+Insecure versions and ciphers
+-----------------------------
+
+Email delivery to MX hosts is usually done with automatic fallback to
+plaintext if TLS could not be negotiated. There are good historical reasons
+for this. You can and should avoid it by using DNSSEC for signing your DNS
+and publishing TLSA records, to enable "DANE" security. This signals to
+senders that they should be able to verify your certificates, and that they
+should not fallback to cleartext.
+
+In the absence of DANE, trying to increase the security of TLS by removing
+support for older generations of ciphers and protocols will actually _lower_
+the security, because the clients fallback to plaintext and retry anyway. As
+a result, you should give serious thought to enabling older features which are
+no longer default in OpenSSL.
+
+The examples below explicitly enable ssl3 and weak ciphers.
+
+We don't like this, but reality doesn't care and is messy.
+
+