SECURITY: fix Qualys CVE-2020-SLCWD

[exim.git] / src / src / receive.c

diff --git a/src/src/receive.c b/src/src/receive.c
index 76b4d378db6de573c9fed674b46684b18c3551c6..b0dacbd681cdba1c9e39a2589870ad38156ce594 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/receive.c
+++ b/src/src/receive.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ else
   empty item in a list. */
 
   if (*p == 0) p = US":";
+  /* should never be a tainted list */
   while ((path = string_nextinlist(&p, &sep, buffer, sizeof(buffer))))
     if (Ustrcmp(path, "syslog") != 0)
       break;
@@ -491,7 +492,7 @@ if (recipients_count >= recipients_list_max)
   int oldmax = recipients_list_max;
   recipients_list_max = recipients_list_max ? 2*recipients_list_max : 50;
   recipients_list = store_get(recipients_list_max * sizeof(recipient_item), FALSE);
-  if (oldlist != NULL)
+  if (oldlist)
     memcpy(recipients_list, oldlist, oldmax * sizeof(recipient_item));
   }
 
@@ -1228,9 +1229,8 @@ if (acl_removed_headers)
     const uschar * list = acl_removed_headers;
     int sep = ':';         /* This is specified as a colon-separated list */
     uschar *s;
-    uschar buffer[128];
 
-    while ((s = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, buffer, sizeof(buffer))))
+    while ((s = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
       if (header_testname(h, s, Ustrlen(s), FALSE))
        {
        h->type = htype_old;
@@ -1516,11 +1516,10 @@ return TRUE;
 void
 received_header_gen(void)
 {
-uschar *received;
-uschar *timestamp;
-header_line *received_header= header_list;
+uschar * received;
+uschar * timestamp = expand_string(US"${tod_full}");
+header_line * received_header= header_list;
 
-timestamp = expand_string(US"${tod_full}");
 if (recipients_count == 1) received_for = recipients_list[0].address;
 received = expand_string(received_header_text);
 received_for = NULL;
@@ -1539,14 +1538,14 @@ so all we have to do is fill in the text pointer, and set the type. However, if
 the result of the expansion is an empty string, we leave the header marked as
 "old" so as to refrain from adding a Received header. */
 
-if (received[0] == 0)
+if (!received[0])
   {
   received_header->text = string_sprintf("Received: ; %s\n", timestamp);
   received_header->type = htype_old;
   }
 else
   {
-  received_header->text = string_sprintf("%s; %s\n", received, timestamp);
+  received_header->text = string_sprintf("%s;\n\t%s\n", received, timestamp);
   received_header->type = htype_received;
   }
 
@@ -2806,7 +2805,7 @@ From:) but we still want to ensure a valid Sender: if it is required. */
 if (  !from_header
    && ((!sender_host_address && !f.suppress_local_fixups) || f.submission_mode))
   {
-  uschar *oname = US"";
+  const uschar * oname = US"";
 
   /* Use the originator_name if this is a locally submitted message and the
   caller is not trusted. For trusted callers, use it only if -F was used to
@@ -3272,7 +3271,7 @@ if (fflush(spool_data_file) == EOF || ferror(spool_data_file) ||
 /* No I/O errors were encountered while writing the data file. */
 
 DEBUG(D_receive) debug_printf("Data file written for message %s\n", message_id);
-if (LOGGING(receive_time)) timesince(&received_time_taken, &received_time);
+gettimeofday(&received_time_complete, NULL);
 
 
 /* If there were any bad addresses extracted by -t, or there were no recipients
@@ -4004,7 +4003,7 @@ if (LOGGING(tls_certificate_verified) && tls_in.cipher)
 if (LOGGING(tls_peerdn) && tls_in.peerdn)
   g = string_append(g, 3, US" DN=\"", string_printing(tls_in.peerdn), US"\"");
 if (LOGGING(tls_sni) && tls_in.sni)
-  g = string_append(g, 3, US" SNI=\"", string_printing(tls_in.sni), US"\"");
+  g = string_append(g, 2, US" SNI=", string_printing2(tls_in.sni, SP_TAB|SP_SPACE));
 #endif
 
 if (sender_host_authenticated)
@@ -4050,7 +4049,11 @@ if (LOGGING(dkim) && arc_state && Ustrcmp(arc_state, "pass") == 0)
 #endif
 
 if (LOGGING(receive_time))
-  g = string_append(g, 2, US" RT=", string_timediff(&received_time_taken));
+  {
+  struct timeval diff = received_time_complete;
+  timediff(&diff, &received_time);
+  g = string_append(g, 2, US" RT=", string_timediff(&diff));
+  }
 
 if (*queue_name)
   g = string_append(g, 2, US" Q=", queue_name);
@@ -4177,12 +4180,10 @@ response, but the chance of this happening should be small. */
 if (smtp_input && sender_host_address && !f.sender_host_notsocket &&
     !receive_smtp_buffered())
   {
-  struct timeval tv;
+  struct timeval tv = {.tv_sec = 0, .tv_usec = 0};
   fd_set select_check;
   FD_ZERO(&select_check);
   FD_SET(fileno(smtp_in), &select_check);
-  tv.tv_sec = 0;
-  tv.tv_usec = 0;
 
   if (select(fileno(smtp_in) + 1, &select_check, NULL, NULL, &tv) != 0)
     {
@@ -4375,12 +4376,17 @@ if (smtp_input)
 
       else if (chunking_state > CHUNKING_OFFERED)
        {
-        smtp_printf("250- %u byte chunk, total %d\r\n250 OK id=%s\r\n", FALSE,
+       /* If there is more input waiting, no need to flush (probably the client
+       pipelined QUIT after data).  We check only the in-process buffer, not
+       the socket. */
+
+        smtp_printf("250- %u byte chunk, total %d\r\n250 OK id=%s\r\n",
+           receive_smtp_buffered(),
            chunking_datasize, message_size+message_linecount, message_id);
        chunking_state = CHUNKING_OFFERED;
        }
       else
-        smtp_printf("250 OK id=%s\r\n", FALSE, message_id);
+        smtp_printf("250 OK id=%s\r\n", receive_smtp_buffered(), message_id);
 
       if (host_checking)
         fprintf(stdout,