-/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.81 2008/01/17 13:03:35 tom Exp $ */
-
/*************************************************
* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2007 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
+/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
#define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
+/* Default quota cache TTLs */
+
+#define QUOTA_POS_DEFAULT (5*60)
+#define QUOTA_NEG_DEFAULT (60*60)
+
+
/* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
/* ACL verbs */
-static uschar *verbs[] =
- { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
- US"warn" };
+static uschar *verbs[] = {
+ [ACL_ACCEPT] = US"accept",
+ [ACL_DEFER] = US"defer",
+ [ACL_DENY] = US"deny",
+ [ACL_DISCARD] = US"discard",
+ [ACL_DROP] = US"drop",
+ [ACL_REQUIRE] = US"require",
+ [ACL_WARN] = US"warn"
+};
/* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
the code. */
static int msgcond[] = {
- (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* accept */
- (1<<OK), /* defer */
- (1<<OK), /* deny */
- (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* discard */
- (1<<OK), /* drop */
- (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* require */
- (1<<OK) /* warn */
+ [ACL_ACCEPT] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
+ [ACL_DEFER] = BIT(OK),
+ [ACL_DENY] = BIT(OK),
+ [ACL_DISCARD] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
+ [ACL_DROP] = BIT(OK),
+ [ACL_REQUIRE] = BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
+ [ACL_WARN] = BIT(OK)
};
/* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
-follows, and the cond_expand_at_top and uschar cond_modifiers tables lower
+follows.
down. */
enum { ACLC_ACL,
ACLC_DECODE,
#endif
ACLC_DELAY,
-#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- ACLC_DEMIME,
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER,
+ ACLC_DKIM_STATUS,
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
- ACLC_DK_POLICY,
- ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
- ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
- ACLC_DK_SENDERS,
- ACLC_DK_STATUS,
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
+ ACLC_DMARC_STATUS,
#endif
ACLC_DNSLISTS,
ACLC_DOMAINS,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
#endif
+ ACLC_QUEUE,
ACLC_RATELIMIT,
ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_REGEX,
#endif
+ ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER,
ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS,
ACLC_SENDERS,
ACLC_SET,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_SPAM,
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+#ifdef SUPPORT_SPF
ACLC_SPF,
+ ACLC_SPF_GUESS,
#endif
+ ACLC_UDPSEND,
ACLC_VERIFY };
/* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
-"message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", and "set" are
+"message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", "queue" and "set" are
modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
-their side effects. */
+their side effects. Do not invent new modifier names that result in one name
+being the prefix of another; the binary-search in the list will go wrong. */
-static uschar *conditions[] = {
- US"acl",
- US"add_header",
- US"authenticated",
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- US"bmi_optin",
-#endif
- US"condition",
- US"continue",
- US"control",
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
- US"dcc",
-#endif
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- US"decode",
-#endif
- US"delay",
-#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- US"demime",
-#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- US"dk_domain_source",
- US"dk_policy",
- US"dk_sender_domains",
- US"dk_sender_local_parts",
- US"dk_senders",
- US"dk_status",
-#endif
- US"dnslists",
- US"domains",
- US"encrypted",
- US"endpass",
- US"hosts",
- US"local_parts",
- US"log_message",
- US"log_reject_target",
- US"logwrite",
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- US"malware",
-#endif
- US"message",
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- US"mime_regex",
-#endif
- US"ratelimit",
- US"recipients",
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- US"regex",
-#endif
- US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- US"spam",
-#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
- US"spf",
-#endif
- US"verify" };
+typedef struct condition_def {
+ uschar *name;
+/* Flag to indicate the condition/modifier has a string expansion done
+at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
+checking functions. */
+ BOOL expand_at_top:1;
-/* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
-that follows! */
+ BOOL is_modifier:1;
-enum {
- CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
- #endif
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- CONTROL_DK_VERIFY,
- #endif
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DKIM
- CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY,
- #endif
- CONTROL_ERROR,
- CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
- CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
- CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
- CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
- CONTROL_FREEZE,
- CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY,
- CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
- CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
- #endif
- CONTROL_FAKEDEFER,
- CONTROL_FAKEREJECT,
- CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
- CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
- CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
- CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH
-};
+/* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
+times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
+For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
+times. */
+ unsigned forbids;
-/* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
-turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
-control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
-and should be tidied up. */
-
-static uschar *controls[] = {
- US"allow_auth_unadvertised",
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- US"bmi_run",
- #endif
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- US"dk_verify",
- #endif
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DKIM
- US"dkim_verify",
- #endif
- US"error",
- US"caseful_local_part",
- US"caselower_local_part",
- US"enforce_sync",
- US"no_enforce_sync",
- US"freeze",
- US"queue_only",
- US"submission",
- US"suppress_local_fixups",
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- US"no_mbox_unspool",
- #endif
- US"fakedefer",
- US"fakereject",
- US"no_multiline_responses",
- US"no_pipelining",
- US"no_delay_flush",
- US"no_callout_flush"
-};
+} condition_def;
-/* Flags to indicate for which conditions/modifiers a string expansion is done
-at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
-checking functions. */
+static condition_def conditions[] = {
+ [ACLC_ACL] = { US"acl", FALSE, FALSE, 0 },
-static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
- TRUE, /* acl */
- TRUE, /* add_header */
- FALSE, /* authenticated */
+ [ACLC_ADD_HEADER] = { US"add_header", TRUE, TRUE,
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
+#endif
+ ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+ ACL_BIT_DKIM |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
+ },
+
+ [ACLC_AUTHENTICATED] = { US"authenticated", FALSE, FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
+ ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO,
+ },
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
+ [ACLC_BMI_OPTIN] = { US"bmi_optin", TRUE, TRUE,
+ ACL_BIT_AUTH |
+ ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO |
+ ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_MIME |
+# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
+# endif
+ ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
+ ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
+ ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_STARTTLS |
+ ACL_BIT_VRFY | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ },
#endif
- TRUE, /* condition */
- TRUE, /* continue */
- TRUE, /* control */
+ [ACLC_CONDITION] = { US"condition", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_CONTINUE] = { US"continue", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+
+ /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
+ always and check in the control processing itself. */
+ [ACLC_CONTROL] = { US"control", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
- TRUE, /* dcc */
+ [ACLC_DCC] = { US"dcc", TRUE, FALSE,
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
+# endif
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
+ },
#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- TRUE, /* decode */
+ [ACLC_DECODE] = { US"decode", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
+
#endif
- TRUE, /* delay */
-#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- TRUE, /* demime */
+ [ACLC_DELAY] = { US"delay", TRUE, TRUE, ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT },
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ [ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER] = { US"dkim_signers", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
+ [ACLC_DKIM_STATUS] = { US"dkim_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
- TRUE, /* dk_policy */
- TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
- TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
- TRUE, /* dk_senders */
- TRUE, /* dk_status */
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
+ [ACLC_DMARC_STATUS] = { US"dmarc_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DATA },
#endif
- TRUE, /* dnslists */
- FALSE, /* domains */
- FALSE, /* encrypted */
- TRUE, /* endpass */
- FALSE, /* hosts */
- FALSE, /* local_parts */
- TRUE, /* log_message */
- TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
- TRUE, /* logwrite */
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- TRUE, /* malware */
+
+ /* Explicit key lookups can be made in non-smtp ACLs so pass
+ always and check in the verify processing itself. */
+ [ACLC_DNSLISTS] = { US"dnslists", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
+
+ [ACLC_DOMAINS] = { US"domains", FALSE, FALSE,
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ |ACL_BIT_PRDR
#endif
- TRUE, /* message */
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- TRUE, /* mime_regex */
+ ),
+ },
+ [ACLC_ENCRYPTED] = { US"encrypted", FALSE, FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
+ ACL_BIT_HELO,
+ },
+
+ [ACLC_ENDPASS] = { US"endpass", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+
+ [ACLC_HOSTS] = { US"hosts", FALSE, FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ },
+ [ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS] = { US"local_parts", FALSE, FALSE,
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ | ACL_BIT_PRDR
#endif
- TRUE, /* ratelimit */
- FALSE, /* recipients */
+ ),
+ },
+
+ [ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE] = { US"log_message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET] = { US"log_reject_target", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_LOGWRITE] = { US"logwrite", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- TRUE, /* regex */
+ [ACLC_MALWARE] = { US"malware", TRUE, FALSE,
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
+# endif
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
+ },
#endif
- FALSE, /* sender_domains */
- FALSE, /* senders */
- TRUE, /* set */
+
+ [ACLC_MESSAGE] = { US"message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- TRUE, /* spam */
+ [ACLC_MIME_REGEX] = { US"mime_regex", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
- TRUE, /* spf */
+
+ [ACLC_QUEUE] = { US"queue", TRUE, TRUE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
#endif
- TRUE /* verify */
-};
+ ACL_BIT_DATA,
+ },
-/* Flags to identify the modifiers */
+ [ACLC_RATELIMIT] = { US"ratelimit", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_RECIPIENTS] = { US"recipients", FALSE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
-static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
- FALSE, /* acl */
- TRUE, /* add_header */
- FALSE, /* authenticated */
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
-#endif
- FALSE, /* condition */
- TRUE, /* continue */
- TRUE, /* control */
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
- FALSE, /* dcc */
-#endif
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- FALSE, /* decode */
-#endif
- TRUE, /* delay */
-#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- FALSE, /* demime */
-#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
- FALSE, /* dk_policy */
- FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
- FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
- FALSE, /* dk_senders */
- FALSE, /* dk_status */
-#endif
- FALSE, /* dnslists */
- FALSE, /* domains */
- FALSE, /* encrypted */
- TRUE, /* endpass */
- FALSE, /* hosts */
- FALSE, /* local_parts */
- TRUE, /* log_message */
- TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
- TRUE, /* logwrite */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- FALSE, /* malware */
-#endif
- TRUE, /* message */
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- FALSE, /* mime_regex */
+ [ACLC_REGEX] = { US"regex", TRUE, FALSE,
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
+# endif
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+ ACL_BIT_MIME),
+ },
+
#endif
- FALSE, /* ratelimit */
- FALSE, /* recipients */
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- FALSE, /* regex */
+ [ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER] = { US"remove_header", TRUE, TRUE,
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL|ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
#endif
- FALSE, /* sender_domains */
- FALSE, /* senders */
- TRUE, /* set */
+ ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
+ },
+ [ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS] = { US"sender_domains", FALSE, FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ ACL_BIT_HELO |
+ ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
+ ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
+ ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
+ },
+ [ACLC_SENDERS] = { US"senders", FALSE, FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ ACL_BIT_HELO |
+ ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
+ ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
+ ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
+ },
+
+ [ACLC_SET] = { US"set", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- FALSE, /* spam */
+ [ACLC_SPAM] = { US"spam", TRUE, FALSE,
+ (unsigned int) ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
+# endif
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
+ },
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
- FALSE, /* spf */
+#ifdef SUPPORT_SPF
+ [ACLC_SPF] = { US"spf", TRUE, FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
+ ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
+ ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ },
+ [ACLC_SPF_GUESS] = { US"spf_guess", TRUE, FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
+ ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
+ ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ },
#endif
- FALSE /* verify */
-};
-
-/* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
-times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
-For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
-times. */
-
-static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
- 0, /* acl */
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* add_header */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* authenticated */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
- #endif
-
- 0, /* condition */
-
- 0, /* continue */
-
- /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
- always and check in the control processing itself. */
-
- 0, /* control */
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* dcc */
- #endif
-
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (unsigned int)
- ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
- #endif
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT), /* delay */
-
- #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
- #endif
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
- #endif
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dnslists */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* encrypted */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
-
- 0, /* endpass */
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* hosts */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
-
- 0, /* log_message */
-
- 0, /* log_reject_target */
-
- 0, /* logwrite */
-
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
- #endif
-
- 0, /* message */
-
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (unsigned int)
- ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
- #endif
-
- 0, /* ratelimit */
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
-
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
- #endif
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
-
- 0, /* set */
-
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
- #endif
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
- #endif
+ [ACLC_UDPSEND] = { US"udpsend", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
/* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
always and check in the verify function itself */
-
- 0 /* verify */
+ [ACLC_VERIFY] = { US"verify", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
};
-/* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
-each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
-specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
-
-static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)), /* allow_auth_unadvertised */
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- 0, /* bmi_run */
- #endif
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dk_verify */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
- #endif
+/* Return values from decode_control(); used as index so keep in step
+with the controls_list table that follows! */
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DKIM
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dkim_verify */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
- #endif
-
- 0, /* error */
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* enforce_sync */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_enforce_sync */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
-
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
- #endif
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
-
- (unsigned int)
- ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+enum {
+ CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
+#endif
+ CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
+ CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
+ CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY,
+ CONTROL_DEBUG,
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY,
+#endif
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
+ CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY,
+ CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC,
+#endif
+ CONTROL_DSCP,
+ CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
+ CONTROL_ERROR, /* pseudo-value for decode errors */
+ CONTROL_FAKEDEFER,
+ CONTROL_FAKEREJECT,
+ CONTROL_FREEZE,
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_multiline */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+ CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH,
+ CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
+ CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
+#endif
+ CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
+ CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_pipelining */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+ CONTROL_QUEUE,
+ CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
+ CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
+#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
+ CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT,
+#endif
+};
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_delay_flush */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_callout_flush */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
-};
-/* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
+/* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics.
+For each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
+to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
typedef struct control_def {
- uschar *name;
- int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
- BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
+ uschar *name;
+ BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
+ unsigned forbids; /* bitmap of dis-allowed times */
} control_def;
static control_def controls_list[] = {
- { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED, FALSE },
+ /* name has_option forbids */
+[CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED] =
+ { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", FALSE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO)
+ },
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
+[CONTROL_BMI_RUN] =
+ { US"bmi_run", FALSE, 0 },
+#endif
+[CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART] =
+ { US"caseful_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
+[CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART] =
+ { US"caselower_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
+[CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY] =
+ { US"cutthrough_delivery", TRUE, 0 },
+[CONTROL_DEBUG] =
+ { US"debug", TRUE, 0 },
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+[CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY] =
+ { US"dkim_disable_verify", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
+# endif
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
+[CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY] =
+ { US"dmarc_disable_verify", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+[CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC] =
+ { US"dmarc_enable_forensic", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE },
+
+[CONTROL_DSCP] =
+ { US"dscp", TRUE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START | ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT
+ },
+[CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
+ { US"enforce_sync", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+
+ /* Pseudo-value for decode errors */
+[CONTROL_ERROR] =
+ { US"error", FALSE, 0 },
+
+[CONTROL_FAKEDEFER] =
+ { US"fakedefer", TRUE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DKIM
- { US"dkim_verify", CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY, FALSE },
+ ACL_BIT_MIME)
+ },
+[CONTROL_FAKEREJECT] =
+ { US"fakereject", TRUE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ ACL_BIT_PRDR |
#endif
- { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
- { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
- { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
- { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
- { US"no_callout_flush", CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH, FALSE },
- { US"no_delay_flush", CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH, FALSE },
- { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
- { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
- { US"no_pipelining", CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING, FALSE },
- { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
+ ACL_BIT_MIME)
+ },
+[CONTROL_FREEZE] =
+ { US"freeze", TRUE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
+ // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
+ },
+
+[CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH] =
+ { US"no_callout_flush", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+[CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH] =
+ { US"no_delay_flush", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+
+[CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
+ { US"no_enforce_sync", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
+[CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL] =
+ { US"no_mbox_unspool", FALSE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
+ // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
+ ACL_BIT_MIME)
+ },
#endif
- { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
- { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
- { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
- { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
- };
+[CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE] =
+ { US"no_multiline_responses", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+[CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING] =
+ { US"no_pipelining", FALSE,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
+ },
+
+[CONTROL_QUEUE] =
+ { US"queue", TRUE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
+ // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
+ },
+
+[CONTROL_SUBMISSION] =
+ { US"submission", TRUE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA)
+ },
+[CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS] =
+ { US"suppress_local_fixups", FALSE,
+ (unsigned)
+ ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START)
+ },
+#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
+[CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT] =
+ { US"utf8_downconvert", TRUE, (unsigned) ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY)
+ }
+#endif
+};
/* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
static int csa_return_code[] = {
- OK, OK, OK, OK,
- FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
+ [CSA_UNKNOWN] = OK,
+ [CSA_OK] = OK,
+ [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = OK,
+ [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = OK,
+ [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = FAIL,
+ [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = FAIL,
+ [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = FAIL,
+ [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = FAIL
};
static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
- US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
- US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
+ [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
+ [CSA_OK] = US"ok",
+ [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"defer",
+ [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"defer",
+ [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"fail",
+ [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"fail",
+ [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"fail",
+ [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"fail"
};
static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
- US"unknown",
- US"ok",
- US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
- US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
- US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
- US"failed (host name not authorized)",
- US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
- US"failed (client address mismatch)"
+ [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
+ [CSA_OK] = US"ok",
+ [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
+ [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
+ [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
+ [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"failed (host name not authorized)",
+ [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
+ [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"failed (client address mismatch)"
+};
+
+/* Options for the ratelimit condition. Note that there are two variants of
+the per_rcpt option, depending on the ACL that is used to measure the rate.
+However any ACL must be able to look up per_rcpt rates in /noupdate mode,
+so the two variants must have the same internal representation as well as
+the same configuration string. */
+
+enum {
+ RATE_PER_WHAT, RATE_PER_CLASH, RATE_PER_ADDR, RATE_PER_BYTE, RATE_PER_CMD,
+ RATE_PER_CONN, RATE_PER_MAIL, RATE_PER_RCPT, RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS
+};
+
+#define RATE_SET(var,new) \
+ (((var) == RATE_PER_WHAT) ? ((var) = RATE_##new) : ((var) = RATE_PER_CLASH))
+
+static uschar *ratelimit_option_string[] = {
+ [RATE_PER_WHAT] = US"?",
+ [RATE_PER_CLASH] = US"!",
+ [RATE_PER_ADDR] = US"per_addr",
+ [RATE_PER_BYTE] = US"per_byte",
+ [RATE_PER_CMD] = US"per_cmd",
+ [RATE_PER_CONN] = US"per_conn",
+ [RATE_PER_MAIL] = US"per_mail",
+ [RATE_PER_RCPT] = US"per_rcpt",
+ [RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS] = US"per_rcpt"
};
/* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
-static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
- uschar **);
+static int acl_check_wargs(int, address_item *, const uschar *, uschar **,
+ uschar **);
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Find control in list *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* The lists are always in order, so binary chop can be used.
+
+Arguments:
+ name the control name to search for
+ ol the first entry in the control list
+ last one more than the offset of the last entry in the control list
+
+Returns: index of a control entry, or -1 if not found
+*/
+
+static int
+find_control(const uschar * name, control_def * ol, int last)
+{
+for (int first = 0; last > first; )
+ {
+ int middle = (first + last)/2;
+ uschar * s = ol[middle].name;
+ int c = Ustrncmp(name, s, Ustrlen(s));
+ if (c == 0) return middle;
+ else if (c > 0) first = middle + 1;
+ else last = middle;
+ }
+return -1;
+}
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Pick out condition from list *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Use a binary chop method
+
+Arguments:
+ name name to find
+ list list of conditions
+ end size of list
+
+Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_checkcondition(uschar * name, condition_def * list, int end)
+{
+for (int start = 0; start < end; )
+ {
+ int mid = (start + end)/2;
+ int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid].name);
+ if (c == 0) return mid;
+ if (c < 0) end = mid;
+ else start = mid + 1;
+ }
+return -1;
+}
/*************************************************
static int
acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
{
-int start = 0;
-
-while (start < end)
+for (int start = 0; start < end; )
{
int mid = (start + end)/2;
int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
acl_block *this = NULL;
acl_condition_block *cond;
acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
-uschar *s;
+uschar * s;
*error = NULL;
-while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
+while ((s = (*func)()))
{
int v, c;
BOOL negated = FALSE;
/* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
exclamation mark. */
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
- if (*s == '!')
+ if (Uskip_whitespace(&s) == '!')
{
negated = TRUE;
s++;
/* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
continues the previous verb. */
- v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
- if (v < 0)
+ if ((v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, nelem(verbs))) < 0)
{
- if (this == NULL)
+ if (!this)
{
*error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
saveline);
*error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
return NULL;
}
- this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
+ this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block), FALSE);
*lastp = this;
lastp = &(this->next);
this->next = NULL;
- this->verb = v;
this->condition = NULL;
+ this->verb = v;
+ this->srcline = config_lineno; /* for debug output */
+ this->srcfile = config_filename; /**/
condp = &(this->condition);
if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
if (*s == '!')
/* Handle a condition or modifier. */
- c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
- if (c < 0)
+ if ((c = acl_checkcondition(name, conditions, nelem(conditions))) < 0)
{
*error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
saveline);
/* The modifiers may not be negated */
- if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
+ if (negated && conditions[c].is_modifier)
{
*error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
- "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
+ "\"%s\"", conditions[c].name);
return NULL;
}
this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
{
*error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
- conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
+ conditions[c].name, verbs[this->verb]);
return NULL;
}
- cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
+ cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), FALSE);
cond->next = NULL;
cond->type = c;
cond->u.negated = negated;
compatibility. */
if (c == ACLC_SET)
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ if ( Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_status", 18) == 0
+ || Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_reason", 18) == 0)
+ {
+ uschar * endptr = s+18;
+
+ if (isalnum(*endptr))
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
+ "modifier \"set %s\" "
+ "(only \"dkim_verify_status\" or \"dkim_verify_reason\" permitted)",
+ s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s, 18);
+ s = endptr;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&s);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
{
uschar *endptr;
- if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 &&
- Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
+ if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 && Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
{
*error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
- "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
+ "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
return NULL;
}
if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
{
*error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
- "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
- s);
+ "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
+ s);
return NULL;
}
- while (*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
+ while (*endptr && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
{
if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
- "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
- return NULL;
- }
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
+ "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
endptr++;
}
cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
s = endptr;
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&s);
}
/* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
if (*s++ != '=')
{
*error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
- cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
+ conditions[c].is_modifier ? US"modifier" : US"condition");
return NULL;
}
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&s);
cond->arg = string_copy(s);
}
}
*/
static void
-setup_header(uschar *hstring)
+setup_header(const uschar *hstring)
{
-uschar *p, *q;
+const uschar *p, *q;
int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
-/* An empty string does nothing; otherwise add a final newline if necessary. */
+/* Ignore any leading newlines */
+while (*hstring == '\n') hstring++, hlen--;
+/* An empty string does nothing; ensure exactly one final newline. */
if (hlen <= 0) return;
-if (hstring[hlen-1] != '\n') hstring = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
+if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n') /* no newline */
+ q = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
+else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n') /* double newline */
+ {
+ uschar * s = string_copy(hstring);
+ while(s[--hlen] == '\n')
+ s[hlen+1] = '\0';
+ q = s;
+ }
+else
+ q = hstring;
/* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
-for (p = q = hstring; *p != 0; )
+for (p = q; *p; p = q)
{
- uschar *s;
+ const uschar *s;
+ uschar * hdr;
int newtype = htype_add_bot;
header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
for (;;)
{
- q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
- if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
+ q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); /* we know there was a newline */
+ if (*++q != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
}
/* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
to the front of it. */
for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
- {
if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
- }
- s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
- hlen = Ustrlen(s);
+ hdr = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", *s == ':' ? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", (int) (q - p), p);
+ hlen = Ustrlen(hdr);
/* See if this line has already been added */
- while (*hptr != NULL)
+ while (*hptr)
{
- if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
- hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
+ if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, hdr, hlen) == 0) break;
+ hptr = &(*hptr)->next;
}
/* Add if not previously present */
- if (*hptr == NULL)
+ if (!*hptr)
{
- header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
- h->text = s;
+ /* The header_line struct itself is not tainted, though it points to
+ possibly tainted data. */
+ header_line * h = store_get(sizeof(header_line), FALSE);
+ h->text = hdr;
h->next = NULL;
h->type = newtype;
h->slen = hlen;
*hptr = h;
- hptr = &(h->next);
+ hptr = &h->next;
}
+ }
+}
+
- /* Advance for next header line within the string */
- p = q;
+/*************************************************
+* List the added header lines *
+*************************************************/
+uschar *
+fn_hdrs_added(void)
+{
+gstring * g = NULL;
+
+for (header_line * h = acl_added_headers; h; h = h->next)
+ {
+ int i = h->slen;
+ if (h->text[i-1] == '\n') i--;
+ g = string_append_listele_n(g, '\n', h->text, i);
}
+
+return g ? g->s : NULL;
}
+/*************************************************
+* Set up removed header line(s) *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* This function is called by the remove_header modifier. The argument is
+treated as a sequence of header names which are added to a colon separated
+list, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
+
+Argument: string of header names
+Returns: nothing
+*/
+
+static void
+setup_remove_header(const uschar *hnames)
+{
+if (*hnames)
+ acl_removed_headers = acl_removed_headers
+ ? string_sprintf("%s : %s", acl_removed_headers, hnames)
+ : string_copy(hnames);
+}
+
/*************************************************
/* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
- for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
+ for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged; logged = logged->next)
if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
- if (logged == NULL)
+ if (!logged)
{
int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
- logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
+ logged->text = US logged + sizeof(string_item);
memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
acl_warn_logged = logged;
/* If there's no user message, we are done. */
-if (user_message == NULL) return;
+if (!user_message) return;
/* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
Log an error. */
{
int rc;
-user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
-
/* Previous success */
if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
/* Need to do a lookup */
HDEBUG(D_acl)
- debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
+ debug_printf_indent("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
{
- *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
- US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
- :
- string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
- host_lookup_msg);
+ *log_msgptr = rc == DEFER
+ ? US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
+ : string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
+ host_lookup_msg);
return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
}
Arguments:
dnsa the DNS answer block
dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
- reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
+ reset option specifying what portion to scan, as described above
target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
uschar *target)
{
-dns_record *rr;
-dns_address *da;
-
-BOOL target_found = FALSE;
+int rc = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
-for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
- rr != NULL;
+for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
+ rr;
rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
{
/* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
if (rr->type != T_A
#if HAVE_IPV6
&& rr->type != T_AAAA
- #ifdef SUPPORT_A6
- && rr->type != T_A6
- #endif
#endif
) continue;
if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
- target_found = TRUE;
+ rc = CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
/* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
- for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
+ for (dns_address * da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da; da = da->next)
{
/* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
- DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
}
using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
addresses. */
-if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
-else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+return rc;
}
*/
static int
-acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
+acl_verify_csa(const uschar *domain)
{
tree_node *t;
-uschar *found, *p;
+const uschar *found;
int priority, weight, port;
-dns_answer dnsa;
+dns_answer * dnsa;
dns_scan dnss;
dns_record *rr;
-int rc, type;
-uschar target[256];
+int rc, type, yield;
+#define TARGET_SIZE 256
+uschar * target = store_get(TARGET_SIZE, TRUE);
/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
-if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
-if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+if (!domain) domain = sender_host_address;
+if (!sender_host_address) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
if (domain[0] == '[')
{
- uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
+ const uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
if (start == NULL) start = domain;
domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
}
if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
{
if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
- dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
- domain = target;
+ domain = dns_build_reverse(domain);
}
/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
we return from this function. */
-t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
-if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
+if ((t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain)))
+ return t->data.val;
-t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
+t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain), is_tainted(domain));
Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
found = domain;
-switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
+dnsa = store_get_dns_answer();
+switch (dns_special_lookup(dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
{
/* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
default:
- return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+ yield = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+ goto out;
/* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
case DNS_NOMATCH:
case DNS_NODATA:
- return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ yield = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
/* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
case DNS_SUCCEED:
- break;
+ break;
}
/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
-for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
- rr != NULL;
- rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
+ rr;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)) if (rr->type == T_SRV)
{
- if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
+ const uschar * p = rr->data;
/* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
- p = rr->data;
GETSHORT(priority, p);
GETSHORT(weight, p);
GETSHORT(port, p);
DEBUG(D_acl)
- debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
+ debug_printf_indent("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
/* Check the CSA version number */
assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
SRV records of their own. */
- if (found != domain)
+ if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
{
- if (port & 1)
- return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
- else
- return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ yield = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
}
/* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
greater than 3 are undefined. */
- if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
+ if (weight < 2)
+ {
+ yield = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (weight > 2) continue;
client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
- (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
- (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
+ (void)dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, p,
+ (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, TARGET_SIZE);
- DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target is %s\n", target);
break;
}
/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
-if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+if (!rr)
+ {
+ yield = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
-if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0)
+ {
+ yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
-rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
-if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
+if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR)
+ {
+ yield = rc;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
type = T_A;
-#if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
-DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN:
-#endif
-
-switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
+lookup_dnssec_authenticated = NULL;
+switch (dns_lookup(dnsa, target, type, NULL))
{
/* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
default:
- return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
+ yield = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
+ break;
/* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
case DNS_SUCCEED:
- rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
- if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
- /* else fall through */
+ rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
+ if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR)
+ {
+ yield = rc;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* else fall through */
/* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
case DNS_NOMATCH:
case DNS_NODATA:
+ yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+ break;
+ }
- #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
- if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
- #endif
+out:
- return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
- }
+store_free_dns_answer(dnsa);
+return t->data.val = yield;
}
* Handle verification (address & other) *
*************************************************/
-/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
-encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
-just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
-lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
+enum { VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, VERIFY_CERT, VERIFY_HELO, VERIFY_CSA, VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX,
+ VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT,
+ VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, VERIFY_ARC
+ };
+typedef struct {
+ uschar * name;
+ int value;
+ unsigned where_allowed; /* bitmap */
+ BOOL no_options; /* Never has /option(s) following */
+ unsigned alt_opt_sep; /* >0 Non-/ option separator (custom parser) */
+ } verify_type_t;
+static verify_type_t verify_type_list[] = {
+ /* name value where no-opt opt-sep */
+ { US"reverse_host_lookup", VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, (unsigned)~0, FALSE, 0 },
+ { US"certificate", VERIFY_CERT, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
+ { US"helo", VERIFY_HELO, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
+ { US"csa", VERIFY_CSA, (unsigned)~0, FALSE, 0 },
+ { US"header_syntax", VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, TRUE, 0 },
+ { US"not_blind", VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, FALSE, 0 },
+ { US"header_sender", VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, FALSE, 0 },
+ { US"sender", VERIFY_SNDR, ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT
+ | ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP,
+ FALSE, 6 },
+ { US"recipient", VERIFY_RCPT, ACL_BIT_RCPT, FALSE, 0 },
+ { US"header_names_ascii", VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, TRUE, 0 },
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
+ { US"arc", VERIFY_ARC, ACL_BIT_DATA, FALSE , 0 },
+#endif
+ };
-Arguments:
- where where called from
- addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
- arg the argument of "verify"
+
+enum { CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, CALLOUT_NOCACHE, CALLOUT_RANDOM, CALLOUT_USE_SENDER,
+ CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,
+ CALLOUT_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, CALLOUT_CONNECT,
+ CALLOUT_HOLD, CALLOUT_TIME /* TIME must be last */
+ };
+typedef struct {
+ uschar * name;
+ int value;
+ int flag;
+ BOOL has_option; /* Has =option(s) following */
+ BOOL timeval; /* Has a time value */
+ } callout_opt_t;
+static callout_opt_t callout_opt_list[] = {
+ /* name value flag has-opt has-time */
+ { US"defer_ok", CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { US"no_cache", CALLOUT_NOCACHE, vopt_callout_no_cache, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { US"random", CALLOUT_RANDOM, vopt_callout_random, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { US"use_sender", CALLOUT_USE_SENDER, vopt_callout_recipsender, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { US"use_postmaster", CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER,vopt_callout_recippmaster, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { US"postmaster_mailfrom",CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM,0, TRUE, FALSE },
+ { US"postmaster", CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { US"fullpostmaster", CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,vopt_callout_fullpm, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { US"mailfrom", CALLOUT_MAILFROM, 0, TRUE, FALSE },
+ { US"maxwait", CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
+ { US"connect", CALLOUT_CONNECT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
+ { US"hold", CALLOUT_HOLD, vopt_callout_hold, FALSE, FALSE },
+ { NULL, CALLOUT_TIME, 0, FALSE, TRUE }
+ };
+
+
+
+static int
+v_period(const uschar * s, const uschar * arg, uschar ** log_msgptr)
+{
+int period;
+if ((period = readconf_readtime(s, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
+ "\"verify %s\"", arg);
+ }
+return period;
+}
+
+
+
+/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
+encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
+just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
+lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
+
+Arguments:
+ where where called from
+ addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
+ arg the argument of "verify"
user_msgptr pointer for user message
log_msgptr pointer for log message
basic_errno where to put verify errno
*/
static int
-acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
+acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *arg,
uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
{
int sep = '/';
BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
BOOL no_details = FALSE;
BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
+BOOL quota = FALSE;
+int quota_pos_cache = QUOTA_POS_DEFAULT, quota_neg_cache = QUOTA_NEG_DEFAULT;
address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
-an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
-now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
+an error if options are given for items that don't expect them.
*/
uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
-uschar *list = arg;
-uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
+const uschar *list = arg;
+uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
+verify_type_t * vp;
-if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
+if (!ss) goto BAD_VERIFY;
/* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
+for (vp = verify_type_list;
+ CS vp < CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list);
+ vp++
+ )
+ if (vp->alt_opt_sep ? strncmpic(ss, vp->name, vp->alt_opt_sep) == 0
+ : strcmpic (ss, vp->name) == 0)
+ break;
+if (CS vp >= CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list))
+ goto BAD_VERIFY;
+
+if (vp->no_options && slash)
{
- if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
- if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
- return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
+ "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
+ return ERROR;
}
-
-/* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
-test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
-mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
-
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
+if (!(vp->where_allowed & BIT(where)))
{
- if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
- if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
- *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
- return FAIL;
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify %s in ACL for %s",
+ vp->name, acl_wherenames[where]);
+ return ERROR;
}
-
-/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
-occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
-
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
+switch(vp->value)
{
- if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
- if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
- return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
- }
-
-/* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
-result code into user-friendly strings. */
-
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
- {
- rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
- *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
+ case VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP:
+ if (!sender_host_address) return OK;
+ if ((rc = acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr)) == DEFER)
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
+ if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0)
+ return OK;
+ return rc;
+
+ case VERIFY_CERT:
+ /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
+ test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
+ mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
+
+ if (tls_in.certificate_verified) return OK;
+ *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
+ return FAIL;
+
+ case VERIFY_HELO:
+ /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
+ occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
+
+ if (!f.helo_verified && !f.helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
+ return f.helo_verified ? OK : FAIL;
+
+ case VERIFY_CSA:
+ /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
+ result code into user-friendly strings. */
+
+ rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
+ *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
csa_reason_string[rc]);
- csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
- DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
- return csa_return_code[rc];
- }
+ csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
+ return csa_return_code[rc];
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
+ case VERIFY_ARC:
+ { /* Do Authenticated Received Chain checks in a separate function. */
+ const uschar * condlist = CUS string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
+ int csep = 0;
+ uschar * cond;
+
+ if (!(arc_state = acl_verify_arc())) return DEFER;
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ARC verify result %s %s%s%s\n", arc_state,
+ arc_state_reason ? "(":"", arc_state_reason, arc_state_reason ? ")":"");
+
+ if (!condlist) condlist = US"none:pass";
+ while ((cond = string_nextinlist(&condlist, &csep, NULL, 0)))
+ if (Ustrcmp(arc_state, cond) == 0) return OK;
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+#endif
-/* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
-a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
-send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
-always). */
+ case VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX:
+ /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct 5322-syntax. If there is
+ a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
+ send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
+ always). */
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
- {
- if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
- if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
- rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
- if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
- *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
- return rc;
- }
+ rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
+ if (rc != OK && *log_msgptr)
+ if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
+ else
+ acl_verify_message = *log_msgptr;
+ return rc;
-/* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
-recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
+ case VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII:
+ /* Check that all header names are true 7 bit strings
+ See RFC 5322, 2.2. and RFC 6532, 3. */
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
- {
- if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
- if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
- rc = verify_check_notblind();
- if (rc != OK)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
- if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ rc = verify_check_header_names_ascii(log_msgptr);
+ if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr)
*user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
- }
- return rc;
- }
+ return rc;
-/* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
-either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
-slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
+ case VERIFY_NOT_BLIND:
+ /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
+ recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
+ {
+ BOOL case_sensitive = TRUE;
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
+ if (strcmpic(ss, US"case_insensitive") == 0)
+ case_sensitive = FALSE;
+ else
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
+ "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
-/* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
-header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
-sender and recipient. */
+ if ((rc = verify_check_notblind(case_sensitive)) != OK)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"bcc recipient detected";
+ if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
+ }
+ return rc;
+ }
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
- {
- if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
- verify_header_sender = TRUE;
- }
+ /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
+ either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
+ slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
-/* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
-In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
-in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
+ case VERIFY_HDR_SNDR:
+ verify_header_sender = TRUE;
+ break;
-else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
- {
- uschar *s = ss + 6;
- if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
+ case VERIFY_SNDR:
+ /* In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
+ in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
{
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
- "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
- acl_wherenames[where]);
- return ERROR;
- }
- if (*s == 0)
- verify_sender_address = sender_address;
- else
- {
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
- if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
- verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
- }
- }
-else
- {
- if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
- if (addr == NULL)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
- "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
- return ERROR;
+ uschar *s = ss + 6;
+ if (!*s)
+ verify_sender_address = sender_address;
+ else
+ {
+ while (isspace(*s)) s++;
+ if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
+ while (isspace(*s)) s++;
+ verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
+ }
}
+ break;
+
+ case VERIFY_RCPT:
+ break;
}
+
+
/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
verification, including "header sender" verification. */
-while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
- != NULL)
+while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
{
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
{
callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
- ss += 7;
- if (*ss != 0)
+ if (*(ss += 7))
{
while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
if (*ss++ == '=')
{
+ const uschar * sublist = ss;
int optsep = ',';
- uschar *opt;
- uschar buffer[256];
- while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
-
- /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
- have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
- kind of table-driven thing. */
- while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- != NULL)
+ while (isspace(*sublist)) sublist++;
+ for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, NULL, 0); )
{
- if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
- else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
- verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
- else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
- verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
- else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
- verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
- else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
- verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
- else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
- else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
- {
- pm_mailfrom = US"";
- verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
- }
+ callout_opt_t * op;
+ double period = 1.0F;
- else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
- {
- if (!verify_header_sender)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
- "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
- "condition \"%s\")", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- opt += 8;
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
- if (*opt++ != '=')
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
- "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
- se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
- }
+ for (op= callout_opt_list; op->name; op++)
+ if (strncmpic(opt, op->name, Ustrlen(op->name)) == 0)
+ break;
- else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
- {
- opt += 19;
+ verify_options |= op->flag;
+ if (op->has_option)
+ {
+ opt += Ustrlen(op->name);
while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
if (*opt++ != '=')
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
- "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
+ "\"%s\" in ACL verify condition \"%s\"", op->name, arg);
return ERROR;
}
while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
- pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
- }
-
- else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
- {
- opt += 7;
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
- if (*opt++ != '=')
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
- "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
- callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
- if (callout_overall < 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
- "\"verify %s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- }
- else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
- {
- opt += 7;
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
- if (*opt++ != '=')
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
- "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
- callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
- if (callout_connect < 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
- "\"verify %s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- }
- else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
- {
- callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
- if (callout < 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
- "\"verify %s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- }
+ }
+ if (op->timeval && (period = v_period(opt, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
+ return ERROR;
+
+ switch(op->value)
+ {
+ case CALLOUT_DEFER_OK: callout_defer_ok = TRUE; break;
+ case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
+ case CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
+ case CALLOUT_MAILFROM:
+ if (!verify_header_sender)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
+ "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
+ "condition \"%s\")", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
+ break;
+ case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM: pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); break;
+ case CALLOUT_MAXWAIT: callout_overall = period; break;
+ case CALLOUT_CONNECT: callout_connect = period; break;
+ case CALLOUT_TIME: callout = period; break;
+ }
}
}
else
}
}
+ /* The quota option has sub-options, comma-separated */
+
+ else if (strncmpic(ss, US"quota", 5) == 0)
+ {
+ quota = TRUE;
+ if (*(ss += 5))
+ {
+ while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
+ if (*ss++ == '=')
+ {
+ const uschar * sublist = ss;
+ int optsep = ',';
+ int period;
+
+ while (isspace(*sublist)) sublist++;
+ for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, NULL, 0); )
+ if (Ustrncmp(opt, "cachepos=", 9) == 0)
+ if ((period = v_period(opt += 9, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
+ return ERROR;
+ else
+ quota_pos_cache = period;
+ else if (Ustrncmp(opt, "cacheneg=", 9) == 0)
+ if ((period = v_period(opt += 9, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
+ return ERROR;
+ else
+ quota_neg_cache = period;
+ else if (Ustrcmp(opt, "no_cache") == 0)
+ quota_pos_cache = quota_neg_cache = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* Option not recognized */
else
return ERROR;
}
+/* Handle quota verification */
+if (quota)
+ {
+ if (vp->value != VERIFY_RCPT)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"can only verify quota of recipient";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((rc = verify_quota_call(addr->address,
+ quota_pos_cache, quota_neg_cache, log_msgptr)) != OK)
+ {
+ *basic_errno = errno;
+ if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ {
+ if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after %s: %s",
+ smtp_names[smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index)]],
+ *log_msgptr);
+ if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+
/* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
message if giving out verification details. */
if (verify_header_sender)
{
int verrno;
- rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
+
+ if ((rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
- &verrno);
- if (rc != OK)
+ &verrno)) != OK)
{
*basic_errno = verrno;
if (smtp_return_error_details)
{
- if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
+ if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
*user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
- if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
}
}
}
specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
-else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
+else if (verify_sender_address)
{
- if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
- != 0)
+ if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)))
{
*log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
"sender verify callout";
}
sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
- if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
- callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
+ if ( sender_vaddr /* Previously checked */
+ && callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
{
/* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
- if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
+ if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed))
+ rc = OK;
+ else
{
rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
*basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
}
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("using cached sender verify result\n");
}
/* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
+#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
+ if ((sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
+ {
+ sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
+ sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
+ }
+#endif
if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
{
rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
- if (rc == OK)
- {
- if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
- {
- DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
- verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
- }
- else
- {
- DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
- verify_sender_address);
- }
- }
- else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
+ if (rc != OK)
+ *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_acl)
+ if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
+ debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
+ verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
+ else
+ debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok\n",
+ verify_sender_address);
}
- else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
+ else
+ rc = OK; /* Null sender */
/* Cache the result code */
/* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
- sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
+ sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->prop.address_data;
}
/* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
addr2 = *addr;
rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
*basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
*log_msgptr = addr2.message;
- *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
- addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
+ *user_msgptr = addr2.user_message ? addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
/* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
- if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
/* Make $address_data visible */
- deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
+ deliver_address_data = addr2.prop.address_data;
}
/* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
-if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
- (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
+if ( rc == DEFER
+ && ( defer_ok
+ || callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
+ ) )
{
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
rc = OK;
}
/* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
-if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
+if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address)
{
if (rc != DEFER)
- {
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
- }
else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
- {
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
- }
else
{
*log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
/* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
-if (addr != NULL)
+if (addr)
{
deliver_domain = addr->domain;
deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
BAD_VERIFY:
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
- "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
- "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
+ "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\", \"header_names_ascii\" "
+ "or \"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
"\"verify %s\"", arg);
return ERROR;
-
-/* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
-
-NO_OPTIONS:
-*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
- "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
-return ERROR;
-
-/* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
-
-WRONG_ACL:
-*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
- "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
-return ERROR;
}
* Check argument for control= modifier *
*************************************************/
-/* Called from acl_check_condition() below
+/* Called from acl_check_condition() below.
+To handle the case "queue_only" we accept an _ in the
+initial / option-switch position.
Arguments:
arg the argument string for control=
*/
static int
-decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
+decode_control(const uschar *arg, const uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
{
-int len;
-control_def *d;
-
-for (d = controls_list;
- d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
- d++)
- {
- len = Ustrlen(d->name);
- if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
- }
-
-if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
- (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
+int idx, len;
+control_def * d;
+uschar c;
+
+if ( (idx = find_control(arg, controls_list, nelem(controls_list))) < 0
+ || ( (c = arg[len = Ustrlen((d = controls_list+idx)->name)]) != 0
+ && (!d->has_option || c != '/' && c != '_')
+ ) )
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
return CONTROL_ERROR;
}
*pptr = arg + len;
-return d->value;
+return idx;
}
+
+/*************************************************
+* Return a ratelimit error *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_ratelimit() below
+
+Arguments:
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+ format format string
+ ... supplementary arguments
+
+Returns: ERROR
+*/
+
+static int
+ratelimit_error(uschar **log_msgptr, const char *format, ...)
+{
+va_list ap;
+gstring * g =
+ string_cat(NULL, US"error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: ");
+
+va_start(ap, format);
+g = string_vformat(g, SVFMT_EXTEND|SVFMT_REBUFFER, format, ap);
+va_end(ap);
+
+gstring_release_unused(g);
+*log_msgptr = string_from_gstring(g);
+return ERROR;
+}
+
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* Handle rate limiting *
*************************************************/
*/
static int
-acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
+acl_ratelimit(const uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
{
-double limit, period;
+double limit, period, count;
uschar *ss;
uschar *key = NULL;
+uschar *unique = NULL;
int sep = '/';
-BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, noupdate = FALSE;
-BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
+BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, readonly = FALSE;
+BOOL noupdate = FALSE, badacl = FALSE;
+int mode = RATE_PER_WHAT;
int old_pool, rc;
tree_node **anchor, *t;
open_db dbblock, *dbm;
+int dbdb_size;
dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
+dbdata_ratelimit_unique *dbdb;
struct timeval tv;
/* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
-/* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
+/* First is the maximum number of messages per period / maximum burst
size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
-sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
-if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
- limit = -1.0;
-else
- {
- limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
- if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
- else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
- else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
- }
-if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
- "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
- sender_rate_limit);
- return ERROR;
- }
+if (!(sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "sender rate limit not set");
+
+limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
+if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
+else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
+else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
-/* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
+if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
+ "\"%s\" is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);
+
+/* Second is the rate measurement period / exponential smoothing time
constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
run-time division errors. */
-sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
-if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
-else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
+period = !(sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0))
+ ? -1.0 : readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
if (period <= 0.0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
- "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
- sender_rate_period);
- return ERROR;
- }
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
+ "\"%s\" is not a time value", sender_rate_period);
+
+/* By default we are counting one of something, but the per_rcpt,
+per_byte, and count options can change this. */
+
+count = 1.0;
-/* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
-used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
+/* Parse the other options. */
-while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
- != NULL)
+while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
{
if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
- else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
- else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
- else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
- else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
- else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
- else key = string_sprintf("%s", ss);
- }
-
-if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
- {
- *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
- return ERROR;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"readonly") == 0) readonly = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) RATE_SET(mode, PER_CMD);
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0)
+ {
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_CONN);
+ if (where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
+ badacl = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0)
+ {
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
+ if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0)
+ {
+ /* If we are running in the RCPT ACL, then we'll count the recipients
+ one by one, but if we are running when we have accumulated the whole
+ list then we'll add them all in one batch. */
+ if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
+ else if (where >= ACL_WHERE_PREDATA && where <= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_ALLRCPTS), count = (double)recipients_count;
+ else if (where == ACL_WHERE_MAIL || where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT), badacl = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0)
+ {
+ /* If we have not yet received the message data and there was no SIZE
+ declaration on the MAIL command, then it's safe to just use a value of
+ zero and let the recorded rate decay as if nothing happened. */
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
+ if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
+ else count = message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_addr") == 0)
+ {
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_RCPT) badacl = TRUE, unique = US"*";
+ else unique = string_sprintf("%s@%s", deliver_localpart, deliver_domain);
+ }
+ else if (strncmpic(ss, US"count=", 6) == 0)
+ {
+ uschar *e;
+ count = Ustrtod(ss+6, &e);
+ if (count < 0.0 || *e != '\0')
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "\"%s\" is not a positive number", ss);
+ }
+ else if (strncmpic(ss, US"unique=", 7) == 0)
+ unique = string_copy(ss + 7);
+ else if (!key)
+ key = string_copy(ss);
+ else
+ key = string_sprintf("%s/%s", key, ss);
}
-/* Default option values */
-
-if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
-if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
+/* Sanity check. When the badacl flag is set the update mode must either
+be readonly (which is the default if it is omitted) or, for backwards
+compatibility, a combination of noupdate and strict or leaky. */
+
+if (mode == RATE_PER_CLASH)
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting per_* options");
+if (leaky + strict + readonly > 1)
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting update modes");
+if (badacl && (leaky || strict) && !noupdate)
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
+ "\"%s\" must not have /leaky or /strict option, or cannot be used in %s ACL",
+ ratelimit_option_string[mode], acl_wherenames[where]);
+
+/* Set the default values of any unset options. In readonly mode we
+perform the rate computation without any increment so that its value
+decays to eventually allow over-limit senders through. */
+
+if (noupdate) readonly = TRUE, leaky = strict = FALSE;
+if (badacl) readonly = TRUE;
+if (readonly) count = 0.0;
+if (!strict && !readonly) leaky = TRUE;
+if (mode == RATE_PER_WHAT) mode = RATE_PER_MAIL;
/* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */
-if (key == NULL)
- key = (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address;
+if (!key)
+ key = !sender_host_address ? US"" : sender_host_address;
-key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s/%s",
+key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s%s",
sender_rate_period,
- per_byte? US"per_byte" :
- per_cmd? US"per_cmd" :
- per_mail? US"per_mail" : US"per_conn",
- strict? US"strict" : US"leaky",
+ ratelimit_option_string[mode],
+ unique == NULL ? "" : "unique/",
key);
-HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
- limit, period, key);
+HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf_indent("ratelimit condition count=%.0f %.1f/%s\n", count, limit, key);
/* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
-pool so that they survive across resets. */
+pool so that they survive across resets. In readonly mode we only remember the
+result for the rest of this command in case a later command changes it. After
+this bit of logic the code is independent of the per_* mode. */
-anchor = NULL;
old_pool = store_pool;
-if (per_conn)
+if (readonly)
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
+else switch(mode)
{
- anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
- store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ case RATE_PER_CONN:
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ break;
+ case RATE_PER_BYTE:
+ case RATE_PER_MAIL:
+ case RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS:
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
+ break;
+ case RATE_PER_ADDR:
+ case RATE_PER_CMD:
+ case RATE_PER_RCPT:
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
+ break;
+ default:
+ anchor = NULL; /* silence an "unused" complaint */
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
+ "internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
+ break;
}
-else if (per_mail || per_byte)
- anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
-else if (per_cmd)
- anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
-if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
+if ((t = tree_search(*anchor, key)))
{
dbd = t->data.ptr;
/* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
store_pool = old_pool;
sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
HDEBUG(D_acl)
- debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
+ debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
return rc;
}
-/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
-rate from the database, update it, and write it back when required. If there's
-no previous rate for this key, create one. */
+/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
+from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */
-dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
-if (dbm == NULL)
+if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
{
store_pool = old_pool;
sender_rate = NULL;
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit database not available\n");
*log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
return DEFER;
}
-dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
+dbdb = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, &dbdb_size);
+dbd = NULL;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
-if (dbd == NULL)
+if (dbdb)
+ {
+ /* Locate the basic ratelimit block inside the DB data. */
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found key in database\n");
+ dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
+
+ /* Forget the old Bloom filter if it is too old, so that we count each
+ repeating event once per period. We don't simply clear and re-use the old
+ filter because we want its size to change if the limit changes. Note that
+ we keep the dbd pointer for copying the rate into the new data block. */
+
+ if(unique && tv.tv_sec > dbdb->bloom_epoch + period)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding old Bloom filter\n");
+ dbdb = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Sanity check. */
+
+ if(unique && dbdb_size < sizeof(*dbdb))
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding undersize Bloom filter\n");
+ dbdb = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Allocate a new data block if the database lookup failed
+or the Bloom filter passed its age limit. */
+
+if (!dbdb)
{
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
- dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
+ if (!unique)
+ {
+ /* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
+ dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
+ dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int extra;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new Bloom filter\n");
+
+ /* See the long comment below for an explanation of the magic number 2.
+ The filter has a minimum size in case the rate limit is very small;
+ this is determined by the definition of dbdata_ratelimit_unique. */
+
+ extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
+ if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
+ dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
+ dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
+ dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
+ dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
+ memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);
+
+ /* Preserve any basic ratelimit data (which is our longer-term memory)
+ by copying it from the discarded block. */
+
+ if (dbd)
+ {
+ dbdb->dbd = *dbd;
+ dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+/* If we are counting unique events, find out if this event is new or not.
+If the client repeats the event during the current period then it should be
+counted. We skip this code in readonly mode for efficiency, because any
+changes to the filter will be discarded and because count is already set to
+zero. */
+
+if (unique && !readonly)
+ {
+ /* We identify unique events using a Bloom filter. (You can find my
+ notes on Bloom filters at http://fanf.livejournal.com/81696.html)
+ With the per_addr option, an "event" is a recipient address, though the
+ user can use the unique option to define their own events. We only count
+ an event if we have not seen it before.
+
+ We size the filter according to the rate limit, which (in leaky mode)
+ is the limit on the population of the filter. We allow 16 bits of space
+ per entry (see the construction code above) and we set (up to) 8 of them
+ when inserting an element (see the loop below). The probability of a false
+ positive (an event we have not seen before but which we fail to count) is
+
+ size = limit * 16
+ numhash = 8
+ allzero = exp(-numhash * pop / size)
+ = exp(-0.5 * pop / limit)
+ fpr = pow(1 - allzero, numhash)
+
+ For senders at the limit the fpr is 0.06% or 1 in 1700
+ and for senders at half the limit it is 0.0006% or 1 in 170000
+
+ In strict mode the Bloom filter can fill up beyond the normal limit, in
+ which case the false positive rate will rise. This means that the
+ measured rate for very fast senders can bogusly drop off after a while.
+
+ At twice the limit, the fpr is 2.5% or 1 in 40
+ At four times the limit, it is 31% or 1 in 3.2
+
+ It takes ln(pop/limit) periods for an over-limit burst of pop events to
+ decay below the limit, and if this is more than one then the Bloom filter
+ will be discarded before the decay gets that far. The false positive rate
+ at this threshold is 9.3% or 1 in 10.7. */
+
+ BOOL seen;
+ unsigned n, hash, hinc;
+ uschar md5sum[16];
+ md5 md5info;
+
+ /* Instead of using eight independent hash values, we combine two values
+ using the formula h1 + n * h2. This does not harm the Bloom filter's
+ performance, and means the amount of hash we need is independent of the
+ number of bits we set in the filter. */
+
+ md5_start(&md5info);
+ md5_end(&md5info, unique, Ustrlen(unique), md5sum);
+ hash = md5sum[0] | md5sum[1] << 8 | md5sum[2] << 16 | md5sum[3] << 24;
+ hinc = md5sum[4] | md5sum[5] << 8 | md5sum[6] << 16 | md5sum[7] << 24;
+
+ /* Scan the bits corresponding to this event. A zero bit means we have
+ not seen it before. Ensure all bits are set to record this event. */
+
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit checking uniqueness of %s\n", unique);
+
+ seen = TRUE;
+ for (n = 0; n < 8; n++, hash += hinc)
+ {
+ int bit = 1 << (hash % 8);
+ int byte = (hash / 8) % dbdb->bloom_size;
+ if ((dbdb->bloom[byte] & bit) == 0)
+ {
+ dbdb->bloom[byte] |= bit;
+ seen = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If this event has occurred before, do not count it. */
+
+ if (seen)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event found in Bloom filter\n");
+ count = 0.0;
+ }
+ else
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event added to Bloom filter\n");
+ }
+
+/* If there was no previous ratelimit data block for this key, initialize
+the new one, otherwise update the block from the database. The initial rate
+is what would be computed by the code below for an infinite interval. */
+
+if (!dbd)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit initializing new key's rate data\n");
+ dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
- dbd->rate = 0.0;
+ dbd->rate = count;
}
else
{
double i_over_p = interval / period;
double a = exp(-i_over_p);
+ /* Combine the instantaneous rate (period / interval) with the previous rate
+ using the smoothing factor a. In order to measure sized events, multiply the
+ instantaneous rate by the count of bytes or recipients etc. */
+
dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
-
- /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
- measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
- then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
- decay as if nothing happened. */
-
- if (per_byte)
- dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
- * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
- else if (per_cmd && where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
- dbd->rate = (double)recipients_count
- * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
- else
- dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
+ dbd->rate = (1 - a) * count / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
+
+ /* When events are very widely spaced the computed rate tends towards zero.
+ Although this is accurate it turns out not to be useful for our purposes,
+ especially when the first event after a long silence is the start of a spam
+ run. A more useful model is that the rate for an isolated event should be the
+ size of the event per the period size, ignoring the lack of events outside
+ the current period and regardless of where the event falls in the period. So,
+ if the interval was so long that the calculated rate is unhelpfully small, we
+ re-initialize the rate. In the absence of higher-rate bursts, the condition
+ below is true if the interval is greater than the period. */
+
+ if (dbd->rate < count) dbd->rate = count;
}
-/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
-matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
-the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
-be completely blocked). */
+/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit.
+This matters for edge cases such as a limit of zero, when the client
+should be completely blocked. */
-rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
+rc = dbd->rate < limit ? FAIL : OK;
/* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
-rate preventing them from getting any email through. If noupdate is set,
-do not do any updates. */
+rate preventing them from getting any email through. If readonly is set,
+neither leaky nor strict are set, so we do not do any updates. */
-if ((rc == FAIL || !leaky) && !noupdate)
+if ((rc == FAIL && leaky) || strict)
{
- dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db updated\n");
+ dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbdb, dbdb_size);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db updated\n");
}
else
{
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
- noupdate? "noupdate set" : "over the limit, but leaky");
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
+ readonly? "readonly mode" : "over the limit, but leaky");
}
dbfn_close(dbm);
-/* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
+/* Store the result in the tree for future reference. Take the taint status
+from the key for consistency even though it's unlikely we'll ever expand this. */
-if (anchor != NULL && !noupdate)
- {
- t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
- t->data.ptr = dbd;
- Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
- (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
- }
+t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key), is_tainted(key));
+t->data.ptr = dbd;
+Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
+(void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
/* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
HDEBUG(D_acl)
- debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
+ debug_printf_indent("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
+
+return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* The udpsend ACL modifier *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called by acl_check_condition() below.
+
+Arguments:
+ arg the option string for udpsend=
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+
+Returns: OK - Completed.
+ DEFER - Problem with DNS lookup.
+ ERROR - Syntax error in options.
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_udpsend(const uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
+{
+int sep = 0;
+uschar *hostname;
+uschar *portstr;
+uschar *portend;
+host_item *h;
+int portnum;
+int len;
+int r, s;
+uschar * errstr;
+
+hostname = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
+portstr = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
+
+if (!hostname)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"missing destination host in \"udpsend\" modifier";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+if (!portstr)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"missing destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+if (!arg)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"missing datagram payload in \"udpsend\" modifier";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+portnum = Ustrtol(portstr, &portend, 10);
+if (*portend != '\0')
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"bad destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
+/* Make a single-item host list. */
+h = store_get(sizeof(host_item), FALSE);
+memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item));
+h->name = hostname;
+h->port = portnum;
+h->mx = MX_NONE;
+
+if (string_is_ip_address(hostname, NULL))
+ h->address = hostname, r = HOST_FOUND;
+else
+ r = host_find_byname(h, NULL, 0, NULL, FALSE);
+if (r == HOST_FIND_FAILED || r == HOST_FIND_AGAIN)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"DNS lookup failed in \"udpsend\" modifier";
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+
+HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf_indent("udpsend [%s]:%d %s\n", h->address, portnum, arg);
+
+/*XXX this could better use sendto */
+r = s = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_DGRAM, h->address, portnum, portnum,
+ 1, NULL, &errstr, NULL);
+if (r < 0) goto defer;
+len = Ustrlen(arg);
+r = send(s, arg, len, 0);
+if (r < 0)
+ {
+ errstr = US strerror(errno);
+ close(s);
+ goto defer;
+ }
+close(s);
+if (r < len)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr =
+ string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" truncated from %d to %d octets", len, r);
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+
+HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf_indent("udpsend %d bytes\n", r);
-return rc;
+return OK;
+
+defer:
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" failed: %s", errstr);
+return DEFER;
}
{
uschar *user_message = NULL;
uschar *log_message = NULL;
-uschar *p = NULL;
int rc = OK;
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
-int sep = '/';
+int sep = -'/';
#endif
-for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
+for (; cb; cb = cb->next)
{
- uschar *arg;
+ const uschar *arg;
int control_type;
/* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
{
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent(" message: %s\n", cb->arg);
user_message = cb->arg;
continue;
}
if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
{
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("l_message: %s\n", cb->arg);
log_message = cb->arg;
continue;
}
of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
checking functions in some cases. */
- if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
+ if (!conditions[cb->type].expand_at_top)
+ arg = cb->arg;
+ else if (!(arg = expand_string(cb->arg)))
{
- arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
- if (arg == NULL)
- {
- if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
- cb->arg, expand_string_message);
- return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
- }
+ if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
+ cb->arg, expand_string_message);
+ return f.search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
}
- else arg = cb->arg;
/* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
HDEBUG(D_acl)
{
int lhswidth = 0;
- debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
- (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
- conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
+ debug_printf_indent("check %s%s %n",
+ (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
+ conditions[cb->type].name, &lhswidth);
if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
{
- debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
- lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ if ( Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0
+ || Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
+ {
+ debug_printf("%s ", cb->u.varname);
+ lhswidth += 19;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
+ lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
+ }
}
debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
/* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
- if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
+ if ((conditions[cb->type].forbids & (1 << where)) != 0)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
- cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
- conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
+ conditions[cb->type].is_modifier ? "use" : "test",
+ conditions[cb->type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
return ERROR;
}
"discard" verb. */
case ACLC_ACL:
- rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
- if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
- "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
- verbs[verb]);
- return ERROR;
- }
+ rc = acl_check_wargs(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
+ if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
+ "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
+ verbs[verb]);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
break;
case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
- rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
- match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
- TRUE, NULL);
+ rc = sender_host_authenticated ? match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated,
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL) : FAIL;
break;
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
#endif
case ACLC_CONDITION:
- if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
+ /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
+ expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
+ different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
+ if (*arg == '-'
+ ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */
+ : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
else
rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
break;
case ACLC_CONTROL:
- control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
-
- /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
-
- if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
- controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
- return ERROR;
- }
-
- switch(control_type)
{
- case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
- allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
- break;
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
- bmi_run = 1;
- break;
- #endif
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
- dk_do_verify = 1;
- break;
- #endif
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DKIM
- case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
- dkim_do_verify = 1;
- break;
- #endif
-
- case CONTROL_ERROR:
- return ERROR;
-
- case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
- deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
- break;
+ const uschar *p = NULL;
+ control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
- case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
- deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
- break;
-
- case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
- smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
- break;
-
- case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
- smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
- break;
+ /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
- no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
- break;
- #endif
+ if (controls_list[control_type].forbids & (1 << where))
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
+ controls_list[control_type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
- case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
- no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
- break;
+ switch(control_type)
+ {
+ case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
+ f.allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
+ break;
- case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
- pipelining_enable = FALSE;
- break;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
+ bmi_run = 1;
+ break;
+#endif
- case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
- disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
- break;
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
+ f.dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
+# ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
+ /* Since DKIM was blocked, skip DMARC too */
+ f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
+ f.dmarc_enable_forensic = FALSE;
+# endif
+ break;
+#endif
- case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
- disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
- break;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
+ case CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY:
+ f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
+ break;
- case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
- case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
- fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
- if (*p == '/')
- {
- uschar *pp = p + 1;
- while (*pp != 0) pp++;
- fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
- p = pp;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Explicitly reset to default string */
- fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
- }
- break;
+ case CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC:
+ f.dmarc_enable_forensic = TRUE;
+ break;
+#endif
- case CONTROL_FREEZE:
- deliver_freeze = TRUE;
- deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
- freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
- if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
- {
- p += 8;
- freeze_tell = NULL;
- }
- if (*p != 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- break;
+ case CONTROL_DSCP:
+ if (*p == '/')
+ {
+ int fd, af, level, optname, value;
+ /* If we are acting on stdin, the setsockopt may fail if stdin is not
+ a socket; we can accept that, we'll just debug-log failures anyway. */
+ fd = fileno(smtp_in);
+ if ((af = ip_get_address_family(fd)) < 0)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf_indent("smtp input is probably not a socket [%s], not setting DSCP\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (dscp_lookup(p+1, af, &level, &optname, &value))
+ if (setsockopt(fd, level, optname, &value, sizeof(value)) < 0)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("failed to set input DSCP[%s]: %s\n",
+ p+1, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("set input DSCP to \"%s\"\n", p+1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised DSCP value in \"control=%s\"", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_ERROR:
+ return ERROR;
+
+ case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
+ deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
+ deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
+ smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
+ smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
+ break;
- case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
- queue_only_policy = TRUE;
- break;
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
+ f.no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
+ break;
+#endif
- case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
- originator_name = US"";
- submission_mode = TRUE;
- while (*p == '/')
- {
- if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
- {
- p += 14;
- active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
- active_local_from_check = FALSE;
- }
- else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
- {
- uschar *pp = p + 8;
- while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
- submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
- p = pp;
- }
- /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
- the string. */
- else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
- {
- uschar *pp = p + 6;
- while (*pp != 0) pp++;
- submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
- big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
- p = pp;
- }
- else break;
- }
- if (*p != 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- break;
+ case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
+ f.no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
+ f.pipelining_enable = FALSE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
+ f.disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
+ f.disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
+ cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"fakereject");
+ case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
+ fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
+ if (*p == '/')
+ {
+ const uschar *pp = p + 1;
+ while (*pp) pp++;
+ fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ else /* Explicitly reset to default string */
+ fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_FREEZE:
+ f.deliver_freeze = TRUE;
+ deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
+ freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
+ if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ p += 8;
+ freeze_tell = NULL;
+ }
+ if (*p)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"item frozen");
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_QUEUE:
+ f.queue_only_policy = TRUE;
+ if (Ustrcmp(p, "_only") == 0)
+ p += 5;
+ else while (*p == '/')
+ if (Ustrncmp(p, "/only", 5) == 0)
+ { p += 5; f.queue_smtp = FALSE; }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/first_pass_route", 17) == 0)
+ { p += 17; f.queue_smtp = TRUE; }
+ else
+ break;
+ cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"queueing forced");
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
+ originator_name = US"";
+ f.submission_mode = TRUE;
+ while (*p == '/')
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
+ {
+ p += 14;
+ f.active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
+ f.active_local_from_check = FALSE;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ const uschar *pp = p + 8;
+ while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
+ the string. */
+ else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
+ {
+ const uschar *pp = p + 6;
+ while (*pp) pp++;
+ submission_name = parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6);
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ else break;
+ }
+ if (*p)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_DEBUG:
+ {
+ uschar * debug_tag = NULL;
+ uschar * debug_opts = NULL;
+ BOOL kill = FALSE;
+
+ while (*p == '/')
+ {
+ const uschar * pp = p+1;
+ if (Ustrncmp(pp, "tag=", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
+ debug_tag = string_copyn(p+5, pp-p-5);
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "opts=", 5) == 0)
+ {
+ for (pp += 5; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
+ debug_opts = string_copyn(p+6, pp-p-6);
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "kill", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
+ kill = TRUE;
+ }
+ else
+ while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ p = pp;
+ }
+
+ if (kill)
+ debug_logging_stop();
+ else
+ debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
+ f.suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY:
+ {
+ uschar * ignored = NULL;
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ if (prdr_requested)
+#else
+ if (0)
+#endif
+ /* Too hard to think about for now. We might in future cutthrough
+ the case where both sides handle prdr and this-node prdr acl
+ is "accept" */
+ ignored = US"PRDR active";
+ else if (f.deliver_freeze)
+ ignored = US"frozen";
+ else if (f.queue_only_policy)
+ ignored = US"queue-only";
+ else if (fake_response == FAIL)
+ ignored = US"fakereject";
+ else if (rcpt_count != 1)
+ ignored = US"nonfirst rcpt";
+ else if (cutthrough.delivery)
+ ignored = US"repeated";
+ else if (cutthrough.callout_hold_only)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf_indent(" cutthrough request upgrades callout hold\n");
+ cutthrough.callout_hold_only = FALSE;
+ cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
+ while (*p == '/')
+ {
+ const uschar * pp = p+1;
+ if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
+ {
+ pp += 6;
+ if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
+ /* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool") == 0) ; default */
+ }
+ else
+ while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(D_acl) if (ignored)
+ debug_printf(" cutthrough request ignored on %s item\n", ignored);
+ }
+ break;
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
+ case CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT:
+ if (*p == '/')
+ {
+ if (p[1] == '1')
+ {
+ message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
+ p += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (p[1] == '0')
+ {
+ message_utf8_downconvert = 0;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
+ p += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (p[1] == '-' && p[2] == '1')
+ {
+ message_utf8_downconvert = -1;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = TRUE;
+ p += 3;
+ break;
+ }
+ *log_msgptr = US"bad option value for control=utf8_downconvert";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ERROR;
+#endif
- case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
- suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
+ }
break;
}
- break;
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
case ACLC_DCC:
{
- /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
- uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
+ /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
+ const uschar * list = arg;
+ uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
/* Run the dcc backend. */
rc = dcc_process(&ss);
- /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
- while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
- != NULL) {
+ /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
- {
- /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
- rc = FAIL;
- }
- }
+ rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
}
break;
#endif
}
else
{
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
delay);
if (host_checking)
{
HDEBUG(D_acl)
- debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
+ debug_printf_indent("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
}
- /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
- gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
- the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
- that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
- is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
- end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
- Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
- can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
- it is not always available.
-
- NOTE 1: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
+ /* NOTE 1: Remember that we may be
dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
else
{
- if (smtp_out != NULL && !disable_delay_flush) mac_smtp_fflush();
+ if (smtp_out && !f.disable_delay_flush)
+ mac_smtp_fflush();
+
+#if !defined(NO_POLL_H) && defined (POLLRDHUP)
+ {
+ struct pollfd p;
+ nfds_t n = 0;
+ if (smtp_out)
+ {
+ p.fd = fileno(smtp_out);
+ p.events = POLLRDHUP;
+ n = 1;
+ }
+ if (poll(&p, n, delay*1000) > 0)
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay cancelled by peer close\n");
+ }
+#else
+ /* Lacking POLLRDHUP it appears to be impossible to detect that a
+ TCP/IP connection has gone away without reading from it. This means
+ that we cannot shorten the delay below if the client goes away,
+ because we cannot discover that the client has closed its end of the
+ connection. (The connection is actually in a half-closed state,
+ waiting for the server to close its end.) It would be nice to be able
+ to detect this state, so that the Exim process is not held up
+ unnecessarily. However, it seems that we can't. The poll() function
+ does not do the right thing, and in any case it is not always
+ available. */
+
while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
+#endif
}
}
}
break;
- #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- case ACLC_DEMIME:
- rc = demime(&arg);
- break;
- #endif
-
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
- case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
- if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
- /* check header source of domain against given string */
- switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
- case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- }
- break;
-
- case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
- if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
- /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
- rc = FAIL;
- if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
- rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- if (dk_verify_block->testing)
- rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
-
- case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
- if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
- if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
- rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
- NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
- else rc = FAIL;
- break;
-
- case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
- if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
- if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
- rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
- NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
- else rc = FAIL;
+ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
+ if (dkim_cur_signer)
+ rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
+ else
+ rc = FAIL;
break;
- case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
- if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
- if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
- rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
- else rc = FAIL;
+ case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
+ rc = match_isinlist(dkim_verify_status,
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
break;
+ #endif
- case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
- if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
- if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
- switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
- case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
- rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
- NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- break;
- }
- }
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
+ case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS:
+ if (!f.dmarc_has_been_checked)
+ dmarc_process();
+ f.dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
+ /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
+ * view into the process in the future. */
+ rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS),
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
break;
- #endif
+#endif
case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
- rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
+ rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, &arg, log_msgptr);
break;
case ACLC_DOMAINS:
rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
- addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
+ addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
break;
/* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
writing is poorly documented. */
case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
- if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
+ if (tls_in.cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
{
uschar *endcipher = NULL;
- uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
- if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
+ uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':');
+ if (!cipher) cipher = tls_in.cipher; else
{
endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
- if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
+ if (endcipher) *endcipher = 0;
}
rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
+ if (endcipher) *endcipher = ':';
}
break;
case ACLC_HOSTS:
rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
- (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
- if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
+ sender_host_address ? sender_host_address : US"", CUSS &host_data);
+ if (rc == DEFER) *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
+ if (host_data) host_data = string_copy_perm(host_data, TRUE);
break;
case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
&localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
- &deliver_localpart_data);
+ CUSS &deliver_localpart_data);
break;
case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
{
int logbits = 0;
int sep = 0;
- uschar *s = arg;
- uschar *ss;
- while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
- != NULL)
+ const uschar *s = arg;
+ uschar * ss;
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, NULL, 0)))
{
if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
case ACLC_LOGWRITE:
{
int logbits = 0;
- uschar *s = arg;
+ const uschar *s = arg;
if (*s == ':')
{
s++;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
-
if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
}
break;
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- case ACLC_MALWARE:
+ case ACLC_MALWARE: /* Run the malware backend. */
{
/* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
- uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
- /* Run the malware backend. */
- rc = malware(&ss);
- /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
- while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
- != NULL) {
- if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
- {
- /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
- rc = FAIL;
- }
- }
+ const uschar * list = arg;
+ uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
+ uschar * opt;
+ BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
+ int timeout = 0;
+
+ while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
+ if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0)
+ defer_ok = TRUE;
+ else if ( strncmpic(opt, US"tmo=", 4) == 0
+ && (timeout = readconf_readtime(opt+4, '\0', FALSE)) < 0
+ )
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad timeout value in '%s'", opt);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
+ rc = malware(ss, timeout);
+ if (rc == DEFER && defer_ok)
+ rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
}
break;
break;
#endif
+ case ACLC_QUEUE:
+ if (is_tainted(arg))
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted",
+ arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
+ "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE);
+ break;
+
case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
break;
case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
- rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
- &recipient_data);
+ rc = match_address_list(CUS addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
+ CUSS &recipient_data);
break;
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
break;
#endif
+ case ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER:
+ setup_remove_header(arg);
+ break;
+
case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
{
uschar *sdomain;
sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
- sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
+ sdomain = sdomain ? sdomain + 1 : US"";
rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
}
break;
case ACLC_SENDERS:
- rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
- sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
+ rc = match_address_list(CUS sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
+ sender_address_cache, -1, 0, CUSS &sender_data);
break;
- /* Connection variables must persist forever */
+ /* Connection variables must persist forever; message variables not */
case ACLC_SET:
{
int old_pool = store_pool;
- if (cb->u.varname[0] == 'c') store_pool = POOL_PERM;
- acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
+ if ( cb->u.varname[0] != 'm'
+#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
+ || event_name /* An event is being delivered */
+#endif
+ )
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM /* Overwriteable dkim result variables */
+ if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0)
+ dkim_verify_status = string_copy(arg);
+ else if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
+ dkim_verify_reason = string_copy(arg);
+ else
+#endif
+ acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
store_pool = old_pool;
}
break;
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_SPAM:
{
- /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
- uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
- /* Run the spam backend. */
- rc = spam(&ss);
- /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
- while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
- != NULL) {
+ /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
+ const uschar * list = arg;
+ uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
+
+ rc = spam(CUSS &ss);
+ /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
- {
- /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
- rc = FAIL;
- }
- }
+ rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
}
break;
- #endif
+#endif
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+#ifdef SUPPORT_SPF
case ACLC_SPF:
- rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
+ rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL);
+ break;
+ case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
+ rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case ACLC_UDPSEND:
+ rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr);
break;
- #endif
/* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
case ACLC_VERIFY:
rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
- acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
+ if (*user_msgptr)
+ acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
break;
/* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
- if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
- {
+ if (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)
if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
- else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
- }
+ else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
}
if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;
-if (((1<<rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
+if ((BIT(rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
{
uschar *expmessage;
uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
(rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
- if (user_message != NULL)
+ if (user_message)
{
acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
- if (expmessage == NULL)
+ if (!expmessage)
{
- if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
+ if (!f.expand_string_forcedfail)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
user_message, expand_string_message);
}
else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
}
- if (log_message != NULL)
+ if (log_message)
{
acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
- if (expmessage == NULL)
+ if (!expmessage)
{
- if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
+ if (!f.expand_string_forcedfail)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
log_message, expand_string_message);
}
/* If no log message, default it to the user message */
- if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
+ if (!*log_msgptr) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
}
acl_verify_message = NULL;
for(;;)
{
- while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
- if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
- yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
+ Uskip_whitespace(&acl_text); /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
+ if (!*acl_text) return NULL; /* No more data */
+ yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
- while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
+ while (*acl_text && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
/* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
- if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
+ if (!*acl_text) return *yield == '#' ? NULL : yield;
/* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
where where called from
addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
- level the nesting level
user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
*/
static int
-acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
+acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s,
uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
{
int fd = -1;
/* Catch configuration loops */
-if (level > 20)
+if (acl_level > 20)
{
*log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
return ERROR;
}
-if (s == NULL)
+if (!s)
{
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
return FAIL;
}
/* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
been expanded as part of condition processing. */
-if (level == 0)
+if (acl_level == 0)
{
- ss = expand_string(s);
- if (ss == NULL)
+ if (!(ss = expand_string(s)))
{
- if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
+ if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
expand_string_message);
return ERROR;
}
else ss = s;
-while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
+while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
/* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
(Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
{
- tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
- if (t != NULL)
+ tree_node * t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
+ if (t)
{
- acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
- if (acl == NULL)
+ if (!(acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr)))
{
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
return FAIL;
}
acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
}
else if (*ss == '/')
{
struct stat statbuf;
- fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
- if (fd < 0)
+ if (is_tainted(ss))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "attempt to open tainted ACL file name \"%s\"", ss);
+ /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
+ *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ if ((fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
strerror(errno));
return ERROR;
}
-
if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
return ERROR;
}
- acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
+ /* If the string being used as a filename is tainted, so is the file content */
+ acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1, is_tainted(ss));
acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
(void)close(fd);
acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
}
}
in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
persists between multiple messages. */
-if (acl == NULL)
+if (!acl)
{
int old_pool = store_pool;
if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
store_pool = old_pool;
- if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
+ if (!acl && *log_msgptr) return ERROR;
if (fd >= 0)
{
- tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
+ tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss), is_tainted(ss));
Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
t->data.ptr = acl;
(void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
/* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
-while (acl != NULL)
+while (acl)
{
int cond;
int basic_errno = 0;
BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
+ BOOL acl_quit_check = acl_level == 0
+ && (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT);
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
- acl_temp_details = FALSE;
-
- if ((where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT) &&
- acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
- acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT or not-QUIT ACL",
- verbs[acl->verb]);
- return ERROR;
- }
+ f.acl_temp_details = FALSE;
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("processing \"%s\" (%s %d)\n",
+ verbs[acl->verb], acl->srcfile, acl->srcline);
/* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
this condition. */
search_error_message = NULL;
- cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
+ cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, acl_level,
&endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
/* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
switch (cond)
{
case DEFER:
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
- if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
- {
- if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
- *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
- if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
- }
- else
- {
- acl_temp_details = TRUE;
- }
- if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
- break;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test deferred in %s\n",
+ verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
+ if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
+ {
+ if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
+ *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
+ if (smtp_return_error_details) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ }
+ else
+ f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
+ break;
default: /* Paranoia */
case ERROR:
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
- return ERROR;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test error in %s\n",
+ verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
+ return ERROR;
case OK:
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
- verbs[acl->verb]);
- break;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test succeeded in %s\n",
+ verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
+ break;
case FAIL:
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
- break;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test failed in %s\n",
+ verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
+ break;
/* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
case DISCARD:
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
- verbs[acl->verb]);
- break;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\" in %s\n",
+ verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
+ break;
case FAIL_DROP:
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
- verbs[acl->verb]);
- break;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\" in %s\n",
+ verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
+ break;
}
/* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
switch(acl->verb)
{
case ACL_ACCEPT:
- if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
- if (endpass_seen)
- {
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
- return cond;
- }
- break;
+ if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: ACCEPT\n", acl_name);
+ return cond;
+ }
+ if (endpass_seen)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
+ return cond;
+ }
+ break;
case ACL_DEFER:
- if (cond == OK)
- {
- acl_temp_details = TRUE;
- return DEFER;
- }
- break;
+ if (cond == OK)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DEFER\n", acl_name);
+ if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
+ f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+ break;
case ACL_DENY:
- if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
- break;
+ if (cond == OK)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DENY\n", acl_name);
+ if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+ break;
case ACL_DISCARD:
- if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
- if (endpass_seen)
- {
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
- return cond;
- }
- break;
+ if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DISCARD\n", acl_name);
+ if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
+ return DISCARD;
+ }
+ if (endpass_seen)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf_indent("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
+ return cond;
+ }
+ break;
case ACL_DROP:
- if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
- break;
+ if (cond == OK)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: DROP\n", acl_name);
+ if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
+ return FAIL_DROP;
+ }
+ break;
case ACL_REQUIRE:
- if (cond != OK) return cond;
- break;
+ if (cond != OK)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: not OK\n", acl_name);
+ if (acl_quit_check) goto badquit;
+ return cond;
+ }
+ break;
case ACL_WARN:
- if (cond == OK)
- acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
- else if (cond == DEFER && (log_extra_selector & LX_acl_warn_skipped) != 0)
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
- "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
- (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
- (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
- *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
- break;
+ if (cond == OK)
+ acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
+ else if (cond == DEFER && LOGGING(acl_warn_skipped))
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
+ "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
+ (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
+ (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
+ *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
+ break;
default:
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
- acl->verb);
- break;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
+ acl->verb);
+ break;
}
/* Pass to the next ACL item */
/* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
-HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
+HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
return FAIL;
+
+badquit:
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("QUIT or not-QUIT toplevel ACL may not fail "
+ "('%s' verb used incorrectly)", verbs[acl->verb]);
+ return ERROR;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/* Same args as acl_check_internal() above, but the string s is
+the name of an ACL followed optionally by up to 9 space-separated arguments.
+The name and args are separately expanded. Args go into $acl_arg globals. */
+static int
+acl_check_wargs(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *s,
+ uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
+{
+uschar * tmp;
+uschar * tmp_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
+uschar * sav_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */
+int sav_narg;
+uschar * name;
+int i;
+int ret;
+
+if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(name = expand_string(tmp)))
+ goto bad;
+
+for (i = 0; i < 9; i++)
+ {
+ while (*s && isspace(*s)) s++;
+ if (!*s) break;
+ if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(tmp_arg[i] = expand_string(tmp)))
+ {
+ tmp = name;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+sav_narg = acl_narg;
+acl_narg = i;
+for (i = 0; i < acl_narg; i++)
+ {
+ sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
+ acl_arg[i] = tmp_arg[i];
+ }
+while (i < 9)
+ {
+ sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i];
+ acl_arg[i++] = NULL;
+ }
+
+acl_level++;
+ret = acl_check_internal(where, addr, name, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
+acl_level--;
+
+acl_narg = sav_narg;
+for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) acl_arg[i] = sav_arg[i];
+return ret;
+
+bad:
+if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return ERROR;
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
+ tmp, expand_string_message);
+return f.search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
}
+
/*************************************************
* Check access using an ACL *
*************************************************/
+/* Alternate interface for ACL, used by expansions */
+int
+acl_eval(int where, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
+{
+address_item adb;
+address_item *addr = NULL;
+int rc;
+
+*user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
+sender_verified_failed = NULL;
+ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
+log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
+
+if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
+ {
+ adb = address_defaults;
+ addr = &adb;
+ addr->address = expand_string(US"$local_part@$domain");
+ addr->domain = deliver_domain;
+ addr->local_part = deliver_localpart;
+ addr->cc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
+ addr->lc_local_part = deliver_localpart;
+ }
+
+acl_level++;
+rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
+acl_level--;
+return rc;
+}
+
+
+
/* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
DEFER can't tell at the moment
ERROR disaster
*/
+int acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
int
acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
-if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY || where==ACL_WHERE_PRDR)
+#else
+if (where==ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where==ACL_WHERE_VRFY)
+#endif
{
adb = address_defaults;
addr = &adb;
*log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
return DEFER;
}
+#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
+ if ((addr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
+ {
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
+ addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
+ }
+#endif
deliver_domain = addr->domain;
deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
}
-rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
+acl_where = where;
+acl_level = 0;
+rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
+acl_level = 0;
+acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
+
+/* Cutthrough - if requested,
+and WHERE_RCPT and not yet opened conn as result of recipient-verify,
+and rcpt acl returned accept,
+and first recipient (cancel on any subsequents)
+open one now and run it up to RCPT acceptance.
+A failed verify should cancel cutthrough request,
+and will pass the fail to the originator.
+Initial implementation: dual-write to spool.
+Assume the rxd datastream is now being copied byte-for-byte to an open cutthrough connection.
+
+Cease cutthrough copy on rxd final dot; do not send one.
+
+On a data acl, if not accept and a cutthrough conn is open, hard-close it (no SMTP niceness).
+
+On data acl accept, terminate the dataphase on an open cutthrough conn. If accepted or
+perm-rejected, reflect that to the original sender - and dump the spooled copy.
+If temp-reject, close the conn (and keep the spooled copy).
+If conn-failure, no action (and keep the spooled copy).
+*/
+switch (where)
+ {
+ case ACL_WHERE_RCPT:
+#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ case ACL_WHERE_PRDR:
+#endif
+
+ if (f.host_checking_callout) /* -bhc mode */
+ cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"host-checking mode");
+
+ else if ( rc == OK
+ && cutthrough.delivery
+ && rcpt_count > cutthrough.nrcpt
+ )
+ {
+ if ((rc = open_cutthrough_connection(addr)) == DEFER)
+ if (cutthrough.defer_pass)
+ {
+ uschar * s = addr->message;
+ /* Horrid kludge to recover target's SMTP message */
+ while (*s) s++;
+ do --s; while (!isdigit(*s));
+ if (*--s && isdigit(*s) && *--s && isdigit(*s)) *user_msgptr = s;
+ f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("cutthrough defer; will spool\n");
+ rc = OK;
+ }
+ }
+ else HDEBUG(D_acl) if (cutthrough.delivery)
+ if (rcpt_count <= cutthrough.nrcpt)
+ debug_printf_indent("ignore cutthrough request; nonfirst message\n");
+ else if (rc != OK)
+ debug_printf_indent("ignore cutthrough request; ACL did not accept\n");
+ break;
+
+ case ACL_WHERE_PREDATA:
+ if (rc == OK)
+ cutthrough_predata();
+ else
+ cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"predata acl not ok");
+ break;
+
+ case ACL_WHERE_QUIT:
+ case ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT:
+ /* Drop cutthrough conns, and drop heldopen verify conns if
+ the previous was not DATA */
+ {
+ uschar prev =
+ smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index))];
+ BOOL dropverify = !(prev == SCH_DATA || prev == SCH_BDAT);
+
+ cancel_cutthrough_connection(dropverify, US"quit or conndrop");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
- sender_address_data = NULL;
+ deliver_domain_data = sender_address_data = NULL;
/* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
}
-
/*************************************************
* Create ACL variable *
*************************************************/
*/
tree_node *
-acl_var_create(uschar *name)
+acl_var_create(uschar * name)
{
-tree_node *node, **root;
-root = (name[0] == 'c')? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
-node = tree_search(*root, name);
-if (node == NULL)
+tree_node * node, ** root = name[0] == 'c' ? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
+if (!(node = tree_search(*root, name)))
{
- node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name));
+ node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name), is_tainted(name));
Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
(void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
}
acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx)
{
FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx;
+if (is_tainted(value)) putc('-', f);
fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);
}
+/* vi: aw ai sw=2
+*/
/* End of acl.c */
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff