NOTE: since the EHLO command must be constructed before the connection is
made it cannot depend on the interface IP address that will be used.
+The string "$sending_ip_address" is checked for; if it appears in helo_data
+and "def:sending_ip_address" does not, the facility is disabled.
+
Transport configurations should be checked for this. An example avoidance:
helo_data = ${if def:sending_ip_address \
vulnarability surface. An attacker able to decrypt it would have access
all connections using the resumed session.
The session ticket encryption key is not committed to storage by the server
- and is rotated regularly. Tickets have limited lifetime.
+ and is rotated regularly (OpenSSL: 1hr, and one previous key is used for
+ overlap; GnuTLS 6hr but does not specify any overlap).
+ Tickets have limited lifetime (2hr, and new ones issued after 1hr under
+ OpenSSL. GnuTLS 2hr, appears to not do overlap).
There is a question-mark over the security of the Diffie-Helman parameters
used for session negotiation. TBD. q-value; cf bug 1895
Issues:
In a resumed session:
- $tls_{in,out}_certificate_verified will be set, and verify = certificate
- will be true, when verify failed but tls_try_verify_hosts allowed the
- connection (under OpenSSL)
$tls_{in,out}_cipher will have values different to the original (under GnuTLS)
$tls_{in,out}_ocsp will be "not requested" or "no response", and
- hosts_require_ocsp will fail
+ hosts_require_ocsp will fail
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