213 .xfer_buffer_hwm = 0,
218 /* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming
219 it's held in globals, GnuTLS doesn't appear to let us register callback data
220 for callbacks, or as part of the session, so we have to keep a "this is the
221 context we're currently dealing with" pointer and rely upon being
222 single-threaded to keep from processing data on an inbound TLS connection while
223 talking to another TLS connection for an outbound check. This does mean that
224 there's no way for heart-beats to be responded to, for the duration of the
226 XXX But see gnutls_session_get_ptr()
229 static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server;
231 /* dh_params are initialised once within the lifetime of a process using TLS;
232 if we used TLS in a long-lived daemon, we'd have to reconsider this. But we
233 don't want to repeat this. */
235 static gnutls_dh_params_t dh_server_params = NULL;
237 /* No idea how this value was chosen; preserving it. Default is 3600. */
239 static const int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
241 static const uschar * const exim_default_gnutls_priority = US"NORMAL";
243 /* Guard library core initialisation */
245 static BOOL exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE;
248 static BOOL gnutls_buggy_ocsp = FALSE;
252 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
255 #define MAX_HOST_LEN 255
257 /* Set this to control gnutls_global_set_log_level(); values 0 to 9 will setup
258 the library logging; a value less than 0 disables the calls to set up logging
259 callbacks. GNuTLS also looks for an environment variable - except not for
260 setuid binaries, making it useless - "GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL".
261 Allegedly the testscript line "GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL=9 sudo exim ..." would work,
262 but the env var must be added to /etc/sudoers too. */
263 #ifndef EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL
264 # define EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL -1
267 #ifndef EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS
268 # define EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS 1024
271 /* With GnuTLS 2.12.x+ we have gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() with which we
272 can ask for a bit-strength. Without that, we stick to the constant we had
274 #ifndef EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12
275 # define EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 1024
278 #define expand_check_tlsvar(Varname, errstr) \
279 expand_check(state->Varname, US #Varname, &state->exp_##Varname, errstr)
281 #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00
282 # define HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
283 # define HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS
284 # define HAVE_GNUTLS_RND
285 /* The security fix we provide with the gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11 option
286 * (4.82 PP/09) introduces a compatibility regression. The symbol simply
287 * isn't available sometimes, so this needs to become a conditional
288 * compilation; the sanest way to deal with this being a problem on
289 * older OSes is to block it in the Local/Makefile with this compiler
291 # ifndef AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11
292 # define HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11
293 # endif /* AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 */
299 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
300 /* Callback declarations */
302 #if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0
303 static void exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message);
306 static int exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session);
309 static int server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr,
310 gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response);
315 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
316 /* Static functions */
318 /*************************************************
320 *************************************************/
322 /* Called from lots of places when errors occur before actually starting to do
323 the TLS handshake, that is, while the session is still in clear. Always returns
324 DEFER for a server and FAIL for a client so that most calls can use "return
325 tls_error(...)" to do this processing and then give an appropriate return. A
326 single function is used for both server and client, because it is called from
327 some shared functions.
330 prefix text to include in the logged error
331 msg additional error string (may be NULL)
332 usually obtained from gnutls_strerror()
333 host NULL if setting up a server;
334 the connected host if setting up a client
335 errstr pointer to returned error string
337 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
341 tls_error(const uschar *prefix, const uschar *msg, const host_item *host,
345 *errstr = string_sprintf("(%s)%s%s", prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : US"");
346 return host ? FAIL : DEFER;
351 tls_error_gnu(const uschar *prefix, int err, const host_item *host,
354 return tls_error(prefix, US gnutls_strerror(err), host, errstr);
358 tls_error_sys(const uschar *prefix, int err, const host_item *host,
361 return tls_error(prefix, US strerror(err), host, errstr);
365 /*************************************************
366 * Deal with logging errors during I/O *
367 *************************************************/
369 /* We have to get the identity of the peer from saved data.
372 state the current GnuTLS exim state container
373 rc the GnuTLS error code, or 0 if it's a local error
374 when text identifying read or write
375 text local error text when rc is 0
381 record_io_error(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, int rc, uschar *when, uschar *text)
386 if (rc == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED)
387 msg = string_sprintf("A TLS fatal alert has been received: %s",
388 US gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(state->session)));
390 msg = US gnutls_strerror(rc);
392 (void) tls_error(when, msg, state->host, &errstr);
395 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection %s",
396 state->host->name, state->host->address, errstr);
399 uschar * conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
400 if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0) conn_info += 5;
401 /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */
402 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s %s", conn_info, errstr);
409 /*************************************************
410 * Set various Exim expansion vars *
411 *************************************************/
413 #define exim_gnutls_cert_err(Label) \
416 if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \
418 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert problem: %s: %s\n", \
419 (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \
425 import_cert(const gnutls_datum_t * cert, gnutls_x509_crt_t * crtp)
429 rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(crtp);
430 exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"gnutls_x509_crt_init (crt)");
432 rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(*crtp, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
433 exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"failed to import certificate [gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert)]");
438 #undef exim_gnutls_cert_err
441 /* We set various Exim global variables from the state, once a session has
442 been established. With TLS callouts, may need to change this to stack
443 variables, or just re-call it with the server state after client callout
446 Make sure anything set here is unset in tls_getc().
450 tls_bits strength indicator
451 tls_certificate_verified bool indicator
452 tls_channelbinding_b64 for some SASL mechanisms
454 tls_peercert pointer to library internal
456 tls_sni a (UTF-8) string
457 tls_ourcert pointer to library internal
460 state the relevant exim_gnutls_state_st *
464 extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st * state)
466 gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
467 #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
470 gnutls_datum_t channel;
472 tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp;
474 tlsp->active.sock = state->fd_out;
475 tlsp->active.tls_ctx = state;
477 cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session);
478 /* returns size in "bytes" */
479 tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8;
481 tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite;
483 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", state->ciphersuite);
485 tlsp->certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified;
487 tlsp->dane_verified = state->peer_dane_verified;
490 /* note that tls_channelbinding_b64 is not saved to the spool file, since it's
491 only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */
493 tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
494 #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING
497 if ((rc = gnutls_session_channel_binding(state->session, GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE, &channel)))
498 { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Channel binding error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(rc)); }
501 old_pool = store_pool;
502 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
503 tls_channelbinding_b64 = b64encode(CUS channel.data, (int)channel.size);
504 store_pool = old_pool;
505 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage.\n");
509 /* peercert is set in peer_status() */
510 tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn;
511 tlsp->sni = state->received_sni;
513 /* record our certificate */
515 const gnutls_datum_t * cert = gnutls_certificate_get_ours(state->session);
516 gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
518 tlsp->ourcert = cert && import_cert(cert, &crt)==0 ? crt : NULL;
525 /*************************************************
526 * Setup up DH parameters *
527 *************************************************/
529 /* Generating the D-H parameters may take a long time. They only need to
530 be re-generated every so often, depending on security policy. What we do is to
531 keep these parameters in a file in the spool directory. If the file does not
532 exist, we generate them. This means that it is easy to cause a regeneration.
534 The new file is written as a temporary file and renamed, so that an incomplete
535 file is never present. If two processes both compute some new parameters, you
536 waste a bit of effort, but it doesn't seem worth messing around with locking to
539 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
543 init_server_dh(uschar ** errstr)
546 unsigned int dh_bits;
548 uschar filename_buf[PATH_MAX];
549 uschar *filename = NULL;
551 uschar *exp_tls_dhparam;
552 BOOL use_file_in_spool = FALSE;
553 host_item *host = NULL; /* dummy for macros */
555 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n");
557 if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params)))
558 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_init", rc, host, errstr);
563 if (!expand_check(tls_dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &exp_tls_dhparam, errstr))
566 if (!exp_tls_dhparam)
568 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loading default hard-coded DH params\n");
569 m.data = US std_dh_prime_default();
570 m.size = Ustrlen(m.data);
572 else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "historic") == 0)
573 use_file_in_spool = TRUE;
574 else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "none") == 0)
576 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n");
579 else if (exp_tls_dhparam[0] != '/')
581 if (!(m.data = US std_dh_prime_named(exp_tls_dhparam)))
582 return tls_error(US"No standard prime named", exp_tls_dhparam, NULL, errstr);
583 m.size = Ustrlen(m.data);
586 filename = exp_tls_dhparam;
590 if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM)))
591 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3", rc, host, errstr);
592 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loaded fixed standard D-H parameters\n");
596 #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS
597 /* If you change this constant, also change dh_param_fn_ext so that we can use a
598 different filename and ensure we have sufficient bits. */
600 if (!(dh_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_DH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_NORMAL)))
601 return tls_error(US"gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() failed", NULL, NULL, errstr);
603 debug_printf("GnuTLS tells us that for D-H PK, NORMAL is %d bits.\n",
606 dh_bits = EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12;
608 debug_printf("GnuTLS lacks gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(), using %d bits.\n",
612 /* Some clients have hard-coded limits. */
613 if (dh_bits > tls_dh_max_bits)
616 debug_printf("tls_dh_max_bits clamping override, using %d bits instead.\n",
618 dh_bits = tls_dh_max_bits;
621 if (use_file_in_spool)
623 if (!string_format(filename_buf, sizeof(filename_buf),
624 "%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits))
625 return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL, errstr);
626 filename = filename_buf;
629 /* Open the cache file for reading and if successful, read it and set up the
632 if ((fd = Uopen(filename, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0)
638 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) < 0) /* EIO */
642 return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache stat failed", saved_errno, NULL, errstr);
644 if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
647 return tls_error(US"TLS cache not a file", NULL, NULL, errstr);
649 if (!(fp = fdopen(fd, "rb")))
653 return tls_error_sys(US"fdopen(TLS cache stat fd) failed",
654 saved_errno, NULL, errstr);
657 m.size = statbuf.st_size;
658 if (!(m.data = malloc(m.size)))
661 return tls_error_sys(US"malloc failed", errno, NULL, errstr);
663 if (!(sz = fread(m.data, m.size, 1, fp)))
668 return tls_error_sys(US"fread failed", saved_errno, NULL, errstr);
672 rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
675 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3", rc, host, errstr);
676 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("read D-H parameters from file \"%s\"\n", filename);
679 /* If the file does not exist, fall through to compute new data and cache it.
680 If there was any other opening error, it is serious. */
682 else if (errno == ENOENT)
686 debug_printf("D-H parameter cache file \"%s\" does not exist\n", filename);
689 return tls_error(string_open_failed(errno, "\"%s\" for reading", filename),
692 /* If ret < 0, either the cache file does not exist, or the data it contains
693 is not useful. One particular case of this is when upgrading from an older
694 release of Exim in which the data was stored in a different format. We don't
695 try to be clever and support both formats; we just regenerate new data in this
701 unsigned int dh_bits_gen = dh_bits;
703 if ((PATH_MAX - Ustrlen(filename)) < 10)
704 return tls_error(US"Filename too long to generate replacement",
705 filename, NULL, errstr);
707 temp_fn = string_copy(US"%s.XXXXXXX");
708 if ((fd = mkstemp(CS temp_fn)) < 0) /* modifies temp_fn */
709 return tls_error_sys(US"Unable to open temp file", errno, NULL, errstr);
710 (void)exim_chown(temp_fn, exim_uid, exim_gid); /* Probably not necessary */
712 /* GnuTLS overshoots!
713 * If we ask for 2236, we might get 2237 or more.
714 * But there's no way to ask GnuTLS how many bits there really are.
715 * We can ask how many bits were used in a TLS session, but that's it!
716 * The prime itself is hidden behind too much abstraction.
717 * So we ask for less, and proceed on a wing and a prayer.
718 * First attempt, subtracted 3 for 2233 and got 2240.
720 if (dh_bits >= EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS + 10)
722 dh_bits_gen = dh_bits - 10;
724 debug_printf("being paranoid about DH generation, make it '%d' bits'\n",
729 debug_printf("requesting generation of %d bit Diffie-Hellman prime ...\n",
731 if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits_gen)))
732 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2", rc, host, errstr);
734 /* gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() will tell us the exact size, every time,
735 and I confirmed that a NULL call to get the size first is how the GnuTLS
736 sample apps handle this. */
740 if ( (rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params,
741 GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, m.data, &sz))
742 && rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
743 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing",
746 if (!(m.data = malloc(m.size)))
747 return tls_error_sys(US"memory allocation failed", errno, NULL, errstr);
749 /* this will return a size 1 less than the allocation size above */
750 if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
754 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real", rc, host, errstr);
756 m.size = sz; /* shrink by 1, probably */
758 if ((sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, m.data, (size_t) m.size)) != m.size)
761 return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write D-H params failed",
762 errno, NULL, errstr);
765 if ((sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, US"\n", 1)) != 1)
766 return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write D-H params final newline failed",
767 errno, NULL, errstr);
769 if ((rc = close(fd)))
770 return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write close() failed", errno, NULL, errstr);
772 if (Urename(temp_fn, filename) < 0)
773 return tls_error_sys(string_sprintf("failed to rename \"%s\" as \"%s\"",
774 temp_fn, filename), errno, NULL, errstr);
776 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote D-H parameters to file \"%s\"\n", filename);
779 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialized server D-H parameters\n");
786 /* Create and install a selfsigned certificate, for use in server mode */
789 tls_install_selfsign(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr)
791 gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL;
793 gnutls_x509_privkey_t pkey = NULL;
794 const uschar * where;
797 where = US"initialising pkey";
798 if ((rc = gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&pkey))) goto err;
800 where = US"initialising cert";
801 if ((rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert))) goto err;
803 where = US"generating pkey";
804 if ((rc = gnutls_x509_privkey_generate(pkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA,
805 #ifdef SUPPORT_PARAM_TO_PK_BITS
806 # ifndef GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM
807 # define GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_HIGH
809 gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM),
816 where = US"configuring cert";
818 if ( (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_version(cert, 3))
819 || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_serial(cert, &now, sizeof(now)))
820 || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_activation_time(cert, now = time(NULL)))
821 || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_expiration_time(cert, now + 60 * 60)) /* 1 hr */
822 || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_key(cert, pkey))
824 || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert,
825 GNUTLS_OID_X520_COUNTRY_NAME, 0, "UK", 2))
826 || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert,
827 GNUTLS_OID_X520_ORGANIZATION_NAME, 0, "Exim Developers", 15))
828 || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert,
829 GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, 0,
830 smtp_active_hostname, Ustrlen(smtp_active_hostname)))
834 where = US"signing cert";
835 if ((rc = gnutls_x509_crt_sign(cert, cert, pkey))) goto err;
837 where = US"installing selfsign cert";
839 if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key(state->x509_cred, &cert, 1, pkey)))
845 if (cert) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
846 if (pkey) gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(pkey);
850 rc = tls_error_gnu(where, rc, NULL, errstr);
857 /* Add certificate and key, from files.
860 Zero or negative: good. Negate value for certificate index if < 0.
861 Greater than zero: FAIL or DEFER code.
865 tls_add_certfile(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const host_item * host,
866 uschar * certfile, uschar * keyfile, uschar ** errstr)
868 int rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred,
869 CS certfile, CS keyfile, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
871 return tls_error_gnu(
872 string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s", certfile, keyfile),
878 /*************************************************
879 * Variables re-expanded post-SNI *
880 *************************************************/
882 /* Called from both server and client code, via tls_init(), and also from
883 the SNI callback after receiving an SNI, if tls_certificate includes "tls_sni".
885 We can tell the two apart by state->received_sni being non-NULL in callback.
887 The callback should not call us unless state->trigger_sni_changes is true,
888 which we are responsible for setting on the first pass through.
891 state exim_gnutls_state_st *
892 errstr error string pointer
894 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
898 tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr)
902 const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */
903 uschar *saved_tls_certificate = NULL;
904 uschar *saved_tls_privatekey = NULL;
905 uschar *saved_tls_verify_certificates = NULL;
906 uschar *saved_tls_crl = NULL;
909 /* We check for tls_sni *before* expansion. */
910 if (!host) /* server */
911 if (!state->received_sni)
913 if ( state->tls_certificate
914 && ( Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni")
915 || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni")
916 || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
919 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI.\n");
920 state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE;
925 /* useful for debugging */
926 saved_tls_certificate = state->exp_tls_certificate;
927 saved_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_privatekey;
928 saved_tls_verify_certificates = state->exp_tls_verify_certificates;
929 saved_tls_crl = state->exp_tls_crl;
932 if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&state->x509_cred)))
933 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials",
936 #ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK
937 gnutls_certificate_set_flags(state->x509_cred, GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_API_V2);
940 /* remember: expand_check_tlsvar() is expand_check() but fiddling with
941 state members, assuming consistent naming; and expand_check() returns
942 false if expansion failed, unless expansion was forced to fail. */
944 /* check if we at least have a certificate, before doing expensive
947 if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate, errstr))
950 /* certificate is mandatory in server, optional in client */
952 if ( !state->exp_tls_certificate
953 || !*state->exp_tls_certificate
956 return tls_install_selfsign(state, errstr);
958 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no client certificate specified; okay\n");
960 if (state->tls_privatekey && !expand_check_tlsvar(tls_privatekey, errstr))
963 /* tls_privatekey is optional, defaulting to same file as certificate */
965 if (state->tls_privatekey == NULL || *state->tls_privatekey == '\0')
967 state->tls_privatekey = state->tls_certificate;
968 state->exp_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_certificate;
972 if (state->exp_tls_certificate && *state->exp_tls_certificate)
974 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("certificate file = %s\nkey file = %s\n",
975 state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey);
977 if (state->received_sni)
978 if ( Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_certificate, saved_tls_certificate) == 0
979 && Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_privatekey, saved_tls_privatekey) == 0
982 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: cert and key unchanged\n");
986 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: have a changed cert/key pair.\n");
989 if (!host) /* server */
991 const uschar * clist = state->exp_tls_certificate;
992 const uschar * klist = state->exp_tls_privatekey;
993 const uschar * olist;
994 int csep = 0, ksep = 0, osep = 0, cnt = 0;
995 uschar * cfile, * kfile, * ofile;
998 if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &ofile, errstr))
1003 while (cfile = string_nextinlist(&clist, &csep, NULL, 0))
1005 if (!(kfile = string_nextinlist(&klist, &ksep, NULL, 0)))
1006 return tls_error(US"cert/key setup: out of keys", NULL, host, errstr);
1007 else if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host, cfile, kfile, errstr)))
1011 int gnutls_cert_index = -rc;
1012 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key %s registered\n", cfile);
1014 /* Set the OCSP stapling server info */
1016 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1018 if (gnutls_buggy_ocsp)
1021 debug_printf("GnuTLS library is buggy for OCSP; avoiding\n");
1023 else if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0)))
1025 /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get
1026 observability. More efficient would be to read the file once only,
1027 if it never changed (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update,
1028 or watch datestamp. */
1030 # ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK
1031 if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2(
1032 state->x509_cred, gnutls_cert_index,
1033 server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile)))
1034 return tls_error_gnu(
1035 US"gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2",
1041 debug_printf("oops; multiple OCSP files not supported\n");
1044 gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function(
1045 state->x509_cred, server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile);
1048 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response file = %s\n", ofile);
1051 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of OCSP response files in list\n");
1057 if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host,
1058 state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey, errstr)))
1060 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n");
1063 } /* tls_certificate */
1066 /* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is
1067 provided. Experiment shows that, if the certificate file is empty, an unhelpful
1068 error message is provided. However, if we just refrain from setting anything up
1069 in that case, certificate verification fails, which seems to be the correct
1072 if (state->tls_verify_certificates && *state->tls_verify_certificates)
1074 if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_verify_certificates, errstr))
1076 #ifndef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE
1077 if (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, "system") == 0)
1078 state->exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL;
1080 if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl)
1081 if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_crl, errstr))
1084 if (!(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates &&
1085 *state->exp_tls_verify_certificates))
1088 debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates expanded empty, ignoring\n");
1089 /* With no tls_verify_certificates, we ignore tls_crl too */
1096 debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates not set or empty, ignoring\n");
1100 #ifdef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE
1101 if (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, "system") == 0)
1102 cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_system_trust(state->x509_cred);
1106 if (Ustat(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, &statbuf) < 0)
1108 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "could not stat %s "
1109 "(tls_verify_certificates): %s", state->exp_tls_verify_certificates,
1114 #ifndef SUPPORT_CA_DIR
1115 /* The test suite passes in /dev/null; we could check for that path explicitly,
1116 but who knows if someone has some weird FIFO which always dumps some certs, or
1117 other weirdness. The thing we really want to check is that it's not a
1118 directory, since while OpenSSL supports that, GnuTLS does not.
1119 So s/!S_ISREG/S_ISDIR/ and change some messaging ... */
1120 if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
1123 debug_printf("verify certificates path is a dir: \"%s\"\n",
1124 state->exp_tls_verify_certificates);
1125 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1126 "tls_verify_certificates \"%s\" is a directory",
1127 state->exp_tls_verify_certificates);
1132 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify certificates = %s size=" OFF_T_FMT "\n",
1133 state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, statbuf.st_size);
1135 if (statbuf.st_size == 0)
1138 debug_printf("cert file empty, no certs, no verification, ignoring any CRL\n");
1144 #ifdef SUPPORT_CA_DIR
1145 (statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR
1147 gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_dir(state->x509_cred,
1148 CS state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM)
1151 gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(state->x509_cred,
1152 CS state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
1156 return tls_error_gnu(US"setting certificate trust", cert_count, host, errstr);
1158 debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n", cert_count);
1160 if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl &&
1161 state->exp_tls_crl && *state->exp_tls_crl)
1163 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("loading CRL file = %s\n", state->exp_tls_crl);
1164 if ((cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(state->x509_cred,
1165 CS state->exp_tls_crl, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM)) < 0)
1166 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file",
1167 cert_count, host, errstr);
1169 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Processed %d CRLs.\n", cert_count);
1178 /*************************************************
1179 * Set X.509 state variables *
1180 *************************************************/
1182 /* In GnuTLS, the registered cert/key are not replaced by a later
1183 set of a cert/key, so for SNI support we need a whole new x509_cred
1184 structure. Which means various other non-re-expanded pieces of state
1185 need to be re-set in the new struct, so the setting logic is pulled
1189 state exim_gnutls_state_st *
1190 errstr error string pointer
1192 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1196 tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr)
1199 const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */
1201 /* Create D-H parameters, or read them from the cache file. This function does
1202 its own SMTP error messaging. This only happens for the server, TLS D-H ignores
1203 client-side params. */
1207 if (!dh_server_params)
1208 if ((rc = init_server_dh(errstr)) != OK) return rc;
1209 gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->x509_cred, dh_server_params);
1212 /* Link the credentials to the session. */
1214 if ((rc = gnutls_credentials_set(state->session,
1215 GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, state->x509_cred)))
1216 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_credentials_set", rc, host, errstr);
1221 /*************************************************
1222 * Initialize for GnuTLS *
1223 *************************************************/
1226 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1229 tls_is_buggy_ocsp(void)
1232 uschar maj, mid, mic;
1234 s = CUS gnutls_check_version(NULL);
1238 while (*s && *s != '.') s++;
1239 mid = atoi(CCS ++s);
1246 while (*s && *s != '.') s++;
1247 mic = atoi(CCS ++s);
1248 return mic <= (mid == 3 ? 16 : 3);
1257 /* Called from both server and client code. In the case of a server, errors
1258 before actual TLS negotiation return DEFER.
1261 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
1262 certificate certificate file
1263 privatekey private key file
1264 sni TLS SNI to send, sometimes when client; else NULL
1267 require_ciphers tls_require_ciphers setting
1268 caller_state returned state-info structure
1269 errstr error string pointer
1271 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1276 const host_item *host,
1277 const uschar *certificate,
1278 const uschar *privatekey,
1282 const uschar *require_ciphers,
1283 exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state,
1287 exim_gnutls_state_st * state;
1290 const char * errpos;
1293 if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done)
1295 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS global init required.\n");
1297 #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11
1298 /* By default, gnutls_global_init will init PKCS11 support in auto mode,
1299 which loads modules from a config file, which sounds good and may be wanted
1300 by some sysadmin, but also means in common configurations that GNOME keyring
1301 environment variables are used and so breaks for users calling mailq.
1302 To prevent this, we init PKCS11 first, which is the documented approach. */
1303 if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11)
1304 if ((rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL)))
1305 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init", rc, host, errstr);
1308 if ((rc = gnutls_global_init()))
1309 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_global_init", rc, host, errstr);
1311 #if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0
1314 gnutls_global_set_log_function(exim_gnutls_logger_cb);
1315 /* arbitrarily chosen level; bump up to 9 for more */
1316 gnutls_global_set_log_level(EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL);
1320 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1321 if (tls_ocsp_file && (gnutls_buggy_ocsp = tls_is_buggy_ocsp()))
1322 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP unusable with this GnuTLS library version");
1325 exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE;
1330 /* For client-side sessions we allocate a context. This lets us run
1331 several in parallel. */
1332 int old_pool = store_pool;
1333 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
1334 state = store_get(sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_st));
1335 store_pool = old_pool;
1337 memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
1339 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS client session\n");
1340 rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
1344 state = &state_server;
1345 memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
1347 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n");
1348 rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER);
1351 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_init", rc, host, errstr);
1355 state->tls_certificate = certificate;
1356 state->tls_privatekey = privatekey;
1357 state->tls_require_ciphers = require_ciphers;
1358 state->tls_sni = sni;
1359 state->tls_verify_certificates = cas;
1360 state->tls_crl = crl;
1362 /* This handles the variables that might get re-expanded after TLS SNI;
1363 that's tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl */
1366 debug_printf("Expanding various TLS configuration options for session credentials.\n");
1367 if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
1369 /* These are all other parts of the x509_cred handling, since SNI in GnuTLS
1370 requires a new structure afterwards. */
1372 if ((rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
1374 /* set SNI in client, only */
1377 if (!expand_check(sni, US"tls_out_sni", &state->tlsp->sni, errstr))
1379 if (state->tlsp->sni && *state->tlsp->sni)
1382 debug_printf("Setting TLS client SNI to \"%s\"\n", state->tlsp->sni);
1383 sz = Ustrlen(state->tlsp->sni);
1384 if ((rc = gnutls_server_name_set(state->session,
1385 GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, state->tlsp->sni, sz)))
1386 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_server_name_set", rc, host, errstr);
1389 else if (state->tls_sni)
1390 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \
1391 "have an SNI set for a server [%s]\n", state->tls_sni);
1393 /* This is the priority string support,
1394 http://www.gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html
1395 and replaces gnutls_require_kx, gnutls_require_mac & gnutls_require_protocols.
1396 This was backwards incompatible, but means Exim no longer needs to track
1397 all algorithms and provide string forms for them. */
1400 if (state->tls_require_ciphers && *state->tls_require_ciphers)
1402 if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_require_ciphers, errstr))
1404 if (state->exp_tls_require_ciphers && *state->exp_tls_require_ciphers)
1406 p = state->exp_tls_require_ciphers;
1407 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n", p);
1412 p = exim_default_gnutls_priority;
1414 debug_printf("GnuTLS using default session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n", p);
1417 if ((rc = gnutls_priority_init(&state->priority_cache, CCS p, &errpos)))
1418 return tls_error_gnu(string_sprintf(
1419 "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.6s..\"",
1420 p, errpos - CS p, errpos),
1423 if ((rc = gnutls_priority_set(state->session, state->priority_cache)))
1424 return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_priority_set", rc, host, errstr);
1426 gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(state->session, ssl_session_timeout);
1428 /* Reduce security in favour of increased compatibility, if the admin
1429 decides to make that trade-off. */
1430 if (gnutls_compat_mode)
1432 #if LIBGNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020104
1433 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("lowering GnuTLS security, compatibility mode\n");
1434 gnutls_session_enable_compatibility_mode(state->session);
1436 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Unable to set gnutls_compat_mode - GnuTLS version too old\n");
1440 *caller_state = state;
1446 /*************************************************
1447 * Extract peer information *
1448 *************************************************/
1450 static const uschar *
1451 cipher_stdname_kcm(gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx, gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher,
1452 gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac)
1455 gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx_i;
1456 gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher_i;
1457 gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac_i;
1460 gnutls_cipher_suite_info(i, cs_id, &kx_i, &cipher_i, &mac_i, NULL);
1462 if (kx_i == kx && cipher_i == cipher && mac_i == mac)
1463 return cipher_stdname(cs_id[0], cs_id[1]);
1469 /* Called from both server and client code.
1470 Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and state->have_set_peerdn
1471 and we use that to detect double-calls.
1473 NOTE: the state blocks last while the TLS connection is up, which is fine
1474 for logging in the server side, but for the client side, we log after teardown
1475 in src/deliver.c. While the session is up, we can twist about states and
1476 repoint tls_* globals, but those variables used for logging or other variable
1477 expansion that happens _after_ delivery need to have a longer life-time.
1479 So for those, we get the data from POOL_PERM; the re-invoke guard keeps us from
1480 doing this more than once per generation of a state context. We set them in
1481 the state context, and repoint tls_* to them. After the state goes away, the
1482 tls_* copies of the pointers remain valid and client delivery logging is happy.
1484 tls_certificate_verified is a BOOL, so the tls_peerdn and tls_cipher issues
1488 state exim_gnutls_state_st *
1489 errstr pointer to error string
1491 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1495 peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr)
1497 const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
1499 unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
1500 gnutls_protocol_t protocol;
1501 gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
1502 gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx;
1503 gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac;
1504 gnutls_certificate_type_t ct;
1505 gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
1509 if (state->have_set_peerdn)
1511 state->have_set_peerdn = TRUE;
1513 state->peerdn = NULL;
1516 cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session);
1517 protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session);
1518 mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session);
1520 #ifdef GNUTLS_TLS1_3
1521 protocol >= GNUTLS_TLS1_3 ? 0 :
1523 gnutls_kx_get(state->session);
1525 old_pool = store_pool;
1527 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
1529 #ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC
1532 uschar * s = US gnutls_session_get_desc(state->session), c;
1534 /* Nikos M suggests we use this by preference. It returns like:
1535 (TLS1.3)-(ECDHE-SECP256R1)-(RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256)-(AES-256-GCM)
1537 For partial back-compat, put a colon after the TLS version, replace the
1538 )-( grouping with __, replace in-group - with _ and append the :keysize. */
1540 /* debug_printf("peer_status: gnutls_session_get_desc %s\n", s); */
1542 for (s++; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, s, 1);
1543 g = string_catn(g, US":", 1);
1544 if (*s) s++; /* now on _ between groups */
1547 for (*++s && ++s; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, c == '-' ? US"_" : s, 1);
1548 /* now on ) closing group */
1549 if ((c = *s) && *++s == '-') g = string_catn(g, US"__", 2);
1550 /* now on _ between groups */
1552 g = string_catn(g, US":", 1);
1553 g = string_cat(g, string_sprintf("%d", (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8));
1554 state->ciphersuite = string_from_gstring(g);
1557 state->ciphersuite = string_sprintf("%s:%s:%d",
1558 gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol),
1559 gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac),
1560 (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8);
1562 /* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS
1563 code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS
1564 releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */
1566 for (uschar * p = state->ciphersuite; *p; p++) if (isspace(*p)) *p = '-';
1569 /* debug_printf("peer_status: ciphersuite %s\n", state->ciphersuite); */
1571 state->tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite;
1572 state->tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8;
1574 state->tlsp->cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_kcm(kx, cipher, mac);
1576 store_pool = old_pool;
1579 cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &cert_list_size);
1581 if (!cert_list || cert_list_size == 0)
1583 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no certificate from peer (%p & %d)\n",
1584 cert_list, cert_list_size);
1585 if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
1586 return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed",
1587 US"no certificate received from peer", state->host, errstr);
1591 if ((ct = gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session)) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
1593 const uschar * ctn = US gnutls_certificate_type_get_name(ct);
1595 debug_printf("TLS: peer cert not X.509 but instead \"%s\"\n", ctn);
1596 if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
1597 return tls_error(US"certificate verification not possible, unhandled type",
1598 ctn, state->host, errstr);
1602 #define exim_gnutls_peer_err(Label) \
1604 if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \
1606 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: %s: %s\n", \
1607 (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \
1608 if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) \
1609 return tls_error_gnu((Label), rc, state->host, errstr); \
1614 rc = import_cert(&cert_list[0], &crt);
1615 exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"cert 0");
1617 state->tlsp->peercert = state->peercert = crt;
1620 rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, NULL, &sz);
1621 if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
1623 exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"getting size for cert DN failed");
1624 return FAIL; /* should not happen */
1626 dn_buf = store_get_perm(sz);
1627 rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, CS dn_buf, &sz);
1628 exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to extract certificate DN [gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert 0)]");
1630 state->peerdn = dn_buf;
1633 #undef exim_gnutls_peer_err
1639 /*************************************************
1640 * Verify peer certificate *
1641 *************************************************/
1643 /* Called from both server and client code.
1644 *Should* be using a callback registered with
1645 gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() to fail the handshake if we dislike
1646 the peer information, but that's too new for some OSes.
1649 state exim_gnutls_state_st *
1650 errstr where to put an error message
1653 FALSE if the session should be rejected
1654 TRUE if the cert is okay or we just don't care
1658 verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr)
1663 if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_NONE)
1666 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: checking peer certificate\n");
1669 if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK || !state->peerdn)
1671 verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
1672 *errstr = US"certificate not supplied";
1678 if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_DANE && state->host)
1680 /* Using dane_verify_session_crt() would be easy, as it does it all for us
1681 including talking to a DNS resolver. But we want to do that bit ourselves
1682 as the testsuite intercepts and fakes its own DNS environment. */
1687 const gnutls_datum_t * certlist =
1688 gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &lsize);
1689 int usage = tls_out.tlsa_usage;
1691 # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
1692 /* Split the TLSA records into two sets, TA and EE selectors. Run the
1693 dane-verification separately so that we know which selector verified;
1694 then we know whether to do name-verification (needed for TA but not EE). */
1696 if (usage == ((1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA) | (1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)))
1697 { /* a mixed-usage bundle */
1702 for(nrec = 0; state->dane_data_len[nrec]; ) nrec++;
1705 dd = store_get(nrec * sizeof(uschar *));
1706 ddl = store_get(nrec * sizeof(int));
1709 if ((rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0)))
1712 for (usage = DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE;
1713 usage >= DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA; usage--)
1714 { /* take records with this usage */
1715 for (j = i = 0; i < nrec; i++)
1716 if (state->dane_data[i][0] == usage)
1718 dd[j] = state->dane_data[i];
1719 ddl[j++] = state->dane_data_len[i];
1726 if ((rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, (char * const *)dd, ddl, 1, 0)))
1729 if ((rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize,
1730 gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session),
1732 usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE
1733 ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0,
1737 debug_printf("TLSA record problem: %s\n", dane_strerror(rc));
1739 else if (verify == 0) /* verification passed */
1747 if (rc) goto tlsa_prob;
1752 if ( (rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0))
1753 || (rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, state->dane_data, state->dane_data_len,
1755 || (rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize,
1756 gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session),
1758 # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
1759 usage == (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)
1760 ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0,
1769 if (verify != 0) /* verification failed */
1772 (void) dane_verification_status_print(verify, &str, 0);
1773 *errstr = US str.data; /* don't bother to free */
1777 # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
1778 /* If a TA-mode TLSA record was used for verification we must additionally
1779 verify the cert name (but not the CA chain). For EE-mode, skip it. */
1781 if (usage & (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE))
1784 state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE;
1787 # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
1788 /* Assume that the name on the A-record is the one that should be matching
1789 the cert. An alternate view is that the domain part of the email address
1790 is also permissible. */
1792 if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert,
1793 CS state->host->name))
1795 state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE;
1800 #endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/
1802 rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify);
1805 /* Handle the result of verification. INVALID is set if any others are. */
1807 if (rc < 0 || verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED))
1809 state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE;
1812 #ifdef GNUTLS_CERT_VFY_STATUS_PRINT
1817 if (gnutls_certificate_verification_status_print(verify,
1818 gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), &txt, 0)
1819 == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
1821 debug_printf("%s\n", txt.data);
1822 gnutls_free(txt.data);
1826 *errstr = verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED
1827 ? US"certificate revoked" : US"certificate invalid";
1831 debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=\"%s\"\n",
1832 *errstr, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
1834 if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
1837 debug_printf("TLS verify failure overridden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
1842 /* Client side, check the server's certificate name versus the name on the
1843 A-record for the connection we made. What to do for server side - what name
1844 to use for client? We document that there is no such checking for server
1847 if ( state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames
1848 && !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert,
1849 CS state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames)
1853 debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n");
1854 if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
1859 state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE;
1860 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=\"%s\"\n",
1861 state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>");
1865 state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn;
1870 *errstr = string_sprintf("TLSA record problem: %s",
1871 rc == DANE_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE ? "none usable" : dane_strerror(rc));
1875 gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
1882 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
1885 /* Logging function which can be registered with
1886 * gnutls_global_set_log_function()
1887 * gnutls_global_set_log_level() 0..9
1889 #if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0
1891 exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message)
1893 size_t len = strlen(message);
1896 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d> empty debug message\n", level);
1899 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d>: %s%s", level, message,
1900 message[len-1] == '\n' ? "" : "\n");
1905 /* Called after client hello, should handle SNI work.
1906 This will always set tls_sni (state->received_sni) if available,
1907 and may trigger presenting different certificates,
1908 if state->trigger_sni_changes is TRUE.
1910 Should be registered with
1911 gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function()
1913 "This callback must return 0 on success or a gnutls error code to terminate the
1916 For inability to get SNI information, we return 0.
1917 We only return non-zero if re-setup failed.
1918 Only used for server-side TLS.
1922 exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session)
1924 char sni_name[MAX_HOST_LEN];
1925 size_t data_len = MAX_HOST_LEN;
1926 exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server;
1927 unsigned int sni_type;
1929 uschar * dummy_errstr;
1931 rc = gnutls_server_name_get(session, sni_name, &data_len, &sni_type, 0);
1932 if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
1935 if (rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE)
1936 debug_printf("TLS: no SNI presented in handshake.\n");
1938 debug_printf("TLS failure: gnutls_server_name_get(): %s [%d]\n",
1939 gnutls_strerror(rc), rc);
1944 if (sni_type != GNUTLS_NAME_DNS)
1946 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: ignoring SNI of unhandled type %u\n", sni_type);
1950 /* We now have a UTF-8 string in sni_name */
1951 old_pool = store_pool;
1952 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
1953 state->received_sni = string_copyn(US sni_name, data_len);
1954 store_pool = old_pool;
1956 /* We set this one now so that variable expansions below will work */
1957 state->tlsp->sni = state->received_sni;
1959 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", sni_name,
1960 state->trigger_sni_changes ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)");
1962 if (!state->trigger_sni_changes)
1965 if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
1967 /* If the setup of certs/etc failed before handshake, TLS would not have
1968 been offered. The best we can do now is abort. */
1969 return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN;
1972 rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, &dummy_errstr);
1973 if (rc != OK) return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN;
1980 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1983 server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr,
1984 gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response)
1987 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP stapling callback: %s\n", US ptr);
1989 if ((ret = gnutls_load_file(ptr, ocsp_response)) < 0)
1991 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to load ocsp stapling file %s\n",
1993 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
1994 return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1997 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED;
2004 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
2006 We use this callback to get observability and detail-level control
2007 for an exim TLS connection (either direction), raising a tls:cert event
2008 for each cert in the chain presented by the peer. Any event
2009 can deny verification.
2011 Return 0 for the handshake to continue or non-zero to terminate.
2015 verify_cb(gnutls_session_t session)
2017 const gnutls_datum_t * cert_list;
2018 unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
2019 gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
2022 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session);
2024 if ((cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size)))
2025 while (cert_list_size--)
2027 if ((rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt)) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
2029 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: depth %d: %s\n",
2030 cert_list_size, gnutls_strerror(rc));
2034 state->tlsp->peercert = crt;
2035 if ((yield = event_raise(state->event_action,
2036 US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", cert_list_size))))
2038 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
2039 "SSL verify denied by event-action: depth=%d: %s",
2040 cert_list_size, yield);
2041 return 1; /* reject */
2043 state->tlsp->peercert = NULL;
2053 ddump(gnutls_datum_t * d)
2055 gstring * g = string_get((d->size+1) * 2);
2056 uschar * s = d->data;
2057 for (unsigned i = d->size; i > 0; i--, s++)
2059 g = string_catn(g, US "0123456789abcdef" + (*s >> 4), 1);
2060 g = string_catn(g, US "0123456789abcdef" + (*s & 0xf), 1);
2066 post_handshake_debug(exim_gnutls_state_st * state)
2068 debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n");
2069 #ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC
2070 debug_printf("%s\n", gnutls_session_get_desc(state->session));
2072 #ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG
2073 if (gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session) < GNUTLS_TLS1_3)
2075 gnutls_datum_t c, s;
2077 /* we only want the client random and the master secret */
2078 gnutls_session_get_random(state->session, &c, &s);
2079 gnutls_session_get_master_secret(state->session, &s);
2082 debug_printf("CLIENT_RANDOM %.*s %.*s\n", (int)gc->ptr, gc->s, (int)gs->ptr, gs->s);
2085 debug_printf("To get keying info for TLS1.3 is hard:\n"
2086 " set environment variable SSLKEYLOGFILE to a filename writable by uid exim\n"
2087 " add SSLKEYLOGFILE to keep_environment in the exim config\n"
2088 " run exim as root\n"
2089 " if using sudo, add SSLKEYLOGFILE to env_keep in /etc/sudoers\n");
2093 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
2094 /* Exported functions */
2099 /*************************************************
2100 * Start a TLS session in a server *
2101 *************************************************/
2103 /* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received
2104 the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate
2108 require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL
2109 errstr pointer to error string
2111 Returns: OK on success
2112 DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
2113 FAIL for errors during the negotiation; the server can't
2118 tls_server_start(const uschar * require_ciphers, uschar ** errstr)
2121 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL;
2123 /* Check for previous activation */
2124 if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0)
2126 tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", US "", NULL, errstr);
2127 smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE);
2131 /* Initialize the library. If it fails, it will already have logged the error
2132 and sent an SMTP response. */
2134 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a server\n");
2136 if ((rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
2137 NULL, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl,
2138 require_ciphers, &state, &tls_in, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
2140 /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
2141 optional, set up appropriately. */
2143 if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
2146 debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be required.\n");
2147 state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED;
2148 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE);
2150 else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
2153 debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be requested but not required.\n");
2154 state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
2155 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST);
2160 debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will not be requested.\n");
2161 state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE;
2162 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE);
2165 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
2168 state->event_action = event_action;
2169 gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state);
2170 gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->x509_cred, verify_cb);
2174 /* Register SNI handling; always, even if not in tls_certificate, so that the
2175 expansion variable $tls_sni is always available. */
2177 gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function(state->session,
2178 exim_sni_handling_cb);
2180 /* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
2181 on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
2182 make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out
2183 the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
2184 mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
2186 if (!state->tlsp->on_connect)
2188 smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n", FALSE);
2192 /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
2193 that the GnuTLS library doesn't.
2194 From 3.1.0 there is gnutls_handshake_set_timeout() - but it requires you
2195 to set (and clear down afterwards) up a pull-timeout callback function that does
2196 a select, so we're no better off unless avoiding signals becomes an issue. */
2198 gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(state->session,
2199 (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) fileno(smtp_in),
2200 (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) fileno(smtp_out));
2201 state->fd_in = fileno(smtp_in);
2202 state->fd_out = fileno(smtp_out);
2204 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
2205 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
2207 rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session);
2208 while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen);
2211 if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
2213 /* It seems that, except in the case of a timeout, we have to close the
2214 connection right here; otherwise if the other end is running OpenSSL it hangs
2215 until the server times out. */
2219 tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", US"timed out", NULL, errstr);
2220 gnutls_db_remove_session(state->session);
2224 tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_handshake", rc, NULL, errstr);
2225 (void) gnutls_alert_send_appropriate(state->session, rc);
2226 gnutls_deinit(state->session);
2227 gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
2229 shutdown(state->fd_out, SHUT_WR);
2230 for (int i = 1024; fgetc(smtp_in) != EOF && i > 0; ) i--; /* drain skt */
2231 (void)fclose(smtp_out);
2232 (void)fclose(smtp_in);
2233 smtp_out = smtp_in = NULL;
2239 DEBUG(D_tls) post_handshake_debug(state);
2241 /* Verify after the fact */
2243 if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr))
2245 if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_OPTIONAL)
2247 (void) tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, NULL, errstr);
2251 debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n",
2255 /* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */
2257 if ((rc = peer_status(state, NULL)) != OK) return rc;
2259 /* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */
2261 extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state);
2263 /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
2264 and initialize appropriately. */
2266 state->xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
2268 receive_getc = tls_getc;
2269 receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf;
2270 receive_get_cache = tls_get_cache;
2271 receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
2272 receive_feof = tls_feof;
2273 receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
2274 receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
2283 tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host_item * host, exim_gnutls_state_st * state,
2284 smtp_transport_options_block * ob)
2286 if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
2288 state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames =
2290 string_domain_utf8_to_alabel(host->name, NULL);
2295 debug_printf("TLS: server cert verification includes hostname: \"%s\".\n",
2296 state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames);
2304 /* Given our list of RRs from the TLSA lookup, build a lookup block in
2305 GnuTLS-DANE's preferred format. Hang it on the state str for later
2306 use in DANE verification.
2308 We point at the dnsa data not copy it, so it must remain valid until
2309 after verification is done.*/
2312 dane_tlsa_load(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, dns_answer * dnsa)
2316 const char ** dane_data;
2317 int * dane_data_len;
2320 for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr;
2321 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
2322 ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA) i++;
2324 dane_data = store_get(i * sizeof(uschar *));
2325 dane_data_len = store_get(i * sizeof(int));
2328 for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr;
2329 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
2330 ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA && rr->size > 3)
2332 const uschar * p = rr->data;
2333 uint8_t usage = p[0], sel = p[1], type = p[2];
2336 debug_printf("TLSA: %d %d %d size %d\n", usage, sel, type, rr->size);
2338 if ( (usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA && usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)
2339 || (sel != 0 && sel != 1)
2344 case 0: /* Full: cannot check at present */
2346 case 1: if (rr->size != 3 + 256/8) continue; /* sha2-256 */
2348 case 2: if (rr->size != 3 + 512/8) continue; /* sha2-512 */
2353 tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<<usage;
2354 dane_data[i] = CS p;
2355 dane_data_len[i++] = rr->size;
2358 if (!i) return FALSE;
2360 dane_data[i] = NULL;
2361 dane_data_len[i] = 0;
2363 state->dane_data = (char * const *)dane_data;
2364 state->dane_data_len = dane_data_len;
2371 /*************************************************
2372 * Start a TLS session in a client *
2373 *************************************************/
2375 /* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted.
2378 cctx connection context
2379 conn_args connection details
2380 cookie datum for randomness (not used)
2381 tlsp record details of channel configuration here; must be non-NULL
2382 errstr error string pointer
2384 Returns: TRUE for success with TLS session context set in smtp context,
2389 tls_client_start(client_conn_ctx * cctx, smtp_connect_args * conn_args,
2390 void * cookie ARG_UNUSED,
2391 tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr)
2393 host_item * host = conn_args->host; /* for msgs and option-tests */
2394 transport_instance * tb = conn_args->tblock; /* always smtp or NULL */
2395 smtp_transport_options_block * ob = tb
2396 ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block
2397 : &smtp_transport_option_defaults;
2399 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL;
2400 uschar * cipher_list = NULL;
2402 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2404 verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
2405 BOOL request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE
2406 : verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
2409 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", cctx->sock);
2412 /* If dane is flagged, have either request or require dane for this host, and
2413 a TLSA record found. Therefore, dane verify required. Which implies cert must
2414 be requested and supplied, dane verify must pass, and cert verify irrelevant
2415 (incl. hostnames), and (caller handled) require_tls */
2417 if (conn_args->dane && ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers)
2419 /* not using expand_check_tlsvar because not yet in state */
2420 if (!expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers",
2421 &cipher_list, errstr))
2423 cipher_list = cipher_list && *cipher_list
2424 ? ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers : ob->tls_require_ciphers;
2429 cipher_list = ob->tls_require_ciphers;
2431 if (tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
2432 ob->tls_sni, ob->tls_verify_certificates, ob->tls_crl,
2433 cipher_list, &state, tlsp, errstr) != OK)
2437 int dh_min_bits = ob->tls_dh_min_bits;
2438 if (dh_min_bits < EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS)
2441 debug_printf("WARNING: tls_dh_min_bits far too low,"
2442 " clamping %d up to %d\n",
2443 dh_min_bits, EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS);
2444 dh_min_bits = EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS;
2447 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting D-H prime minimum"
2448 " acceptable bits to %d\n",
2450 gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(state->session, dh_min_bits);
2453 /* Stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
2454 set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts are unset. Check only
2455 the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
2458 if (conn_args->dane && dane_tlsa_load(state, &conn_args->tlsa_dnsa))
2461 debug_printf("TLS: server certificate DANE required.\n");
2462 state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_DANE;
2463 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE);
2467 if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates
2468 && !ob->tls_verify_hosts
2469 && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
2471 || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK
2474 tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob);
2476 debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification required.\n");
2477 state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED;
2478 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE);
2480 else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
2482 tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob);
2484 debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification optional.\n");
2485 state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
2486 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST);
2491 debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification not required.\n");
2492 state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE;
2493 gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE);
2496 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2497 /* supported since GnuTLS 3.1.3 */
2500 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: will request OCSP stapling\n");
2501 if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session,
2502 NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK)
2504 tls_error_gnu(US"cert-status-req", rc, state->host, errstr);
2507 tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
2511 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
2512 if (tb && tb->event_action)
2514 state->event_action = tb->event_action;
2515 gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state);
2516 gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->x509_cred, verify_cb);
2520 gnutls_transport_set_ptr(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) cctx->sock);
2521 state->fd_in = cctx->sock;
2522 state->fd_out = cctx->sock;
2524 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("about to gnutls_handshake\n");
2525 /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
2527 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
2528 ALARM(ob->command_timeout);
2530 rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session);
2531 while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen);
2534 if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
2538 gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_USER_CANCELED);
2539 tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", US"timed out", state->host, errstr);
2542 tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_handshake", rc, state->host, errstr);
2546 DEBUG(D_tls) post_handshake_debug(state);
2550 if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr))
2552 tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr);
2556 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
2561 gnutls_datum_t stapling;
2562 gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp;
2563 gnutls_datum_t printed;
2564 if ( (rc= gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(state->session, &stapling)) == 0
2565 && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp)) == 0
2566 && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, &stapling)) == 0
2567 && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_print(resp, GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_FULL, &printed)) == 0
2570 debug_printf("%.4096s", printed.data);
2571 gnutls_free(printed.data);
2574 (void) tls_error_gnu(US"ocsp decode", rc, state->host, errstr);
2577 if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0)
2579 tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
2580 tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr);
2583 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n");
2584 tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
2588 /* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */
2590 if (peer_status(state, errstr) != OK)
2593 /* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */
2595 extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state);
2597 cctx->tls_ctx = state;
2604 /*************************************************
2605 * Close down a TLS session *
2606 *************************************************/
2608 /* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
2609 daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
2610 would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process).
2613 ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
2614 shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent,
2615 2 if also response to be waited for
2621 tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int shutdown)
2623 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server;
2625 if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active.sock < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
2629 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n",
2630 shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
2633 gnutls_bye(state->session, shutdown > 1 ? GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR : GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
2637 gnutls_deinit(state->session);
2638 gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
2641 state->tlsp->active.sock = -1;
2642 state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL;
2643 if (state->xfer_buffer) store_free(state->xfer_buffer);
2644 memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
2651 tls_refill(unsigned lim)
2653 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server;
2656 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n",
2657 state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
2659 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
2660 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
2663 inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer,
2664 MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim));
2665 while (inbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN);
2667 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM_CLR(0);
2669 if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */
2670 smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */
2671 if (had_command_sigterm)
2672 smtp_command_sigterm_exit();
2673 if (had_data_timeout)
2674 smtp_data_timeout_exit();
2675 if (had_data_sigint)
2676 smtp_data_sigint_exit();
2678 /* Timeouts do not get this far. A zero-byte return appears to mean that the
2679 TLS session has been closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed
2680 down. Revert to non-TLS handling. */
2684 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n");
2685 state->xfer_error = TRUE;
2689 else if (inbytes == 0)
2691 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n");
2693 receive_getc = smtp_getc;
2694 receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf;
2695 receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
2696 receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
2697 receive_feof = smtp_feof;
2698 receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
2699 receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
2701 gnutls_deinit(state->session);
2702 gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
2704 state->session = NULL;
2705 state->tlsp->active.sock = -1;
2706 state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL;
2707 state->tlsp->bits = 0;
2708 state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
2709 tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
2710 state->tlsp->cipher = NULL;
2711 state->tlsp->peercert = NULL;
2712 state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
2717 /* Handle genuine errors */
2719 else if (inbytes < 0)
2721 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv\n", __FUNCTION__);
2722 record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
2723 state->xfer_error = TRUE;
2726 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2727 dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes);
2729 state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes;
2730 state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
2734 /*************************************************
2735 * TLS version of getc *
2736 *************************************************/
2738 /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty,
2739 it refills the buffer via the GnuTLS reading function.
2740 Only used by the server-side TLS.
2742 This feeds DKIM and should be used for all message-body reads.
2744 Arguments: lim Maximum amount to read/buffer
2745 Returns: the next character or EOF
2749 tls_getc(unsigned lim)
2751 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server;
2753 if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
2754 if (!tls_refill(lim))
2755 return state->xfer_error ? EOF : smtp_getc(lim);
2757 /* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
2759 return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++];
2763 tls_getbuf(unsigned * len)
2765 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server;
2769 if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
2770 if (!tls_refill(*len))
2772 if (!state->xfer_error) return smtp_getbuf(len);
2777 if ((size = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm) > *len)
2779 buf = &state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm];
2780 state->xfer_buffer_lwm += size;
2789 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2790 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server;
2791 int n = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm;
2793 dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer+state->xfer_buffer_lwm, n);
2799 tls_could_read(void)
2801 return state_server.xfer_buffer_lwm < state_server.xfer_buffer_hwm
2802 || gnutls_record_check_pending(state_server.session) > 0;
2808 /*************************************************
2809 * Read bytes from TLS channel *
2810 *************************************************/
2812 /* This does not feed DKIM, so if the caller uses this for reading message body,
2813 then the caller must feed DKIM.
2816 ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
2820 Returns: the number of bytes read
2821 -1 after a failed read, including EOF
2825 tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len)
2827 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server;
2833 if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm < state->xfer_buffer_hwm)
2835 debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \
2836 "tls_read() called with data in the tls_getc() buffer, %d ignored\n",
2837 state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm);
2840 debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n",
2841 state->session, buff, len);
2844 inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, buff, len);
2845 while (inbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN);
2847 if (inbytes > 0) return inbytes;
2850 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n");
2854 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv\n", __FUNCTION__);
2855 record_io_error(state, (int)inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
2864 /*************************************************
2865 * Write bytes down TLS channel *
2866 *************************************************/
2870 ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
2873 more more data expected soon
2875 Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
2876 -1 after a failed write
2880 tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar * buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
2884 exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server;
2886 static BOOL corked = FALSE;
2888 if (more && !corked) gnutls_record_cork(state->session);
2891 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT "%s)\n", __FUNCTION__,
2892 buff, left, more ? ", more" : "");
2896 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(SSL, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n",
2900 outbytes = gnutls_record_send(state->session, buff, left);
2901 while (outbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN);
2903 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=" SSIZE_T_FMT "\n", outbytes);
2906 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: gnutls_record_send err\n", __FUNCTION__);
2907 record_io_error(state, outbytes, US"send", NULL);
2912 record_io_error(state, 0, US"send", US"TLS channel closed on write");
2923 debug_printf("Whoops! Wrote more bytes (" SIZE_T_FMT ") than INT_MAX\n",
2931 if (!more) (void) gnutls_record_uncork(state->session, 0);
2942 /*************************************************
2943 * Random number generation *
2944 *************************************************/
2946 /* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be
2947 cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves
2948 in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or
2949 whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork()
2950 and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us.
2954 Returns a random number in range [0, max-1]
2957 #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_RND
2959 vaguely_random_number(int max)
2963 uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
2968 needed_len = sizeof(r);
2969 /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were
2970 asked for a number less than 10. */
2972 for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i)
2978 i = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, smallbuf, needed_len);
2981 DEBUG(D_all) debug_printf("gnutls_rnd() failed, using fallback.\n");
2982 return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
2985 for (uschar * p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
2988 /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
2989 * smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
2992 #else /* HAVE_GNUTLS_RND */
2994 vaguely_random_number(int max)
2996 return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
2998 #endif /* HAVE_GNUTLS_RND */
3003 /*************************************************
3004 * Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup *
3005 *************************************************/
3007 /* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the
3010 Returns: NULL on success, or error message
3014 tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
3017 uschar *expciphers = NULL;
3018 gnutls_priority_t priority_cache;
3020 uschar * dummy_errstr;
3022 #define validate_check_rc(Label) do { \
3023 if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) gnutls_global_deinit(); \
3024 return string_sprintf("%s failed: %s", (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); } } while (0)
3025 #define return_deinit(Label) do { gnutls_global_deinit(); return (Label); } while (0)
3027 if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done)
3028 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
3029 "already initialised GnuTLS, Exim developer bug");
3031 #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11
3032 if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11)
3034 rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL);
3035 validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init");
3038 rc = gnutls_global_init();
3039 validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_global_init()");
3040 exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE;
3042 if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
3043 return_deinit(NULL);
3045 if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers,
3047 return_deinit(US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers");
3049 if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
3050 return_deinit(NULL);
3053 debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers);
3055 rc = gnutls_priority_init(&priority_cache, CS expciphers, &errpos);
3056 validate_check_rc(string_sprintf(
3057 "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.8s..\"",
3058 expciphers, errpos - CS expciphers, errpos));
3060 #undef return_deinit
3061 #undef validate_check_rc
3062 gnutls_global_deinit();
3070 /*************************************************
3071 * Report the library versions. *
3072 *************************************************/
3074 /* See a description in tls-openssl.c for an explanation of why this exists.
3076 Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to
3081 tls_version_report(FILE *f)
3083 fprintf(f, "Library version: GnuTLS: Compile: %s\n"
3086 gnutls_check_version(NULL));
3091 /* End of tls-gnu.c */