liable to incompatible change.
-OCSP Stapling support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-X.509 PKI certificates expire and can be revoked; to handle this, the
-clients need some way to determine if a particular certificate, from a
-particular Certificate Authority (CA), is still valid. There are three
-main ways to do so.
-
-The simplest way is to serve up a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) with
-an ordinary web-server, regenerating the CRL before it expires. The
-downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially
-huge file from every certificate authority it knows of.
-
-The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
-Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
-against an OCSP server run by the CA. This lets the CA track all
-usage of the certs. This requires running software with access to the
-private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries. OCSP
-is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
-
-The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
-comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
-connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
-re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
-
-The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
-issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
-the OCSP server, then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
-negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
-CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
-resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
-starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
-proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
-
-If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and it was built with OpenSSL,
-then it gains one new option: "tls_ocsp_file".
-
-The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
-an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
-option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the tls_certificate option
-contains $tls_sni, as per other TLS options.
-
-Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
-proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
-Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
-contents are always valid. Exim will expand the "tls_ocsp_file" option
-on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
-next connection.
-
-Exim will check for a valid next update timestamp in the OCSP proof;
-if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be ignored.
-
-At this point in time, we're gathering feedback on use, to determine if
-it's worth adding complexity to the Exim daemon to periodically re-fetch
-OCSP files and somehow handling multiple files. There is no client support
-for OCSP in Exim, this is feature expected to be used by mail clients.
-
-
-
-
Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) suppport
--------------------------------------------------------------
This means the queried domain has published
a SPF record, but wants to allow outside
servers to send mail under its domain as well.
- o err_perm This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
- record of the queried domain. This should be
- treated like "none".
- o err_temp This indicates a temporary error during all
+ This should be treated like "none".
+ o permerror This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
+ record of the queried domain. You may deny
+ messages when this occurs. (Changed in 4.83)
+ o temperror This indicates a temporary error during all
processing, including Exim's SPF processing.
You may defer messages when this occurs.
+ (Changed in 4.83)
+ o err_temp Same as permerror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
+ removed in a future release.
+ o err_perm Same as temperror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
+ removed in a future release.
You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert
-is meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
+its meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
"fail". The string list is evaluated left-to-right, in a
short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of
the SPF check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed
$spf_result
This contains the outcome of the SPF check in string form,
- one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, err_perm or
- err_temp.
+ one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, permerror or
+ temperror.
$spf_smtp_comment
This contains a string that can be used in a SMTP response
would relax host matching rules to a broader network range.
+A lookup expansion is also available. It takes an email
+address as the key and an IP address as the database:
+
+ $lookup (username@domain} spf {ip.ip.ip.ip}}
+
+The lookup will return the same result strings as they can appear in
+$spf_result (pass,fail,softfail,neutral,none,err_perm,err_temp).
+Currently, only IPv4 addresses are supported.
+
+
+
SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support
--------------------------------------------------------------
DCC Support
--------------------------------------------------------------
+Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse; http://www.rhyolite.com/dcc/
*) Building exim
If you want to pass even more headers in the middle of the
DATA stage you can set
$acl_m_dcc_add_header
-to tell the DCC routines add more information; eg, you might set
+to tell the DCC routines to add more information; eg, you might set
this to some results from ClamAV. Be careful. Header syntax is
not checked and is added "as is".
+In case you've troubles with sites sending the same queue items from several
+hosts and fail to get through greylisting you can use
+$acl_m_dcc_override_client_ip
+
+Setting $acl_m_dcc_override_client_ip to an IP address overrides the default
+of $sender_host_address. eg. use the following ACL in DATA stage:
+
+ warn set acl_m_dcc_override_client_ip = \
+ ${lookup{$sender_helo_name}nwildlsearch{/etc/mail/multipleip_sites}{$value}{}}
+ condition = ${if def:acl_m_dcc_override_client_ip}
+ log_message = dbg: acl_m_dcc_override_client_ip set to \
+ $acl_m_dcc_override_client_ip
+
+Then set something like
+# cat /etc/mail/multipleip_sites
+mout-xforward.gmx.net 82.165.159.12
+mout.gmx.net 212.227.15.16
+
+Use a reasonable IP. eg. one the sending cluster acutally uses.
+
+DMARC Support
+--------------------------------------------------------------
+
+DMARC combines feedback from SPF, DKIM, and header From: in order
+to attempt to provide better indicators of the authenticity of an
+email. This document does not explain the fundamentals, you
+should read and understand how it works by visiting the website at
+http://www.dmarc.org/.
+
+DMARC support is added via the libopendmarc library. Visit:
+
+ http://sourceforge.net/projects/opendmarc/
+
+to obtain a copy, or find it in your favorite rpm package
+repository. If building from source, this description assumes
+that headers will be in /usr/local/include, and that the libraries
+are in /usr/local/lib.
+
+1. To compile Exim with DMARC support, you must first enable SPF.
+Please read the above section on enabling the EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+feature. You must also have DKIM support, so you cannot set the
+DISABLE_DKIM feature. Once both of those conditions have been met
+you can enable DMARC in Local/Makefile:
+
+EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC=yes
+LDFLAGS += -lopendmarc
+# CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include
+# LDFLAGS += -L/usr/local/lib
+
+The first line sets the feature to include the correct code, and
+the second line says to link the libopendmarc libraries into the
+exim binary. The commented out lines should be uncommented if you
+built opendmarc from source and installed in the default location.
+Adjust the paths if you installed them elsewhere, but you do not
+need to uncomment them if an rpm (or you) installed them in the
+package controlled locations (/usr/include and /usr/lib).
+
+
+2. Use the following global settings to configure DMARC:
+
+Required:
+dmarc_tld_file Defines the location of a text file of valid
+ top level domains the opendmarc library uses
+ during domain parsing. Maintained by Mozilla,
+ the most current version can be downloaded
+ from a link at http://publicsuffix.org/list/.
+
+Optional:
+dmarc_history_file Defines the location of a file to log results
+ of dmarc verification on inbound emails. The
+ contents are importable by the opendmarc tools
+ which will manage the data, send out DMARC
+ reports, and expire the data. Make sure the
+ directory of this file is writable by the user
+ exim runs as.
+
+dmarc_forensic_sender The email address to use when sending a
+ forensic report detailing alignment failures
+ if a sender domain's dmarc record specifies it
+ and you have configured Exim to send them.
+ Default: do-not-reply@$default_hostname
+
+
+3. By default, the DMARC processing will run for any remote,
+non-authenticated user. It makes sense to only verify DMARC
+status of messages coming from remote, untrusted sources. You can
+use standard conditions such as hosts, senders, etc, to decide that
+DMARC verification should *not* be performed for them and disable
+DMARC with a control setting:
+
+ control = dmarc_disable_verify
+
+A DMARC record can also specify a "forensic address", which gives
+exim an email address to submit reports about failed alignment.
+Exim does not do this by default because in certain conditions it
+results in unintended information leakage (what lists a user might
+be subscribed to, etc). You must configure exim to submit forensic
+reports to the owner of the domain. If the DMARC record contains a
+forensic address and you specify the control statement below, then
+exim will send these forensic emails. It's also advised that you
+configure a dmarc_forensic_sender because the default sender address
+construction might be inadequate.
+
+ control = dmarc_enable_forensic
+
+(AGAIN: You can choose not to send these forensic reports by simply
+not putting the dmarc_enable_forensic control line at any point in
+your exim config. If you don't tell it to send them, it will not
+send them.)
+
+There are no options to either control. Both must appear before
+the DATA acl.
+
+
+4. You can now run DMARC checks in incoming SMTP by using the
+"dmarc_status" ACL condition in the DATA ACL. You are required to
+call the spf condition first in the ACLs, then the "dmarc_status"
+condition. Putting this condition in the ACLs is required in order
+for a DMARC check to actually occur. All of the variables are set
+up before the DATA ACL, but there is no actual DMARC check that
+occurs until a "dmarc_status" condition is encountered in the ACLs.
+
+The dmarc_status condition takes a list of strings on its
+right-hand side. These strings describe recommended action based
+on the DMARC check. To understand what the policy recommendations
+mean, refer to the DMARC website above. Valid strings are:
+
+ o accept The DMARC check passed and the library recommends
+ accepting the email.
+ o reject The DMARC check failed and the library recommends
+ rejecting the email.
+ o quarantine The DMARC check failed and the library recommends
+ keeping it for further inspection.
+ o none The DMARC check passed and the library recommends
+ no specific action, neutral.
+ o norecord No policy section in the DMARC record for this
+ sender domain.
+ o nofrom Unable to determine the domain of the sender.
+ o temperror Library error or dns error.
+ o off The DMARC check was disabled for this email.
+
+You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert its
+meaning, for example "!accept" will match all results but
+"accept". The string list is evaluated left-to-right in a
+short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of the
+DMARC check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed
+strings matches the outcome of the DMARC check, the condition
+fails.
+
+Of course, you can also use any other lookup method that Exim
+supports, including LDAP, Postgres, MySQL, etc, as long as the
+result is a list of colon-separated strings.
+
+Several expansion variables are set before the DATA ACL is
+processed, and you can use them in this ACL. The following
+expansion variables are available:
+
+ o $dmarc_status
+ This is a one word status indicating what the DMARC library
+ thinks of the email. It is a combination of the results of
+ DMARC record lookup and the SPF/DKIM/DMARC processing results
+ (if a DMARC record was found). The actual policy declared
+ in the DMARC record is in a separate expansion variable.
+
+ o $dmarc_status_text
+ This is a slightly longer, human readable status.
+
+ o $dmarc_used_domain
+ This is the domain which DMARC used to look up the DMARC
+ policy record.
+
+ o $dmarc_domain_policy
+ This is the policy declared in the DMARC record. Valid values
+ are "none", "reject" and "quarantine". It is blank when there
+ is any error, including no DMARC record.
+
+ o $dmarc_ar_header
+ This is the entire Authentication-Results header which you can
+ add using an add_header modifier.
+
+
+5. How to enable DMARC advanced operation:
+By default, Exim's DMARC configuration is intended to be
+non-intrusive and conservative. To facilitate this, Exim will not
+create any type of logging files without explicit configuration by
+you, the admin. Nor will Exim send out any emails/reports about
+DMARC issues without explicit configuration by you, the admin (other
+than typical bounce messages that may come about due to ACL
+processing or failure delivery issues).
+
+In order to log statistics suitable to be imported by the opendmarc
+tools, you need to:
+a. Configure the global setting dmarc_history_file.
+b. Configure cron jobs to call the appropriate opendmarc history
+ import scripts and truncating the dmarc_history_file.
+
+In order to send forensic reports, you need to:
+a. Configure the global setting dmarc_forensic_sender.
+b. Configure, somewhere before the DATA ACL, the control option to
+ enable sending DMARC forensic reports.
+
+
+6. Example usage:
+(RCPT ACL)
+ warn domains = +local_domains
+ hosts = +local_hosts
+ control = dmarc_disable_verify
+
+ warn !domains = +screwed_up_dmarc_records
+ control = dmarc_enable_forensic
+
+ warn condition = (lookup if destined to mailing list)
+ set acl_m_mailing_list = 1
+
+(DATA ACL)
+ warn dmarc_status = accept : none : off
+ !authenticated = *
+ log_message = DMARC DEBUG: $dmarc_status $dmarc_used_domain
+ add_header = $dmarc_ar_header
+
+ warn dmarc_status = !accept
+ !authenticated = *
+ log_message = DMARC DEBUG: '$dmarc_status' for $dmarc_used_domain
+
+ warn dmarc_status = quarantine
+ !authenticated = *
+ set $acl_m_quarantine = 1
+ # Do something in a transport with this flag variable
+
+ deny condition = ${if eq{$dmarc_domain_policy}{reject}}
+ condition = ${if eq{$acl_m_mailing_list}{1}}
+ message = Messages from $dmarc_used_domain break mailing lists
+
+ deny dmarc_status = reject
+ !authenticated = *
+ message = Message from $dmarc_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
+
+
+
+DANE
+------------------------------------------------------------
+DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied
+to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
+it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather
+than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
+operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection
+you make, and make another one to the server (so both
+you and the server still think you have an encrypted
+connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
+Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something
+which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
+certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the
+Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
+
+What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the
+trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
+that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the
+admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
+by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set
+of root CAs.
+
+It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that
+connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
+fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
+
+DANE scales better than having to maintain (and
+side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
+for every possible target server. It also scales
+(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
+client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also
+means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
+
+DANE requires a server operator to do three things:
+1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
+that DNS lookups they do for the server have not
+been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
+to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and
+any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
+DNSSEC.
+2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server
+certificate for a TLS connection should be.
+3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain,
+in TLS connections which is traceable to the one
+defined by (one of?) the TSLA records
+
+There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side
+operation of DANE.
+
+The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate
+usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies
+the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved
+is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted
+during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a
+single system, using a self-signed certificate.
+ DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA
+to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
+well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just
+a self-signed certificate which is used to sign
+cerver certificates, but running one securely does
+require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used
+then either all clients must be primed with it, or
+(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit
+the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.
+If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it
+(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is
+reduced from all public CAs to that single CA.
+DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or
+servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
+all of which point to a single TLSA record.
+
+The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1)
+and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
+
+At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa
+is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like
+
+ openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
+ | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
+ | openssl sha512 \
+ | awk '{print $2}'
+
+are workable for 4th-field hashes.
+
+For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates
+must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
+
+The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing
+for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
+be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However,
+this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
+default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff
+DANE is in use, to:
+
+ hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
+ {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
+ {*}{}}
+
+The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with
+numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
+The zero above means DANE was not in use,
+the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
+found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the
+string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
+control the OCSP request.
+
+This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if
+it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
+those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction
+with DANE in their OCSP settings.
+
+
+For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options,
+hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane. They do the obvious thing.
+[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ]
+
+DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured
+MX, A and TLSA records.
+
+A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match
+and the host-lookup succeded using dnssec.
+If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
+will be required for the host.
+
+(TODO: specify when fallback happens vs. when the host is not used)
+
+If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport
+options are ignored:
+ hosts_require_tls
+ tls_verify_hosts
+ tls_try_verify_hosts
+ tls_verify_certificates
+ tls_crl
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames
+
+If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
+verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set
+appropriately.
+
+Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that)
+and dnssec_require_domains is ignored.
+
+If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item
+in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
+
+There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if
+verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
+in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable
+$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above).
+
+
+
+DSN extra information
+---------------------
+If compiled with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO extra information will be added
+to DSN fail messages ("bounces"), when available. The intent is to aid
+tracing of specific failing messages, when presented with a "bounce"
+complaint and needing to search logs.
+
+
+The remote MTA IP address, with port number if nonstandard.
+Example:
+ Remote-MTA: X-ip; [127.0.0.1]:587
+Rationale:
+ Several addresses may correspond to the (already available)
+ dns name for the remote MTA.
+
+The remote MTA connect-time greeting.
+Example:
+ X-Remote-MTA-smtp-greeting: X-str; 220 the.local.host.name ESMTP Exim x.yz Tue, 2 Mar 1999 09:44:33 +0000
+Rationale:
+ This string sometimes presents the remote MTA's idea of its
+ own name, and sometimes identifies the MTA software.
+
+The remote MTA response to HELO or EHLO.
+Example:
+ X-Remote-MTA-helo-response: X-str; 250-the.local.host.name Hello localhost [127.0.0.1]
+Limitations:
+ Only the first line of a multiline response is recorded.
+Rationale:
+ This string sometimes presents the remote MTA's view of
+ the peer IP connecting to it.
+
+The reporting MTA detailed diagnostic.
+Example:
+ X-Exim-Diagnostic: X-str; SMTP error from remote mail server after RCPT TO:<d3@myhost.test.ex>: 550 hard error
+Rationale:
+ This string somtimes give extra information over the
+ existing (already available) Diagnostic-Code field.
+
+
+Note that non-RFC-documented field names and data types are used.
+
+
+
--------------------------------------------------------------
End of file
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff