Prebuild the data structure for builtin macros

[exim.git] / src / src / auths / gsasl_exim.c

diff --git a/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c b/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c
index d9a27ea5f911e99cd072cb0c4be82eaa061777bf..6326eaa02e8d47d1b0dd1a7789545339e69c225f 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/gsasl_exim.c
@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ sense in all contexts.  For some, we can do checks at init time.
 
 #ifndef AUTH_GSASL
 /* dummy function to satisfy compilers when we link in an "empty" file. */
-static void dummy(int x) { dummy(x-1); }
+static void dummy(int x);
+static void dummy2(int x) { dummy(x-1); }
+static void dummy(int x) { dummy2(x-1); }
 #else
 
 #include <gsasl.h>
@@ -76,6 +78,19 @@ auth_gsasl_options_block auth_gsasl_option_defaults = {
   FALSE                     /* server_channelbinding */
 };
 
+
+#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF
+
+/* Dummy values */
+void auth_gsasl_init(auth_instance *ablock) {}
+int auth_gsasl_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *data) {return 0;}
+int auth_gsasl_client(auth_instance *ablock, smtp_inblock *inblock,
+  smtp_outblock *outblock, int timeout, uschar *buffer, int buffsize) {return 0;}
+
+#else   /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/
+
+
+
 /* "Globals" for managing the gsasl interface. */
 
 static Gsasl *gsasl_ctx = NULL;
@@ -273,7 +288,7 @@ auth_gsasl_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *initial_data)
     /* Some auth mechanisms can ensure that both sides are talking withing the
     same security context; for TLS, this means that even if a bad certificate
     has been accepted, they remain MitM-proof because both sides must be within
-    the same negotiated session; if someone is terminating one sesson and
+    the same negotiated session; if someone is terminating one session and
     proxying data on within a second, authentication will fail.
 
     We might not have this available, depending upon TLS implementation,
@@ -433,11 +448,11 @@ server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_insta
   switch (prop) {
     case GSASL_VALIDATE_SIMPLE:
       /* GSASL_AUTHID, GSASL_AUTHZID, and GSASL_PASSWORD */
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
       auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
       auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD);
       auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
       expand_nmax = 3;
       for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)
@@ -453,7 +468,7 @@ server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_insta
         cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
         break;
       }
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
       /* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
       auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
       expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
@@ -470,7 +485,7 @@ server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_insta
         cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
         break;
       }
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN);
       /* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
       auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
       expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
@@ -491,9 +506,9 @@ server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_insta
       First coding, we had these values swapped, but for consistency and prior
       to the first release of Exim with this authenticator, they've been
       switched to match the ordering of GSASL_VALIDATE_SIMPLE. */
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME);
       auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
       auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
       expand_nmax = 2;
       for (i = 1; i <= 2; ++i)
@@ -520,16 +535,17 @@ server_callback(Gsasl *ctx, Gsasl_session *sctx, Gsasl_property prop, auth_insta
         tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_scram_salt);
         gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SCRAM_SALT, tmps);
       }
-      /* Asking for GSASL_AUTHZID will probably call back into us.
+      /* Asking for GSASL_AUTHZID calls back into us if we use
+      gsasl_property_get(), thus the use of gsasl_property_fast().
       Do we really want to hardcode limits per mechanism?  What happens when
       a new mechanism is added to the library.  It *shouldn't* result in us
       needing to add more glue, since avoiding that is a large part of the
       point of SASL. */
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
       auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
       auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
-      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_REALM);
+      propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_REALM);
       auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
       expand_nmax = 3;
       for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)
@@ -611,6 +627,7 @@ auth_gsasl_version_report(FILE *f)
           GSASL_VERSION, runtime);
 }
 
+#endif   /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/
 #endif  /* AUTH_GSASL */
 
 /* End of gsasl_exim.c */