(standard crypt does 25 rounds). It then crypts the next 8 characters,
or an empty block if the password is less than 9 characters, using a
20-round version of crypt and the same salt as was used for the first
-block. Charaters after the first 16 are ignored. It always generates
+block. Characters after the first 16 are ignored. It always generates
a 16-byte hash, which is expressed together with the salt as a string
of 24 base 64 digits. Here are some links to peruse:
US"base64d",
US"domain",
US"escape",
+ US"escape8bit",
US"eval",
US"eval10",
US"expand",
EOP_BASE64D,
EOP_DOMAIN,
EOP_ESCAPE,
+ EOP_ESCAPE8BIT,
EOP_EVAL,
EOP_EVAL10,
EOP_EXPAND,
size += ilen + comma + 1; /* +1 for the newline */
- /* Second pass - concatentate the data, up to a maximum. Note that
+ /* Second pass - concatenate the data, up to a maximum. Note that
the loop stops when size hits the limit. */
if (i != 0)
+
/*************************************************
* Read and expand substrings *
*************************************************/
"value \"%s\"", t);
return NULL;
}
+ DEBUG(D_expand) debug_printf("%s: condition evaluated to %s\n", ourname,
+ boolvalue? "true":"false");
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (boolvalue == testfor);
return s;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s == '}')
{
- if (type[0] == 'i')
- {
- if (yes) *yieldptr = string_catn(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, US"true", 4);
- }
- else
- {
- if (yes && lookup_value)
- *yieldptr = string_cat(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, lookup_value);
- lookup_value = save_lookup;
- }
+ if (!skipping)
+ if (type[0] == 'i')
+ {
+ if (yes) *yieldptr = string_catn(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, US"true", 4);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (yes && lookup_value)
+ *yieldptr = string_cat(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, lookup_value);
+ lookup_value = save_lookup;
+ }
s++;
goto RETURN;
}
/* SIGFPE both on div/mod by zero and on INT_MIN / -1, which would give
* a value of INT_MAX+1. Note that INT_MIN * -1 gives INT_MIN for me, which
* is a bug somewhere in [gcc 4.2.1, FreeBSD, amd64]. In fact, -N*-M where
- * -N*M is INT_MIN will yielf INT_MIN.
+ * -N*M is INT_MIN will yield INT_MIN.
* Since we don't support floating point, this is somewhat simpler.
* Ideally, we'd return an error, but since we overflow for all other
* arithmetic, consistency suggests otherwise, but what's the correct value
We use an internal routine recursively to handle embedded substrings. The
external function follows. The yield is NULL if the expansion failed, and there
are two cases: if something collapsed syntactically, or if "fail" was given
-as the action on a lookup failure. These can be distinguised by looking at the
+as the action on a lookup failure. These can be distinguished by looking at the
variable expand_string_forcedfail, which is TRUE in the latter case.
The skipping flag is set true when expanding a substring that isn't actually
save_expand_strings(save_expand_nstring, save_expand_nlength);
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
- next_s = eval_condition(s, &resetok, skipping? NULL : &cond);
+ next_s = eval_condition(s, &resetok, skipping ? NULL : &cond);
if (next_s == NULL) goto EXPAND_FAILED; /* message already set */
DEBUG(D_expand)
goto EXPAND_FAILED;
}
- if (!(encoded = imap_utf7_encode(sub_arg[0], headers_charset,
- sub_arg[1][0], sub_arg[2], &expand_string_message)))
- goto EXPAND_FAILED;
if (!skipping)
+ {
+ if (!(encoded = imap_utf7_encode(sub_arg[0], headers_charset,
+ sub_arg[1][0], sub_arg[2], &expand_string_message)))
+ goto EXPAND_FAILED;
yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, encoded);
+ }
continue;
}
#endif
prvscheck_keynum = NULL;
}
else
- {
/* Does not look like a prvs encoded address, return the empty string.
We need to make sure all subs are expanded first, so as to skip over
the entire item. */
case 2:
case 3: goto EXPAND_FAILED;
}
- }
continue;
}
port = ntohs(service_info->s_port);
}
- if ((fd = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_STREAM, server_name, port, port,
- timeout, NULL, &expand_string_message)) < 0)
+ fd = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_STREAM, server_name, port, port,
+ timeout, NULL, &expand_string_message);
+ callout_address = NULL;
+ if (fd < 0)
goto SOCK_FAIL;
}
}
if (skipping) /* Just pretend it worked when we're skipping */
+ {
runrc = 0;
+ lookup_value = NULL;
+ }
else
{
if (!transport_set_up_command(&argv, /* anchor for arg list */
/* While skipping we cannot rely on the data for expansions being
available (eg. $item) hence cannot decide on numeric vs. keyed.
- Read a maximum of 5 arguments (inclding the yes/no) */
+ Read a maximum of 5 arguments (including the yes/no) */
if (skipping)
{
blob b;
char st[3];
- exim_sha_init(&h, HASH_SHA256);
+ if (!exim_sha_init(&h, HASH_SHA256))
+ {
+ expand_string_message = US"unrecognised sha256 variant";
+ goto EXPAND_FAILED;
+ }
exim_sha_update(&h, sub, Ustrlen(sub));
exim_sha_finish(&h, &b);
while (b.len-- > 0)
: Ustrcmp(arg, "512") == 0 ? HASH_SHA3_512
: HASH_BADTYPE;
- if (m == HASH_BADTYPE)
+ if (m == HASH_BADTYPE || !exim_sha_init(&h, m))
{
expand_string_message = US"unrecognised sha3 variant";
goto EXPAND_FAILED;
}
- exim_sha_init(&h, m);
exim_sha_update(&h, sub, Ustrlen(sub));
exim_sha_finish(&h, &b);
while (b.len-- > 0)
case EOP_ESCAPE:
{
- const uschar *t = string_printing(sub);
+ const uschar * t = string_printing(sub);
yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, t);
continue;
}
+ case EOP_ESCAPE8BIT:
+ {
+ const uschar * s = sub;
+ uschar c;
+
+ for (s = sub; (c = *s); s++)
+ yield = c < 127 && c != '\\'
+ ? string_catn(yield, &size, &ptr, s, 1)
+ : string_catn(yield, &size, &ptr, string_sprintf("\\%03o", c), 4);
+ continue;
+ }
+
/* Handle numeric expression evaluation */
case EOP_EVAL:
+/*************************************************
+* Error-checking for testsuite *
+*************************************************/
+typedef struct {
+ const char * filename;
+ int linenumber;
+ uschar * region_start;
+ uschar * region_end;
+ const uschar *var_name;
+ const uschar *var_data;
+} err_ctx;
+
+static void
+assert_variable_notin(uschar * var_name, uschar * var_data, void * ctx)
+{
+err_ctx * e = ctx;
+if (var_data >= e->region_start && var_data < e->region_end)
+ {
+ e->var_name = CUS var_name;
+ e->var_data = CUS var_data;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+assert_no_variables(void * ptr, int len, const char * filename, int linenumber)
+{
+err_ctx e = {filename, linenumber, ptr, US ptr + len, NULL };
+int i;
+var_entry * v;
+
+/* check acl_ variables */
+tree_walk(acl_var_c, assert_variable_notin, &e);
+tree_walk(acl_var_m, assert_variable_notin, &e);
+
+/* check auth<n> variables */
+for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VARS; i++) if (auth_vars[i])
+ assert_variable_notin(US"auth<n>", auth_vars[i], &e);
+
+/* check regex<n> variables */
+for (i = 0; i < REGEX_VARS; i++) if (regex_vars[i])
+ assert_variable_notin(US"regex<n>", regex_vars[i], &e);
+
+/* check known-name variables */
+for (v = var_table; v < var_table + var_table_size; v++)
+ if (v->type == vtype_stringptr)
+ assert_variable_notin(US v->name, *(USS v->value), &e);
+
+if (e.var_name)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
+ "live variable '%s' destroyed by reset_store at %s:%d\n- value '%.64s'",
+ e.var_name, e.filename, e.linenumber, e.var_data);
+}
+
+
/*************************************************
**************************************************
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff