; This is a testing zone file for use when testing DNS handling in Exim. This
-; is a fake zone of no real use - hence no SOA record. The zone name is
+; is a fake zone of no real use. The zone name is
; test.ex. This file is passed through the substitution mechanism before being
; used by the fakens auxiliary program. This inserts the actual IP addresses
; of the local host into the zone.
; NOTE (3): the top-level networks for testing addresses are parameterized by
; the use of V4NET and V6NET. These networks should be such that no real
; host ever uses them.
+;
+; Several prefixes may be used, see the source in src/fakens.c for a complete list
+; and description.
test.ex. NS exim.test.ex.
+test.ex. SOA exim.test.ex. hostmaster.exim.test.ex 1430683638 1200 120 604800 3000
test.ex. TXT "A TXT record for test.ex."
s/lash TXT "A TXT record for s/lash.test.ex."
+long TXT "This is a max-length chunk 789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234" "A short chunk" "A final chunk"
+long TXT "Second RR"
cname CNAME test.ex.
UpperCase A 127.0.0.1
-; A host with UTF-8 characters in its name
+; A host with punycoded UTF-8 characters used for its lookup ( mx.π.test.ex )
-mx.π A V4NET.255.255.255
+mx.xn--1xa A V4NET.255.255.255
; A non-standard name for localhost
thishost A 127.0.0.1
+localhost4 A 127.0.0.1
+
+; A localhost with short TTL
+
+TTL=2 shorthost A 127.0.0.1
+
; Something that gives both the IP and the loopback
v6 AAAA V6NET:ffff:836f:0a00:000a:0800:200a:c032
; Alias A and CNAME records for the local host, under the name "eximtesthost"
+; Make the A covered by DNSSEC and add a TLSA for it.
-DNSSEC eximtesthost A HOSTIPV4
+eximtesthost A HOSTIPV4
alias-eximtesthost CNAME eximtesthost.test.ex.
; A bad CNAME
recurse.test.ex A V4NET.99.0.2
+; a CNAME pointing to a name with both ipv4 and ipv6 A-records
+; and one with only ipv4
+
+cname46 CNAME localhost
+cname4 CNAME thishost
+
; -------- Testing RBL records -------
; V4NET.11.12.13 is deliberately not reverse-registered
-13.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2
+TTL=3 13.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2
TXT "This is a test blacklisting message"
-14.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2
+TTL=2 14.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2
TXT "This is a test blacklisting message"
15.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2
TXT "This is a very long blacklisting message, continuing for ages and ages and certainly being longer than 128 characters which was a previous limit on the length that Exim was prepared to handle."
2.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.1
A 127.0.0.2
-; -------- Testing MX records --------
+; Foolish return values outside 127.0/8
-DNSSEC mxplain MX 1 eximtesthost.
+100.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 0.0.0.0
+101.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 126.255.255.255
+102.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 128.0.0.0
+103.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 255.255.255.255
+104.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 255.255.255.255
+ A 127.0.0.0
+105.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 255.255.255.255
+ A 255.255.255.254
+
+; -------- Testing MX records --------
mxcased MX 5 ten-99.TEST.EX.
mxt1c MX 1 dontqualify.
-; MX with UTF-8 characters in its name
+; MX with punycoded UTF-8 characters used for its lookup ( π.test.ex )
+
+xn--1xa MX 0 mx.π.test.ex.
-π MX 0 mx.π.test.ex.
+; MX with actual UTF-8 characters in its name, for allow_utf8_domains mode test
+
+π MX 0 mx.xn--1xa.test.ex.
; -------- Testing SRV records --------
csa1 A V4NET.9.8.7
csa2 A V4NET.9.8.8
+; ------- Testing DNSSEC ----------
+
+mx-unsec-a-unsec MX 5 a-unsec
+mx-unsec-a-sec MX 5 a-sec
+DNSSEC mx-sec-a-unsec MX 5 a-unsec
+DNSSEC mx-sec-a-sec MX 5 a-sec
+DNSSEC mx-sec-a-aa MX 5 a-aa
+AA mx-aa-a-sec MX 5 a-sec
+
+a-unsec A V4NET.0.0.100
+DNSSEC a-sec A V4NET.0.0.100
+DNSSEC l-sec A 127.0.0.1
+
+AA a-aa A V4NET.0.0.100
+
+; ------- Testing DANE ------------
+; Since these refer to certs in the exim-ca tree, they must be regenerated any time that tree is.
+;
+
+; full suite dns chain, sha512
+;
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha512 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+;
+DNSSEC mxnodane MX 1 nodane
+DNSSEC mxdane512ee MX 1 dane512ee
+DNSSEC mxdane512ee1 MX 1 dane512ee
+mxnondane512ee MX 1 dane512ee
+DNSSEC dane512ee A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC nodane A HOSTIPV4
+
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane512ee TLSA 3 1 2 e8173aaefffadc6c96700f7f396a17b8e590ebd15b081f1455abb152afecceb16a5534707ecd64611c8b6d8b9111f82e3fa954b98c6b230cda0e9be386747b71
+
+# mx of mxdane owns a secure A and TLSA record
+# used in 5802
+DNSSEC mxdane MX 1 dane512ee
+
+# mx of mxdanesecchain is a CNAME, with a secure target, that owns a secure A and TLSA record
+DNSSEC mxdanesecchain MX 1 danesecchain
+DNSSEC danesecchain CNAME dane512ee
+
+# mx of mxdaneinsecchain is CNAME, with an insecure target that own a secure A and TLSA record
+# DANE should report a failure if the message is for ...@mxdaneinsecurechain
+DNSSEC mxdaneinsecchain MX 1 daneinsecchain
+daneinsecchain CNAME dane512ee
+
+; A-only, sha256
+;
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+;
+DNSSEC dane256ee A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ee TLSA 3 1 1 e9f6e8fe73b130c720eb1fb5c94eaff522ec6f9759ed4c6815351d827b1226a7
+
+; full MX, sha256, TA-mode
+;
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/CA/CA.pem -fingerprint -sha256 -noout \
+; | awk -F= '{print $2}' | tr -d : | tr '[A-F]' '[a-f]'
+;
+DNSSEC mxdane256ta MX 1 dane256ta
+DNSSEC dane256ta A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ta TLSA 2 0 1 0d643c1ebcdf2cb83634e0c2f5102c1e268983401c9f4d8711d60b44d7fb7a3e
+
+
+; full MX, sha256, TA-mode, cert-key-only
+; Indicates a trust-anchor for a chain involving an Authority Key ID extension
+; linkage, as this excites a bug in OpenSSL 1.0.2 which the DANE code has to
+; work around, while synthesizing a selfsigned parent for it.
+; As it happens it is also an intermediate cert in the CA-rooted chain, as this
+; was initially thought to be a factor.
+;
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/CA/Signer.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+;
+DNSSEC mxdane256tak MX 1 dane256tak
+DNSSEC dane256tak A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256tak TLSA 2 1 1 beabbe636030e4c26d15a015e878c2a607ed5a87774443ffbc6991ec01d2b6b1
+
+
+
+; A multiple-return MX where all TLSA lookups defer
+DNSSEC mxdanelazy MX 1 danelazy
+DNSSEC MX 2 danelazy2
+
+DNSSEC danelazy A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC danelazy2 A 127.0.0.1
+
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danelazy CNAME test.again.dns.
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danelazy2 CNAME test.again.dns.
+
+; hosts with no TLSA (just missing here, hence the TLSA NXDMAIN is _insecure_; a broken dane config)
+; 1 for dane-required, 2 for merely requested
+DNSSEC dane.no.1 A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC dane.no.2 A 127.0.0.1
+
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA lookup fails (as opposed to there not being one)
+DNSSEC danebroken1 A 127.0.0.1
+_1225._tcp.danebroken1 CNAME test.fail.dns.
+
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA record is wrong
+; (127.0.0.1 for merely dane-requested, but having gotten the TLSA it is supposedly definitive)
+DNSSEC danebroken2 A 127.0.0.1
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken2 TLSA 2 0 1 cb0fa60000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA record is correct but not DNSSEC-assured
+; (record copied from dane256ee above)
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+; 3 for dane-requested, 4 for dane-required
+DNSSEC danebroken3 A 127.0.0.1
+_1225._tcp.danebroken3 TLSA 2 0 1 beabbe636030e4c26d15a015e878c2a607ed5a87774443ffbc6991ec01d2b6b1
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+DNSSEC danebroken4 A HOSTIPV4
+_1225._tcp.danebroken4 TLSA 2 0 1 beabbe636030e4c26d15a015e878c2a607ed5a87774443ffbc6991ec01d2b6b1
+
+; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the address record is correct but not DNSSEC-assured
+; (TLSA record copied from dane256ee above)
+; 5 for dane-requested, 6 for dane-required
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+danebroken5 A 127.0.0.1
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken5 TLSA 2 0 1 beabbe636030e4c26d15a015e878c2a607ed5a87774443ffbc6991ec01d2b6b1
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \
+; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \
+; | openssl dgst -sha256 \
+; | awk '{print $2}'
+danebroken6 A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken6 TLSA 2 0 1 beabbe636030e4c26d15a015e878c2a607ed5a87774443ffbc6991ec01d2b6b1
+
+; a good dns config saying there is no dane support, by securely returning NOXDOMAIN for TLSA lookups
+; 3 for dane-required, 4 for merely requested
+; the TLSA data here is dummy; ignored
+DNSSEC dane.no.3 A HOSTIPV4
+DNSSEC dane.no.4 A 127.0.0.1
+
+DNSSEC NXDOMAIN _1225._tcp.dane.no.3 TLSA 2 0 1 eec923139018c540a344c5191660ecba1ac3708525a98bfc338e17f31d3fa741
+DNSSEC NXDOMAIN _1225._tcp.dane.no.4 TLSA 2 0 1 eec923139018c540a344c5191660ecba1ac3708525a98bfc338e17f31d3fa741
+
+; a mixed-usage set of TLSA records, EE one failing. TA one coped from dane256ta.
+;
+; TLSA_AUTOGEN
+; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/CA/CA.pem -fingerprint -sha256 -noout \
+; | awk -F= '{print $2}' | tr -d : | tr '[A-F]' '[a-f]'
+;
+DNSSEC danemixed A 127.0.0.1
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danemixed TLSA 2 0 1 0d643c1ebcdf2cb83634e0c2f5102c1e268983401c9f4d8711d60b44d7fb7a3e
+DNSSEC TLSA 3 1 1 8276000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+
+; have the TLSA lookup, only, return SERVFAIL
+;
+DNSSEC daneservfail A 127.0.0.1
+DNSSEC _1225._tcp.daneservfail CNAME test.again.dns.
+
+; ------- Testing delays ------------
+
+DELAY=500 delay500 A HOSTIPV4
+DELAY=1500 delay1500 A HOSTIPV4
+
+; ------- DKIM ---------
+
+; public key, base64 - matches private key in aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private
+; openssl genrsa -out aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private 1024
+; openssl rsa -in aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private -out /dev/stdout -pubout -outform PEM
+;
+; Deliberate bad version, having extra backslashes
+; sha256-hash-only version.... appears to be too long, gets truncated
+; Bad records, missing a value for the key
+;
+; Another, 512-bit (with a Notes field)
+; 512 requiring sha1 hash
+; 512 requiring sha256 hash
+;
+sel._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
+sel_bad._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1\; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
+sel_sha256._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha256; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
+sel_nullkey._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p="
+sel_snullkey._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p= "
+
+ses._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; n=halfkilo; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ=="
+ses_sha1._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha1; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ=="
+ses_sha256._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha256; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ=="
+
+sel2._domainkey TXT "v=spf1 mx a include:spf.nl2go.com -all"
+sel2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB"
+
+; EC signing, using Ed25519
+; - needs GnuTLS 3.6.0 (fedora rawhide has that)
+; certtool --generate-privkey --key-type=ed25519 --outfile=dkim_ed25519.private
+; certtool --load_privkey=dkim_ed25519.private --pubkey_info --outder | tail -c +13 | base64
+
+sed._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=sPs07Vu29FpHT/80UXUcYHFOHifD4o2ZlP2+XUh9g6E="
+
+; version of the above wrapped in SubjectPublicKeyInfo, in case the WG plumps in that direction
+; certtool --load_privkey=aux-fixed/dkim/dkim_ed25519.private --pubkey_info
+; (and grab the b64 content from between the pem headers)
+
+sedw._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAsPs07Vu29FpHT/80UXUcYHFOHifD4o2ZlP2+XUh9g6E="
+
+
+; ------- DMARC ---------
+
+_dmarc TXT v=DMARC1; p=none
+
; End
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff