+ /* Other kinds of record just have one piece of data each, but there may be
+ several of them, of course. TXT & SPF can have data in multiple chunks. */
+
+ if (yield->ptr) yield = string_catn(yield, outsep, 1);
+
+ if (type == T_TXT || type == T_SPF)
+ for (unsigned data_offset = 0; data_offset + 1 < rr->size; )
+ {
+ uschar chunk_len = (rr->data)[data_offset];
+ int remain;
+
+ if (outsep2 && *outsep2 && data_offset != 0)
+ yield = string_catn(yield, outsep2, 1);
+
+ /* Apparently there are resolvers that do not check RRs before passing
+ them on, and glibc fails to do so. So every application must...
+ Check for chunk len exceeding RR */
+
+ remain = rr->size - ++data_offset;
+ if (chunk_len > remain)
+ chunk_len = remain;
+ yield = string_catn(yield, US ((rr->data) + data_offset), chunk_len);
+ data_offset += chunk_len;
+
+ if (!outsep2) break; /* output only the first chunk of the RR */
+ }
+ else if (type == T_TLSA)
+ if (rr->size < 3)
+ continue;
+ else
+ {
+ uint8_t usage, selector, matching_type;
+ uint16_t payload_length;
+ uschar s[MAX_TLSA_EXPANDED_SIZE];
+ uschar * sp = s;
+ uschar * p = US rr->data;
+
+ usage = *p++;
+ selector = *p++;
+ matching_type = *p++;
+ /* What's left after removing the first 3 bytes above */
+ payload_length = rr->size - 3;
+ sp += sprintf(CS s, "%d%c%d%c%d%c", usage, *outsep2,
+ selector, *outsep2, matching_type, *outsep2);
+ /* Now append the cert/identifier, one hex char at a time */
+ while (payload_length-- > 0 && sp-s < (MAX_TLSA_EXPANDED_SIZE - 4))
+ sp += sprintf(CS sp, "%02x", *p++);
+
+ yield = string_cat(yield, s);
+ }
+ else /* T_CNAME, T_CSA, T_MX, T_MXH, T_NS, T_PTR, T_SOA, T_SRV */
+ {
+ int priority, weight, port;
+ uschar s[264];
+ uschar * p = US rr->data;
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case T_MXH:
+ if (rr_bad_size(rr, sizeof(uint16_t))) continue;
+ /* mxh ignores the priority number and includes only the hostnames */
+ GETSHORT(priority, p);
+ break;
+
+ case T_MX:
+ if (rr_bad_size(rr, sizeof(uint16_t))) continue;
+ GETSHORT(priority, p);
+ sprintf(CS s, "%d%c", priority, *outsep2);
+ yield = string_cat(yield, s);
+ break;
+
+ case T_SRV:
+ if (rr_bad_size(rr, 3*sizeof(uint16_t))) continue;
+ GETSHORT(priority, p);
+ GETSHORT(weight, p);
+ GETSHORT(port, p);
+ sprintf(CS s, "%d%c%d%c%d%c", priority, *outsep2,
+ weight, *outsep2, port, *outsep2);
+ yield = string_cat(yield, s);
+ break;
+
+ case T_CSA:
+ if (rr_bad_size(rr, 3*sizeof(uint16_t))) continue;
+ /* See acl_verify_csa() for more comments about CSA. */
+ GETSHORT(priority, p);
+ GETSHORT(weight, p);
+ GETSHORT(port, p);
+
+ if (priority != 1) continue; /* CSA version must be 1 */
+
+ /* If the CSA record we found is not the one we asked for, analyse
+ the subdomain assertions in the port field, else analyse the direct
+ authorization status in the weight field. */
+
+ if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
+ {
+ if (port & 1) *s = 'X'; /* explicit authorization required */
+ else *s = '?'; /* no subdomain assertions here */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (weight < 2) *s = 'N'; /* not authorized */
+ else if (weight == 2) *s = 'Y'; /* authorized */
+ else if (weight == 3) *s = '?'; /* unauthorizable */
+ else continue; /* invalid */
+ }
+
+ s[1] = ' ';
+ yield = string_catn(yield, s, 2);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* GETSHORT() has advanced the pointer to the target domain. */
+
+ rc = dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, p,
+ (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)s, sizeof(s));
+
+ /* If an overlong response was received, the data will have been
+ truncated and dn_expand may fail. */
+
+ if (rc < 0)