/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
-/* Copyright (c) Twitter Inc 2012 */
+/* Copyright (c) Twitter Inc 2012
+ Author: Phil Pennock <pdp@exim.org> */
+/* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */
/* Interface to GNU SASL library for generic authentication. */
#ifndef AUTH_GSASL
/* dummy function to satisfy compilers when we link in an "empty" file. */
-static void dummy(int x) { dummy(x-1); }
+static void dummy2(int x) { dummy2(x-1); }
+static void dummy(int x) { dummy2(x-1); }
#else
#include <gsasl.h>
ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
if ((ablock->server_condition == NULL) &&
- (strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"EXTERNAL") ||
- strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"ANONYMOUS") ||
- strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"PLAIN") ||
- strcmpic(ob->server_mech, US"LOGIN")))
+ (streqic(ob->server_mech, US"EXTERNAL") ||
+ streqic(ob->server_mech, US"ANONYMOUS") ||
+ streqic(ob->server_mech, US"PLAIN") ||
+ streqic(ob->server_mech, US"LOGIN")))
log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
"Need server_condition for %s mechanism",
ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+ /* This does *not* scale to new SASL mechanisms. Need a better way to ask
+ which properties will be needed. */
+ if ((ob->server_realm == NULL) &&
+ streqic(ob->server_mech, US"DIGEST-MD5"))
+ log_write(0, LOG_PANIC_DIE|LOG_CONFIG_FOR, "%s authenticator: "
+ "Need server_realm for %s mechanism",
+ ablock->name, ob->server_mech);
+
/* At present, for mechanisms we don't panic on absence of server_condition;
need to figure out the most generically correct approach to deciding when
it's critical and when it isn't. Eg, for simple validation (PLAIN mechanism,
struct callback_exim_state *cb_state =
(struct callback_exim_state *)gsasl_session_hook_get(sctx);
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("Callback entered, prop=%d (loop prop=%d)\n",
- prop, callback_loop);
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("GNU SASL Callback entered, prop=%d (loop prop=%d)\n",
+ prop, callback_loop);
if (cb_state == NULL) {
HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf(" not from our server/client processing.\n");
switch (rc) {
case GSASL_OK:
- goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+ if (!to_send)
+ goto STOP_INTERACTION;
+ break;
case GSASL_NEEDS_MORE:
break;
goto STOP_INTERACTION;
}
- exim_error =
- auth_get_no64_data((uschar **)&received, (uschar *)to_send);
+ if ((rc == GSASL_NEEDS_MORE) ||
+ (to_send && *to_send))
+ exim_error =
+ auth_get_no64_data((uschar **)&received, (uschar *)to_send);
+
+ if (to_send) {
+ free(to_send);
+ to_send = NULL;
+ }
+
if (exim_error)
break; /* handles * cancelled check */
switch (prop) {
case GSASL_VALIDATE_SIMPLE:
/* GSASL_AUTHID, GSASL_AUTHZID, and GSASL_PASSWORD */
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_PASSWORD);
auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
expand_nmax = 3;
for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)
cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
break;
}
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
/* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
cbrc = GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
break;
}
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN);
/* We always set $auth1, even if only to empty string. */
auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(expand_nstring[1]);
break;
case GSASL_VALIDATE_GSSAPI:
- /* GSASL_AUTHZID and GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME */
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ /* GSASL_AUTHZID and GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME
+ The display-name is authenticated as part of GSS, the authzid is claimed
+ by the SASL integration after authentication; protected against tampering
+ (if the SASL mechanism supports that, which Kerberos does) but is
+ unverified, same as normal for other mechanisms.
+
+ First coding, we had these values swapped, but for consistency and prior
+ to the first release of Exim with this authenticator, they've been
+ switched to match the ordering of GSASL_VALIDATE_SIMPLE. */
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME);
auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_GSSAPI_DISPLAY_NAME);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
expand_nmax = 2;
for (i = 1; i <= 2; ++i)
tmps = CS expand_string(ob->server_scram_salt);
gsasl_property_set(sctx, GSASL_SCRAM_SALT, tmps);
}
- /* Asking for GSASL_AUTHZID will probably call back into us.
+ /* Asking for GSASL_AUTHZID calls back into us if we use
+ gsasl_property_get(), thus the use of gsasl_property_fast().
Do we really want to hardcode limits per mechanism? What happens when
a new mechanism is added to the library. It *shouldn't* result in us
needing to add more glue, since avoiding that is a large part of the
point of SASL. */
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHID);
auth_vars[0] = expand_nstring[1] = propval ? propval : US"";
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_AUTHZID);
auth_vars[1] = expand_nstring[2] = propval ? propval : US"";
- propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_get(sctx, GSASL_REALM);
+ propval = (uschar *) gsasl_property_fast(sctx, GSASL_REALM);
auth_vars[2] = expand_nstring[3] = propval ? propval : US"";
expand_nmax = 3;
for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i)