AA a-aa A V4NET.0.0.100
; ------- Testing DANE ------------
+; Since these refer to certs in the exim-ca tree, they must be regenerated any time that tree is.
+;
; full suite dns chain, sha512
;
-; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/cert1 -noout -pubkey \
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
; | openssl dgst -sha512 \
; | awk '{print $2}'
;
DNSSEC mxdane512ee MX 1 dane512ee
DNSSEC dane512ee A HOSTIPV4
-DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane512ee TLSA 3 1 2 3d5eb81b1dfc3f93c1fa8819e3fb3fdb41bb590441d5f3811db17772f4bc6de29bdd7c4f4b723750dda871b99379192b3f979f03db1252c4f08b03ef7176528d
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane512ee TLSA 3 1 2 69e8a5ddf24df2c51dc503959d26e621be4ce3853f71890512de3ae3390c5749ef3368dd4d274669b0653da8c3663f12ca092cd98e5e242e4de57ee6aa01cde1
; A-only, sha256
;
-; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/cert1 -noout -pubkey \
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
; | awk '{print $2}'
;
DNSSEC dane256ee A HOSTIPV4
-DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ee TLSA 3 1 1 2bb55f418bb03411a5007cecbfcd3ec1c94404312c0d53a44bb2166b32654db3
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ee TLSA 3 1 1 827664533176a58b3578e0e91d77d79d036d3a97f023d82baeefa8b8e13b44f8
; full MX, sha256, TA-mode
;
; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/CA/CA.pem -fingerprint -sha256 -noout \
-; | awk -F= '{print $2}' | tr -d : | tr '[A-F]' '[a-f]'
+; | awk -F= '{print $2}' | tr -d : | tr '[A-F]' '[a-f]'
;
DNSSEC mxdane256ta MX 1 dane256ta
DNSSEC dane256ta A HOSTIPV4
-DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ta TLSA 2 0 1 882be5ac06deafdc021a69daa457226153bfde6da7914813b0144b0fd31bf7ae
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ta TLSA 2 0 1 cb0fa6a633e52c787657f5ca0da1030800223cac459577b9b6a55ac9733348e5
+
+
+; full MX, sha256, TA-mode, cert-key-only
+; Indicates a trust-anchor for a chain involving an Authority Key ID extension
+; linkage, as this excites a bug in OpenSSL 1.0.2 which the DANE code has to
+; work around, while synthesizing a selfsigned parent for it.
+; As it happens it is also an intermediate cert in the CA-rooted chain, as this
+; was initially thought ot be a factor.
+;
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/CA/Signer.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+;
+DNSSEC mxdane256tak MX 1 dane256tak
+DNSSEC dane256tak A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256tak TLSA 2 1 1 73e279c0f5f5a9ee9851bbbc39023603d7b266acfd0764419c3b07cc380b79f9
; A multiple-return MX where all TLSA lookups defer
DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danelazy CNAME test.again.dns.
DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danelazy2 CNAME test.again.dns.
-; hosts with no TLSA
+; hosts with no TLSA (just missing here, hence the TLSA NXDMAIN is _insecure_; a broken dane config)
+; 1 for dane-required, 2 for merely requested
DNSSEC dane.no.1 A HOSTIPV4
DNSSEC dane.no.2 A 127.0.0.1
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA lookup fails (as opposed to there not being one)
+DNSSEC danebroken1 A 127.0.0.1
+_1225._tcp.danebroken1 CNAME test.fail.dns.
+
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA record is wrong
+; (127.0.0.1 for merely dane-requested, but having gotten the TLSA it is supposedly definitive)
+DNSSEC danebroken2 A 127.0.0.1
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken2 TLSA 2 0 1 cb0fa60000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA record is correct but not DNSSEC-assured
+; (record copied from dane256ee above)
+; 3 for dane-requested, 4 for dane-required
+DNSSEC danebroken3 A 127.0.0.1
+_1225._tcp.danebroken3 TLSA 2 0 1 827664533176a58b3578e0e91d77d79d036d3a97f023d82baeefa8b8e13b44f8
+DNSSEC danebroken4 A HOSTIPV4
+_1225._tcp.danebroken4 TLSA 2 0 1 827664533176a58b3578e0e91d77d79d036d3a97f023d82baeefa8b8e13b44f8
+
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the address record is correct but not DNSSEC-assured
+; (TLSA record copied from dane256ee above)
+; 5 for dane-requested, 6 for dane-required
+danebroken5 A 127.0.0.1
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken5 TLSA 2 0 1 827664533176a58b3578e0e91d77d79d036d3a97f023d82baeefa8b8e13b44f8
+danebroken6 A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken6 TLSA 2 0 1 827664533176a58b3578e0e91d77d79d036d3a97f023d82baeefa8b8e13b44f8
+
+; a good dns config saying there is no dane support, by securely returning NOXDOMAIN for TLSA lookups
+; 3 for dane-required, 4 for merely requested
+; the TLSA data here is dummy; ignored
+DNSSEC dane.no.3 A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC dane.no.4 A 127.0.0.1
+
+DNSSEC NXDOMAIN _1225._tcp.dane.no.3 TLSA 2 0 1 eec923139018c540a344c5191660ecba1ac3708525a98bfc338e17f31d3fa741
+DNSSEC NXDOMAIN _1225._tcp.dane.no.4 TLSA 2 0 1 eec923139018c540a344c5191660ecba1ac3708525a98bfc338e17f31d3fa741
+
+; a mixed-usage set of TLSA records, EE one failing. TA one coped from dane256ta.
+DNSSEC danemixed A 127.0.0.1
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danemixed TLSA 2 0 1 cb0fa6a633e52c787657f5ca0da1030800223cac459577b9b6a55ac9733348e5
+DNSSEC TLSA 3 1 1 8276000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+
; ------- Testing delays ------------
DELAY=500 delay500 A HOSTIPV4
; openssl genrsa -out aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private 1024
; openssl rsa -in aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private -out /dev/stdout -pubout -outform PEM
;
+; Deliberate bad version, having extra backslashes
+; sha256-hash-only version.... appears to be too long, gets truncated
+;
; Another, 512-bit (with a Notes field)
+; 512 requiring sha1 hash
+; 512 requiring sha256 hash
;
sel._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
+sel_bad._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1\; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
+sel_sha256._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha256; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
ses._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; n=halfkilo; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ=="
+ses_sha1._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha1; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ=="
+ses_sha256._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha256; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ=="
+
+sel2._domainkey TXT "v=spf1 mx a include:spf.nl2go.com -all"
+sel2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
+
+; EC signing, using Ed25519
+; - needs GnuTLS 3.6.0 (fedora rawhide has that)
+; certtool --generate-privkey --key-type=ed25519 --outfile=dkim_ed25519.private
+; certtool --load_privkey=dkim_ed25519.private --pubkey_info --outder | tail -c +13 | base64
+
+sed._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=sPs07Vu29FpHT/80UXUcYHFOHifD4o2ZlP2+XUh9g6E="
+
+; version of the above wrapped in SubjectPublicKeyInfo, in case the WG plumps in that direction
+; certtool --load_privkey=aux-fixed/dkim/dkim_ed25519.private --pubkey_info
+; (and grab the b64 content from between the pem headers)
+
+sedw._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAsPs07Vu29FpHT/80UXUcYHFOHifD4o2ZlP2+XUh9g6E="
; End