liable to incompatible change.
-PRDR support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-Per-Recipient Data Reponse is an SMTP extension proposed by Eric Hall
-in a (now-expired) IETF draft from 2007. It's not hit mainstream
-use, but has apparently been implemented in the META1 MTA.
-
-There is mention at http://mail.aegee.org/intern/sendmail.html
-of a patch to sendmail "to make it PRDR capable".
-
- ref: http://www.eric-a-hall.com/specs/draft-hall-prdr-00.txt
-
-If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_PRDR there is a new config
-boolean "prdr_enable" which controls whether PRDR is advertised
-as part of an EHLO response, a new "acl_data_smtp_prdr" ACL
-(called for each recipient, after data arrives but before the
-data ACL), and a new smtp transport option "hosts_try_prdr".
-
-PRDR may be used to support per-user content filtering. Without it
-one must defer any recipient after the first that has a different
-content-filter configuration. With PRDR, the RCPT-time check
-for this can be disabled when the MAIL-time $smtp_command included
-"PRDR". Any required difference in behaviour of the main DATA-time
-ACL should however depend on the PRDR-time ACL having run, as Exim
-will avoid doing so in some situations (eg. single-recipient mails).
-
-
-
-OCSP Stapling support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-X.509 PKI certificates expire and can be revoked; to handle this, the
-clients need some way to determine if a particular certificate, from a
-particular Certificate Authority (CA), is still valid. There are three
-main ways to do so.
-
-The simplest way is to serve up a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) with
-an ordinary web-server, regenerating the CRL before it expires. The
-downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially
-huge file from every certificate authority it knows of.
-
-The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
-Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
-against an OCSP server run by the CA. This lets the CA track all
-usage of the certs. This requires running software with access to the
-private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries. OCSP
-is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
-
-The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
-comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
-connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
-re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
-
-The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
-issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
-the OCSP server, then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
-negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
-CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
-resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
-starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
-proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
-
-If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and it was built with OpenSSL,
-then it gains a new global option: "tls_ocsp_file".
-
-The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
-an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
-option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the tls_certificate option
-contains $tls_sni, as per other TLS options.
-
-Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
-proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
-Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
-contents are always valid. Exim will expand the "tls_ocsp_file" option
-on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
-next connection.
-
-Exim will check for a valid next update timestamp in the OCSP proof;
-if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be ignored.
-
-Also, given EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and OpenSSL, the smtp transport gains
-a "hosts_require_ocsp" option; a host-list for which an OCSP Stapling
-is requested and required for the connection to proceed. The host(s)
-should also be in "hosts_require_tls", and "tls_verify_certificates"
-configured for the transport.
-
-For the client to be able to verify the stapled OCSP the server must
-also supply, in its stapled information, any intermediate
-certificates for the chain leading to the OCSP proof from the signer
-of the server certificate. There may be zero or one such. These
-intermediate certificates should be added to the server OCSP stapling
-file (named by tls_ocsp_file).
-
-At this point in time, we're gathering feedback on use, to determine if
-it's worth adding complexity to the Exim daemon to periodically re-fetch
-OCSP files and somehow handling multiple files.
-
- A helper script "ocsp_fetch.pl" for fetching a proof from a CA
- OCSP server is supplied. The server URL may be included in the
- server certificate, if the CA is helpful.
-
- One fail mode seen was the OCSP Signer cert expiring before the end
- of vailidity of the OCSP proof. The checking done by Exim/OpenSSL
- noted this as invalid overall, but the re-fetch script did not.
-
-
-
-
Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) suppport
--------------------------------------------------------------
This means the queried domain has published
a SPF record, but wants to allow outside
servers to send mail under its domain as well.
- o err_perm This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
- record of the queried domain. This should be
- treated like "none".
- o err_temp This indicates a temporary error during all
+ This should be treated like "none".
+ o permerror This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
+ record of the queried domain. You may deny
+ messages when this occurs. (Changed in 4.83)
+ o temperror This indicates a temporary error during all
processing, including Exim's SPF processing.
You may defer messages when this occurs.
+ (Changed in 4.83)
+ o err_temp Same as permerror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
+ removed in a future release.
+ o err_perm Same as temperror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
+ removed in a future release.
You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert
-is meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
+its meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
"fail". The string list is evaluated left-to-right, in a
short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of
the SPF check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed
$spf_result
This contains the outcome of the SPF check in string form,
- one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, err_perm or
- err_temp.
+ one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, permerror or
+ temperror.
$spf_smtp_comment
This contains a string that can be used in a SMTP response
Of course, you can also use any other lookup method that Exim
supports, including LDAP, Postgres, MySQL, etc, as long as the
-result is a list of colon-separated strings;
+result is a list of colon-separated strings.
Several expansion variables are set before the DATA ACL is
processed, and you can use them in this ACL. The following
o $dmarc_status
This is a one word status indicating what the DMARC library
- thinks of the email.
+ thinks of the email. It is a combination of the results of
+ DMARC record lookup and the SPF/DKIM/DMARC processing results
+ (if a DMARC record was found). The actual policy declared
+ in the DMARC record is in a separate expansion variable.
o $dmarc_status_text
This is a slightly longer, human readable status.
This is the domain which DMARC used to look up the DMARC
policy record.
+ o $dmarc_domain_policy
+ This is the policy declared in the DMARC record. Valid values
+ are "none", "reject" and "quarantine". It is blank when there
+ is any error, including no DMARC record.
+
o $dmarc_ar_header
This is the entire Authentication-Results header which you can
add using an add_header modifier.
warn !domains = +screwed_up_dmarc_records
control = dmarc_enable_forensic
+ warn condition = (lookup if destined to mailing list)
+ set acl_m_mailing_list = 1
+
(DATA ACL)
warn dmarc_status = accept : none : off
!authenticated = *
set $acl_m_quarantine = 1
# Do something in a transport with this flag variable
+ deny condition = ${if eq{$dmarc_domain_policy}{reject}}
+ condition = ${if eq{$acl_m_mailing_list}{1}}
+ message = Messages from $dmarc_used_domain break mailing lists
+
deny dmarc_status = reject
!authenticated = *
message = Message from $domain_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
-Transport post-delivery actions
+Event Actions
--------------------------------------------------------------
-An arbitrary per-transport string can be expanded on successful delivery,
-and (for SMTP transports) a second string on deferrals caused by a host error.
+(Renamed from TPDA, Transport post-delivery actions)
+
+An arbitrary per-transport string can be expanded upon various transport events.
+Additionally a main-section configuration option can be expanded on some
+per-message events.
This feature may be used, for example, to write exim internal log information
(not available otherwise) into a database.
-In order to use the feature, you must set
+In order to use the feature, you must compile with
-EXPERIMENTAL_TPDA=yes
+EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT=yes
in your Local/Makefile
-and define the expandable strings in the runtime config file, to
-be executed at end of delivery.
+and define one or both of
+- the event_action option in the transport
+- the event_action main option
+to be expanded when the event fires.
-Additionally, there are 6 more variables, available at end of
-delivery:
+A new variable, $event_name, is set to the event type when the
+expansion is done. The current list of events is:
-tpda_delivery_ip IP of host, which has accepted delivery
-tpda_delivery_port Port of remote host which has accepted delivery
-tpda_delivery_fqdn FQDN of host, which has accepted delivery
-tpda_delivery_local_part local part of address being delivered
-tpda_delivery_domain domain part of address being delivered
-tpda_delivery_confirmation SMTP confirmation message
+ msg:complete after main per message
+ msg:delivery after transport per recipient
+ msg:host:defer after transport per attempt
+ msg:fail:delivery after main per recipient
+ msg:fail:internal after main per recipient
+ tcp:connect before transport per connection
+ tcp:close after transport per connection
+ tls:cert before both per certificate in verification chain
+ smtp:connect after transport per connection
-In case of a deferral caused by a host-error:
-tpda_defer_errno Error number
-tpda_defer_errstr Error string possibly containing more details
+The expansion is called for all event types, and should use the $event_name
+value to decide when to act. The variable data is a colon-separated
+list, describing an event tree.
-The $router_name and $transport_name variables are also usable.
+There is an auxilary variable, $event_data, for which the
+content is event_dependent:
+ msg:delivery smtp confirmation mssage
+ msg:host:defer error string
+ tls:cert verification chain depth
+ smtp:connect smtp banner
-To take action after successful deliveries, set the following option
-on any transport of interest.
+The msg:host:defer event populates one extra variable, $event_defer_errno.
+
+The following variables are likely to be useful depending on the event type:
+
+ router_name, transport_name
+ local_part, domain
+ host, host_address, host_port
+ tls_out_peercert
+ lookup_dnssec_authenticated, tls_out_dane
+ sending_ip_address, sending_port
+ message_exim_id, verify_mode
-tpda_delivery_action
An example might look like:
-tpda_delivery_action = \
-${lookup pgsql {SELECT * FROM record_Delivery( \
+event_action = ${if eq {msg:delivery}{$event_name} \
+{${lookup pgsql {SELECT * FROM record_Delivery( \
'${quote_pgsql:$sender_address_domain}',\
'${quote_pgsql:${lc:$sender_address_local_part}}', \
- '${quote_pgsql:$tpda_delivery_domain}', \
- '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$tpda_delivery_local_part}}', \
- '${quote_pgsql:$tpda_delivery_ip}', \
- '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$tpda_delivery_fqdn}}', \
- '${quote_pgsql:$message_exim_id}')}}
-
-The string is expanded after the delivery completes and any
-side-effects will happen. The result is then discarded.
+ '${quote_pgsql:$domain}', \
+ '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$local_part}}', \
+ '${quote_pgsql:$host_address}', \
+ '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$host}}', \
+ '${quote_pgsql:$message_exim_id}')}} \
+} {}}
+
+The string is expanded when each of the supported events occur
+and any side-effects of the expansion will happen.
Note that for complex operations an ACL expansion can be used.
-In order to log host deferrals, add the following option to an SMTP
-transport:
+The expansion of the event_action option should normally
+return an empty string. Should it return anything else the
+following will be forced:
-tpda_host_defer_action
+ msg:delivery (ignored)
+ msg:host:defer (ignored)
+ msg:fail:delivery (ignored)
+ tcp:connect do not connect
+ tcp:close (ignored)
+ tls:cert refuse verification
+ smtp:connect close connection
-This is a private option of the SMTP transport. It is intended to
-log failures of remote hosts. It is executed only when exim has
-attempted to deliver a message to a remote host and failed due to
-an error which doesn't seem to be related to the individual
-message, sender, or recipient address.
-See section 47.2 of the exim documentation for more details on how
-this is determined.
+No other use is made of the result string.
-Example:
-tpda_host_defer_action = \
-${lookup mysql {insert into delivlog set \
- msgid = '${quote_mysql:$message_exim_id}', \
- senderlp = '${quote_mysql:${lc:$sender_address_local_part}}', \
- senderdom = '${quote_mysql:$sender_address_domain}', \
- delivlp = '${quote_mysql:${lc:$tpda_delivery_local_part}}', \
- delivdom = '${quote_mysql:$tpda_delivery_domain}', \
- delivip = '${quote_mysql:$tpda_delivery_ip}', \
- delivport = '${quote_mysql:$tpda_delivery_port}', \
- delivfqdn = '${quote_mysql:$tpda_delivery_fqdn}', \
- deliverrno = '${quote_mysql:$tpda_defer_errno}', \
- deliverrstr = '${quote_mysql:$tpda_defer_errstr}' \
- }}
+Known issues:
+- the tls:cert event is only called for the cert chain elements
+ received over the wire, with GnuTLS. OpenSSL gives the entire
+ chain including thse loaded locally.
Redis Lookup
Exim now has Experimental "Proxy Protocol" support. It was built on
specifications from:
http://haproxy.1wt.eu/download/1.5/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
+Above URL revised May 2014 to change version 2 spec:
+http://git.1wt.eu/web?p=haproxy.git;a=commitdiff;h=afb768340c9d7e50d8e
The purpose of this function is so that an application load balancer,
such as HAProxy, can sit in front of several Exim servers and Exim
3. In the ACL's the following expansion variables are available.
-proxy_host_address The src IP of the proxy server making the connection
-proxy_host_port The src port the proxy server is using
-proxy_session Boolean, yes/no, the connected host is required to use
- Proxy Protocol.
+proxy_host_address The (internal) src IP of the proxy server
+ making the connection to the Exim server.
+proxy_host_port The (internal) src port the proxy server is
+ using to connect to the Exim server.
+proxy_target_address The dest (public) IP of the remote host to
+ the proxy server.
+proxy_target_port The dest port the remote host is using to
+ connect to the proxy server.
+proxy_session Boolean, yes/no, the connected host is required
+ to use Proxy Protocol.
There is no expansion for a failed proxy session, however you can detect
it by checking if $proxy_session is true but $proxy_host is empty. As
[$sender_host_address] through proxy protocol \
host $proxy_host_address
-4. Runtime issues to be aware of:
+ # Possibly more clear
+ warn logwrite = Remote Source Address: $sender_host_address:$sender_host_port
+ logwrite = Proxy Target Address: $proxy_target_address:$proxy_target_port
+ logwrite = Proxy Internal Address: $proxy_host_address:$proxy_host_port
+ logwrite = Internal Server Address: $received_ip_address:$received_port
+
+
+4. Recommended ACL additions:
- Since the real connections are all coming from your proxy, and the
per host connection tracking is done before Proxy Protocol is
evaluated, smtp_accept_max_per_host must be set high enough to
handle all of the parallel volume you expect per inbound proxy.
+ - With the smtp_accept_max_per_host set so high, you lose the ability
+ to protect your server from massive numbers of inbound connections
+ from one IP. In order to prevent your server from being DOS'd, you
+ need to add a per connection ratelimit to your connect ACL. I
+ suggest something like this:
+
+ # Set max number of connections per host
+ LIMIT = 5
+ # Or do some kind of IP lookup in a flat file or database
+ # LIMIT = ${lookup{$sender_host_address}iplsearch{/etc/exim/proxy_limits}}
+
+ defer message = Too many connections from this IP right now
+ ratelimit = LIMIT / 5s / per_conn / strict
+
+
+5. Runtime issues to be aware of:
- The proxy has 3 seconds (hard-coded in the source code) to send the
required Proxy Protocol header after it connects. If it does not,
the response to any commands will be:
mail programs from working because that would require mail from
localhost to use Proxy Protocol. Again, not advised!
-5. Example of a refused connection because the Proxy Protocol header was
+6. Example of a refused connection because the Proxy Protocol header was
not sent from a host configured to use Proxy Protocol. In the example,
the 3 second timeout occurred (when a Proxy Protocol banner should have
been sent), the banner was displayed to the user, but all commands are
221 mail.example.net closing connection
+DSN Support
+--------------------------------------------------------------
+
+DSN Support tries to add RFC 3461 support to Exim. It adds support for
+*) the additional parameters for MAIL FROM and RCPT TO
+*) RFC complient MIME DSN messages for all of
+ success, failure and delay notifications
+*) dsn_advertise_hosts main option to select which hosts are able
+ to use the extension
+*) dsn_lasthop router switch to end DSN processing
+
+In case of failure reports this means that the last three parts, the message body
+intro, size info and final text, of the defined template are ignored since there is no
+logical place to put them in the MIME message.
+
+All the other changes are made without changing any defaults
+
+Building exim:
+--------------
+
+Define
+EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES
+in your Local/Makefile.
+
+Configuration:
+--------------
+All DSNs are sent in MIME format if you built exim with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES
+No option needed to activate it, and no way to turn it off.
+
+Failure and delay DSNs are triggered as usual except a sender used NOTIFY=...
+to prevent them.
+
+Support for Success DSNs is added and activated by NOTIFY=SUCCESS by clients.
+
+Add
+dsn_advertise_hosts = *
+or a more restrictive host_list to announce DSN in EHLO answers
+
+Those hosts can then use NOTIFY,ENVID,RET,ORCPT options.
+
+If a message is relayed to a DSN aware host without changing the envelope
+recipient the options are passed along and no success DSN is generated.
+
+A redirect router will always trigger a success DSN if requested and the DSN
+options are not passed any further.
+
+A success DSN always contains the recipient address as submitted by the
+client as required by RFC. Rewritten addresses are never exposed.
+
+If you used DSN patch up to 1.3 before remove all "dsn_process" switches from
+your routers since you don't need them anymore. There is no way to "gag"
+success DSNs anymore. Announcing DSN means answering as requested.
+
+You can prevent Exim from passing DSN options along to other DSN aware hosts by defining
+dsn_lasthop
+in a router. Exim will then send the success DSN himself if requested as if
+the next hop does not support DSN.
+Adding it to a redirect router makes no difference.
+
+
+
+
+Certificate name checking
+--------------------------------------------------------------
+The X509 certificates used for TLS are supposed be verified
+that they are owned by the expected host. The coding of TLS
+support to date has not made these checks.
+
+If built with EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES defined, code is
+included to do so for server certificates, and a new smtp transport option
+"tls_verify_cert_hostnames" supported which takes a hostlist
+which must match the target host for the additional checks must be made.
+The option currently defaults to empty, but this may change in
+the future. "*" is probably a suitable value.
+Whether certificate verification is done at all, and the result of
+it failing, is stll under the control of "tls_verify_hosts" nad
+"tls_try_verify_hosts".
+
+The name being checked is that for the host, generally
+the result of an MX lookup.
+
+Both Subject and Subject-Alternate-Name certificate fields
+are supported, as are wildcard certificates (limited to
+a single wildcard being the initial component of a 3-or-more
+component FQDN).
+
+The equivalent check on the server for client certificates is not
+implemented. At least one major email provider is using a client
+certificate which fails this check. They do not retry either without
+the client certificate or in clear.
+
+It is possible to duplicate the effect of this checking by
+creative use of Events.
+
+
+
+
+DANE
+------------------------------------------------------------
+DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied
+to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
+it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather
+than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
+operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection
+you make, and make another one to the server (so both
+you and the server still think you have an encrypted
+connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
+Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something
+which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
+certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the
+Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
+
+What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the
+trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
+that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the
+admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
+by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set
+of root CAs.
+
+It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that
+connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
+fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
+
+DANE scales better than having to maintain (and
+side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
+for every possible target server. It also scales
+(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
+client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also
+means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
+
+DANE requires a server operator to do three things:
+1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
+that DNS lookups they do for the server have not
+been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
+to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and
+any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
+DNSSEC.
+2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server
+certificate for a TLS connection should be.
+3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain,
+in TLS connections which is traceable to the one
+defined by (one of?) the TSLA records
+
+There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side
+operation of DANE.
+
+The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate
+usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies
+the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved
+is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted
+during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a
+single system, using a self-signed certificate.
+ DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA
+to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
+well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just
+a self-signed certificate which is used to sign
+cerver certificates, but running one securely does
+require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used
+then either all clients must be primed with it, or
+(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit
+the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.
+If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it
+(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is
+reduced from all public CAs to that single CA.
+DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or
+servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
+all of which point to a single TLSA record.
+
+The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1)
+and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
+
+At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa
+is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like
+
+ openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
+ | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
+ | openssl sha512 \
+ | awk '{print $2}'
+
+are workable for 4th-field hashes.
+
+For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates
+must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
+
+The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing
+for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
+be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However,
+this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
+default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff
+DANE is in use, to:
+
+ hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
+ {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
+ {*}{}}
+
+The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with
+numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
+The zero above means DANE was not in use,
+the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
+found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the
+string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
+control the OCSP request.
+
+This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if
+it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
+those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction
+with DANE in their OCSP settings.
+
+
+For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options,
+hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane. They do the obvious thing.
+[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ]
+
+DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured
+MX, A and TLSA records.
+
+A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match
+and the host-lookup succeded using dnssec.
+If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
+will be required for the host.
+
+(TODO: specify when fallback happens vs. when the host is not used)
+
+If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport
+options are ignored:
+ hosts_require_tls
+ tls_verify_hosts
+ tls_try_verify_hosts
+ tls_verify_certificates
+ tls_crl
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames
+
+If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
+verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set
+appropriately.
+
+Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that)
+and dnssec_require_domains is ignored.
+
+If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item
+in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
+
+There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if
+verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
+in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable
+$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above).
+
--------------------------------------------------------------
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git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff