#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
# include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+# include <danessl.h>
+#endif
+
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
# define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \
+ && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+#endif
#if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
# warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
uschar *server_cipher_list;
/* only passed down to tls_error: */
host_item *host;
-
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
- uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
+ const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ uschar * event_action;
#endif
} tls_ext_ctx_cb;
*/
static int
-tls_error(uschar *prefix, host_item *host, uschar *msg)
+tls_error(uschar * prefix, const host_item * host, uschar * msg)
{
-if (msg == NULL)
+if (!msg)
{
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
msg = (uschar *)ssl_errstring;
}
-if (host == NULL)
+if (host)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection (%s): %s",
+ host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+else
{
uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
conn_info += 5;
+ /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s): %s",
conn_info, prefix, msg);
return DEFER;
}
-else
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on connection to %s [%s] (%s): %s",
- host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
- return FAIL;
- }
}
{
X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
+ name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
}
}
*/
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+static int
+verify_event(tls_support * tlsp, X509 * cert, int depth, const uschar * dn,
+ BOOL *calledp, const BOOL *optionalp, const uschar * what)
+{
+uschar * ev;
+uschar * yield;
+X509 * old_cert;
+
+ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
+if (ev)
+ {
+ old_cert = tlsp->peercert;
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+ /* NB we do not bother setting peerdn */
+ if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] %s verify denied by event-action: "
+ "depth=%d cert=%s: %s",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ what, depth, dn, yield);
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ {
+ if (old_cert) tlsp->peercert = old_cert; /* restore 1st failing cert */
+ return 1; /* reject (leaving peercert set) */
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
+ "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ }
+ X509_free(tlsp->peercert);
+ tlsp->peercert = old_cert;
+ }
+return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
/*************************************************
* Callback for verification *
*************************************************/
/* The SSL library does certificate verification if set up to do so. This
callback has the current yes/no state is in "state". If verification succeeded,
-we set up the tls_peerdn string. If verification failed, what happens depends
-on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate or not.
+we set the certificate-verified flag. If verification failed, what happens
+depends on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate
+or not.
If verification is optional, we change the state to yes, but still log the
verification error. For some reason (it really would help to have proper
documentation of OpenSSL), this callback function then gets called again, this
-time with state = 1. In fact, that's useful, because we can set up the peerdn
-value, but we must take care not to set the private verified flag on the second
-time through.
+time with state = 1. We must take care not to set the private verified flag on
+the second time through.
Note: this function is not called if the client fails to present a certificate
when asked. We get here only if a certificate has been received. Handling of
optional verification for this case is done when requesting SSL to verify, by
setting SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the non-optional case.
+May be called multiple times for different issues with a certificate, even
+for a given "depth" in the certificate chain.
+
Arguments:
state current yes/no state as 1/0
x509ctx certificate information.
tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
{
X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
-static uschar txt[256];
+int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
+uschar dn[256];
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
+X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
if (state == 0)
{
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx),
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ depth,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
- txt);
- tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
+ dn);
*calledp = TRUE;
if (!*optionalp)
{
- tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
- return 0; /* reject */
+ if (!tlsp->peercert)
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */
+ return 0; /* reject */
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
"tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
}
-else if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx) != 0)
+else if (depth != 0)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n",
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx), txt);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, dn);
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
{ /* client, wanting stapling */
cert))
ERR_clear_error();
}
+#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
+ return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
#endif
}
else
{
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
- uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
-#endif
+ const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
- tlsp->peerdn = txt;
- tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
-
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
if ( tlsp == &tls_out
&& ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
/* client, wanting hostname check */
-
-# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010002000L
-# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
-# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
-# endif
{
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
+# endif
+# ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS
+# define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0
+# endif
int sep = 0;
- uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
+ const uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
uschar * name;
int rc;
while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
if ((rc = X509_check_host(cert, name, 0,
- X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS)))
+ X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
+ | X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS,
+ NULL)))
{
if (rc < 0)
{
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: internal error\n");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address);
name = NULL;
}
break;
}
if (!name)
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
- "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
- return 0; /* reject */
- }
- }
-# else
+#else
if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
+#endif
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
- "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
- return 0; /* reject */
+ "[%s] SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
+ dn);
+ *calledp = TRUE;
+ if (!*optionalp)
+ {
+ if (!tlsp->peercert)
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */
+ return 0; /* reject */
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
+ "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
}
-# endif
-#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES*/
+ }
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
+ return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
+#endif
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
- *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
+ *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", dn);
if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
*calledp = TRUE;
}
-return 1; /* accept */
+return 1; /* accept, at least for this level */
}
static int
verify_callback_client_dane(int state, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx)
{
X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
-static uschar txt[256];
+uschar dn[256];
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
+BOOL dummy_called, optional = FALSE;
+#endif
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
+X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", txt);
-tls_out.peerdn = txt;
-tls_out.peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", dn);
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+ if (verify_event(&tls_out, cert, depth, dn,
+ &dummy_called, &optional, US"DANE"))
+ return 0; /* reject, with peercert set */
+#endif
if (state == 1)
tls_out.dane_verified =
/* If dhparam is set, expand it, and load up the parameters for DH encryption.
Arguments:
+ sctx The current SSL CTX (inbound or outbound)
dhparam DH parameter file or fixed parameter identity string
host connected host, if client; NULL if server
*/
static BOOL
-init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, host_item *host)
+init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, const host_item *host)
{
BIO *bio;
DH *dh;
+/*************************************************
+* Initialize for ECDH *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Load parameters for ECDH encryption.
+
+For now, we stick to NIST P-256 because: it's simple and easy to configure;
+it avoids any patent issues that might bite redistributors; despite events in
+the news and concerns over curve choices, we're not cryptographers, we're not
+pretending to be, and this is "good enough" to be better than no support,
+protecting against most adversaries. Given another year or two, there might
+be sufficient clarity about a "right" way forward to let us make an informed
+decision, instead of a knee-jerk reaction.
+
+Longer-term, we should look at supporting both various named curves and
+external files generated with "openssl ecparam", much as we do for init_dh().
+We should also support "none" as a value, to explicitly avoid initialisation.
+
+Patches welcome.
+
+Arguments:
+ sctx The current SSL CTX (inbound or outbound)
+ host connected host, if client; NULL if server
+
+Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked)
+*/
+
+static BOOL
+init_ecdh(SSL_CTX *sctx, host_item *host)
+{
+if (host) /* No ECDH setup for clients, only for servers */
+ return TRUE;
+
+#ifndef SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh
+/* No elliptic curve API in OpenSSL, skip it */
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("No OpenSSL API to define ECDH parameters, skipping\n");
+return TRUE;
+#else
+# ifndef NID_X9_62_prime256v1
+/* For now, stick to NIST P-256 to get "something" running.
+If that's not available, bail */
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("NIST P-256 EC curve not available, skipping ECDH setup\n");
+return TRUE;
+# else
+ {
+ EC_KEY * ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ BOOL rv;
+
+ /* The "tmp" in the name here refers to setting a tempoary key
+ not to the stability of the interface. */
+
+ if ((rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(sctx, ecdh) != 0))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ECDH: enable NIST P-256 curve\n");
+ }
+ else
+ tls_error(US"Error enabling NIST P-256 curve", host, NULL);
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ return rv;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
+
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/*************************************************
* Load OCSP information into state *
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(server_ctx));
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
+
+if ( !init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL)
+ || !init_ecdh(server_sni, NULL)
+ )
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+
if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
OCSP information. */
-rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo);
-if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-
-if (!init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL))
+if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo)) != OK)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, parse error");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, parse error");
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
return 0;
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, error parsing response");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, error parsing response");
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error parsing response\n");
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable");
BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
ERR_print_errors(bp);
i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
long init_options;
int rc;
BOOL okay;
-tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
+tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo;
cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
cbinfo->host = host;
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+cbinfo->event_action = NULL;
+#endif
SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
/* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
level. */
-SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
+DEBUG(D_tls) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
/* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
(void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(*ctxp, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
/* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
-if (!init_dh(*ctxp, dhparam, host)) return DEFER;
+if ( !init_dh(*ctxp, dhparam, host)
+ || !init_ecdh(*ctxp, host)
+ )
+ return DEFER;
/* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */
# endif
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
-#endif
/* Set up the RSA callback */
}
+static void
+peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned bsize)
+{
+/*XXX we might consider a list-of-certs variable for the cert chain.
+SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL*). We'd need a new variable type and support
+in list-handling functions, also consider the difference between the entire
+chain and the elements sent by the peer. */
+
+/* Will have already noted peercert on a verify fail; possibly not the leaf */
+if (!tlsp->peercert)
+ tlsp->peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
+/* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
+if (tlsp->peercert)
+ {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tlsp->peercert), CS peerdn, bsize);
+ peerdn[bsize-1] = '\0';
+ tlsp->peerdn = peerdn; /*XXX a static buffer... */
+ }
+else
+ tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
+}
+
+
if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0')
{
- struct stat statbuf;
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
- return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
-
- if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
+ if (Ustrcmp(expcerts, "system") == 0)
{
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
- "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
- return DEFER;
+ /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
+ CA bundle, only */
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
+ return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
}
else
{
- uschar *file, *dir;
- if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
- { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
- else
- { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
+ struct stat statbuf;
- /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
- unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
- certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
- says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
+ /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
+ CA bundle. Those given by the exim config are additional to these */
- if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
- !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
- return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
+ return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
- if (file != NULL)
+ if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
{
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file));
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ uschar *file, *dir;
+ if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
+ { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
+ else
+ { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
+
+ /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
+ unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
+ certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
+ says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
+
+ if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
+ !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
+ return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
+
+ /* Load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for sending
+ to the client. This is only for the one-file tls_verify_certificates
+ variant.
+ If a list isn't loaded into the server, but
+ some verify locations are set, the server end appears to make
+ a wildcard reqest for client certs.
+ Meanwhile, the client library as deafult behaviour *ignores* the list
+ we send over the wire - see man SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.
+ Because of this, and that the dir variant is likely only used for
+ the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing.
+ */
+ if (file != NULL)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
+ sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
+ }
}
}
int rc;
uschar *expciphers;
tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
+static uschar peerdn[256];
static uschar cipherbuf[256];
/* Check for previous activation */
/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
and initialize things. */
+peer_cert(server_ssl, &tls_in, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
+
construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
static int
tls_client_basic_ctx_init(SSL_CTX * ctx,
- host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
- , tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo
-#endif
+ host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo
)
{
int rc;
set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts is not set. Check only
the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
-if ((!ob->tls_verify_hosts && !ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) ||
- (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts) == OK))
- {
- if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
- ob->tls_crl, host, FALSE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
- return rc;
+if ( ( !ob->tls_verify_hosts
+ && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
+ )
+ || (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+ )
client_verify_optional = FALSE;
+else if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+ client_verify_optional = TRUE;
+else
+ return OK;
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
- if (ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames)
- {
- if (!expand_check(ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames,
- US"tls_verify_cert_hostnames",
- &cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames))
- return FAIL;
- if (cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
- cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
- }
+if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
+ ob->tls_crl, host, client_verify_optional, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
+ return rc;
+
+if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
+ {
+ cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames =
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_INTERNATIONAL
+ string_domain_utf8_to_alabel(host->name, NULL);
+#else
+ host->name;
#endif
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
+ cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
}
-else if (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
+return OK;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+static int
+dane_tlsa_load(SSL * ssl, host_item * host, dns_answer * dnsa)
+{
+dns_record * rr;
+dns_scan dnss;
+const char * hostnames[2] = { CS host->name, NULL };
+int found = 0;
+
+if (DANESSL_init(ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
+ return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL);
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
+ rr;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
+ ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
{
- if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
- ob->tls_crl, host, TRUE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
- return rc;
- client_verify_optional = TRUE;
+ uschar * p = rr->data;
+ uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
+ const char * mdname;
+
+ usage = *p++;
+
+ /* Only DANE-TA(2) and DANE-EE(3) are supported */
+ if (usage != 2 && usage != 3) continue;
+
+ selector = *p++;
+ mtype = *p++;
+
+ switch (mtype)
+ {
+ default: continue; /* Only match-types 0, 1, 2 are supported */
+ case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
+ case 1: mdname = "sha256"; break;
+ case 2: mdname = "sha512"; break;
+ }
+
+ found++;
+ switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(ssl, usage, selector, mdname, p, rr->size - 3))
+ {
+ default:
+ case 0: /* action not taken */
+ return tls_error(US"tlsa load", host, NULL);
+ case 1: break;
+ }
+
+ tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<<usage;
}
-return OK;
+if (found)
+ return OK;
+
+log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: No usable TLSA records");
+return DEFER;
}
+#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
+
+
/*************************************************
* Start a TLS session in a client *
fd the fd of the connection
host connected host (for messages)
addr the first address
- ob smtp transport options
+ tb transport (always smtp)
+ tlsa_dnsa tlsa lookup, if DANE, else null
Returns: OK on success
FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
int
tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
- void *v_ob)
+ transport_instance *tb
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+ , dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa
+#endif
+ )
{
-smtp_transport_options_block * ob = v_ob;
-static uschar txt[256];
+smtp_transport_options_block * ob =
+ (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
+static uschar peerdn[256];
uschar * expciphers;
-X509 * server_cert;
int rc;
static uschar cipherbuf[256];
BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-dns_answer tlsa_dnsa;
-BOOL dane = FALSE;
-BOOL dane_required;
-#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-dane_required = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_dane, NULL,
- host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
+tls_out.tlsa_usage = 0;
+#endif
-if (host->dnssec == DS_YES)
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
{
- if( dane_required
- || verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_try_dane, NULL,
- host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK
- )
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+ if ( tlsa_dnsa
+ && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
+ && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
+ )
{
- /* move this out to host.c given the similarity to dns_lookup() ? */
- uschar buffer[300];
- uschar * fullname = buffer;
-
- /* TLSA lookup string */
- (void)sprintf(CS buffer, "_%d._tcp.%.256s", host->port,
- host->name);
-
- switch (rc = dns_lookup(&tlsa_dnsa, buffer, T_TLSA, &fullname))
- {
- case DNS_AGAIN:
- return DEFER; /* just defer this TLS'd conn */
-
- default:
- case DNS_FAIL:
- if (dane_required)
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup failed");
- return FAIL;
- }
- break;
-
- case DNS_SUCCEED:
- if (!dns_is_secure(&tlsa_dnsa))
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup not DNSSEC");
- return DEFER;
- }
- dane = TRUE;
- break;
- }
+ /* Unchanged from default. Use a safer one under DANE */
+ request_ocsp = TRUE;
+ ob->hosts_request_ocsp = US"${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} "
+ " {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } "
+ " {*}{}}";
}
- }
-else if (dane_required)
- {
- /*XXX a shame we only find this after making tcp & smtp connection */
- /* move the test earlier? */
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: previous lookup not DNSSEC");
- return FAIL;
- }
-
-if (!dane) /*XXX todo: enable ocsp with dane */
-#endif
+# endif
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- {
- require_ocsp = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp,
- NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
- request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE
- : verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp,
- NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
+ if ((require_ocsp =
+ verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
+ request_ocsp = TRUE;
+ else
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+ if (!request_ocsp)
+# endif
+ request_ocsp =
+ verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
}
#endif
if (rc != OK) return rc;
tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-tls_out.dane_verified = FALSE;
-#endif
client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
}
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-if (dane)
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
{
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback_client_dane);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+ verify_callback_client_dane);
if (!DANESSL_library_init())
return tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL);
#endif
- if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
- , client_static_cbinfo
-#endif
- )) != OK)
+ if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob, client_static_cbinfo))
+ != OK)
return rc;
if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
}
}
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
+ if ((rc = dane_tlsa_load(client_ssl, host, tlsa_dnsa)) != OK)
+ return rc;
+#endif
+
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+if (request_ocsp)
+ {
+ const uschar * s;
+ if ( ((s = ob->hosts_require_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
+ || ((s = ob->hosts_request_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
+ )
+ { /* Re-eval now $tls_out_tlsa_usage is populated. If
+ this means we avoid the OCSP request, we wasted the setup
+ cost in tls_init(). */
+ require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ request_ocsp = require_ocsp
+ || verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
if (request_ocsp)
{
SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
}
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-if (dane)
- {
- dns_record * rr;
- dns_scan dnss;
- uschar * hostnames[2] = { host->name, NULL };
-
- if (DANESSL_init(client_ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
- return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL);
-
- for (rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
- rr;
- rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
- ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
- {
- uschar * p = rr->data;
- int usage, selector, mtype;
- const char * mdname;
-
- GETSHORT(usage, p);
- GETSHORT(selector, p);
- GETSHORT(mtype, p);
-
- switch (mtype)
- {
- default: /* log bad */ return FAIL;
- case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
- case 1: mdname = "sha256"; break;
- case 2: mdname = "sha512"; break;
- }
-
- switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(client_ssl,
- (uint8_t) usage, (uint8_t) selector,
- mdname, p, rr->size - (p - rr->data)))
- {
- default:
- case 0: /* action not taken */
- return tls_error(US"tlsa load", host, NULL);
- case 1: break;
- }
- }
- }
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
+client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb->event_action;
#endif
-
/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
alarm(0);
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-if (dane)
- DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl); /*XXX earliest possible callpoint. Too early? */
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
+ DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl);
#endif
if (rc <= 0)
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
-/* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
-/*XXX server_cert is never freed... use X509_free() */
-server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (client_ssl);
-if (server_cert)
- {
- tls_out.peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
- CS txt, sizeof(txt));
- tls_out.peerdn = txt; /*XXX a static buffer... */
- }
-else
- tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
+peer_cert(client_ssl, &tls_out, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff