1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.55 2006/02/13 12:02:59 ph10 Exp $ */
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2006 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
15 /* Default callout timeout */
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
26 static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
30 /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
32 static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK };
34 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
37 enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
38 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
41 ACLC_CONDITION, ACLC_CONTROL,
42 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
46 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
49 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
50 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
52 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
53 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
57 ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, ACLC_ENCRYPTED, ACLC_ENDPASS,
58 ACLC_HOSTS, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE, ACLC_LOGWRITE,
59 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
63 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
68 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
71 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET,
72 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
75 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
80 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
81 "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
82 but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
84 static uschar *conditions[] = {
87 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
92 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
96 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
99 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
100 US"dk_domain_source",
102 US"dk_sender_domains",
103 US"dk_sender_local_parts",
107 US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted",
108 US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite",
109 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
113 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
118 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
121 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
122 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
125 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
131 /* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
135 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
138 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
141 CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
142 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
143 CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION, CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
144 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
145 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
147 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
149 /* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
150 turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
151 control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
152 and should be tidied up. */
154 static uschar *controls[] = {
155 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
158 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
161 US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
162 US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze",
163 US"queue_only", US"submission", US"suppress_local_fixups",
164 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
170 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
171 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
172 checking functions. */
174 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
176 FALSE, /* authenticated */
177 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
178 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
180 TRUE, /* condition */
182 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
186 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
189 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
190 TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
191 TRUE, /* dk_policy */
192 TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
193 TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
194 TRUE, /* dk_senders */
195 TRUE, /* dk_status */
199 FALSE, /* encrypted */
202 FALSE, /* local_parts */
203 TRUE, /* log_message */
205 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
209 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
210 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
212 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
213 FALSE, /* recipients */
214 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
217 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
220 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
223 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
229 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
231 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
233 FALSE, /* authenticated */
234 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
235 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
237 FALSE, /* condition */
239 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
243 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
246 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
247 FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
248 FALSE, /* dk_policy */
249 FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
250 FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
251 FALSE, /* dk_senders */
252 FALSE, /* dk_status */
254 FALSE, /* dnslists */
256 FALSE, /* encrypted */
259 FALSE, /* local_parts */
260 TRUE, /* log_message */
262 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
266 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
267 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
269 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
270 FALSE, /* recipients */
271 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
274 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
277 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
280 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
286 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
287 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
288 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
290 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
293 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* authenticated */
296 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
297 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
298 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
299 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
300 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
301 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
302 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
303 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA),
308 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
309 always and check in the control processing itself. */
313 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
315 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
320 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
322 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
325 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
326 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
328 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
329 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
330 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
334 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
335 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
336 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
337 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
338 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
342 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
343 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
344 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
345 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
346 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
347 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
350 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
351 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
352 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
353 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
354 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
355 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
358 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
359 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
360 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
361 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
362 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
363 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
366 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
367 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
368 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
369 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
370 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
371 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
375 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */
378 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
380 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */
388 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
394 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
396 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
401 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
403 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
409 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
411 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
413 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
414 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
417 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
419 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
420 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
421 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
423 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
425 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
426 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
427 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
431 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
433 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
436 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
437 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
439 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
440 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
441 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
444 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
445 always and check in the verify function itself */
451 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
452 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
453 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
455 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
456 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
459 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
460 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dk_verify */
466 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
469 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
471 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* enforce_sync */
473 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_enforce_sync */
476 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
477 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
478 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
481 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
482 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
483 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
486 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
490 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
491 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
493 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
495 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
496 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
497 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
501 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
502 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
503 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
506 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
507 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
508 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
510 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) /* no_multiline */
513 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
515 typedef struct control_def {
517 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
518 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
521 static control_def controls_list[] = {
522 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
523 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
525 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
526 { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE },
528 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
529 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
530 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
531 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
532 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
533 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
534 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
535 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
536 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
538 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
539 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
540 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
541 { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
544 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
545 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
546 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
547 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
549 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
551 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
552 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
554 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
555 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
556 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
557 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
558 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
559 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
560 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
562 static int csa_return_code[] = {
564 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
567 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
568 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
569 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
572 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
575 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
576 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
577 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
578 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
579 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
580 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
583 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
585 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
589 /*************************************************
590 * Pick out name from list *
591 *************************************************/
593 /* Use a binary chop method
600 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
604 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
610 int mid = (start + end)/2;
611 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
612 if (c == 0) return mid;
613 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
620 /*************************************************
621 * Read and parse one ACL *
622 *************************************************/
624 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
625 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
626 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
627 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
628 blank lines (where relevant).
631 func function to get next line of ACL
632 error where to put an error message
634 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
635 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
639 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
641 acl_block *yield = NULL;
642 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
643 acl_block *this = NULL;
644 acl_condition_block *cond;
645 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
650 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
653 BOOL negated = FALSE;
654 uschar *saveline = s;
657 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
660 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
667 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
668 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
670 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
671 if (*s == ':' || isupper(name[0] && *s == '=')) return yield;
673 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
674 continues the previous verb. */
676 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
681 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline);
692 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
695 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
697 lastp = &(this->next);
700 this->condition = NULL;
701 condp = &(this->condition);
702 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
708 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
711 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
713 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
716 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
721 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
723 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
725 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
726 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
730 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
732 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
733 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
734 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
736 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
737 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
741 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
744 cond->u.negated = negated;
747 condp = &(cond->next);
749 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
750 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
751 gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
758 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0) goto BAD_ACL_VAR;
764 else if (s[4] == 'm')
769 else goto BAD_ACL_VAR;
771 n = Ustrtoul(s + 5, &endptr, 10);
772 if ((*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr)) || n >= max)
775 *error = string_sprintf("syntax error or unrecognized name after "
776 "\"set\" in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", s);
780 cond->u.varnumber = n + offset;
782 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
785 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
786 "endpass" has no data */
788 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
792 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
793 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
796 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
797 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
806 /*************************************************
808 *************************************************/
810 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
811 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
812 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
815 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
816 user_message message for adding to headers
817 log_message message for logging, if different
823 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
827 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
832 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
833 string_printing(log_message));
835 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
836 failed", add the failure message. */
838 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
839 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
840 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
841 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
843 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
844 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
846 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
847 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
851 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
852 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
853 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
854 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
855 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
856 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
857 acl_warn_logged = logged;
861 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
863 if (user_message == NULL) return;
865 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
868 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
870 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
871 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
872 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
876 /* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */
878 hlen = Ustrlen(user_message);
881 uschar *text, *p, *q;
883 /* Add a final newline if not present */
885 text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message :
886 string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message);
888 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
890 for (p = q = text; *p != 0; )
893 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
894 header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers;
896 /* Find next header line within the string */
900 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
901 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
904 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
905 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
909 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
911 newtype = htype_add_rec;
914 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
916 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
919 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
921 newtype = htype_add_top;
924 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
926 newtype = htype_add_bot;
929 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
932 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
933 to the front of it. */
935 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
937 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
940 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
943 /* See if this line has already been added */
945 while (*hptr != NULL)
947 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
948 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
951 /* Add if not previously present */
955 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
964 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
973 /*************************************************
974 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
975 *************************************************/
977 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
978 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
979 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
980 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
983 user_msgptr pointer for user message
984 log_msgptr pointer for log message
986 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
987 FAIL verification failed
988 DEFER there was a problem verifying
992 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
996 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
998 /* Previous success */
1000 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1002 /* Previous failure */
1004 if (host_lookup_failed)
1006 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1010 /* Need to do a lookup */
1013 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1015 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1017 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
1018 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1020 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1022 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1025 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1031 /*************************************************
1032 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1033 *************************************************/
1035 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1036 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1037 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1038 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1039 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1040 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1041 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1042 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1045 dnsa the DNS answer block
1046 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1047 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1048 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1050 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1051 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1052 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1056 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1062 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1064 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1066 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1068 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1072 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1079 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1081 target_found = TRUE;
1083 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1084 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1086 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1088 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1090 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1092 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1096 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1097 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1100 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1101 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1106 /*************************************************
1107 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1108 *************************************************/
1110 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1111 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1112 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1113 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1114 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1115 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1116 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1119 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1121 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1122 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1123 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1124 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1128 acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1132 int priority, weight, port;
1139 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1140 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1141 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1143 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1144 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1145 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1146 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1148 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1149 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1150 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1152 if (domain[0] == '[')
1154 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1155 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1156 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1159 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1160 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1161 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1162 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1163 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1165 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1167 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1168 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1172 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1173 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1174 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1175 we return from this function. */
1177 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1178 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1180 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1181 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1182 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1184 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1187 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1189 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1192 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1194 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1198 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1200 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1206 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1208 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1210 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1212 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1214 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1217 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1218 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1222 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1224 /* Check the CSA version number */
1226 if (priority != 1) continue;
1228 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1229 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1230 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1231 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1232 SRV records of their own. */
1234 if (found != domain)
1237 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1239 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1242 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1243 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1244 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1245 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1246 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1248 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1250 if (weight > 2) continue;
1252 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1253 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1254 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1256 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1257 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1259 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1264 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1266 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1268 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1269 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1270 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1271 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1272 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1274 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1276 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1277 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1278 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1279 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1281 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1282 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1284 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1287 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1290 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1294 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1298 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1300 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1303 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1305 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1308 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1309 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1310 /* else fall through */
1312 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1313 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1314 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1319 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1320 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1323 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1329 /*************************************************
1330 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1331 *************************************************/
1333 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1334 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1335 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1336 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1339 where where called from
1340 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1341 arg the argument of "verify"
1342 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1343 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1344 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1346 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1347 FAIL verification failed
1348 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1353 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1354 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1358 int callout_overall = -1;
1359 int callout_connect = -1;
1360 int verify_options = 0;
1362 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1363 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1364 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1365 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1366 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1367 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1368 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1369 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1370 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1372 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1373 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1374 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1377 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1379 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1381 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1383 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1385 if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1387 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1388 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1389 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1392 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1393 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1394 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1396 if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1398 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1399 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1400 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1404 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1405 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1407 if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1409 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1410 if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1411 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1414 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1415 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1417 if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1419 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1420 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1421 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1422 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1423 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1424 return csa_return_code[rc];
1427 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1428 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1429 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1432 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
1434 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1435 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1436 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1437 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1438 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1442 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1443 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1445 if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
1447 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1448 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1449 rc = verify_check_notblind();
1452 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1453 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1454 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1459 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1460 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1461 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1464 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1465 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1466 sender and recipient. */
1468 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1470 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1471 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1474 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1475 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1476 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1478 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1481 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1483 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1484 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1485 acl_wherenames[where]);
1489 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1492 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1493 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1494 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1495 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1500 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1503 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1504 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1509 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1510 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1512 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1515 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1516 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1517 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1519 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1521 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1523 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1524 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1527 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1530 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1533 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1535 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1537 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1541 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1547 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1549 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1550 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1551 kind of table-driven thing. */
1553 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1556 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1557 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1558 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1559 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1560 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1561 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1562 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1563 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1564 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1565 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
1566 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1569 verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
1572 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1574 if (!verify_header_sender)
1576 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1577 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1578 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1582 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1585 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1586 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1589 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1590 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1593 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1596 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1599 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1600 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1603 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1604 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1607 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1610 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1613 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1614 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1617 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1618 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1619 if (callout_overall < 0)
1621 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1622 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1626 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1629 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1632 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1633 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1636 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1637 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1638 if (callout_connect < 0)
1640 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1641 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1645 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1647 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1650 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1651 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1659 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1660 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1666 /* Option not recognized */
1670 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1671 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1676 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1677 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1679 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1680 "for a recipient callout";
1684 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1685 message if giving out verification details. */
1687 if (verify_header_sender)
1690 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1691 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1695 *basic_errno = verrno;
1696 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1698 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1699 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1700 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1705 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1706 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1707 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1708 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1709 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1710 during message reception.
1712 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1713 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1714 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1715 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1716 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1717 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1718 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1720 else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1722 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1725 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1726 "sender verify callout";
1730 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1731 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1732 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1734 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1735 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1736 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1737 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1739 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1741 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1742 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1744 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1747 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1748 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1749 specified (see comments above).
1751 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1752 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1753 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1754 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1755 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1760 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1762 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1763 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1764 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1766 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1767 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1768 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1770 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1771 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1773 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1775 if (success_on_redirect)
1776 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1778 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1781 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1782 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1784 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1788 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1790 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1791 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1795 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1796 verify_sender_address);
1799 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1801 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1803 /* Cache the result code */
1805 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1806 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1807 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1808 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1809 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
1811 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1812 the sender verification. */
1814 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
1817 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1819 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
1822 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1823 the DEFER overrides. */
1829 if (success_on_redirect)
1830 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1832 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1836 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
1837 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
1838 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1840 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
1841 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
1842 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
1843 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1845 /* Make $address_data visible */
1846 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1849 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1851 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1852 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1854 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1855 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1859 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1860 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1862 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1866 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1868 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1870 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1874 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1875 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
1879 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
1882 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1883 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1887 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
1888 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
1892 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1895 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
1896 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1897 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
1898 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1901 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1904 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1905 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1908 /* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
1911 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1912 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1919 /*************************************************
1920 * Check argument for control= modifier *
1921 *************************************************/
1923 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
1926 arg the argument string for control=
1927 pptr set to point to the terminating character
1928 where which ACL we are in
1929 log_msgptr for error messages
1931 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
1935 decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
1940 for (d = controls_list;
1941 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
1944 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
1945 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
1948 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
1949 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
1951 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
1952 return CONTROL_ERROR;
1961 /*************************************************
1962 * Handle rate limiting *
1963 *************************************************/
1965 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
1966 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
1968 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
1969 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
1970 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
1971 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
1974 arg the option string for ratelimit=
1975 log_msgptr for error messages
1977 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
1978 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
1979 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
1980 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
1984 acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
1986 double limit, period;
1989 BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
1990 BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
1992 tree_node **anchor, *t;
1993 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
1994 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
1997 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
1998 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
1999 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2001 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
2002 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2003 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2005 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2006 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
2010 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2011 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2012 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2013 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2015 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
2017 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2018 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
2023 /* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
2024 lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
2025 if the period or options are different. */
2029 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
2030 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2031 run-time division errors. */
2033 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2034 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
2035 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2038 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2039 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
2040 sender_rate_period);
2044 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
2045 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
2047 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2050 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2051 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2052 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
2053 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
2054 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
2055 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
2056 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
2057 else have_key = TRUE;
2059 if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
2061 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
2065 /* Default option values */
2066 if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
2067 if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
2069 /* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
2070 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2072 if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
2073 key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
2075 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2076 limit, period, key);
2078 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2079 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2080 so that they survive across resets. */
2083 old_pool = store_pool;
2087 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2088 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2090 else if (per_mail || per_byte)
2091 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2093 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2095 if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2098 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2099 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2101 store_pool = old_pool;
2102 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2104 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2108 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2109 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2110 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2112 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2115 store_pool = old_pool;
2117 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2118 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2121 dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2123 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2127 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2128 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2129 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2130 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2135 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2136 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2137 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2138 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2140 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2141 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2142 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2143 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2144 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2146 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2147 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2148 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2150 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2151 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2152 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2153 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2155 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2157 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2158 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2159 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2160 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2161 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2162 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2164 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2166 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2167 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2168 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2169 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2171 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2172 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2173 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2174 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2175 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2177 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2178 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2179 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2180 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2182 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2183 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2184 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2186 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2187 : this_time - prev_time;
2189 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2190 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2192 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2193 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2195 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2196 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2197 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2198 decay as if nothing happened. */
2201 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2202 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2204 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2207 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2208 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2209 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2210 be completely blocked). */
2212 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2215 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2216 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2217 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2218 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2220 if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
2221 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2224 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2228 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2230 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2231 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2234 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2235 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2237 store_pool = old_pool;
2238 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2241 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2248 /*************************************************
2249 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2250 *************************************************/
2252 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2256 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2257 where where called from
2258 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2259 level the nesting level
2260 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2261 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2262 user_msgptr user message pointer
2263 log_msgptr log message pointer
2264 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2266 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2267 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2268 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2269 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2270 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2271 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2272 but can be temporary callout problem)
2273 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2278 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2279 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2280 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2282 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2283 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2286 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2290 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2295 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2296 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2298 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2300 user_message = cb->arg;
2304 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2306 log_message = cb->arg;
2310 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2311 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2313 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2319 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2320 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2321 checking functions in some cases. */
2323 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2325 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2328 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2329 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2330 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2331 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2336 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2341 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2342 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2343 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2345 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2347 int n = cb->u.varnumber;
2348 int t = (n < ACL_CVARS)? 'c' : 'm';
2349 if (n >= ACL_CVARS) n -= ACL_CVARS;
2350 debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
2354 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2357 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2361 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2363 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2365 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2366 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2367 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2371 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2372 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2376 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2380 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2381 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2383 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2384 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2390 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2391 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2392 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2396 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2397 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2399 int old_pool = store_pool;
2400 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2401 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2402 store_pool = old_pool;
2407 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2408 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2409 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2411 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2412 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2413 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2414 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2416 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2420 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2422 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2424 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2426 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2427 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2431 switch(control_type)
2433 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2434 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2438 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2439 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
2446 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2447 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2450 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2451 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2454 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2455 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2458 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2459 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2462 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2463 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2464 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2468 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2469 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2472 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
2473 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
2474 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
2478 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2479 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
2484 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2485 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2489 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2490 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2491 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2492 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
2493 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
2500 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2505 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2506 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2509 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
2510 originator_name = US"";
2511 submission_mode = TRUE;
2514 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2517 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
2518 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2520 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2523 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2524 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2527 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
2529 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2532 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2533 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2534 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
2541 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2546 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
2547 suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
2552 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2554 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2560 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2563 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2564 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2569 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2574 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2577 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2578 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2579 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2580 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2581 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2582 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2583 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2584 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2585 it is not always available.
2587 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2588 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2589 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2590 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2594 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
2600 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2606 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2607 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
2608 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2609 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2610 switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
2611 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
2612 rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
2613 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2615 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
2616 rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
2617 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2619 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
2620 rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
2621 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2625 case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
2626 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2627 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2629 if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
2630 rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
2631 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2632 if (dk_verify_block->testing)
2633 rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
2634 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2636 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2637 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2638 if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
2639 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2640 NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2643 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
2644 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2645 if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
2646 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
2647 NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
2650 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
2651 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2652 if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
2653 rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
2656 case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
2657 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2658 if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
2659 switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
2660 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
2661 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
2662 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2664 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
2665 rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
2666 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2668 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
2669 rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
2670 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2672 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
2673 rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
2674 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2676 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
2677 rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
2678 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2680 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
2681 rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
2682 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2684 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
2685 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
2686 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2694 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2698 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2699 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2702 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2703 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2704 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2705 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2706 writing is poorly documented. */
2708 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2709 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2711 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2712 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2713 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2715 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2716 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2718 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2719 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2723 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2724 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2725 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2726 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2727 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2728 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2731 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2732 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2733 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2736 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2737 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2738 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2739 &deliver_localpart_data);
2751 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2752 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2753 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2754 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2755 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2756 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2759 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2760 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2761 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2767 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2768 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2769 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2773 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2776 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2777 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2778 /* Run the malware backend. */
2780 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2781 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2783 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2785 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2792 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2793 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2797 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2798 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, log_msgptr);
2801 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2802 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2806 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2812 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2815 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2816 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2817 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2818 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2823 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
2824 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
2827 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2831 int old_pool = store_pool;
2832 if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_CVARS) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2833 acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
2834 store_pool = old_pool;
2838 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2841 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2842 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2843 /* Run the spam backend. */
2845 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2846 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2848 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2850 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2858 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2860 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
2864 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2865 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
2866 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2867 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2868 (until something changes it). */
2871 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
2872 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
2873 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
2877 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2878 "condition %d", cb->type);
2882 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2884 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
2886 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
2887 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
2890 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
2894 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
2895 handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
2896 which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
2897 message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
2898 appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
2899 and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
2901 These modifiers act in different ways:
2903 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
2904 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
2906 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
2907 message that is already set.
2909 If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
2911 if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] ||
2912 (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) ||
2913 (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT))
2917 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
2918 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
2919 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
2920 during expansions. */
2922 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2923 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
2925 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
2927 if (user_message != NULL)
2929 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
2930 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
2931 if (expmessage == NULL)
2933 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2934 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2935 user_message, expand_string_message);
2937 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
2940 if (log_message != NULL)
2942 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
2943 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
2944 if (expmessage == NULL)
2946 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2947 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2948 log_message, expand_string_message);
2950 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
2952 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
2953 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
2957 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
2959 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2962 acl_verify_message = NULL;
2970 /*************************************************
2971 * Get line from a literal ACL *
2972 *************************************************/
2974 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
2975 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
2976 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
2978 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
2979 Exim configuration file. That is:
2981 . Leading spaces are ignored.
2983 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
2984 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
2985 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
2987 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
2988 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
2990 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
2993 Returns: a pointer to the next line
2997 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
2998 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3006 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3010 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3011 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
3012 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
3014 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3016 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3017 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3019 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
3021 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3022 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3024 if (*yield != '#') break;
3027 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3028 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3029 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3030 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3035 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3037 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3046 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3047 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3052 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
3053 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
3054 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
3057 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3058 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3059 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3061 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
3062 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
3064 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3065 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
3068 /* Control does not reach here */
3075 /*************************************************
3076 * Check access using an ACL *
3077 *************************************************/
3079 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3080 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3081 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3082 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3083 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3084 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3085 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3086 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3087 appears immediately above.
3090 where where called from
3091 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3092 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3093 level the nesting level
3094 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3095 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3097 Returns: OK access is granted
3098 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3099 FAIL access is denied
3100 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3101 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3106 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3107 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3110 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3111 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3114 /* Catch configuration loops */
3118 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3124 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3128 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3129 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3133 ss = expand_string(s);
3136 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3137 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3138 expand_string_message);
3144 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3146 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3147 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3151 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3152 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3153 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3154 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3155 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3157 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3159 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3162 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3165 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3168 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3169 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3172 else if (*ss == '/')
3174 struct stat statbuf;
3175 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3178 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3183 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3185 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3190 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3191 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3193 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3195 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3196 ss, strerror(errno));
3199 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3202 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3203 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3207 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3208 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3209 persists between multiple messages. */
3213 int old_pool = store_pool;
3214 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3215 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3216 store_pool = old_pool;
3217 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3220 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3221 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3223 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3227 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3232 int basic_errno = 0;
3233 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3235 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3236 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3238 if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
3239 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3240 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3242 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3247 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3249 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3252 search_error_message = NULL;
3253 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3254 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3256 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3257 ERROR always causes a return. */
3262 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3263 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3265 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3266 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3267 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3271 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3273 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3276 default: /* Paranoia */
3278 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3282 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3287 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3290 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3291 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3294 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3299 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3304 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3305 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3306 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3311 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
3314 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3322 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3328 if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
3332 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
3335 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3341 if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
3345 if (cond != OK) return cond;
3350 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
3351 else if (cond == DEFER && (log_extra_selector & LX_acl_warn_skipped) != 0)
3352 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3353 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
3354 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
3355 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
3356 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3360 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3365 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3370 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3372 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
3377 /*************************************************
3378 * Check access using an ACL *
3379 *************************************************/
3381 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3382 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3383 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3386 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3387 recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
3388 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3389 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3390 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3392 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3393 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3394 FAIL access is denied
3395 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3396 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3401 acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
3402 uschar **log_msgptr)
3406 address_item *addr = NULL;
3408 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
3409 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
3410 ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
3412 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
3414 adb = address_defaults;
3416 addr->address = recipient;
3417 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
3419 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3422 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
3423 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
3426 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3428 deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
3429 sender_address_data = NULL;
3431 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3432 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3436 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
3438 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3439 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3445 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3447 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
3449 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3450 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3454 /* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
3455 message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3457 if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75)
3459 uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr);
3465 while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++;
3466 if (*ss == 0) break;
3473 while (--t > s + 35)
3477 if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; }
3478 if (tt == NULL) tt = t;
3482 if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
3487 if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n')
3493 if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */