* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2017 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030506 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
# define SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK
#endif
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000 && defined(EXPERIMENTAL_DANE)
-# define SUPPORT_DANE
-# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA 2
-# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE 3
-#endif
-#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x999999 && defined(EXPERIMENTAL_DANE)
-# define GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000
+# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA 2
+# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE 3
+# else
+# error GnuTLS version too early for DANE
+# endif
+# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x999999
+# define GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
+# endif
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
BOOL trigger_sni_changes;
BOOL have_set_peerdn;
const struct host_item *host;
- gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert;
uschar *peerdn;
uschar *ciphersuite;
uschar *received_sni;
uschar *xfer_buffer;
int xfer_buffer_lwm;
int xfer_buffer_hwm;
- int xfer_eof;
- int xfer_error;
+ BOOL xfer_eof; /*XXX never gets set! */
+ BOOL xfer_error;
} exim_gnutls_state_st;
static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = {
.xfer_buffer = NULL,
.xfer_buffer_lwm = 0,
.xfer_buffer_hwm = 0,
- .xfer_eof = 0,
- .xfer_error = 0,
+ .xfer_eof = FALSE,
+ .xfer_error = FALSE,
};
/* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming
XXX But see gnutls_session_get_ptr()
*/
-static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server, state_client;
+static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server;
/* dh_params are initialised once within the lifetime of a process using TLS;
if we used TLS in a long-lived daemon, we'd have to reconsider this. But we
#endif
tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp;
-tlsp->active = state->fd_out;
+tlsp->active.sock = state->fd_out;
+tlsp->active.tls_ctx = state;
cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session);
/* returns size in "bytes" */
goto err;
where = US"configuring cert";
-now = 0;
+now = 1;
if ( (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_version(cert, 3))
|| (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_serial(cert, &now, sizeof(now)))
|| (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_activation_time(cert, now = time(NULL)))
const uschar *crl,
const uschar *require_ciphers,
exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state,
+ tls_support * tlsp,
uschar ** errstr)
{
exim_gnutls_state_st *state;
if (host)
{
- state = &state_client;
+ /* For client-side sessions we allocate a context. This lets us run
+ several in parallel. */
+ int old_pool = store_pool;
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ state = store_get(sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_st));
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+
memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
- state->tlsp = &tls_out;
+ state->tlsp = tlsp;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS client session\n");
rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
}
{
state = &state_server;
memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
- state->tlsp = &tls_in;
+ state->tlsp = tlsp;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n");
rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER);
}
(needed for TA but not EE). */
if (usage == ((1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA) | (1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)))
- { /* a mixed-usage bundle */
+ { /* a mixed-usage bundle */
int i, j, nrec;
const char ** dd;
int * ddl;
1, 0))
|| (rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize,
gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session),
- r, 0,
+ r, 0,
# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION
usage == (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)
? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0,
state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn;
return TRUE;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
tlsa_prob:
*errstr = string_sprintf("TLSA record problem: %s", dane_strerror(rc));
+#endif
+
badcert:
gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
return FALSE;
uschar * yield;
exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session);
-cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
-if (cert_list)
+if ((cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size)))
while (cert_list_size--)
{
- rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt);
- if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ if ((rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt)) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: depth %d: %s\n",
cert_list_size, gnutls_strerror(rc));
exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL;
/* Check for previous activation */
-if (tls_in.active >= 0)
+if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0)
{
tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", "", NULL, errstr);
smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE);
if ((rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
NULL, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl,
- require_ciphers, &state, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
+ require_ciphers, &state, &tls_in, errstr)) != OK) return rc;
/* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
optional, set up appropriately. */
Arguments:
fd the fd of the connection
- host connected host (for messages)
+ host connected host (for messages and option-tests)
addr the first address (not used)
tb transport (always smtp)
tlsa_dnsa non-NULL, either request or require dane for this host, and
Which implies cert must be requested and supplied, dane
verify must pass, and cert verify irrelevant (incl.
hostnames), and (caller handled) require_tls
+ tlsp record details of channel configuration
errstr error string pointer
-Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL (because using common functions),
- but for a client, DEFER and FAIL have the same meaning
+Returns: Pointer to TLS session context, or NULL on error
*/
-int
+void *
tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host,
address_item *addr ARG_UNUSED,
transport_instance * tb,
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa,
#endif
- uschar ** errstr)
+ tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr)
{
-smtp_transport_options_block *ob =
- (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
+smtp_transport_options_block *ob = tb
+ ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block
+ : &smtp_transport_option_defaults;
int rc;
exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL;
+uschar *cipher_list = NULL;
+
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
BOOL require_ocsp =
verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", fd);
-if ((rc = tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa && ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers)
+ {
+ /* not using expand_check_tlsvar because not yet in state */
+ if (!expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers",
+ &cipher_list, errstr))
+ return NULL;
+ cipher_list = cipher_list && *cipher_list
+ ? ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers : ob->tls_require_ciphers;
+ }
+#endif
+
+if (!cipher_list)
+ cipher_list = ob->tls_require_ciphers;
+
+if (tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
ob->tls_sni, ob->tls_verify_certificates, ob->tls_crl,
- ob->tls_require_ciphers, &state, errstr)) != OK)
- return rc;
+ cipher_list, &state, tlsp, errstr) != OK)
+ return NULL;
{
int dh_min_bits = ob->tls_dh_min_bits;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: will request OCSP stapling\n");
if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session,
NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK)
- return tls_error(US"cert-status-req",
- gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr);
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+ {
+ tls_error(US"cert-status-req", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
}
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
-if (tb->event_action)
+if (tb && tb->event_action)
{
state->event_action = tb->event_action;
gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state);
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
alarm(ob->command_timeout);
do
- {
rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session);
- } while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) ||
- (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen));
+while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen);
alarm(0);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
+ {
if (sigalrm_seen)
{
gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_USER_CANCELED);
- return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", state->host, errstr);
+ tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", state->host, errstr);
}
else
- return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr);
+ tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n");
/* Verify late */
if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr))
- return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr);
+ {
+ tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (require_ocsp)
if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0)
{
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- return tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr);
+ tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr);
+ return NULL;
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n");
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
+ tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
}
#endif
/* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */
-if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK)
- return rc;
+if (peer_status(state, errstr) != OK)
+ return NULL;
/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */
extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state);
-return OK;
+return state;
}
daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process).
-Arguments: TRUE if gnutls_bye is to be called
+Arguments:
+ ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
+ shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent,
+ 2 if also response to be waited for
+
Returns: nothing
*/
void
-tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
+tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int shutdown)
{
-exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server;
-if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
+if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active.sock < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
if (shutdown)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS\n");
- gnutls_bye(state->session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n",
+ shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
+
+ alarm(2);
+ gnutls_bye(state->session, shutdown > 1 ? GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR : GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
+ alarm(0);
}
gnutls_deinit(state->session);
gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
-state->tlsp->active = -1;
+state->tlsp->active.sock = -1;
+state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL;
+if (state->xfer_buffer) store_free(state->xfer_buffer);
memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init));
-
-if ((state_server.session == NULL) && (state_client.session == NULL))
- {
- gnutls_global_deinit();
- exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE;
- }
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n",
state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
+sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer,
MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim));
-alarm(0);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(0);
+
+if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */
+ smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */
+if (had_command_sigterm)
+ smtp_command_sigterm_exit();
+if (had_data_timeout)
+ smtp_data_timeout_exit();
+if (had_data_sigint)
+ smtp_data_sigint_exit();
-/* Timeouts do not get this far; see command_timeout_handler().
- A zero-byte return appears to mean that the TLS session has been
- closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
- non-TLS handling. */
+/* Timeouts do not get this far. A zero-byte return appears to mean that the
+TLS session has been closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed
+down. Revert to non-TLS handling. */
if (sigalrm_seen)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n");
- state->xfer_error = 1;
+ state->xfer_error = TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred);
state->session = NULL;
- state->tlsp->active = -1;
+ state->tlsp->active.sock = -1;
+ state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL;
state->tlsp->bits = 0;
state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL;
else if (inbytes < 0)
{
record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL);
- state->xfer_error = 1;
+ state->xfer_error = TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
then the caller must feed DKIM.
Arguments:
+ ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
buff buffer of data
len size of buffer
Returns: the number of bytes read
- -1 after a failed read
+ -1 after a failed read, including EOF
*/
int
-tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len)
{
-exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server;
ssize_t inbytes;
if (len > INT_MAX)
/*
Arguments:
- is_server channel specifier
+ ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
buff buffer of data
len number of bytes
more more data expected soon
*/
int
-tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
+tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar * buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
{
ssize_t outbytes;
size_t left = len;
-exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client;
+exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server;
#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK
static BOOL corked = FALSE;
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff