GnuTLS: fix $tls_out_ocsp under hosts_request_ocsp

[exim.git] / doc / doc-txt / experimental-spec.txt

diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt
index aa7046e58f9b8bb1398eb1795f7a44d0b62cf134..301152f1a91a77f6d6317f566b944703effa04da 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt
@@ -984,7 +984,10 @@ Security aspects:
  vulnarability surface.  An attacker able to decrypt it would have access
  all connections using the resumed session.
  The session ticket encryption key is not committed to storage by the server
- and is rotated regularly.  Tickets have limited lifetime.
+ and is rotated regularly (OpenSSL: 1hr, and one previous key is used for
+ overlap; GnuTLS 6hr but does not specify any overlap).
+ Tickets have limited lifetime (2hr, and new ones issued after 1hr under
+ OpenSSL.  GnuTLS 2hr, appears to not do overlap).
 
  There is a question-mark over the security of the Diffie-Helman parameters
  used for session negotiation. TBD.  q-value; cf bug 1895
@@ -1000,11 +1003,9 @@ Observability:
 
 Issues:
  In a resumed session:
-  $tls_{in,out}_certificate_verified will be set, and verify = certificate
-    will be true, when verify failed but tls_try_verify_hosts allowed the
-    connection (under OpenSSL)
   $tls_{in,out}_cipher will have values different to the original (under GnuTLS)
-  $tls_{in,out}_ocsp will be "not requested" or "no response"
+  $tls_{in,out}_ocsp will be "not requested" or "no response", and
+   hosts_require_ocsp will fail
 
 
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