If the ACL returns defer the result is a forced-fail. Otherwise the expansion fails.
+.new
+.vitem "&*${authresults{*&<&'authserv-id'&>&*}}*&"
+.cindex authentication "results header"
+.cindex headers "authentication-results:"
+This item returns a string suitable for insertion as an
+&'Authentication-Results"'&
+header line.
+The given <&'authserv-id'&> is included in the result; typically this
+will ba a domain name identifying the system performing the authentications.
+Methods that may be present in the result include:
+.code
+none
+iprev
+auth
+spf
+dkim
+.endd
+
+Example use (as an ACL modifier):
+.code
+ add_header = :at_start:${authresults {$primary_hostname}}
+.endd
+.wen
+
+
.vitem "&*${certextract{*&<&'field'&>&*}{*&<&'certificate'&>&*}&&&
{*&<&'string2'&>&*}{*&<&'string3'&>&*}}*&"
.cindex "expansion" "extracting certificate fields"
&<<CHAPTLS>>& for details of TLS support and chapter &<<CHAPsmtptrans>>& for
details of the &(smtp)& transport.
+.vitem &$tls_out_dane$&
+.vindex &$tls_out_dane$&
+DANE active status. See section &<<SECDANE>>&.
+
.vitem &$tls_in_ocsp$&
.vindex "&$tls_in_ocsp$&"
When a message is received from a remote client connection
SMTP deliveries, this variable reflects the value of the &%tls_sni%& option on
the transport.
+.vitem &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$&
+.vindex &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$&
+Bitfield of TLSA record types found. See section &<<SECDANE>>&.
+
.vitem &$tod_bsdinbox$&
.vindex "&$tod_bsdinbox$&"
The time of day and the date, in the format required for BSD-style mailbox
TLS session for any host that matches this list.
&%tls_verify_certificates%& should also be set for the transport.
+.new
+.option hosts_require_dane smtp "host list&!!" unset
+.cindex DANE "transport options"
+.cindex DANE "requiring for certain servers"
+If built with DANE support, Exim will require that a DNSSEC-validated
+TLSA record is present for any host matching the list,
+and that a DANE-verified TLS connection is made.
+There will be no fallback to in-clear communication.
+See section &<<SECDANE>>&.
+.wen
+
.option hosts_require_ocsp smtp "host list&!!" unset
.cindex "TLS" "requiring for certain servers"
Exim will request, and check for a valid Certificate Status being given, on a
CHUNKING support, Exim will attempt to use BDAT commands rather than DATA.
BDAT will not be used in conjunction with a transport filter.
+.new
+.option hosts_try_dane smtp "host list&!!" unset
+.cindex DANE "transport options"
+.cindex DANE "attempting for certain servers"
+If built with DANE support, Exim will lookup a
+TLSA record for any host matching the list.
+If found and verified by DNSSEC,
+a DANE-verified TLS connection is made to that host;
+there will be no fallback to in-clear communication.
+See section &<<SECDANE>>&.
+.wen
+
.option hosts_try_fastopen smtp "host list&!!" unset
.cindex "fast open, TCP" "enabling, in client"
.cindex "TCP Fast Open" "enabling, in client"
+.new
+.section DANE "SECDANE"
+.cindex DANE
+DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that
+it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM)
+operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection you make, and make another one to the server (so both
+you and the server still think you have an encrypted connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of
+Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable
+certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the Mozilla set, as your trust anchors).
+
+What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility
+that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the admins of the target server. The attack surface presented
+by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set of root CAs.
+
+It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply
+fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS.
+
+DANE scales better than having to maintain (and side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates
+for every possible target server. It also scales (slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP
+client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also means not having to pay a CA for certificates.
+
+DANE requires a server operator to do three things: 1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients
+that DNS lookups they do for the server have not been tampered with. The domain MX record applying
+to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and any associated CNAME records must all be covered by
+DNSSEC.
+2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server certificate for a TLS connection should be.
+3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain, in TLS connections which is traceable to the one
+defined by (one of?) the TSLA records
+
+There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side operation of DANE.
+Support for client-side operation of DANE can be included at compile time by defining SUPPORT_DANE=yes
+in &_Local/Makefile_&.
+If it has been included, the macro "_HAVE_DANE" will be defined.
+
+The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies
+the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted
+during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a single system, using a self-signed certificate.
+DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
+well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just a self-signed certificate which is used to sign
+cerver certificates, but running one securely does require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used
+then either all clients must be primed with it, or (probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit
+the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate. If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it
+(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is reduced from all public CAs to that single CA.
+DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record,
+all of which point to a single TLSA record.
+
+The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1) and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
+
+At the time of writing, &url(https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa)
+is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like
+
+.code
+ openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout <certificate.pem \
+ | openssl rsa -outform der -pubin 2>/dev/null \
+ | openssl sha512 \
+ | awk '{print $2}'
+.endd
+
+are workable for 4th-field hashes.
+
+For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
+
+The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
+be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However, this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the
+default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff DANE is in use, to:
+
+.code
+ hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \
+ {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \
+ {*}{}}
+.endd
+
+The (new) variable &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$& is a bitfield with numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes.
+The zero above means DANE was not in use, the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were
+found. If the definition of &%hosts_request_ocsp%& includes the
+string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to
+control the OCSP request.
+
+This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and
+those who use &%hosts_require_ocsp%&, should consider the interaction with DANE in their OCSP settings.
+
+
+For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options, &%hosts_try_dane%& and &%hosts_require_dane%&.
+The latter variant will result in failure if the target host is not DNSSEC-secured.
+
+DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured MX, A and TLSA records.
+
+A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match and the host-lookup succeeded using dnssec.
+If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection
+will be required for the host. If it does not, the host will not
+be used; there is no fallback to non-DANE or non-TLS.
+
+If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport options are ignored:
+.code
+ hosts_require_tls
+ tls_verify_hosts
+ tls_try_verify_hosts
+ tls_verify_certificates
+ tls_crl
+ tls_verify_cert_hostnames
+.endd
+
+If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored
+verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set appropriately.
+
+Currently the &%dnssec_request_domains%& must be active and &%dnssec_require_domains%& is ignored.
+
+If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane".
+
+There is a new variable &$tls_out_dane$& which will have "yes" if
+verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful
+in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable &$tls_out_tlsa_usage$& (detailed above).
+
+Under GnuTLS, DANE is only supported from version 3.0.0 onwards.
+.wen
+
+
+
. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
. ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
unchanged, or whether they should be rendered as escape sequences.
.next
.cindex "log" "certificate verification"
+.cindex log DANE
+.cindex DANE logging
&%tls_certificate_verified%&: An extra item is added to <= and => log lines
when TLS is in use. The item is &`CV=yes`& if the peer's certificate was
-verified, and &`CV=no`& if not.
+verified
+.new
+using a CA trust anchor,
+&`CA=dane`& if using a DNS trust anchor,
+.wen
+and &`CV=no`& if not.
.next
.cindex "log" "TLS cipher"
.cindex "TLS" "logging cipher"
.endd
.cindex utf8 "address downconversion"
-.cindev i18n "utf8 address downconversion"
+.cindex i18n "utf8 address downconversion"
.new
The RCPT ACL
.wen
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff