Copyright updates:

[exim.git] / src / src / tls-gnu.c

diff --git a/src/src/tls-gnu.c b/src/src/tls-gnu.c
index 729fb58799ed66bf8e896bfa89d9f60102458dd4..efa6004a38d1b7af1b45530c1d82cd7abfd0ebee 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/tls-gnu.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-gnu.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 *     Exim - an Internet mail transport agent    *
 *************************************************/
 
-/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2022 */
+/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2023 */
 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
 /* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */
 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ file is never present. If two processes both compute some new parameters, you
 waste a bit of effort, but it doesn't seem worth messing around with locking to
 prevent this.
 
-Returns:     OK/DEFER/FAIL
+Returns:     OK/DEFER (expansion issue)/FAIL (requested none)
 */
 
 static int
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "historic") == 0)
 else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "none") == 0)
   {
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters\n");
-  return OK;
+  return FAIL;
   }
 else if (exp_tls_dhparam[0] != '/')
   {
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ now = 1;
 if (  (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_version(cert, 3))
    || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_serial(cert, &now, sizeof(now)))
    || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_activation_time(cert, now = time(NULL)))
-   || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_expiration_time(cert, (long)2 * 60 * 60))      /* 2 hour */
+   || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_expiration_time(cert, now + (long)2 * 60 * 60))        /* 2 hour */
    || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_key(cert, pkey))
 
    || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert,
@@ -1119,21 +1119,28 @@ switch (tls_id)
     /* The format of "data" here doesn't seem to be documented, but appears
     to be a 2-byte field with a (redundant, given the "size" arg) total length
     then a sequence of one-byte size then string (not nul-term) names.  The
-    latter is as described in OpenSSL documentation. */
+    latter is as described in OpenSSL documentation.
+    Note that we do not get called for a match_fail, making it hard to log
+    a single bad ALPN being offered (the common case). */
+    {
+    gstring * g = NULL;
 
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Seen ALPN extension from client (s=%u):", size);
     for (const uschar * s = data+2; s-data < size-1; s += *s + 1)
       {
       server_seen_alpn++;
+      g = string_append_listele_n(g, ':', s+1, *s);
       DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" '%.*s'", (int)*s, s+1);
       }
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("\n");
     if (server_seen_alpn > 1)
       {
+      log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS ALPN (%Y) rejected", g);
       DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: too many ALPNs presented in handshake\n");
       return GNUTLS_E_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
       }
     break;
+    }
 #endif
   }
 return 0;
@@ -1995,10 +2002,10 @@ Returns:          OK/DEFER/FAIL
 */
 
 static int
-tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr)
+tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr)
 {
-int rc;
-const host_item *host = state->host;  /* macro should be reconsidered? */
+int rc = OK;
+const host_item * host = state->host;  /* macro should be reconsidered? */
 
 /* Create D-H parameters, or read them from the cache file. This function does
 its own SMTP error messaging. This only happens for the server, TLS D-H ignores
@@ -2007,11 +2014,13 @@ client-side params. */
 if (!state->host)
   {
   if (!dh_server_params)
-    if ((rc = init_server_dh(errstr)) != OK) return rc;
+    if ((rc = init_server_dh(errstr)) == DEFER) return rc;
 
   /* Unnecessary & discouraged with 3.6.0 or later, according to docs.  But without it,
   no DHE- ciphers are advertised. */
-  gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->lib_state.x509_cred, dh_server_params);
+
+  if (rc == OK)
+    gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->lib_state.x509_cred, dh_server_params);
   }
 
 /* Link the credentials to the session. */
@@ -2295,7 +2304,7 @@ old_pool = store_pool;
 
     for (s++; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, s, 1);
 
-    tlsp->ver = string_copyn(g->s, g->ptr);
+    tlsp->ver = string_copy_from_gstring(g);
     for (uschar * p = US tlsp->ver; *p; p++)
       if (*p == '-') { *p = '\0'; break; }     /* TLS1.0-PKIX -> TLS1.0 */
 
@@ -2613,7 +2622,7 @@ else
      )
     {
     DEBUG(D_tls)
-      debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n");
+      debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch (per GnuTLS)\n");
     if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED)
       goto badcert;
     return TRUE;